Inclusive Wealth Report 2018 by Managi, Shunsuke & Kumar, Pushpam
 Inclusive Wealth Report 2018 
 The Inclusive Wealth Index provides important insights into long-term economic 
growth and human well-being. The Index measures the wealth of nations through 
a comprehensive analysis of a country’s productive base and the country’s wealth 
in terms of progress, well-being and long-term sustainability. It measures all assets 
which human well-being is based upon, in particular, produced, human and natural 
capital to create and maintain human well-being over time. 
 Shunsuke Managi is Distinguished Professor at Urban Institute & the Faculty of 
Engineering, Kyushu University.
Pushpam Kumar is Chief of Ecosystem Services Economics Unit, Division of 






Edited by Shunsuke Managi 
and Pushpam Kumar
First published 2018 
by Routledge 
2 Park Square, Milton Park, Abingdon, Oxon OX14 4RN
and by Routledge 
711 Third Avenue, New York, NY 10017
Routledge is an imprint of the Taylor & Francis Group, an informa business
© 2018 selection and editorial matter, Shunsuke Managi and 
Pushpam Kumar; individual chapters, the contributors
The right of Shunsuke Managi and Pushpam Kumar to be 
identified as the authors of the editorial material, and of the 
authors for their individual chapters, has been asserted in 
accordance with sections 77 and 78 of the Copyright, Designs 
and Patents Act 1988.
The Open Access version of this book, available at  
www.taylorfrancis.com, has been made available under a 
Creative Commons Attribution-Non Commercial-No 
Derivatives 4.0 license.
Trademark notice: Product or corporate names may be trademarks 
or registered trademarks, and are used only for identification and 
explanation without intent to infringe.
British Library Cataloguing-in-Publication Data 
A catalog record for this book is available from the British Library
Library of Congress Cataloging-in-Publication Data 
A catalogue record for this book has been requested
ISBN: 978-1-138-54127-6 (hbk) 
ISBN: 978-1-351-00208-0 (ebk)
Typeset in Galliard 
by Apex CoVantage, LLC
List of figures vii
List of tables xi






What does the data say? 1
1 Accounting for the inclusive wealth of nations:  
key findings of the IWR 2018 3
SHUNSUKE MANAGI
2 Inclusive wealth: from theory to practice 53
PUSHPAM KUMAR AND RODNEY B W SMITH
PART II 
Natural capital 75
3 More on natural wealth of nations and regions 77
SHUNSUKE MANAGI
4 Reconciling inclusive wealth and Piketty: natural capital  




5 Challenges to ecosystem service valuation for wealth  
accounting 136
KRISTINE GRIMSRUD, HENRIK LINDHJEM, DAVID N. BARTON,  
AND STÅLE NAVRUD
6 Is Economic growth linked with comprehensive wealth?  




7 Human capital: educational attainment progress 179
BARBARA M. FRAUMENI, AND GANG LIU
8 Operationalizing IWI for policymaking through a  
learning game 194
BHARATH M. PALAVALLI, SRIJAN SIL,  
AND ANANTHA KUMAR DURAIAPPAH
9 The IWR and policy lessons 211
SHUNSUKE MANAGI
Annex 227
Annex 1: key statistics 229
Annex 2: methodological annex 235
Annex 3: data 249
Index 447
Figures
1.1 A three capital model of wealth creation 5
1.2 Schematic representation of the Inclusive Wealth Index  
and the Adjusted Inclusive Wealth Index 9
1.3 Annual average growth rate in IWI and IWI per capita before  
adjustments for 140 countries, annual average for 1990–2014 10
1.4 Annual average growth rate in IWI and IWI per capita after  
adjustments for 140 countries assessed in the IWR 2017  
during the period of 1990 and 2014 11
1.5 Annual average growth rate in IW and IW per capita 12
1.6 IW growth rates disaggregated by capital form, annual average  
for 1990–2014 14
1.7 Changes in worldwide inclusive wealth per capita and other  
indicators for 1992–2014 15
1.8 Percentages of human, produced and natural capital in  
total wealth, annual average for 1990–2014 16
1.9 Developments in the composition of wealth by capital from  
1990–2014 17
1.10 Percentage share of capital in total wealth, average 1990–2014 19
1.11 Average annual growth rates of IWI disaggregated by  
the three adjustments 22
1.12 Annual average growth of the adjustment factors in 1990–2014 22
1.13 Average annual growth rates of IW per capita, GDP per capita  
and HDI, period 1990–2014 24
1.14 HDI vs. IW per capita 25
1.15 GDP per capita vs. IW per capita 26
1.16 GDP per capita vs. HDI 27
1.17 Happiness vs. IW per capita 27
1.18 Growth in Inclusive Wealth Index, using the education approach 29
1.19 Comparison of numbers of countries of positive IW growth,  
education approach 30
1.20 Inclusive wealth and inclusive wealth per capita  
(education approach) 31
1.21 Breakdown of growth rates of inclusive wealth into three  
capital assets before adjustments (education approach) 32
viii Figures
1.22 Growth rates of inclusive wealth per capita and its components,  
relative to the level of 1992 worldwide (education approach) 33
1.23 Percentages of produced, human and natural capital in  
total wealth, average for 1990–2014, education approach 34
1.24 Global aggregate wealth composition, education approach 35
1.25 Breakdown of growth rates of inclusive wealth adjusted into  
three adjustment assets (education approach) 38
1.26 Crude oil price movements since 1976, USD, with no inflation  
adjustments 39
1.27 Growth rates in IW per capita (education approach) vs.  
GDP per capita 41
1.28 Natural capital share in 2014 (education approach) vs. 25-year  
average GDP per capita variation (standard deviation) 42
1.29 Growth rates in IW per capita (education approach) vs. HDI 43
1.30 Growth rates in IW per capita (education approach) vs. happiness 44
1.31 Growth rates in IW per capita (education approach) vs.  
genuine savings as a share of GNI 46
2.1 Global trend in human (HC), natural (NC) and physical (PC)  
capital shares 63
2.2 Institutional framework for IWI and Sustainable Development  
Goals (SDGs) 65
3.1 Average share of resources, renewables and non-renewables in  
natural capital from 1990–2014 78
3.2 Measuring the per capita changes in natural capital and IW:  
average annual growth rate from 1990 to 2014 80
3.3 Annual average growth rate of natural capital per capita  
disaggregated by agricultural land, forest, fisheries and  
fossil fuels 81
3.4 Average annual growth rate of renewables per capita from  
1990–2014 81
3.5 Average annual growth rate of cropland per capita from 1990  
to 2014 82
3.6 Average annual growth rate of pastureland per capita from 1990  
to 2014 82
3.7 Average annual growth rate of forests per capita from  
1990 to 2014 83
3.8 Average annual growth rate of fisheries per capita from  
1990 to 2014 84
3.9 Average annual growth rate of non-renewables per capita  
from 1990–2014 85
3.10 Average annual growth rate of oil per capita from 1990 to 2014 85
3.11 Average annual growth rate of natural gas per capita from 1990  
to 2014 85
3.12 Average annual growth rate of coal per capita from 1990 to 2014 86
3.13 Average annual growth rate of minerals per capita from  
1990–2014 87
3.14 Percentage change in natural capital in Asia and the Pacific  
countries from 1992 to 2014 88
Figures ix
3.15 Percentage change in natural capital in Africa countries from  
1992 to 2014 89
3.16 Percentage change in natural capital in Pan-European countries  
from 1992 to 2014 91
3.17 Percentage change in natural capital in Latin America and  
the Caribbean countries from 1992 to 2014 93
3.18 Percentage change in natural capital in West Asian countries  
from 1992 to 2014 95
3.19 Percentage change in natural capital in North America countries  
from 1992 to 2014 96
3.20 Top 10 countries in fishery capture production 105
3.21 The value of fishery stocks of selected nations, 1990 and 2014 106
3.22 Average annual growth rate of fishery from 1990 to 2014 107
4.1 Net national income (NNI) adjusted for natural capital  
depreciation 117
4.2 Net national savings (NNS) adjusted for natural capital  
depreciation 118
4.3 Wealth-income ratios in rich countries, 1970–2010 119
4.4 Financial asset-income ratios in rich countries, 1960–2010 119
4.5 Adjusted net savings and natural capital depreciation in OECD  
high-income countries, 1970–2014 123
4.6 Wealth-income accumulation relative to growth in OECD  
high-income countries, 1970–2014 125
4.7 Adjusted net saving and natural capital depreciation in  
developing countries, 1970–2014 126
4.8 Wealth-income accumulation relative to growth in developing  
countries, 1970–2014 127
4.9 Adjusted net saving and natural capital depreciation in  
low-income countries, 1970–2014 128
4.10 Wealth-income accumulation relative to growth in low-income  
countries, 1975–2014 129
5.1 Ecosystem accounting framework for SEEA EEA 140
5.2 Broad steps in ecosystem accounting 142
5.3 Resource rent in the Norwegian fishery 1984–2016 146
5.4 Conceptual framework for municipal experimental ecosystem  
accounting 154
6.1 States share of GDP and population in 2011 164
6.2 Cumulative growth in per capita income during 1993–2012 165
6.3 Decadal change in per capita income, output per worker,  
work participation rates and gross capital formation 166
6.4 Decadal cumulative growth in GDP (2001–2011) vs. HDI 2011 167
6.5 Share of forest, subsoil assets and human capital in Indian states 171
7.1 Predicted educational attainment in 2030 in different scenarios,  
by region, gender 184
7.2 PISA aggregate test scores and average years of schooling  
(aged 15–19) in 2010 188
7.3 Average years of primary, secondary and tertiary schooling  
by regions, aged 15 and above, 1950, 2000, 2010 189
x Figures
8.1 Kolb’s Experiential Learning Cycle 199
8.2 Conceptual model of the game 201
9.1 Average years of schooling from 1990 to 2014 212
9.2 Percentage of vocational students in total secondary school  
enrolment 213
9.3 Percentage of children (aged 7–14) employed in labour 214
9.4 Growth of PM2.5 damages from 1990–2014 (percentage) 215
9.5 Average PM2.5 damages from 1990–2014 (million USD 2005) 215
9.6 Growth of the PM2.5 damages per capita from 1990–2014  
(percentage) 216
9.7 Average PM2.5 damages per capita from 1990–2014 (USD 2005) 216
9.8 Time-series data of global marine fisheries catch, population  
and world GDP per capita 217
9.9 Comparison of fish stock capital for selected countries 218
Tables
2.1 Productive base – capital quantities, unit flow and stock values,  
GDP and Inclusive Wealth 56
2.2 Countries with negative (average) per capita growth rates*  
in inclusive wealth: 1990–2015 59
2.3 Malawi inclusive wealth growth accounting 61
2.4 China inclusive wealth growth accounting 62
2.5 Selected policy applications of forest accounts 69
2.6 Countries with negative (average) per capita growth rates*  
in inclusive wealth: 1990–2015 73
3.1 Measuring the changes of natural capital in Asia and the Pacific  
countries: average annual growth rates from 1990–2014 87
3.2 Measuring the changes of natural capital in Africa countries:  
average annual growth rates from 1990–2014 89
3.3 Measuring the changes of natural capital in Pan-European  
countries: average annual growth rates from 1990–2014 91
3.4 Measuring the changes of natural capital in Latin America and  
the Caribbean countries: average annual growth rates from  
1990–2014 93
3.5 Measuring the changes of natural capital in West Asia: average  
annual growth rates from 1990–2014 95
3.6 Measuring the changes of natural capital in North America:  
average annual growth rates from 1990–2014 96
3.7 Renewable energy capital of selected countries, and its ratio  
compared to other capitals 101
3.8 Growth rate of natural capital and renewable resources from  
1990–2014 110
4.1 Increase in wealth of the world’s rich, 1987–2013 120
4.2 Trends in wealth inequality across countries, 2000–2014 121
6.1 Ranking of states based on HDI, per capita GSDP and  
investments in comprehensive wealth 173
7.1 Educational attainment, aged 15 and above, by region and gende 183
7.2 The gender educational attainment gap*, aged 15 and above,  
by region 185
xii Tables
  7.3 Country distribution by educational attainment differences of  
younger (25–34) vs. older (55–64) in 2010 186
  8.1 Directionality of change between IWI and GDP 202
  8.2 Significance of change in IWI and GDP 202
  8.3 Combinations of change in IWI and GDP, where P = CAGR of  
per capita IWI and Q = CAGR of per capita GDP 202
  8.4 Shortlisted countries 202
  8.5 Relationship between variables in IWI and SDGs 207
  8.6 Mapping between objectives of the game and the various  
game elements 208
  8.7 Mapping between objectives in the game and the game elements 209
  9.1 Inclusive wealth in India, 1990–2014 222
 A1.1 Key statistics of Inclusive Wealth Report 2018 229
 A2.1 Data sources and assumptions for the calculation of  
produced capital 236
 A2.2 Data sources and assumptions for the calculation of  
human capital 237
 A2.3 Data sources and assumptions for the calculation of fossil fuels 239
 A2.4 Data sources and assumptions for the calculation of metal  
and mineral resources 240
 A2.5 Data sources and assumptions for the calculation of  
agricultural land 241
 A2.6 Data sources and assumptions for the calculation of forest 242
 A2.7 Accounting of non-timber forest benefits 242
 A3.1 Wealth (Inclusive wealth in billions of constant 2005 US$) 249
 A3.2 IW per capita (Inclusive wealth per capita in thousands of  
constant 2005 US$) 252
 A3.3 IW Growth (unadjusted) (Inclusive wealth change (%) with  
respect to base year 1990) 256
 A3.4 IW per capita growth (unadjusted) (Inclusive wealth per capita  
change (%) with respect to base year 1990)  259
 A3.5 Human capital (Human capital in billions of constant  
2005 US$) 262
 A3.6 Human capital per capita (Human capital per capita in  
thousands of constant 2005 US$) 266
 A3.7 Human capital growth (Human capital change (%) with respect  
to base year 1990) 269
 A3.8 Human capital per capita growth (Human capital per capita  
change (%) with respect to base year 1990) 273
 A3.9 Produced capital (Produced capital in billions of constant  
2005 US$) 276
A3.10 Produced capital per capita (Produced capital per capita in  
thousands of constant 2005 US$) 280
A3.11 Produced capital growth (Produced capital change (%) with  
respect to base year 1990) 283
A3.12 Produced capital per capita growth (Produced capital per capita  
change (%) with respect to base year 1990) 286
Tables xiii
A3.13 Natural capital (Natural capital in billions of constant  
2005 US$) 290
A3.14 Natural capital per capita (Natural capital per capita in  
thousands of constant 2005 US$) 293
A3.15 Natural capital growth (Natural capital change (%) with respect  
to base year 1990) 297
A3.16 Natural capital per capita growth (Natural capital per capita  
change (%) with respect to base year 1990) 300
A3.17 Renewable resources (Renewable resources in billions of  
constant 2005 US$) 304
A3.18 Renewable resources per capita (Renewable resources per capita  
in thousands of constant 2005 US$) 307
A3.19 Renewable resources growth (Renewable resources change (%)  
with respect to base year 1990) 311
A3.20 Renewable resources per capita growth (Renewable resources  
per capita change (%) with respect to base year 1990) 314
A3.21 Non-renewable resources (Non-renewable resources in billions  
of constant 2005 US$) 318
A3.22 Non-renewable resources per capita (Non-renewable resources  
per capita in thousands of constant 2005 US$) 321
A3.23 Non-renewable resources growth (Non-renewable resources  
change (%) with respect to base year 1990) 325
A3.24 Non-renewable resources per capita growth (Non-renewable  
resources per capita change (%) with respect to base year 1990) 328
A3.25 Agriculture land (Agriculture land in billions of constant  
2005 US$) 332
A3.26 Agriculture land per capita (Agriculture land per capita in  
thousands of constant 2005 US$) 335
A3.27 Agriculture land growth (Agriculture land change (%) with  
respect to base year 1990) 338
A3.28 Agriculture land per capita growth (Agriculture land per capita  
change (%) with respect to base year 1990) 341
A3.29 Forest resources (Forest resources in billions of constant  
2005 US$) 345
A3.30 Forest resources per capita (Forest resources per capita in  
thousands of constant 2005 US$) 348
A3.31 Forest growth (Forest change (%) with respect to base  
year 1990) 351
A3.32 Forest per capita growth (Forest per capita change (%) with  
respect to base year 1990) 354
A3.33 Fishery (Fishery in billions of constant 2005 US$) 358
A3.34 Fishery per capita (Fishery per capita in thousands of constant  
2005 US$) 361
A3.35 Fishery growth (Fishery change (%) with respect to base  
year 1990) 364
A3.36 Fishery per capita growth (Fishery per capita change (%) with  
respect to base year 1990) 367
xiv Tables
A3.37 Fossil fuels (Fossil fuels in billions of constant 2005 US$) 371
A3.38 Fossil fuel per capita (Fossil fuel per capita in thousands of  
constant 2005 US$) 374
A3.39 Fossil fuel growth (Fossil fuel change (%) with respect to base  
year 1990) 377
A3.40 Fossil fuel per capita growth (Fossil fuel per capita change (%)  
with respect to base year 1990) 380
A3.41 Minerals (Minerals in billions of constant 2005 US$) 384
A3.42 Minerals per capita (Minerals per capita in thousands of  
constant 2005 US$) 387
A3.43 Minerals growth (Minerals change (%) with respect to base  
year 1990) 390
A3.44 Minerals per capita growth (Minerals per capita change (%)  
with respect to base year 1990) 393
A3.45 IWI adjusted (Average growth rate in percentage from  
1990–1995) 397
A3.46 IWI adjusted (Average growth rate in percentage from  
1995–2000) 403
A3.47 IWI adjusted (Average growth rate in percentage from  
2000–2005) 409
A3.48 IWI adjusted (Average growth rate in percentage from  
2005–2010) 415
A3.49 IWI adjusted (Average growth rate in percentage from  
2010–2014) 421
A3.50 GDP (GDP billion of constant 2005 US$) 427
A3.51 GDP per capita (GDP per capita in thousands of constant  
2005 US$) 430
A3.52 GDP growth (GDP change (%) with respect to base year 1990) 434
A3.53 GDP per capita growth (GDP per capita change (%) with  
respect to base year 1990) 437
A3.54 Country classification by region 440
A3.55 Country classification by income 442
 Director 
 Shunsuke Managi is Distinguished Professor at Urban Institute & the Faculty of 
Engineering, Kyushu University. 
 Science advisory group 
 Partha Dasgupta is Frank Ramsey Professor Emeritus of Economics at the University 
of Cambridge, United Kingdom. 
 Anantha Duraiappah is Director of UNESCO MGIEP. 
 Barbara M. Fraumeni is Special-term Professor at Central University for Finance 
and Economics and Hunan University, China and Research Associate of the 
National Bureau of Economic Research, USA. 
 Harold Mooney is Paul S. and Billie Achilles Professor of Environmental Biology, 
Emeritus at the Stanford University, United States. 
 Hamid Zakri is Science Advisor to the Prime Minister of Malaysia, Malaysia. 
 Policy advisory board 
 Stig Johansson is Senior Forestry Specialist, Sustainable Development Network at 
the World Bank. 
 Pushpam Kumar is Chief Environmental Economist, UN Environment. 
 Arico Salvatore is Senior Programme Specialist for Biodiversity Assessments and 
Inter-Agency Coordination at UNESCO. 
 Agnès Soucat is Director of Health Systems Governance and Financing, World 
Health Organization. 
 Kazuhiko Takeuchi is Senior Visiting Professor, United Nations University Institute 
for the Advanced Study of Sustainability (UNU-IAS). 
 Authors 




 David N. Barton is Senior Research Scientist at Norwegian Institute for Nature 
Research (NINA), Norway. 
 Anantha Kumar Duraiappah is Director of UNESCO MGIEP, India. 
 Barbara M. Fraumeni is Research Associate at National Bureau of Economic Research, 
USA and Professor at Central University for Finance and Economics, China. 
 Kristine Grimsrud is Senior Researcher at Statistics Norway, Norway. 
 Haripriya Gundimeda is Professor at the Department of Humanities and Social 
Sciences, Indian Institute of Technology Bombay, India. 
 Pushpam Kumar is Chief Environmental Economist, UN Environment. 
 Henrik Lindhjem is Head of Research at Menon Centre for Environmental and 
Resource Economics (MERE), Norway and Adjunct Researcher at Norwegian 
Institute for Nature Research (NINA), Norway. 
 Gang Liu is Research Fellow at Statistics Norway, Norway. 
 Shunsuke Managi is Distinguished Professor at Urban Institute & the Faculty of 
Engineering, Kyushu University. 
 Ståle Navrud is at the School of Economics and Business, Norwegian University of 
Life Sciences, Norway. 
 Bharath M. Palavalli is Researcher at Fields of View Bangalore, India. 
 Srijan Sil is Researcher at Fields of View Bangalore, India. 
 Rodney B W Smith is Professor at the Department of Applied Economics, University 
of Minnesota, USA. 
 Review board 
 Eli Fenichel is Assistant Professor at the Department of Bio-Economics and Eco-
system Management, Yale School of Forestry & Environmental Studies, USA. 
 George Halkos is Professor at the Department of Economics, University of Thessaly, 
Greece. 
 Dale W. Jorgenson is Professor at the Department of Economics, Harvard Uni-
versity, USA. 
 Ramanan Laxminarayan is Director at the Centre for Disease Dynamics, Economics & 
Policy, USA. 
 Nandan Nawn is Associate Professor at the Department of Policy Studies, TERI 
University, India. 
 Mary O’Mahony is Professor at the Department of Management, King’s College 
London, UK. 
 Roy P. Remme is Researcher at Wageningen University, the Netherlands. 
 Noelle Eckley Selin is Associate Professor at the Department of Earth, Atmospheric and 
Planetary Sciences, Massachusetts Institute of Technology, USA. 
 Mesfi n Tilahun is Assistant Professor at the Department of Economics, Mekelle 
University, Ethiopia. 
 The Inclusive Wealth Report (IWR) is the outcome of a cooperative effort. Many 
individuals and organizations participated in various capacities. The IWR would not 
have been possible without the numerous contributions from authors, reviewers, 
the Urban Institute, funding agencies and many others who at one point or another 
contributed to the initiative. We would like to express our deep gratitude to all of 
them. We acknowledge and thank them for their dedication, compromise and long 
hours. 
 Science advisory board 
 We would like to begin by extending special thanks to the Chair of the Science 
Advisory Group, Prof. Sir Partha Dasgupta. Our gratitude also goes to Prof. Barbara 
M. Fraumeni, Dr. Zakri Abdul Hamid, Prof. Dr. Anantha Duraiappah and Prof. 
Emeritus Dr. Harold Mooney. We are very grateful for their advice, guidance and 
support. 
 Authors 
 We would like to gratefully acknowledge the authors of this report for taking the 
time to bring the report to fruition: Shunsuke Managi, Pushpam Kumar, Rodney 
B W Smith, Barbara M. Fraumeni, Gang Liu, Ed Barbier, Kristine Grimsrud, Henrik 
Lindhjem, David N. Barton, Ståle Navrud, Haripriya Gundimeda, Bharath M. 
Palavalli, Srijan Sil and Anantha Kumar Duraiappah. 
 Reviewers 
 The IWR benefi tted greatly from the comments and suggestions provided by our 
reviewers. We extend our acknowledgements to Dale W. Jorgenson, Eli Fenichel, 
Noelle Eckley Selin, George Halkos, Ramanan Laxminarayan, Mary O’Mahony, 
Nandan Nawn, Roy P. Remme and Mesfi n Tilahun. 
 IWR team 
 The IWR has involved many people who devoted much time and energy. Shunsuke 
Managi, Executive Director of Urban Institute, Kyushu University, who updated 
 Acknowledgements 
xviii Acknowledgements
IWR 2018 and led as the IWR Director. Pushpam Kumar of UNEP, who coordi-
nated and oversaw scientifi c inputs to the report, is the IWR’s Science Director. 
Moinul Islam and Rintaro Yamaguchi provided analytical and quantitative 
support. 
 Funding bodies 
 The IWR benefi tted from a grant by the United Nations Environment Programme 
(UNEP). We acknowledge the fi nancial support from the Grant in Aid from the 
Ministry of Education, Culture, Sports, Science and Technology in Japan (MEXT): 
Grant in Aid for Specially Promoted Research 26000001. The Urban Institute, 
Kyushu University also played key roles as funding bodies. We are extremely thankful 
for their essential contribution to the initiative. 
 Publisher 
 Finally, we would like to thank our publisher, Routledge, for the time and fl exibility 
given to us throughout the production and printing of the report. 
CO2 carbon dioxide
EDF expected damage function
EIA Energy Information Administration
EPA United States Environmental Protection Agency
ESVD Ecosystem Service Valuation Database
ESW ecosystem service wealth
EU European Union
FAO Food and Agricultural Organization of the United Nations
GDP gross domestic product
GHG greenhouse gas
GIS geographical information systems
GTAP Global Trade Analysis Project
HC human capital
HDI Human Development Index
IEA International Energy Agency
IW inclusive wealth
IWI Inclusive Wealth Index
IWIadj Adjusted Inclusive Wealth Index
IWR Inclusive Wealth Report
MA Millennium Ecosystem Assessment
NAFSA Association of International Educators
NC natural capital
NCC Natural Capital Committee
NDP net domestic product
NIA national income account
NPV net present value
NRC National Research Council
NTFB non-timber forest benefits
NTFP non-timber forest products
OECD Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
ONS Office of National Statistics
PC produced capital
PCE personal consumption expenditure
Abbreviations
xx Abbreviations
PIM perpetual inventory method
PLA physical amount of pastureland area available
PPI per capita income, adjusted by a private consumption
PPP purchasing power parity
REDD Reducing Emissions for Deforestation and Degradation
RICE Regional Integrated Climate-Economy
RPA rental price per hectare
SEEA System of Environmental and Economic Accounts
SEPA State Environmental Protection Administration
SNA System of National Accounts
TEEB The Economics of Ecosystems and Biodiversity
TFP total factor productivity
UN United Nations
UN-DESA United Nations Department of Economic and Social Affairs
UNDP United Nations Development Programme
UNECE United Nations Economic Commission for Europe
UNECE CES United Nations Economic Commission for Europe-Conference of 
European Statisticians
UNEP United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization
UN-OWG United Nations – Open Working Group
USSR Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
VARG The Value at Risk or Gain
VSL value of a statistical life
VSLY value of a statistical life year
WAVES Wealth Accounting and the Valuation of Ecosystem Services
WCL wealth in cropland
WDR World Development Report
WHA wealth per hectare
WPL wealth in pastureland
WTO World Trade Organization
WTP willingness to pay
The global growth experience since the end of the Second World War has offered 
two conflicting messages. On the one hand, if we look at the state of the biosphere 
(fresh water, ocean fisheries, the atmosphere as a carbon sink – more generally, 
ecosystems), there is strong evidence that the rates at which we are utilizing them 
are unsustainable. For example, the rate of biological extinctions globally today is 
100–1,000 times the average rate over the past several million years (the “background 
rate”). The mid-20th century years are acknowledged to have been the beginnings 
of an era that environmental scientists now call the Anthropocene (Vosen, 2016), 
massively altering the processes that define the biosphere.1
On the other hand, it is argued by many that just as previous generations in the 
West invested in science and technology, education, and machines and equipment 
so as to bequeath to us the ability to achieve high living standards, we in turn can 
make investments that would assure still higher living standards in the future. The 
years immediately following the Second World War are routinely praised by com-
mentators for being the start of the Golden Age of Capitalism.2
We should not be surprised that the Anthropocene and the Golden Age of 
Capitalism began at about the same time. We should also not be surprised that the 
conflicting signals of the past 65 years do not receive much airing by economic 
commentators. That’s because contemporary models of economic growth and 
development in large measure ignore the workings of the biosphere (Helpman, 
2004).
Recently a group of economists have studied the tension inherent in the conflict-
ing intuitions by appealing to the idea of “sustainable development,” a term coined 
in the famous Brundtland Report (World Commission on Environment and Devel-
opment, 1987). By sustainable development the Commission meant “development 
that meets the needs of the present without compromising the ability of future 
generations to meet their own needs.” In this reading sustainable development 
requires that, relative to their respective demographic bases each generation should 
bequeath to its successor at least as large a productive base as it had inherited from 
its predecessor. For if a generation were to follow the prescription, the economic 
possibilities facing its successor would be no worse than those it faced when inherit-
ing productive assets from its predecessor.
The problem is that the rule leaves open the question of how the productive base 
is to be measured. We are thus in need of an index whose movements over time 
track the sustainability of development programmes. The authors of IWR 2018 show 
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that prominent attempts at constructing ways to assess the sustainability of develop-
ment programmes have been unsatisfactory because they didn’t arrive at their favoured 
indices from a well-articulated notion of sustainable development (Chapter 1).3
In recent years a number of authors have shown that if by sustainable develop-
ment we are to mean that welfare across the generations should not decline over 
time, the index that measures an economy’s productive base is an inclusive measure 
of wealth.4
The authors of IWR 2018 follow that line of thought and extend the empirical 
reach of IWR 2012 and IWR 2014. They develop the idea of inclusive wealth and 
uncover the logic underlying its use in sustainability analysis and then put it to work 
in tracking the inclusive wealth of nations.
Inclusive wealth is the dynamic version of income. It is the accounting value of 
an economy’s stock of manufactured capital, human capital and natural capital (hence 
the qualifier “inclusive”). Wealth is a stock, whereas income is a flow. In a stationary 
economy the two amount to the same thing, but they can point in different direc-
tions when an economy is not at a stationary state. The authors of IWR 2018 find 
that 44 out of the 140 countries in their sample experienced a decline in (inclusive) 
wealth per capita since 1998, even though GDP (read, “income”) per capita increased 
in all but a handful of them. The tension I alluded to is expressed quantitatively in 
the present volume.
In this essay I offer an account of the logic and pertinence of inclusive wealth in 
both sustainability and policy analysis that parallels the authors’ reasoning in this 
volume. My hope is that the two parallel accounts will give a better flavour of the 
significance of the exercise undertaken in IWR 2018.
Framework for economic evaluation
Assessing the sustainability of economic programmes is different from prescribing 
policy. Although both evaluate change, they differ as to the type of change. In the 
former, change corresponds to the passage of time; in the latter, change is initiated 
at a point in time by choice of policy. In either case the change is a “perturbation” 
to the economy, so we will often use that term.
Sustainability analysis and policy analysis involve exercises in what is commonly known 
as economic evaluation. I shall refer to the person engaged in economic evaluation as 
the social evaluator (or evaluator, for short). She could be a citizen (thinking about 
things before casting her vote on political candidates); he could be an ethicist employed 
to offer guidance to the national government; she could be a member of the local 
council; he could be the proverbial man on the Clapham Omnibus, reflecting on the 
state of the world on his way back from work; and so on.
The criterion proposed in the Brundtland Report for sustainability analysis differs 
from the one that has usually been adopted for policy analysis. The former takes 
the means for promoting the ends of development as its point of interest (for the 
Brundtland Report those means are the economy’s productive capacity), whereas 
the latter is based directly on ends (promoting human well-being).5 In order to 
bring the two types of analysis in line with each other, we need to reconstruct the 
idea of sustainable development in terms of ends. When we have done that, we will 
discover that prescribing policy and assessing sustainability involve the same 
exercise.
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Let us call the ends our social evaluator seeks to advance, social well-being. Because 
our evaluator considers not only the well-being of people who are present but that 
of future people too, social well-being can also be thought of as intergenerational 
well-being; so I will use the terms interchangeably.
Ends and means
There are two points I want to demonstrate here in intuitive terms:
(1) Evaluation in terms of social well-being is equivalent to evaluation on the 
basis of the means that further social well-being. (2) Policy and sustainability 
analyses amount to the same exercise.
In what follows I give a sketch of the pair of equivalences. The equivalences 
provide the foundations of economic evaluation. I shall call the pair of equivalences 
Proposition. But because of its centrality in intergenerational ethics, it is useful to 
first study the intuition behind it.
Ends are, to be sure, antecedent to the means. One can articulate ends even 
without asking whether they can be realized, but it makes no sense to talk of means 
if the ends they are meant to advance aren’t first articulated. The equivalence between 
ends and means I am alluding to doesn’t deny the antecedence of ends; what Propo-
sition says is that if the means to a set of ends have been identified, it doesn’t in 
principle make any difference whether we examine the extent to which the ends 
have been (or are likely to be) furthered by a perturbation to an economy or whether 
we estimate the degree to which the means to those ends have been (or are likely 
to be) bolstered by that perturbation: the two point in the same direction. We 
should imagine also that the equivalence would hold as tightly in a society where 
the ends are far from being met owing to mis-allocation of the means or unjustified 
usurpation of the means, as it would in a society where they are met as far as is 
possible under the prevailing scarcities of the means. Nor should it make a difference 
whether the perturbation is caused because of a shift in policy or whether it occurs 
because of the sheer passage of time; in either case the task is to evaluate the per-
turbation. Both theory and experience say, however, that it is commonly easier to 
measure the means to the ends than it is to measure the ends themselves. It will 
prove useful even here to indicate why.
The items that appear in documents that are put before the social evaluator are 
goods and services. Feasibility reports on investment projects, for example, contain 
quantitative estimates of the assets that are required at the investment stage (so 
many pieces of equipment, so many labourers, so many acres of land to be cleared, 
and so on), the labour hours and material inputs that are expected to be required each 
year, and the flow of outputs the authors hope will be forthcoming over the project’s 
life. Similarly, proposals for changes in the rate of taxation contain information about 
their likely impact on the flow of goods and services, expressed in terms of employ-
ment (labour of various skills), savings and investment, and redistribution of incomes. 
Those items are the “means”; they are not themselves the ends. The social evaluator 
is expected to make use of that information in order to judge whether the invest-
ment project or tax change is socially desirable. In order to do that she has to value 
the goods and services in terms of the ends. She has to do that because goods and 
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services acquire the status of means only when the ends to which they are the means 
have been articulated. As in the case of private investment decisions, she would 
attempt to value the goods and services in units of a suitably chosen commodity, 
expressed in a monetary currency. Moreover, she would know that the value of a 
commodity depends on its location, intended use, the date and circumstances in 
which it is to be used as an input or produced as an output, and the persons affected. 
But once she asks why a commodity’s value depends on those features, she is well 
on her way to the required analysis.6
Development experts have been known to view matters otherwise. Authors of 
the annual Human Development Report of the United Nations Development Pro-
gramme (beginning in UNDP, 1990) have routinely criticized national governments 
and international organizations for prescribing policy and assessing economic per-
formance on the basis of quantitative indicators that reflect the means, not the ends. 
They say that to use GDP and its distribution for those purposes is to confuse means 
for ends, and they caution against the use of GDP as an index of economic achieve-
ment on grounds that it is a measure of a country’s opulence, not well-being (UNDP, 
1994: 14–15). But I have never read a publication in which GDP was taken by its 
authors to be an end in itself. Moreover, it isn’t a mistake to seek to identify success 
(or the lack of success) in achieving ends in terms of an index of opulence. That it 
is not is the message of Proposition. The point isn’t that opulence misleads, but that 
we should search for the right measure of opulence. GDP misleads when used in 
social evaluation not because it is a measure of the means, but because it is not the 
right measure of the means. Nor is the United Nations’ Human Development Index 
the right measure of the means. Proposition tells us why our evaluator should not 
rely on that either.
We have now identified a reason it is better to evaluate change in terms of the 
means for achieving the ends than by examining the extent to which the ends are 
met by the change. It is a reason of convenience, not of principle. Of course, the 
intuition behind the theoretical equivalence between evaluation in terms of ends 
and means, respectively, has to be supported by a formal argument, with a pointer 
at showing the way the means should be valued in terms of the ends. The authors 
of IWR 2018 construct approximate ways for doing that for a number of assets, 
including human capital.
IWR 2018 reveals that the hardest task for the social evaluator is to determine 
the way the ends are reflected in estimates of the social worth of the means. That’s 
especially hard because the ends include the well-being of future persons, and they 
include the value of nature as we transform it over time by our activities. The 
reasoning involved in bringing the interests of people in the distant future into 
decisions over the deployment of today’s means is intricate, often non-intuitive. 
That is why the social evaluator is often obliged to rely on (informed) conjecture 
because there are matters on which there can be no data.
Inclusive wealth and social well-being
In Chapter 1 of IWR 2018, the authors show that if the ends are summarized in 
the idea of intergenerational well-being, the corresponding measure of the means 
is the economy’s productive capacity, a notion that is central to economic evaluation 
irrespective of how the ends are reached and interpreted by the social evaluator.
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The intuition behind it is this: an economy’s productive capacity reflects the 
opportunities open to its members. So it is a measure of the extent to which social 
well-being can be furthered. At a practical level, however, the relationship between 
social well-being and productive capacity isn’t immediate. Intergenerational well-
being includes not only the well-being of those who are present today, but also the 
well-being of people in the future. Put another way, it is an aggregate measure of 
the flow of personal well-beings across time and the generations. In contrast, an 
economy’s productive capacity is specific to the time at which it is measured. Proposi-
tion says that by an economy’s productive capacity we should mean an inclusive 
measure of its wealth.
To better appreciate the notion of wealth that IWR 2018 advances, imagine 
someone is asked to estimate their personal wealth. The individual would most likely 
turn first to financial assets (savings in the bank, stocks and bonds) and the proper-
ties he owns (house and belongings, for example). And he would use their market 
value to compute wealth. If pressed, he would acknowledge that his future earnings 
at work should be included, and he would estimate that part of his wealth by mak-
ing a forecast of the flow of his (post-tax) earned incomes and adding them over 
the working life that is ahead of him, using perhaps a market interest rate to discount 
future earnings. If he were pressed no further, he would probably stop there and 
agree that his earned incomes represent returns on the human capital he has accu-
mulated (sociality, education, skills, health). He would also agree that wealth is 
important to him because it determines the opportunities he has to shape his life – 
the activities he can engage in, the commodities he can purchase for pleasure and 
so on. But he would probably overlook that his taxes go to pay for the public 
infrastructure he uses, and he would almost certainly not mention the natural envi-
ronment he makes use of daily, free of charge.
The notion of wealth the social evaluator is interested in is far wider than that. 
For her, wealth is the social worth of the economy’s entire stock of assets. Assets 
are often called by a more generic name, “capital goods,” so we may use the terms 
interchangeably. Assets offer potential streams of goods and services over time; the 
more durable an asset, the more lasting is the potential stream. Time is built into 
an asset. That explains why an economy’s wealth at a point in time is able to reflect 
the flow of well-being across time and the generations.
The social value (or accounting price) of an asset is the worth of the stream of 
goods and services a society is able to obtain from it. A mangrove forest is a habitat 
for fish populations. It is also a recurrent source of timber for inhabitants, and it 
protects people from storms and tsunamis. An economy’s institutions and politics 
are factors determining the social value of its assets, because they influence what 
people are able to enjoy from them. The value of a building is not independent of 
whether society is at peace.
An asset’s accounting price can be very different from its market value. The dif-
ference between an asset’s accounting price and its market price reflects a distortion 
in the economy and should be eliminated if possible. To give an example, as the 
market price of fish in the open seas is zero, fishermen harvesting them ought to 
be charged for doing so. The charge, or tax, in this case is the accounting price of 
fish in their natural habitat. It may even be judicious to impose a quota on fishing, 
but quotas are only an extreme form of taxation (zero tax per unit caught up to 
the quota, a prohibitive tax beyond it).
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An economy’s inclusive wealth is the accounting value of its stock of assets. It 
is useful to confine assets to: (i) manufactured capital (roads, buildings, machines, 
equipment); (ii) human capital (knowledge, aptitude, education, skills); and 
(iii) natural capital (forests, agricultural land, rivers and estuaries, the atmosphere 
and the oceans – ecosystems more generally; subsoil resources).
Capital goods are to be distinguished from an economy’s social environment, 
which is the intangible medium in which goods and services are produced and 
allocated across persons, time and the generations. The social environment consists 
of the laws and norms that provide people with incentives to choose one course of 
action rather than another; it includes the workings of social and economic institu-
tions such as families, firms, communities, charities and government; and it includes 
the play of politics. The social environment is the seat of mutual trust. A strength-
ening of trust facilitates enterprise and exchange, thus enhancing personal 
well-being.
The social environment isn’t quantifiable, but as it shapes events, its consequences 
are often quantifiable. It influences the engagements we undertake, such as the rates 
at which we consume goods and services, save and invest, borrow and lend, engage 
in social activities and so on. Political scientists say that economic development co-
evolves with the social environment, by which they mean institutions and politics 
adapt to the state of the economy as surely as the economy responds to its institu-
tions and politics. That’s another way of saying that the mix of capital goods co-
evolves with the economy’s social environment.7 Seemingly innocuous changes to 
the geography of voters’ constituencies are known to influence political outcomes, 
which in turn influence the shape of institutions, and thus the policies that are 
chosen. Small differences in religious sensibilities (small, that is, to the sensibilities 
of outsiders) can make enormous differences to the development of attitudes and 
thought, and so on. For any conception of social well-being, an economy’s stock 
of capital assets and its social environment, together with a forecast of things to 
come, determine the accounting price of each capital good. The accounting value 
of an economy’s stock of capital goods is its inclusive wealth.
Proposition
Assets are stocks, not flows. They offer goods and services to us, which are flows. 
A tree is a stock; the fruit it bears is an annual flow of goods. Moreover, the carbon 
dioxide its leaves inhale is a continuous flow of services to us. Output is a flow (so 
many dollars’ worth of goods per year), whereas wealth is a stock (so many dollars’ 
worth of capital goods, period). The pair of equivalences we have been describing 
can now be summarized in
Proposition. Any perturbation to an economy that increases social well-being across 
the generations raises inclusive wealth as well. Similarly, any perturbation that 
lowers social well-being across the generations reduces inclusive wealth.
The simplest way to illustrate Proposition is to recognize that investment projects 
are perturbations to the economy. If a project is accepted, the future trajectory of 
the economy is different from what it would be if the project were not accepted. 
The common method for evaluating projects is to estimate the present value of 
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social profits accompanying them. Proposition implies that a project’s present value 
of social profits is its contribution to wealth. An economy’s assets and social envi-
ronment, taken together, comprise its productive capacity. Inclusive wealth is a 
measure of that capacity.
I have stated Proposition in its starkest form. We should read “wealth” for “wealth, 
adjusted for its distribution among people and for population size.” IWR 2018 does 
that and considers a form of intergenerational well-being where inclusive wealth per 
capita is the correct index for both sustainability and policy analysis.
Proposition says that inclusive wealth and social well-being are linked by an 
unbreakable bond and can be stated in the reverse order: if inclusive wealth increases 
(no matter what the cause of the rise happens to be), social well-being (the well-
being of contemporary people and the potential well-being of future generations) 
increases. Similarly, if inclusive wealth declines (no matter what the cause of the fall 
happens to be), social well-being declines. Being respectively the ends and the means 
to those ends, social well-being and inclusive wealth are not the same, of course; 
but they move in tandem.
Because Proposition is an “if and only if” statement, it has no empirical content. 
But it has powerful implications for empirical work and theoretical reasoning. It 
says for example that governments should instruct their statistical offices to prepare 
wealth accounts and track movements in wealth through time so as to check whether 
social well-being has risen under their proposed policies. The change in (inclusive) 
wealth over a period of time, say a year, is called “net investment”; that is, invest-
ment net of the wear and tear of capital assets and the degradation of natural capital. 
Proposition can be read as saying that, controlling for population change and the 
distribution of assets, economic development is sustainable over a period of time 
if net investment in the economy’s stock of assets is positive during the period. 
That’s net investment in the aggregate, which means that even if stocks of some 
capital goods were to decline (in quantity or quality, or both), net investment would 
be positive if sufficient investment were made toward the accumulation of the 
remaining assets. Whether investment in manufactured capital and human capital 
can be relied upon always to compensate for the degradation and depletion of 
nature remains a bone of contention between growth economists and environmental 
scientists. But analysing data from the past to infer what lies ahead can lead us 
astray with tragic consequences.
Proposition puts into perspective recent controversies over the objects of interest 
in distributive justice – for example whether they should be personal well-beings or 
whether they should be resources or opportunities.8 As I understand it, those con-
troversies arose in response to John Rawls’ theory of justice (Rawls, 1972). Proposi-
tion can be used to show that Rawls was entirely right to frame the principles of 
justice as fairness in terms of the distribution of primary goods (Rawlsian primary 
goods are the means to personal well-being; they are not themselves a person’s 
well-being). His philosophical move was to identify the circumstances in which 
agreement over the basic structure of society is to be reached and be committed 
to. Rawls saw the circumstances as being those in which each person is shrouded 
by a thick veil of ignorance of what his life from its earliest stages has in store for 
him. The objects chosen under the veil were derived in Rawls’ theory; they were 
not given ab initio. It can be argued that when they are aggregated in an appropri-
ate way, Rawlsian primary goods read as inclusive wealth.9
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The practical significance of Proposition was lost on the framers of the Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs), which were adopted by the United Nations General 
Assembly in September 2015. The UN has made a commitment to attain the goals 
by 2030. Seventeen in number, the goals range from poverty eradication and 
improvements in education and health, to the protection of global assets that include 
the oceans and a stable climate. Each is of compelling importance. But neither the 
SDGs nor their background documents mention the need to move to a system of 
national accounts that contains estimates of wealth. Without that move, however, 
there would be no way for governments to check that the economic measures they 
take to meet the international agreement would not jeopardize the sustainability of 
those goals. If wealth (adjusted for population and the distribution of wealth) 
increases as governments try to meet the SDGs, the SDGs will be sustainable; if it 
declines, the SDGs will be unsustainable. It could be that the goals are reached in 
the stipulated time period but aren’t sustainable because the development paths 
nations follow erode productive capacities beyond repair. The supporting documents 
of the United Nations’ Sustainable Development Goals don’t tell us how to check 
that the goals are being met in a sustainable way.
The theory-practice divide
Economic evaluation is not for the purist. There would be weaknesses in the evalua-
tor’s work no matter how she goes about it. She knows that. She worries that the 
basis on which she has estimated accounting prices is ethically inadequate, that she 
has neglected vital features of life; she is conscious of cutting corners when measuring 
items she is trying to measure. The evaluator also knows that she must justify (to 
herself at the very least) the approximations she has been forced to make in the act 
of measurement. Rather than express her estimates as exact figures, she knows she 
should offer them as bands. She is moreover aware that people would be wary of 
figures for wealth in the aggregate, derived from a numerical rendering of social well-
being. They would want a sensitivity analysis of wealth estimates, based on alternative 
weighting systems on the items of ethical significance. The evaluator could do that 
by working with alternative specifications of ethical parameters, which is to say alterna-
tive values of accounting prices. What she would arrive at is a menu of figures for 
wealth, each corresponding to a particular specification of facts, theories and values.
Restricting the ends to the well-being of people across the generations is ques-
tionable. The social evaluator will want to respond to the suggestion that nature 
has a value over and above the services it provides humanity. She will be respon-
sive too to the thought that animal life has a value that isn’t based solely on their 
welfare (to think it does would not account for the special role species conservation 
plays in our ethical sensibilities), nor on the “rights” animals may be assumed to 
have. Understandably, IWR 2018 does not enter such matters. For these are early 
days in the art and science of economic evaluation, done correctly.
Partha Dasgupta
Chair of the IWR science advisory group and
Frank Ramsey Professor Emeritus of Economics
at the University of Cambridge
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Notes
1 See Waters et al. (2016). Ehrlich and Ehrlich (2008) is an excellent account of the 
rise of human dominance over the biosphere and the speed with which that has come 
about in comparison to evolutionary time scales.
2 Micklethwait and Wooldridge (2000); Ridley (2010); and Norberg (2016) are a sample 
of books with that message.
3 IWR 2018 follows two previous Inclusive Wealth Reports (IWR 2012; IWR 2014) 
with the same intent.
4 See Dasgupta and Mäler (2000); Arrow et al. (2004); and Arrow et al. (2012, 2013).
5 Policy prescription as practised in welfare economics has the ends explicitly in sight. 
See for example Graaff (1962) and Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980).
6 There are goods that serve as both ends and means. Health is a prime example. As 
the two aspects of health can be kept separate, the dual feature of health doesn’t cause 
a problem for economic evaluation.
7 Putnam (1993); Landes (1998); and Mokyr (2002, 2016).
8 See Dworkin (1981a, 1981b); Cohen (1989); Barry (1990); and Sen (1992, 1999, 
2009) among many others.
9 I provide the argument in a book I am preparing under the title, Time and the 
Generations.
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Preface
In the arena of global environmental policy, the past several decades have seen some 
major accomplishments in setting goals. On the onset of 2016, the United Nations 
ushered in a very ambitious list of goals to be achieved by 2030. The 17 goals set 
in the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) span from no poverty and hunger, 
gender equality and reduced inequalities, to peace, justice and institutions and 
partnerships.
The 13th goal of SDGs is devoted to “take urgent action to combat climate 
change and its impacts.” Accordingly, the Paris Agreement was reached at the COP21 
on 12 December 2015, and entered into force in the next year. In particular, the 
Agreement lays down that all countries put an effort to limit the global temperature 
rise to well below 2 degrees Celsius at least.
This ambitious target-oriented approach to tackling environment and development 
challenges is commendable in many ways. It serves to share the status of the topic 
with a wide audience on the globe. Moreover, the goals may facilitate local regions 
to “downscale” global goals, leading to local initiatives to complement global 
solutions.
However, this approach and the aforementioned goals have their own setbacks. 
Sometimes the stipulated goals may seem too ambitious, either in depth or in width. 
It is no doubt a daunting task to achieve the Paris Agreement if we look at the 
current state of affairs. Quite a few may have felt overwhelmed to see the whopping 
17 priorities in the SDGs.
We take a different approach in this report. Rather than setting somewhat arbitrary 
goals, all we do in this report is construct and monitor a single index that covers a 
productive base of the economies around the globe. An index is but an index; it 
does not imply any solutions to national issues, let alone global issues. Nevertheless, 
what we have in mind in the construction of the index is that it is eventually used 
also for gradually improving the resource allocation mechanisms prevailing in the 
imperfect economies we live in, in the spirit of the late Kenneth Arrow, Partha 
Dasgupta and Karl-Göran Mäler.
The debate on green national accounting should date back at least to the begin-
ning of the 20th century when such economists as Irving Fisher, Erik Lindahl and 
John Hicks discussed the concept of income that is consistent with the non-declining 
wealth criterion. After the 1970s, the welfare significance of net national product 
was noted by Martin Weitzman, and positive net investment rule was studied by 
John Hartwick. Our framework is directly based on welfare economic theory of 
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green national accounting that has progressed since around the turn of the century. 
In particular, shadow prices – the marginal contribution of a given capital asset to 
social well-being – are used to attach relative weight to capital assets.
We build on the past achievements of Inclusive Wealth Report (IWR) 2012 and 
2014, but extend the analysis both in depth and width. The inaugural report, IWR 
2012, performed a pilot study of past developments of the three capitals in 20 
countries since 1990. The ensuing report, IWR 2014, drastically enlarged the scope 
to 140 countries, 1990–2010. Some classes of capital assets, including forest resources, 
used updated information to reflect recent developments of ecosystem valuation.
In the current edition, we retained the scope of countries and the starting period: 
140 countries, from 1990 to 2014. Moreover, we have added fishery to the list of 
capital assets, an increasingly important class of renewable natural capital. Although 
its share in natural capital turns out to be still small, the falling stock trend is an 
alarming one. We also show two approaches of human capital valuation, the frontier 
approach and conventional approach. In the frontier approach, both education and 
health components of human capital are employed in the so-called frontier function 
which is hardly founded on welfare economic theory. The sounder conventional 
approach is plausibly consistent with previous IWR 2012 and 2014 methodology 
and is the mainstay of the continuing IWR database.
All in all, we trust that this database will be a founding stone on which to record 
changes and sustainability of capital assets in the 21st century – and hopefully 
onward. Of course, no index is immune from the need of improvement. Rather, 
the current Inclusive Wealth Index should be regarded as an evolving process that 
gradually moves toward an index to better proxy social well-being. The total nine 
chapters contained in IWR 2018 are either directly or indirectly employing IWR 
2018 dataset, but they are mostly relevant to furthering this ongoing discussion.
On a final note, we stress that ours is not conflicting with a goal-oriented approach. 
Rather, they actually resonate and complement each other, as some chapters demon-
strate. We do hope that the current edition of IWR 2018 will lead to shared under-
standing of the current state of affairs in view of capital assets – from physical to human 
and natural – and eventually help solve the global problems laid down by the Sustainable 
Development Goals and Paris Agreement.
Shunsuke Managi
Report Director to the Inclusive Wealth Project, and
Distinguished Professor and Director of Urban Institute,
Kyushu University, Japan
Part I
What does the data say?

1. Introduction
There has been an elusive quest to determine how we can go beyond gross domestic 
product (GDP) to attain a true indicator of social well-being. The well-known 
report by Stiglitz et al. (2009) suggested that GDP faces three challenges: con-
ventional problems, quality of life aspects and sustainability issues. While some 
have argued that GDP is problematic on many fronts, it does have its uses. It is 
intended to measure the value added in an economy within a period and thus to 
act as a proxy for the magnitude of economic activity. Here, it is important 
to remember that one of the fathers of GDP, Simon Kuznets, originally intended 
to design an index that represents welfare rather than the value added in an 
economy (Coyle 2015).
In the vast literature of green national accounting, with reference to the long-
term well-being of an economy, an adjusted index of GDP – net domestic product 
(NDP) – has been shown to represent human well-being fairly well (Weitzman 1976; 
Asheim and Weitzman 2001). NDP is computed from GDP, accounting for changes 
in capital assets, such as capital depreciation and natural capital depletion.
It is in this sense that NDP goes some way toward representing human well-being. 
However, this adjustment is not sufficient for representing intergenerational well-
being or the sustainability of an economy. In particular, NDP still includes that 
portion that is supposed to be allocated to current consumption, which could incur 
the risk of being excessive. Excluding the value of current consumption from NDP 
leaves us with investment into produced, human and natural capital – that is, an 
Inclusive Wealth Index (IWI) (Dasgupta et al. 2015).
What makes our index – and the World Bank’s genuine savings – distinct from 
GDP is obvious.1 It is calculated from stocks, rather than flows; it measures deter-
minants, rather than constituents, of well-being (Dasgupta 2001). For the latter, it 
is more of a matter of subjective well-being, i.e. happiness, life satisfaction (Helliwell 
et al. 2017; Easterlin 2003; Kahneman et al. 2006; Layard 2005) and other objec-
tive outcomes of well-being, such as the Better Life Index (OECD 2014). The 
Human Development Index (United Nations Development Programme 1990–2016) 
is a composite index of education and health, in addition to GDP, which is a com-
mendable innovation in that it has shifted the focus toward human capital aspects 
of well-being. Although its original intention was not focused on sustainability, it 
fails to theoretically associate the index with social well-being; natural capital is also 
absent, but it is an unarguably crucial component of the long-term sustainability of 
nations (Managi, 2015a, 2015b).
Accounting for the inclusive 
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Another strand of the literature arguing to abandon GDP for a true welfare or 
well-being indicator is also flourishing. Fleurbaey and Gaulier (2009) ranked OECD 
countries by accounting for international flows of income, labour, risk of unemploy-
ment, healthy life expectancy, household demography and inequalities, along with 
income. In a similar vein, Jones and Klenow (2016) constructed a welfare index, 
including consumption, leisure, mortality and inequality fronts, and they found that 
these data are highly correlated with GDP per capita but also deviate. The aspects 
that they addressed are by no means dismissible; however, our focus is more on the 
long-term sustainability of determinants of human well-being, thereby leading to 
the construction of a capital-based indicator.
Of course, no single index can measure every aspect of human well-being, and IWI 
is not an exception in this regard. Note, in particular, that our IWI says little about 
the extent to which current well-being is achieved in practice, partly because the score 
of current capital stocks is not fully consumed by contemporaries and also because 
IWI is by construction a determinant- or opportunity-based indicator. It is not meant 
to be something that can explain the outcomes and constituents of well-being.
In principle, IWI should include a sufficiently broad, ideally exhaustive, but not 
redundant, score of capital assets that is relevant to current and future human well-
being. While classical economics focused on the input trio of (produced) capital, 
labour and land, neoclassical economics has treated capital and labour in production 
function. Subsequently, the economics of exhaustible resources included capital and 
non-renewable resources (Dasgupta and Heal 1974; Solow 1974). In mainstream 
economics, human capital – the capitalized concept of labour – has also played an 
important role in how economic growth can be decomposed (Mankiw et al. 1992). 
Regarding the sustainable development of well-being, natural capital – a broader 
notion than natural resource stock only – should not be absent. Thus, we have come 
full circle to attain the ultimate set of capital stocks as productive bases: produced, 
human and natural capital.
Figure 1.1 shows how these three capitals lead to the ultimate purpose – if any – 
of an economy: social well-being. The three capitals are inputs into the production 
system; thus, they are called the productive base of the economy. Produced capital 
is the easiest to imagine: roads, ports, cables, buildings, machines, equipment and 
other physical infrastructures. Human capital consists of population (size and com-
position), the knowledge and skills acquired by education, and health (enhancing 
quality of life, extending life and boosting productivity). For natural capital, the 
current accounting addresses subsoil non-renewable resources, forests and agricultural 
land, but it should ideally also include ecosystems in general.
Along with these three familiar capital assets, our first edition (UNU-IHDP and 
UNEP 2012) noted that knowledge, population, institutions and even time can be 
conceived as capital assets. Dasgupta (2015) called them enabling assets in the sense 
that they enable the three capital assets to function well to improve social well-being. 
Formally, they could increase the shadow prices of pillar capital assets. All in all, 
unconventional capitals include the following:
• Institutions (property rights, firms, government, households);
• Knowledge (natural laws, algorithms, theorems, cultural narratives);
• Social capital (the law, social norms, habitual practices); and
• Time (exogenous changes experienced by society over time).
Accounting for inclusive wealth of nations 5
While including these capital assets would be commendable, they are at least elusive 
as they currently stand. Changing institutions reveal themselves in how capital 
assets are employed to improve social well-being; thus, they could be a determinant 
of the shadow prices of capital assets. Time as an asset represents the value of 
waiting, including Solowian technological progress, resource price movements, 
population changes and other exogenous shocks to the economy in question. The 
IWR 2014 and our edition of this IWR 2018 address all of these terms in the 
adjustment of IWI, namely population changes, total factor productivity (TFP), 
oil capital gains and carbon damage. Thus, time as an asset is already addressed 
in our framework.
Once we establish relevant capital assets, then the output of this production 
process is either consumed or invested, as a result of national accounting identity. 
Current consumption directly improves current well-being, while investment increases 
the accumulation of productive base, which in turn improves future well-being. This 
fundamental trade-off between consumption and investment has been a classic 
problem of optimal saving, dating back at least to Ramsey (1928). However, in our 
context of sustainable development, economies should strike a balance between 



























consumption and investment, the latter including the degradation – negative 
investment – of natural capital.2
Some studies have suggested that there is a direct effect of capital stocks on 
utility, circumventing the consumption channel. For example, air pollution or 
climate change can cause disutility, for which increased consumption cannot be a 
substitute (Krautkraemer 1985; Xepapadeas 2005; d’Autume and Schubert 2008). 
It is not uncommon in climate change modelling to assume that climate directly 
affects utility (van der Ploeg and Withagen 2014). It is for these reasons that we 
present an alternative route from a productive base to welfare in Figure 1.1.
It is of the utmost importance to note that the absolute value of wealth per se 
does not indicate anything. Only the comparison of wealth across time or space 
(nations) can have welfare significance. Asheim (2010) showed that net national 
product (NNP) per capita can be the most appropriate index for the purpose of 
welfare comparisons across different countries. In any case, we must resist the 
temptation to compare the absolute value of inclusive wealth (per capita); our 
interest should lie in the change in inclusive wealth per capita over the course 
of years.
Building on our first and second editions of IWR, this year’s report features 
several advancements and expansions. First, our rich sample continues to track 
the 140- country sample of IWR 2014, compared with 20 countries (IWR 2012). 
The dataset now represents the lion’s share of world GDP (56,835 billion) and 
of the global population (6,885 million).
Second, the studied time period is also expanded by five years to a quarter century, 
expanding our coverage to the period of 1990–2014, which provides us with a 
picture of the changes in capital assets over almost a generation.
Third, our dataset of natural capital now includes one of the most significant 
renewable but mobile resources: fisheries. This inclusion adds to our collection of 
renewable resource natural capital, which already included forest resources and 
agricultural land in IWR 2012 and 2014. IWR 2012 included some discussion of 
the fishery resources of no more than four countries for the time period of 
1990–2006, based on studies of fishery stock (the RAM Legacy Stock Assessment 
Database (Ricard et al. 2012)) and shadow prices (SAUP 2011). Our edition 
boasts a much more refined calculation of fish stocks extended for many countries 
(Sugiawan et al. 2017).
Fourth, the methodologies for calculating components of human capital are 
enriched and updated. In particular, we present alternative shadow prices of human 
capital (education and health), based on a non-parametric methodology called frontier 
analysis. Throughout the report, we call it the frontier approach. This approach is 
contrasted to that adopted in IWR 2012 and 2014, following the literature on 
pricing human capital using a lifetime income approach.
The remainder of this introductory chapter is organized as follows. In Section 2, 
the basic idea and methodology behind the Inclusive Wealth Index (IWI) are intro-
duced. Further details regarding the architecture of the index are relegated to a 
Methodological Annex at the end of the report. Section 3 presents the central results 
and findings resulting from inclusive wealth calculations, based on non-parametric 
computation of shadow prices for human capital (education and health). Section 4 
shows our parallel results, which employ former methods for human capital 
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(education) calculation, consistent with the traditional interpretation of the rate of 
return on education and the IWR 2014 results. Section 5 summarizes our results, 
explains some limitations of the current methodology and addresses some concerns 
and potential criticisms of IWI in general.
2. Methods
In this section, we outline our underlying framework, which is premised on the 
body of work in the literature on green accounting, especially under imperfect 
economies (Arrow et al. 2012). We note that the economy’s objective is sustainable 
development, in the sense that intertemporal well-being at t:
V t U C e dt
t
( )= ( ) ( )∫ τ τ
∞
τ- -δ ,
is not declining. This expression is merely a discounted sum of instantaneous welfare 
that is depicted in Figure 1.1. A central assumption is that this intertemporal well-
being is a function of capital assets in the economy. Thus, denoting produced, human 
and natural capital as K, H and N, we have the following equivalence between 
inclusive wealth and well-being:
W K,H,N,t V t U C e dtt
- t
t




where W is inclusive wealth. Then, sustainable development is equivalent to non-
declining inclusive wealth. Formally, we would like to ensure the sign of the temporal 
change of inclusive wealth:
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where pK, pH and pK are the marginal shadow prices of produced, human and 
natural capital, respectively. Note that aside from the three capital channels, we 
have a direct channel through which only the passing of time directly affects 
well-being. The shadow prices are essentially marginal contributions to the inter-





















given a forecast of how produced, human and natural capitals, as well as other flow 
variables, evolve in the future in the economy in question. In practice, shadow prices 
act as a weight factor attached to each capital, resulting in the measure of wealth, 
or IWI:
IWI K H NK H N = + +ρ ρ ρ .
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In practice, we can use W and IWI interchangeably.3 For sustainability analysis, what 
we need is the change in capital assets or what we can call inclusive investment,
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In our accounting, barring oil capital gains, which we elaborate on later, we omit 
the change in the shadow prices for both theoretical and practical reasons. Shadow 
prices are defined as the marginal changes when there is a hypothetical, small per-
turbation in capital assets. Thus, for tracking relatively short-term sustainability, it 
suffices to use fixed, average shadow prices within the studied period. It also makes 
practical sense in our report since fixing shadow prices will enable us to focus on 
the quantity changes in inclusive wealth.
In addition, if there is a large perturbation, such as large project implementation, 
natural disasters or financial crises, we must account for the change in shadow prices 
even within a short time period. We might consider the price change – capital gains 
on any capital asset – seriously because we will accumulate our editions of IWR over 
the course of the years ahead.
One exception of this rule of constant shadow prices assumed over the studied 
period is oil capital gains. Oil prices, or commodity prices for that matter, are notori-
ous for fluctuations within relatively short periods of time. Even if the physical 
quantity of an oil-rich nation does not change, a spike in the oil price will translate 
into better opportunities for the country because the country can cash in its oil 
wealth on the market for increased consumption and investment into inclusive wealth. 
This fact is particularly relevant for oil-rich nations in the Middle East, where eco-
nomic powerhouses other than oil-related industries have long been craved. Nurturing 
an industry from scratch takes a long time. Conversely, net oil importing countries 
tend to witness their social well-being being degraded by rising oil prices. We account 
for this loss of opportunity by allocating global oil capital gains to oil-importing 
countries according to the current share of oil imports. Formally, if we allow the 












which represents our capital gain adjustment.
Aside from these oil capital gains, there is another class of adjustment contributed 
by our enabling assets, as we mentioned earlier. How capital assets are employed 
and utilized to yield ultimate social well-being can change over time, perhaps as the 
enhanced productivity of activities, technological progress, or improvement in trust 
and social capital. In practice, however, all of these factors should be captured by 
the change in TFP. In so far as social well-being improves (deteriorates) more than 
the individual contributions of capital assets increase (decrease), this residual should 
also be considered. Arrow et al. (2012) showed that what needs to be done in 
accounting is only to add TFP growth rate to inclusive wealth growth rate.
Finally, there is another aspect of the natural environment that need not be dis-
missed in coming centuries. Increasing carbon emissions are likely to cause climate 
change, which endangers many lives, as well as other potentially devastating 
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socio-economic damages. It can be conceivably stated that the current economic 
activity is reducing the carbon sink stock of our planet, which can be accounted for 
as another capital asset in inclusive wealth. Alternatively, we can tap into the ongoing 
and increasing research on the social cost of carbon to be employed to value the 
damage done to social well-being by additional emissions of carbon. In this report, 
we continue to adopt the latter approach. In particular, the total global emissions 
of carbon are evaluated using the social cost of carbon, which is then allocated to 
individual countries according to the share of the global damage done, which is 
further subtracted from the inclusive wealth of nations.4
Figure 1.2 provides our schematic representation of how our three-pillar capital 
assets, as well as adjustment factors, shape our final index of inclusive wealth. Along 
with the familiar capital assets that we consider from previous reports (IWR 2012, 
2014), this report adds fishery resource stock to the list of natural capital. In the 
ensuing sections, we report many aspects of the aggregated figures of Inclusive 
Wealth Index, both before and after adjustments.
To avoid confusion, in Section 3, we focus on inclusive wealth based on the 
frontier approach, which uses a non-parametric valuing of education- and health-
induced human capital. Produced and natural capital are computed in a similar 
manner as in IWR 2012 and 2014. In Section 4, we extend the conventional 
approach inherited from IWR 2012 and 2014. For human capital, we account only 
for the education-induced portion. For further notes on the different methodologies, 
readers are advised to examine the Methodological Annex.
Figure 1.2  Schematic representation of the Inclusive Wealth Index and the Adjusted 
Inclusive Wealth Index
10 Shunsuke Managi
3. The inclusive wealth of nations
3.1. Measuring performances based on changes in wealth
In this subsection, we evaluate the countries’ sustainability conditions over the past 
25 years by calculating human capital, including both education and health shadow 
prices, using the frontier approach. The sustainable growth of the nations is evalu-
ated by analysing changes in IWI. We show the changes in inclusive wealth, both 
in absolute and per capita forms, for 140 countries over the past few decades. In 
addition, we discuss how the changes and per capita changes in wealth correlate 
with other traditional indicators.
The results show that the growth of inclusive wealth of the nations is positive for a 
considerable number of countries. However, the slower progress of wealth than popula-
tion growth results in negative per capita growth of wealth for a significant number of 
countries as well. In addition, some of the negative per capita growth of wealth occurred 
in countries that experienced absolute gains in wealth. The changes of countries’ wealth 
are calculated by annual average growth rates over the past 25 years, and 1990 is set 
as a base year.
Our estimation results show that 135 of the 140 countries assessed in the IWR 2017 
present growth in inclusive wealth (before adjusted factors) (Figure 1.3a). On a per capita 
basis, 89 of the 140 countries (64%) show positive growth rates in IWI (Figure 1.3b).
When IWI includes the adjustments of TFP, carbon damages and oil capital gains 
to evaluate social well-being, 124 of the 140 countries showed positive growth rate 
(Figure 1.4a). In a per capita analysis, 96 of the 140 countries (69%) experienced 
positive IWI growth rates after adjustments (Figure 1.4b).
We investigate the IW growth by identifying countries and regions in Figure 1.5a. 
Three countries can be identified in Quadrant III – Congo, Trinidad and Tobago – 
and Ukraine experienced negative growth rates in both absolute and per capita terms. 
Two former Soviet-allied countries – Bulgaria and Moldova – improved their perfor-
mance when population is considered in the index because both countries have had 
declining populations over time (Quadrant II of Figure 1.5a). The population decreased 
in these countries, and more resources became available for persons compared to the 
Figure 1.3a  Annual average growth rate of Inclusive Wealth Index
Figure 1.3  Annual average growth rate in IWI and IWI per capita before adjustments 
for 140 countries, annual average for 1990–2014
Figure 1.4a  Growth in Inclusive Wealth Index (adjusted)
Figure 1.4b  Growth in Inclusive Wealth Index per capita (adjusted)
Figure 1.4  Annual average growth rate in IWI and IWI per capita after adjustments for 
140 countries assessed in the IWR 2017 during the period of 1990 and 2014

































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































base year. Of 135 countries with positive absolute growth in wealth (Quadrant I and 
IV), 87 also experienced per capita growth in wealth as well (Quadrant I). The remain-
ing 48 countries with decreases in wealth on a per capita basis (Quadrant IV) can be 
regarded as underinvesting in wealth in light of their population growth.
We identify the IW growth rates of countries in addition to the three adjustments 
of IW in Figure 1.5b. Fifteen countries are assessed as unsustainable by IW per 
capita adjusted: Bulgaria, Congo, Gabon, Gambia, Greece, Croatia, Haiti, Jamaica, 
Laos, Latvia, Sudan, Serbia, Syria, Ukraine and Vietnam. Both absolute and per 
capita terms showed negative growth rates in Quadrant III of Figure 1.5b. Estonia 
is the only country that improved when population is considered (Quadrant II). Of 
the 124 countries with positive absolute growth in inclusive wealth adjusted (Quad-
rant I and IV), 95 countries also experienced growing wealth per capita (Quadrant I). 
The remaining 29 countries had eroded wealth on a per capita basis.
3.2. Wealth change compositions
In this section, we break down inclusive wealth change by the contributions of 
capital assets. Contributions of natural, human and produced capital to average 
inclusive wealth growth are shown in Figure 1.6. It should be noted that natural 
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capital is positive for only 31 countries. In contrast, in 133 nations, human capital 
increased during the period from 1990 to 2014; for produced capital, 136 of the 
140 countries gained.
On a per capita front, positive growth in human capital is achieved by 122 
countries. Similarly, 120 of the 140 nations experienced growth for produced 
capital from 1990 to 2014. The contribution of human capital was 59% over 
1990–2014, followed by produced capital (21%) and natural capital (20%). For 
the breakdown of human capital, 33% and 26% come from education and health, 
respectively.
The global change in inclusive wealth in absolute and per capita terms is critical 
to evaluate the performance of the global economy. We calculate the changes in 
inclusive wealth and per capita inclusive wealth in international dollars using purchas-
ing power parity (PPP) exchange rates. These data are the aggregated wealth of all 
nations for 1992 to 2014, and results are illustrated in Figure 1.7. Changes in global 
wealth were significantly positive from 1990 to 2014. The major positive changes 
can be observed for produced capital, followed by human capital. In contrast, natural 
capital experienced a significant decline from 1992.
3.3. Wealth composition
In this section, we discuss the wealth stock of nations by sources. The compositions 
of the assets of countries are shown in Figure 1.8a–c, representing the relative 
importance of each capital. Human capital is dominant over the other two capitals 
for 93 of the 140 countries evaluated. In addition, the majority (77) of these 
93 countries owned 50% or a higher share of human capital than natural and pro-
duced capital.
Turning to natural capital, it turned out to be the most important source of 
wealth for 21 countries. Interestingly, 16 of the 21 natural capital-abundant 
nations are low-income or middle-income economies. South America, Middle 
Africa and Western Asia are regions where natural capital is an important source 
of wealth.
Figure 1.8a  Percentage of natural capital in total wealth
Figure 1.8b  Percentage of produced capital in total wealth
Figure 1.8  Percentages of human, produced and natural capital in total wealth, annual 
average for 1990–2014
Figure 1.8c  Percentage of human capital in total wealth
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For 19 countries, produced capital is the main source of capital. Of those nations 
with a lion’s share of produced capital in composition, all are high-income countries 
and geographically located in Europe, North America and East Asia.
We also explore how overall capital is composed on the global level. The share of 
human capital clearly demonstrates its importance, with a representation of 59% 
(Figure 1.9a). Developments of the capitals over time show that, while the average 
contributions of human and produced capital to the total capital increased, the natural 
capital share declined, as symbolically expressed in the crossing line of Figure 1.9b.
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Figure 1.9  Developments in the composition of wealth by capital from 1990–2014
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An interesting composition between human and natural capital can be observed 
in Figure 1.10a: countries with high shares of human capital generally have lower 
shares of natural capital. As expected, high-income countries also tend to have 
higher shares of produced capital and lower shares of natural capital (Figure 1.10b). 
Moreover, high-income countries have a balanced share of human and produced 
capital (Figure 1.10c). These shares should be interpreted with caution, however, 
because they only show the worth of one capital in relation to the total wealth of 
the country.
3.4. IWI adjusted
In this subsection, we investigate the performance of IW, after considering three 
factors.
1 Carbon damage: accounting for damages due to climate change, which are 
experienced by nations due to increased impacts of carbon concentrations on 
the atmosphere
2 TFP: explaining the exogenous factors that are missing but that impact economic 
growth
3 Oil capital gains: capturing the changes in oil price and how the value of the 
productive base changes
The adjustment factors can affect the IW of nations either positively or negatively. 
If oil prices increase, oil-producing countries benefit, while oil-importing countries 
experience loss. TFP can also impact either way; less efficient use of resources will 
cause negative productivity in the subsequent year (Managi 2015a; Kurniawan and 
Managi 2017). In Figure 1.11, we show estimates of how each of the adjustment 
factors contributes to the IW of nations. We plot the adjusted IW in gradually 
decreasing order to identify the impacts on countries.
In our analysis, Moldova and Trinidad and Tobago are the “gainers” by adjust-
ments; they move from negative to positive IW growth rates. In contrast, 13 countries 
reported positive growth in IW but turned to negative IW growth after adjustments.5 
In per capita terms before adjustments, 89 countries experienced positive growth in 
IW; after adjustments, the number of countries with positive growth in IW per 
capita increased to 98 countries.
We examine the contributions of specific adjustment factors.
Oil capital gains show that 113 of the 140 countries suffered from increasing 
prices of oil (Figure 1.12a). The remaining 27 countries experienced positive impacts 
of oil price increases. Six oil-abundant countries, mainly in the Middle East, for 
instance, gained at least 4% from increasing oil prices: Venezuela, Iraq, Qatar, Kuwait, 
Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates.
TFP growth rates were positive for 87 countries and negative for 53 countries 
(Figure 1.12b). The average growth of TFP ranged from +7% to −3% and had 
significant impacts on several countries. For instance, Malaysia moved to positive 
growth of per capita IW adjusted, primarily due to positive TFP growth. In contrast, 
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Figure 1.12a  Average growth rate of oil capital gains in 1990–2014
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Regarding carbon damage incurred by climate change, 134 of the 140 countries 
face negative economic impacts (Figure 1.12c). Only six countries improved their 
productive base and avoided the adverse impacts of climate change damage. However, 
its impact is less than 0.5% of IW per capita adjusted, which can be said to be rela-
tively low.
3.5.  Measuring economic performance: comparison of 
inclusive wealth, GDP, HDI and happiness
For evaluating nations’ economic and social performance, there exist a number of 
indicators. Three of the commonly used indicators are gross domestic product (GDP), 
Human Development Index (HDI) and happiness. GDP is the indicator to measure 
the market value of final goods and services in an economy over a period. HDI 
measures the well-being of nations by considering education, life expectancy and 
Figure 1.12b  Average growth rate of Total Factor Productivity (TFP) in 1990–2014
Figure 1.12  Annual average growth of the adjustment factors in 1990–2014
Figure 1.12c  Average growth rate of carbon damage in 1990–2014
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income. Happiness, although measured in many ways, basically evaluates the people’s 
subjective satisfaction by considering freedom, social support, life expectancy and 
corruption, among other things. Figures 1.13a–c provide an overview of the countries’ 
GDP per capita, HDI and inclusive wealth per capita in terms of annual average 
growth rate over the period of 1990 to 2014.
Figure 1.13a  IW per capita
Figure 1.13  Average annual growth rates of IW per capita, GDP per capita and HDI, 
period 1990–2014
Figure 1.13c  HDI
Figure 1.13b  GDP per capita
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Figure 1.14a provides the relationship between the growth of HDI and IW per 
capita. We find positive growth of IW per capita for 89 countries and negative growth 
for 51 countries. Figure 1.14b represents the growth of HDI and adjusted IW per 
capita. We identify positive growth of IW for 97 countries, while in the case of HDI, 


















































































































































































































































































































































































Figure 1.15a  GDP per capita vs. IW per capita (unadjusted)















































































































































Figure 1.15b  GDP per capita vs. IW per capita adjusted
139 of 140 countries show positive growth. Thus, the IW per capita shows more a 
pessimistic picture of progress of nations than HDI. In terms of GDP, 128 of 140 
countries indicate positive growth rates over the past 25 years; the remainder are 
mostly African nations (Figure 1.15a and 1.15b), which is evidently a dissimilar picture 
from that shown by IWI or even other indicators of sustainability.
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Because GDP, HDI and IWI do not represent the same – if not totally different – 
aspects of human well-being, the evaluation of the countries is not always consistent 
among the three (Figure 1.16). We note, however, that, when the nations are grouped 
into high-income or developed economies, all three measures consistently show a posi-
tive growth rate. In addition, the measure of happiness also shows a high satisfaction 
level (not growth) in developed countries (Figure 1.17a and 1.17b).









































































































































Figure 1.17  (Continued)
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4.  The inclusive wealth of nations: education  
as human capital
4.1. Measuring performance based on changes in wealth
This section shows the inclusive wealth of nations following the approach used in 
IWR 2012 and 2014, based on the idea of education as human capital and shadow 
prices following IWR 2012 and 2014, which we henceforth call the education approach. 
The main difference lies in the calculation of human capital: the educational rate of 
return is used as its shadow price. In line with IWR 2014, health capital is beyond 
the scope in this method, primarily because it would swamp other capital assets. 
Additionally, conventional TFP values are used for IW adjusted. We report our results 
based on this approach, along with the frontier approach in Section 3, because this 
methodology is in line with the long history of the economics of education and its 
consistency helps the reader to compare our results with previous editions of IWR 
in a continuous manner. Needless to say, the question to be asked continues from 
the previous section: Have nations been maintaining their wealth for the past quarter 
century? The dataset continues to be all 140 countries from 1990 to 2014.
As the methodology in this subsection inherits from previous reports (IWR 2012 
and IWR 2014), it turns out that the basic trend in inclusive wealth also continues 
to hold for them. In particular, the aggregated accumulation of wealth has been 
slower than population growth, leading to negative growth rates in inclusive wealth 
per capita.









































































































































Figure 1.17  Happiness vs. IW per capita
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According to the total wealth of nations, 133 of the 140 countries (95%) enjoyed 
positive growth rates in inclusive wealth over the past quarter century (see Fig-
ure 1.18a). That the overall wealth has been increasing in the world in aggregate 
seems to be good news, but conversely, the remaining five countries experienced 
degradation of their wealth.
If we change the measure from total to per capita, 84 of the 140 countries (60%) 
under study presented positive inclusive wealth per capita (see Figure 1.18b). The 
worse performance indicates that the simple Malthusian effect on sustainability is 
negative all worldwide and perhaps more so in developing countries.
Finally, growth in inclusive wealth per capita with adjustments by TFP, carbon 
damage and oil capital gains (Figure 1.18c) indicates that 81 of the 140 countries 
(58%) are on a sustainable path.
They can be contrasted with the previous results of IWR 2014: for the studied 
period of 1990–2010, only 128, 85 and 58 of the 140 countries (compared to 133, 
84 and 81 in the current edition) experienced an increase in inclusive wealth in 
absolute terms, inclusive wealth per capita and inclusive wealth per capita adjusted, 
Figure 1.18a  Growth in Inclusive Wealth Index (unadjusted), using the education 
approach
Figure 1.18b  Growth in Inclusive Wealth Index per capita (unadjusted), using the educa-
tion approach
Figure 1.18  (Continued)
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respectively (see Figure 1.19). Since the sample countries remain unchanged, and 
the methodology has not changed drastically, this better performance can be trace-
able either to expansion of the study period by four recent years (2011–2014) or 
to the addition of fishery resources to natural capital.
Figure 1.20 shows the relationship with inclusive wealth on an absolute versus 
per capita basis. Overall, we observe an upward relationship between the two: the 
larger that the growth in inclusive wealth is, the larger that the growth in inclusive 
wealth per capita tends to be. Note also that almost all of the European and North 
American countries fall into Quadrant I: they have experienced increasing wealth in 
both absolute and per capita terms. For the other regions, the results are mixed. 
Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar, all of which are sitting on enormous 
oil and gas capital, lie somewhat as outliers.
Figure 1.18c  Growth in Inclusive Wealth Index per capita adjusted, using the education 
approach
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Figure 1.18  Growth in Inclusive Wealth Index, using the education approach
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The seven countries with negative inclusive wealth growth include four African 
nations (Cameroon, the Central African Republic, Liberia and Sudan), Trinidad and 
Tobago, the Republic of Moldova and Cambodia. It is remarkable that, of these 
seven countries, only the oil-rich Caribbean nation, Trinidad and Tobago, falls into 
the high-income category. In absolute terms, the country’s natural capital has been 
eroded by 3.9% per annum. It seems like the country has depleted ample natural 
capital across the board, from agricultural land to oil and gas, but the extent to 
which nature has been converted into produced and human capital seems to have 
been insufficient.
4.2. Wealth change compositions
In this subsection, we take a closer look at the breakdown of the contributions 
of each capital asset group to total inclusive wealth average growth rates. In par-
ticular, Figure 1.21 shows the breakdown of (unadjusted) inclusive wealth growth 
into produced, natural and human capital groups. We can observe that, even within 
high inclusive wealth growth countries, the composition of each capital asset varies. 
For example, oil-rich gulf nations (Bahrain, the United Arab Emirates and Qatar) 
have converted massive natural capital into other capitals, especially human capital. 
Other nations, such as Singapore, Tanzania, Bangladesh, South Korea and the 
Philippines, have been on a sustainable path, primarily by growing their produced 
capital, with very little rundown of their natural resources, or because they are 
poorly endowed with these resources in the first place.
Turning to unsustainable or barely sustainable countries in Figure 1.21, despite 
their sluggish growth in inclusive wealth, it should be noted that human capital has 
grown by more than 2%, with several exceptions. Therefore, the degradation of 
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natural capital and slow growth in produced capital are mainly responsible for their 
disappointing growth rates of inclusive wealth. Notable exceptions include several 
former Soviet republics, such as Ukraine, Russia, Kazakhstan, Lithuania and the 
Republic of Moldova, the populations and, thus, human capital of which have 
decreased in the latest quarter century. Furthermore, all of these countries have 
decreased in natural capital, whereas the Republic of Moldova was the only country 
that eroded in all three capital assets.
We note here that, since the growth rates are expressed in geometric means, the 
growth rates of each component simply do not add up. Therefore, some ASEAN 
countries, such as Laos, Myanmar and Cambodia, have recently accumulated pro-
duced capital, which does not contribute to high growth rates in inclusive wealth 
for the studied period.
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Figure 1.22  Growth rates of inclusive wealth per capita and its components, relative to 














































































What if we aggregate all of the countries all over the world? In other words, has 
the world been preserving its wealth on the whole? Figure 1.22 shows the global 
change rates of inclusive wealth and its components on a per capita basis, setting 
1992 as the reference year.6 Inclusive wealth per capita has been slightly positive, 
especially over the last decade. Observe that this trend is a cumulatively large decrease 
of inclusive wealth in absolute terms. Figure 1.22 also demonstrates vividly that 
natural capital degradation – which amounts to approximately 35% in a cumulative 
fashion – has been compensated for by investment in human capital and, to a much 
greater extent, in produced capital.
Another interesting observation from Figure 1.22 is that all of the growth in 
capital assets has been linear if we aggregate it across the world, whether these assets 
have been positive (produced and human) or negative (natural). In contrast, GDP 
growth has been mostly linearly positive, but the enormous financial crisis caused a 
drop in this trend in 2008.
4.3. Wealth composition
As we have stated, what matters in sustainability assessment is the change in capital 
assets over the course of years. However, it is of some interest to also examine the 
composition of capital assets themselves. Figure 1.23 shows the percentage of three 
capitals in inclusive wealth, averaged for the period between 1990 and 2014. Panel 
a of the figure in the following suggests that it accounts for less than 20% of total 
wealth in many countries. It is relatively more important in some developed nations, 
such as the USA, the European Union, South Korea and Japan. In contrast, the 
share of produced capital is alarmingly low in some developing countries; it accounted 
for less than 5% in some sub-Saharan African countries in 2014. It is difficult to 
draw normative implications only from this percentage, but investing in produced 
capital would help some poor countries take off, as history suggests.
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Figure 1.23b shows the (education-induced) human capital share, annually averaged 
for 1990–2014 for the whole world. It demonstrates that human capital accounts for 
the lion’s share in many countries. There are, however, several exceptions in the less 
developed world. As of 2014, it was still less than 20% in Belize, Bolivia, Guyana, the 
Central African Republic, Laos, Liberia, Mongolia, Papua New Guinea and Tanzania.
Finally, Figure 1.23c represents the natural capital share in inclusive wealth. In 
contrast to other capital forms, the share of natural capital largely depends on initial 
Figure 1.23a  Percentage of produced capital in total wealth
Figure 1.23b  Percentage of human capital in total wealth
Figure 1.23c  Percentage of natural capital in total wealth
Figure 1.23  Percentages of produced, human and natural capital in total wealth, average 
for 1990–2014, education approach
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endowments, so it is not infrequently very small, whether in low-income or high-
income countries. For example, natural capital stands for less than 5% in both Belgium 
and Bangladesh. It is also worth mentioning that some countries that are presumably 
rich in natural capital are actually running out of it: less than 1% of wealth was in 
the form of natural capital in Bahrain and the United Kingdom as of 2014. Both 
of them might have depleted their oil capital over the last several decades.
What about the wealth composition across the whole world? Figure 1.24a indicates 
that, on average, human capital is responsible for more than half of inclusive wealth, 
followed by natural capital, with approximately one quarter of total wealth. Produced 
capital accounts for the smallest share of inclusive wealth, less than one-fifth of total 
wealth worldwide. Note, however, that this figure is aggregated both over time and 
worldwide. To determine the temporal change of this composition, the right panel of 
Figure 1.24a shows its temporal development. One can see clearly that natural capital 
has been substituted primarily by produced capital. It is somewhat surprising to see 
that the shares of natural and produced capital converge at approximately 20%, while 
the share of human capital continues to account for more than half of total wealth.
However, a different picture emerges when we aggregate in a different manner. 
In Figure 1.24b, instead of calculating the average of the shares, we first aggregate 
each capital for a specific year for the whole world to compute each capital share in 
the right panel. This amount is further averaged for the whole period in the pie 
chart. According to this calculation, the places of produced and natural capital were 
changed in the mid-1990s. Furthermore, natural capital only accounts for 15% of 
total wealth, which is a somewhat sobering figure in light of the time trend.
This replacement of natural capital by produced capital should be examined in 
further detail. Inclusive Wealth Report 2014 found that the share of produced capital 
tends to be slightly less than 20% in many countries, and – interestingly – natural 
and human capital shares tend to be inversely correlated. This tendency continues 
to hold for our updated data, as shown in Figure 1.24c. This apparently linear 
relationship between produced and natural capital tempts us to assert that natural 
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Figure 1.24a  Global aggregate wealth composition, mean 1990–2014 and over time, 
education approach
Note: Shares of each capital are computed for a specific country and year first, and they are 
then aggregated across countries in the right panel. This amount is further averaged for the 
whole period, 1990–2014, in the left panel.
Figure 1.24  (Continued)
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suggests that, if one starts from the state of natural capital being 100% of wealth, 
a 20% decrease in natural capital would translate into a 15% increase in human 
capital, which would be reminiscent of the well-known Hartwick rule, which says 
that rents of depleted natural capital should be invested into other forms of capital 
to maintain future consumption and well-being (Hartwick 1977; Dixit et al. 1980). 
Although this story is easy to comprehend, recall that the apparent relationship in 
Figure 1.24c only represents that across countries. In other words, the way that 
65% 
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Figure 1.24b  Global aggregate wealth composition, mean 1990–2014 and over time, 
education approach
Note: Each capital is first aggregated across countries for specific years in the right panel. This 

























































































































































Figure 1.24c  Percentage shares of human capital and natural capital in total wealth, aver-
age 1990–2014 (education approach)
Figure 1.24  Global aggregate wealth composition, education approach
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capital assets are substituted for each other differs from country to country accord-
ing to their historical paths. Moreover, it is important to remember that this correla-
tion does not suggest any causation; it could be that, in theory, nations can invest 
into natural capital, resulting in a lower share of human capital.
In summary, it is confirmed that natural capital has been used to increase produced 
and, to a lesser extent, human capital. The higher that the share of natural capital 
is, the lower that the share of human capital tends to be. However, this amount is 
the global aggregate, and a closer look is always warranted. In particular, the share 
of natural capital has little to do with the advancement of the economy in question. 
After all, it is the change in combined wealth that counts.
4.4. IWI adjusted
As we have demonstrated in the methodology section, the increase in inclusive 
wealth should show the same direction in which social well-being moves. Aside 
from population growth and its Malthusian effect, there are at least three factors 
that affect social well-being but that avoid the three capital channels: carbon dam-
age, oil capital gains and TFP. Carbon damage erodes a nation’s well-being because 
of its nature as a global public bad; the damage to the economy caused by climate 
change, which is affected by an aggregate of global carbon emissions, does not 
necessarily have something to do with its own levels of carbon emission or natural 
capital changes. Oil capital gains boost the total wealth by an exogenous increase 
in the price of natural capital. The economy can also enjoy improved social well-
being in the presence of an increase in TFP, without any improvement in the 
quantity of inclusive wealth, representing technological progress in a broad sense 
across the whole society. Of course, one can think of TFP as another capital asset 
(Arrow et al. 2012).
Figure 1.25 shows the breakdown of the change in inclusive wealth, adjusted for 
the three terms. The figure starts from IW per capita and then introduces carbon 
damage, oil capital gains/losses and TFP to reach IW per capita adjusted.
Not surprisingly, carbon damage as a share of inclusive wealth affects small 
countries more because their inclusive wealth tends not to be sufficiently large 
enough to absorb such exogenous shocks. In this regard, our measure proves 
useful because we express carbon damage as a share of inclusive wealth. Per annum, 
the carbon damage adjustment does not exceed 1% of inclusive wealth, and it 
proves to be the least contributor to the adjustment terms of inclusive wealth. 
The largest order of carbon damage with regard to inclusive wealth is seen in 
Luxembourg (−0.6%), followed by Malta (−0.4%), Maldives (−0.4%), Bahrain 
(−0.4%) and Barbados (−0.3%). It should be noted that it is the well-known island 
nations that are most vulnerable to climate change and on the verge of non-
existence, some of which lie out of the scope of our 140 studied countries. In 
absolute terms, however, carbon damage is relatively large in high-income countries 
such as Germany, France, the United Kingdom and the United States, among 
others. In per capita terms, carbon damage exceeds USD500 in Austria, Belgium, 
Switzerland, Germany, Denmark, Finland, France, the United Kingdom, Ireland, 
Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Norway and Sweden. It is also 
interesting to note that some countries become better off due to climate change: 
Australia, Canada, Israel, New Zealand, Russia and Singapore actually gained as a 
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result of global carbon emissions. Thus, in these countries, carbon damage is 
recorded in positive terms in our accounting.
A much larger effect can be observed for oil capital gains and losses. In the cur-
rent edition, an annual increase of 3% in the rental price of oil is assumed, corre-
sponding to the annual average oil price increase during 1990–2014 (BP 2015), 
which means that even if no oil is withdrawn, the country in question can enjoy 3% 
growth in social well-being.7,8 As shown in Figure 1.26, there has been dramatic 
volatility in oil prices in the last decade. Over the last quarter century, however, oil 
capital gain counts for more than 1% annually of inclusive wealth in the following 
dozen countries: Kuwait (7.7%), Iraq (7.0%), Venezuela (6.1%), Qatar (5.9%), the 
United Arab Emirates (5.4%), Saudi Arabia (4.5%), Iran (3.1%), Nigeria (3.0%), 
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Uganda (2.1%), Kazakhstan (1.8%), Ecuador (1.4%) and Canada (1.1%). They are 
all countries with enormous reserves of either oil or natural gas, regardless of their 
income levels. As unconventional fossil fuel such as shale oil and gas comes to the 
fore, countries endowed with them will gain more if oil prices continue to increase. 
Among those nations with large oil capital gains, the adjusted IW per capita of the 
United Arab Emirates ends up at a moderate 2.0%. In other words, had it extracted 
its oil wealth more moderately, its IW per capita would have been on a par with, 
for example, United Kingdom.
Conversely, because sources of wealth cannot appear out of this air, there are 
“losers” in terms of these exogenous oil price movements. For completeness, we 
record negative numbers for those that faced higher import prices of oil. Those 
importing countries with negative oil capital gains comprise the majority (113 of 
140 countries). The largest oil capital loss appears in Singapore, equivalent to −1.5% 
per annum of its initial wealth in 1990, followed by smaller nations, such as Malta 
(−1.1%), Jordan (−1.0%), Maldives (−0.9%) and Panama (−0.8%), because their 
inclusive wealth is considered to be relatively scarce with regard to importing oil 
price shocks. In comparison with oil capital gains, the order of magnitude of capital 
losses for individual countries is smaller, reflecting that oil-importing countries are 
geographically much more dispersed than exporting ones.
Finally, TFP measures residual GDP growth that the contributions of the three 
capital assets cannot explain. As Arrow et al. (2012) demonstrated, all we have to do 
is add the residual TFP growth to the change in inclusive wealth growth. In the educa-
tion approach of this section, we take a different tack from the frontier approach in 
Section 3 and instead follow IWR 2012, taking the 25-year average of the TFP growth 
Figure 1.26  Crude oil price movements since 1976, USD, with no inflation 
adjustments
Source: BP (2015), averaged prices of Dubai, Brent, Nigerian Forcados and West Texas 
Intermediate.
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rates reported by the Conference Board (2017).9 The only shortcoming of this dataset 
is the lack of natural capital as an input, which indicates that the TFP values might 
overestimate the true technical progress. However, this concern is not serious because, 
with our purpose of sustainability assessment, the final IW per capita adjusted by TFP 
would be the lowest bar to overcome. The development paths of those countries with 
negative IW per capita and with somewhat optimistic TFP would not be judged as 
sustainable even if TFP considering natural capital input were readily available. The top 
countries in terms of annual average TFP growth rates include Bangladesh, Mozam-
bique, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Iraq, all surpassing 2%. Less than half of 
the sample (52 of 140) witnessed positive growth in TFP over the last 25 years.
All things considered, the ultimate IW growth rate, which is adjusted for the 
three factors along with population growth, can be calculated and shown, as in 
Figure 1.25. Among the top countries, Iraq, Venezuela, Kuwait and the United 
Arab Emirates all have experienced negative inclusive wealth per capita because of 
the depletion of their oil capital. This finding demonstrates how much oil capital 
gains might have worked as proverbial windfall benefits in terms of the sustainable 
development of those nations. Bangladesh, China, Albania, Uruguay, Slovakia and 
South Korea have moderately accumulated inclusive wealth and TFP.
On the opposite end, 59 countries have seen negative growth in adjusted IW per 
capita. It is remarkable that, aside from Croatia, all ten of the worst performing 
countries have had both negative inclusive wealth per capita and negative TFP. If 
they not only continue to lack investment in the usual set of capital assets but are 
also sluggish in improving the overall efficiency of their economies, their paths to 
sustainable well-being look far-fetched.
4.5. Comparison with GDP and HDI
In this subsection, we compare our results, based on conventional calculations, with 
the past performances of other well-known indices. GDP per capita is the most 
popular index to date for monitoring the progress of nations. Since its launch in 
the early 1990s, the Human Development Index (HDI) has also been widely cited 
as an index for tracking the development of nations. HDI is a composite index of 
human capital (health and education) and income levels (GDP). Happiness, or more 
generally subjective well-being, has gained attention recently, shedding light on the 
other side of social well-being, rather than our determinant-based indicator of social 
well-being. Finally, the closest to our index is the World Bank’s genuine savings, 
formally adjusted net savings, which keeps track of savings (and dissavings) in pro-
duced, human and natural capital. For our comparison, we exhibit IWI per capita, 
both before and after adjustments, because they differ greatly.
4.5.1. GDP per capita
GDP has been criticized for sending an incorrect message regarding the sustainability 
of social well-being. Their growth can differ from our IWI per capita, as shown in 
Figures 1.27a and 1.27b. Countries in Quadrant I, which form the majority, have 
experienced both positive GDP and IWI on per capita terms. This finding is under-
standable to a certain extent since portions of GDP are directed toward investment 
in capital assets. More importantly, several dozens of countries still fall into Quadrant II, 
















































































































































Figure 1.27  Growth rates in IW per capita (education approach) vs. GDP per capita

















































































































































with positive GDP per capita but negative IW per capita, both in non-adjusted and 
adjusted terms. Note, from Quadrant IV, that the reverse is not true: positive IW 
per capita is associated with negative GDP per capita for only five countries and two 
countries, without and with adjustments, respectively. This finding shows that it 
might be sufficient to monitor IW per capita growth, even for the purpose of track-
ing GDP growth.
There is a very weak correlation between GDP per capita and IW per capita before 
adjustment, but there is a weak but positive correlation between GDP per capita 
and IW per capita after adjusting for all of the income strata. The latter finding is 
not surprising since one of the adjustment terms, TFP, measures the unaccounted-
for contribution of capital assets to GDP.
4.5.2. Growth volatility
Some authors have argued that volatility of resource prices could hurt economic 
performance (e.g. van der Ploeg and Poelhekke 2009). Although there is no formal 
theory to prove that volatility of output hampers sustainable development, it would 
be helpful to have a picture of how these two factors can be placed. Figure 1.28 
plots GDP volatility as measured by the standard deviation of the past 25-year output 
and the natural capital share. In contrast to our predictions, there is almost no 
relationship between volatility and dependence on natural capital. Although it is not 
reported, we do not see a clear correlation between volatility and IW per capita 
growth rate either. Countries that depend highly on natural capital are not neces-
sarily experiencing volatile output growth, although Iraq, Kuwait and Liberia have 








































































































































Figure 1.28  Natural capital share in 2014 (education approach) vs. 25-year average GDP 
per capita variation (standard deviation)
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4.5.3. Human Development Index (HDI)
What about the correlation of IWI and another oft-cited index of development, 
HDI? Figure 1.29 shows that there is no apparent relationship between the two 
indices. For lower middle-income countries, it even shows a slightly negative rela-
tionship; thus, HDI could send an incorrect message regarding sustainability. How-





























































































































Figure 1.29a  Growth rates in IW per capita (before adjustment) (education approach) vs. HDI





























































































































Figure 1.29b  Growth rates in IW per capita adjusted (education approach) vs. HDI
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growth IWI per capita adjusted is, the higher that HDI growth is for a limited set 
of nations, with a slightly weak correlation of R2 = 0.17 for low-income nations and 
R2 = 0.21 for upper middle-income countries. No such relationship is clearly detected 
for high or lower middle-income nations. Again, a slightly better fit for IW per 
capita adjusted can be justified since the economic component of HDI is GDP per 
capita, which contains TFP, which in turn is used in our adjustment terms to IWI.
4.5.4. Happiness
As we articulated earlier in this chapter, inclusive wealth addresses the determinants 
of social well-being. Capital assets comprise the productive base of the economy, 
which in turn becomes the source of utility for further generations. It is not intended, 
therefore, to address the constituents of well-being (Dasgupta 2001). It is not that 
the constituents can be ignored; in contrast, they can complement each other to 
express current and future social well-being.
As depicted in Figure 1.30a and 1.30b, there seems to be almost no correlation 
between the twin aspects of well-being, at least for our studied sample. Note that 
the vertical axis represents the status of happiness, instead of the growth rate of 
happiness. For some income categories, a slightly negative relationship even can be 
detected. Although we are tempted to cynically state that non-declining inclusive 
wealth might not be able to buy happiness, this observation is not necessarily bad 
news; as we have argued, they are totally different aspects of social well-being, 




































































































































Figure 1.30a  Growth rates in IW per capita (before adjustment) (education approach) vs. 
happiness
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4.5.5. Genuine savings
As part of their World Development Indicators database, the World Bank started to 
compute the genuine savings of nations as early as 1999. Its composite index is an 
affine to our IWI because they both measure the changes in produced, human and 
natural capital. However, we differ from the World Bank in many important details. 
Most notably, the World Bank does not compute capital assets per se annually; what 
it accounts for is the change in capital assets. For example, the change in produced 
capital corresponds to net national savings. Human capital is recorded as the change 
in inputs (i.e. education expenditure) instead of outputs (i.e. return on education). 
For natural capital, the World Bank studies fossil fuels, minerals, forests and carbon 
damage, but not agricultural land and fisheries. Additionally, its notion of intangible 
capital is based on the residual of the net present value of consumption, which can-
not be explained by tangible capital assets. It is not our purpose to extensively discuss 
the theoretical difference here: for further extensive discussion of the comparison, 
see IWR 2012 (UNU-IHDP and UNEP 2012).10
In principle, they could look similar, but are they empirically different in the 
assessment of sustainability over the years? Figure 1.31a shows correlation of IWI 
per capita with genuine savings. It would be best if we could express genuine sav-
ings as a share of wealth-like figures, but the World Bank does not publish stock 
data annually. We instead use the average genuine savings, excluding particulate 





































































































































Figure 1.30  Growth rates in IW per capita (education approach) vs. happiness
Figure 1.31a  Growth rates in IW per capita (before adjustment)(education approach) vs. 








































































































































Figure 1.31  Growth rates in IW per capita (education approach) vs. genuine savings as 









































































































































Figure 1.31b  Growth rates in IW per capita adjusted (education approach) vs. genuine 
savings as a share of GNI
Source: Genuine savings excluding particulate matter emissions are expressed as a share of 
GNI, taking the average values of 1990–2014.
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matter emissions, as part of the average gross national income (GNI). For genuine 
savings and IW per capita (without adjustment), the two indices do not have an 
evident relationship. In fact, a negative relationship can be found for high-income 
countries. However, once IW per capita is adjusted (Figure 1.31b), a mildly positive 
relationship can be found for all income groups, indicating that both indices tend 
to produce similar sustainability assessments, although we still have many country 
samples in Quadrant II. In a similar manner to the relationship with GDP per capita, 
we observe few countries in Quadrant IV: very few countries with positive IW per 
capita have negative genuine savings, but not the other way around. In this sense, 
IW per capita could be a more conservative indicator of sustainability.
5. Final remarks
Sustainability assessment based on capital stocks seems to be here to stay. However, 
it should be emphasized that the equivalence between wealth and well-being is the 
premise from which we all should start. Under such an equivalence, the change in 
well-being should move in the same direction as the change in wealth. Standing on 
the shoulders of Inclusive Wealth Report (IWR) 2012 and 2014, we continue our 
effort to show a truer wealth of nations. As we have stressed, it is the change in 
capital assets and wealth that counts. The value of wealth itself does not have welfare 
significance. Nonetheless, the picture of wealth also provides an interesting piece of 
information.
Specifically, in the current edition of IWR, we show the inclusive wealth of nations, 
consisting of produced, human and natural capital, based on a non-parametric 
method, which we call the frontier approach. In this approach, shadow prices are 
determined so that GDP is the output and the three capitals are inputs. As it turns 
out, 135, 89 and 96 of the 140 countries saw increases compared to their levels in 
1990 in inclusive wealth (IW), IW per capita and IW per capita adjusted. The global 
growth rate was 44%, which is an average growth rate of 1.8% per annum. However, 
this rate is smaller than the annual average GDP growth rate suggests (3.4%) during 
the same period. Turning to the breakdown of growth, we find that produced capital 
increased at an annual average rate of 3.8%, while health- and education-induced 
human capital growth remained at 2.1%, and natural capital decreased by 0.7%. In 
short, investment in produced capital has been facilitated; however, health, education 
and natural capital, in which we see enormous potential for future well-being, either 
grew modestly or even decreased. On a global scale, the configuration of capital has 
been as follows: produced (21%), education (26%), health (33%) and natural (20%). 
It is remarkable that, of the trio of capitals, the value decreased only for natural 
capital. A natural way to interpret this outcome is that produced capital and, to a 
lesser extent, human capital have been enhanced at the cost of natural capital.
Since some readers might want to see education as human capital using the IWR 
2014 approach, in which the shadow prices of human capital are based on the rate 
of return on education, as well as conventional TFP (Arrow et al. 2012), we have 
also shown the results of education computation of capital assets, following IWR 
2012 and 2014. According to this approach, for the studied period of 1990–2014, 
133, 84 and 81 countries experienced increases in IW in absolute terms, IW per 
capita and IW per capita adjusted, respectively. Since the number of countries and 
the methodology are comparable to previous editions of IWR, these numbers can 
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be said to have improved from 128, 85 and 58 of the 140 countries reported in 
IWR 2014 for the studied period of 1990–2010. Because we do not include health 
capital in the education approach for practical reasons, frontier and education 
approaches are not directly comparable because many would be double counted. 
Having noted this fact, the averages of the shares of capital assets (which is further 
averaged for the 25-year period) are as follows: produced (17%), human (54%) and 
natural (29%), with little change from IWR 2014. However, on a different scale, 
the averages are produced (20%), human (65%) and natural (15%). The last is an 
alarmingly low number, highlighting the rising scarcity of nature.
We conclude this chapter by alluding to some of the major challenges and potential 
discussions.
Completing the list of capital assets
By construction, we are asked to account for many capital assets, provided that they 
affect intertemporal well-being and they do not overlap with existing capital assets. 
Otherwise, the very premise of an equivalent relationship between wealth and well-
being would collapse.11 We have included fish wealth as an important constituent 
of natural capital for virtually the first time. Another class of natural capital that 
comes to mind is water, which is vital to economies and people of all income catego-
ries. As was experimentally discussed in UNU-IHDP and UNEP (2012), water poses 
a challenge in terms of a tricky relationship between flow and stock variables.12 In 
addition, the resilience of nature can be added as another essential capital to econo-
mies, at least conceptually (Mäler and Li 2010) and locally in practice (Walker et al. 
2010). Accounting for resilience in a non-local manner would be difficult, if not 
impossible.
Furthermore, institutions and social capital are even more challenging classes to 
consider. Aside from their intangibility, part of the issue arises from the very nature 
of these assets: they enable other capital assets to function to yield well-being (Das-
gupta 2015). Therefore, we should resist the temptation to add, for example, social 
capital as another capital asset in an ad hoc manner, such as the valuation of social 
capital through revealed preference. A more promising method would be to account 
for social capital in a two-stage setup, in which we can see how social capital raises 
the shadow prices of other capital assets.
Shadow prices
Even in imperfect economies, as we know, the relative weight of capital assets has 
been shown to be formalized as their marginal contributions to social well-being, 
given a forecast of an economy (Arrow et al. 2012), as we demonstrated in Sec-
tion 2. In the current volume of IWR, we have shown results in which non-parametric 
frontier analysis is used to compute the shadow prices of human capital. This capital 
comes with its costs: compared to the education approach to human capital shadow 
prices, GDP is used as the output, corresponding to the three capitals.13 Inclusive 
wealth accounting for sustainability assessment is, by construction, founded on 
intertemporal well-being, so it would be best if we could use the latter as the output. 
Admittedly, the education approach is also not without faults: the rate of return on 
education, as well as value of statistical life (VSL) year, is derived from market 
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transactions and thus can deviate from the marginal impact on well-being. Perhaps 
of more concern to us in the face of looming climate change is the non-linearity of 
shadow prices. We are required to update our shadow prices, if necessary, once 
scientific evidence of the scarcity of the components of natural capital is revealed.
Coevolution and interdependence of capital assets
The shadow price of a given capital reflects marginal social value, but it can also be 
subject to other capital assets. In the language of ecological economists, capital assets 
co-evolve. For example, we can think of negative externality in health capital. We 
already have accounted for carbon damage by greenhouse gases in the adjustment 
terms, but it might also be a good idea to include local air pollution, as is performed 
for particulate matter in the World Bank’s (2016) computation of genuine savings. 
Indeed, there is ample evidence that local air pollution, both indoor and outdoor, 
is hazardous to health and poses a hindrance to longevity. Local air pollution acts 
more like a flow variable rather than a stock, but it could be formalized as a per-
sistent negative natural capital. Even so, care should be taken not to double count 
health capital because, if the VSL already captures shorter life years caused by air 
pollution, then it would be redundant to account for its externality to health.
To provide another example, it is not necessarily clear to which capital urban land 
is allocated; currently, it is implicitly within produced capital in many cases. In its 
analysis of state-by-state wealth accounting, Chapter 5 of UNU-IHDP and UNEP 
(2012) has explicitly treated urban land under produced capital. Improving the 
amenity value of the environment in cities, therefore, could potentially boost the 
shadow value of urban land. Conversely, natural capital shadow prices could be 
affected by produced capital investment. However, this question remains open to 
discussion since it would involve consumers’ surplus, which might not exactly match 
shadow value in inclusive wealth accounting. This consideration would bring us 
back, like it or not, to the matter of shadow prices.
Notes
1 See UNU-IHDP and UNEP (2012) for what makes the Inclusive Wealth Index 
distinct from the World Bank’s genuine savings. To be more precise, genuine savings 
are constructed from flow variables, complemented by stock calculations.
2 Hartwick (1977) and Dixit et al. (1980) showed that investing exhaustible resource 
rents into produced capital yields non-declining consumption, which is another way 
of defining sustainable development.
3 In theory, W is different from IWI, which is calculated based on constant shadow 
prices. When reckoning the real W, it is obvious that, for example, the last drop of 
oil should have a different marginal value than the regular drop when it is not scarce. 
We compute IWI on the premise that the studied period is relatively short.
4 More specifically, the ratio of carbon damage to inclusive wealth can be deducted from 
the inclusive wealth growth rate to arrive at the adjusted inclusive wealth growth rate.
5 These countries are Estonia, Gabon, Gambia, Greece, Croatia, Haiti, Jamaica, Laos, 
Latvia, Sudan, Serbia, Syria and Vietnam.
6 The years 1990 and 1991 are skipped here to avoid missing data in some former 
Soviet republics.
7 In theory, the value of oil natural capital can remain intact if the decreasing rate of 
oil quantity can be compensated for by the oil price increase rate when the quantity 
is fixed.
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8 When oil prices are expected to increase in the future for some reason or another, 
the current list of capital assets could also be adjusted to reflect such a gain in social 
well-being (Vincent et al. 1997; Hamilton and Bolt 2004; van der Ploeg 2010). We 
do not consider this possibility since future oil prices are too uncertain, as our recent 
experience demonstrates.
9 Of the 140 countries sampled, there are 33 countries with TFP data missing in 
Conference Board (2017), which are complemented by regional averages.
10 The methodology of the World Bank’s genuine savings is delineated in World Bank (2011).
11 If our list of capital assets is not complete, wealth could deviate from well-being. On 
an empirical level, there have been studies to test genuine savings and consumption 
changes (Ferreira et al. 2008; Greasley et al. 2014), and we recommend similar studies 
be conducted for inclusive wealth as well.
12 Fenichel et al. (2016) attempted to account for local groundwater in an imperfect 
economy.
13 One can defend the use of GDP as the output of three capitals by claiming that the 
value of life expressed as health capital implicitly nests future generations. However, 
this interpretation of utility function would be very limited, so we do not push this 
thesis any further.
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Introduction
One is unlikely to find a major publicly traded firm that does not conduct asset 
accounting and balance sheet analysis. The information embedded in such reports 
provides investors valuable insights into the composition of firm assets and insights 
into its short and long-run trends. Surprisingly, few nations have a history of prepar-
ing annual balance sheets, thus hamstringing the ability of policy analysts and poli-
cymakers to understand trends in the composition and status of national wealth, 
and use such information to inform policy design. Recently, however, the advent of 
wealth accounting by UN Environment and others is helping fill this information 
gap – how this information will be used remains to be seen.
Currently, UN Environment measures of wealth are calculated as weighted sums 
of human, natural and produced capital, with the weighted index called the Inclusive 
Wealth Index (IWI).1 One can view a nation’s wealth as an index of the productive 
base from which the flow of goods and services (i.e. gross national product, or 
GDP) is generated. Roughly speaking, if the productive base (per capita) of a 
country has not fallen over time, and if projections suggest this pattern will continue 
into the future, we say the country’s growth is sustainable. Note that while sustain-
able growth can accommodate a pattern of increasing (or decreasing) GDP per 
capita over time, it is not wise to assume that a pattern of increasing GDP over 
time is consistent with sustainable growth. A simple example in the next section 
illustrates.
This chapter has four sections. The first section provides an overview of the 
rationale underlying the claim that – from an intergenerational welfare perspective – 
linking resource allocation policies to changes in wealth is more appropriate than link-
ing resource allocation policies to changes in gross domestic product (GDP). This 
second section provides an overview of the basis for wealth estimation and explores 
how various types of conservation and development policies recognizing the trade-
off can be understood better with the help of inclusive wealth. The second section 
also brings the wealth concept closer to national level policies on selected conserva-
tion goals and targets, and shows its comparative advantage over others.
The third section illustrates some of the advantages of estimating wealth in the 
context of Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs) of the United Nations endorsed 
in 2015. The chapter examines some of the global policy goals manifested in Agenda 
2030 and the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). By selecting a few goals and 
targets, it has been shown how we can achieve greater results for the SDGs if the 
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indicator is orchestrated through wealth index. Finally, the chapter synthesizes the 
lessons learned including caveats and limitations of wealth in formulating policies 
of conservation and development at various levels of decision-making units.
1.  Gross domestic product, wealth measurement, 
substitution and sustainability
Gross domestic product and inclusive wealth
Gross domestic product was introduced at the Bretton Woods conference in 1944 
and was to serve as an index of the size of a country’s economy – an accounting 
measure of all goods and services produced in a country over a given period of 
time. Since its inception, however, GDP gradually morphed from simply a measure 
of market activity, into a measure of a country’s overall well-being – per capita 
GDP – a far cry from its original interpretation in the 1940s.
The shortcomings of GDP as a measure of social well-being are well-known, with 
the two most germane to this discussion being – GDP ignores: (i) the value of 
human capital and the non-market values of natural capital; and (ii) the economic 
value of externalities, both positive and negative. Few will argue that GDP was to 
serve as a measure of social inclusivity or environmental sustainability.2 Perhaps this 
is why, as countries continue to advance economically, one questions the ability of 
GDP to adequately gauge human well-being and sustainability – this is especially 
the case when natural resource availability appears to present impediments to eco-
nomic growth.
Gross domestic product is a measure of the value of service flows generated by 
an economy’s produced (or physical), human and natural capital over a period of 
time. Wealth – in this case inclusive wealth – is defined as the sum of the value of 
three types of capital stock: human capital, physical capital and natural capital. The 
value of each capital is defined as the unit stock value of that capital multiplied by 
the quantity of that capital. For example, if the unit stock price of physical capital 
is $1 and the economy is endowed with 5,000,000 units of physical capital, the 
stock value of physical capital is $5,000,000.
The Inclusive Wealth Index measures the wealth of a country by carrying out a 
comprehensive analysis of the country’s productive base – with the productive base 
including three types of capital: manufactured or physical, human and natural. Its 
objective is that of measuring a nation’s capacity to create and maintain human 
well-being over time. A country’s inclusive wealth is the social value (as contrasted 
with market values) of all its capital assets, including natural capital, human capital 
and produced capital. If a country’s IWI is non-decreasing over time, we say its 
growth is sustainable. The implication being the average household in the future is 
no worse off than households today.
Manufactured capital is the physical capital produced by humans – automobiles, 
roads, buildings, etc. Human capital is often defined as the stock of knowledge and 
skills possessed by a population, and the health status of that population. Investments 
in education, training and health are called investments in human capital.3 Natural 
capital can be viewed as the stocks of natural assets, ranging from soil, water and 
air, to all living things.
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The wide range of services natural capital provide are called ecosystem services, 
some of which are provisioning services like fuel from wood, cooking water from 
streams and lakes, and food from agricultural production. In developing countries, 
the poor and other economically vulnerable groups are highly dependent on eco-
system services for their livelihoods, with natural capital accounting for 36% of wealth 
in low-income countries (WAVES, 2012).
In addition to the provisioning service flows that directly support human life, 
there are less visible ecosystem services that come within the purview of regulat-
ing, habitat and supporting, and cultural functions. Although these services can 
be just as important – in some cases, essential – for human well-being, their 
contributions typically fall outside the domain of market valuation. An example of 
regulating services include a forest’s contribution to flood control and climate 
regulation, and its carbon storage services – each of which may be intangible from 
an economic standpoint, but undeniably valuable to humans, animals and other 
life forms. Despite the importance of the regulating and sustaining services to 
human well-being, the value of the services or the natural capital that produce 
them are seldom measured.
One could argue that, traditionally, economic policymakers focused on efficient 
production (e.g. eliminating subsidies, curtailing trade barriers) and increasing 
per capita GDP growth. The thinking was that efficiency and growth would 
increase the size of the economy, and the larger the economy, the more goods 
and services available for social consumption. Such productive activities, however, 
were often accompanied by negative externalities like air and water pollution. As 
the negative impact of the environmental externalities became more apparent, 
and documented with verifiable statistics, many countries adjusted their industrial 
policies to lessen the levels and impact of the externalities. Still, in spite of the 
efforts to curtail negative outcomes like air pollution, air pollution levels in cities 
across the globe provide evidence of the continued negative side effects of modern 
economic production.4 Furthermore, the impacts of environmental degradation 
on health and recreational quality have not yet made its way into any well-known 
economic indices.
We have come to a similar point with natural resource and ecosystem manage-
ment: a more clear understanding – and acceptance – of the potential problems 
associated with natural resource and ecosystem degradation has led to efforts to 
collect data that eventually should help better manage ecosystems and increasingly 
scarce natural resources. Data such as water stocks and qualities across nations, soil 
depth, forested area and carbon sequestration are beginning to enter national account 
tables via the United Nations’ System and Environmental Economic Accounting 
(SEEA).5 The hope is to eventually use the natural resource stock levels to calculate 
natural resource, and possibly ecosystem service, stock and flow value indices.
Why a wealth-based index of sustainability?
Typically, if per capita GDP growth is non-negative, decision makers assume the 
economy is doing well. The following example, however, illustrates this assumption 
could be misleading. Table 2.1 presents hypothetical levels of physical, human and 
natural capital for an (closed) economy, along with unit flow and unit stock prices. 
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For simplicity, assume the economy produces a single final good, and that producing 
a unit of the final good takes one year, and requires a one unit of natural capital, 
40 units of physical capital and 0.006 units of labour.6 The reader can verify that 
given the factor endowments in Table 2.1, the maximum amount of the final good 
the economy can produce over the year is 250,000 units. In such a case, given the 
unit rental (Flower & Schreve) rates of capital and labour, and assuming the unit 
cost of the unit price of timber is $20; the economy’s GDP is $9,000,000. The 
initial value of inclusive wealth is equal to the sum of the stock values of physical, 
human and natural capital: $1 × 10,000,000 + $400,000 × 150 + $20 × 1,000,000 = 
$90,000,000.
To keep calculations simple, assume physical and human capital do not depreciate, 
and the economy never replaces the natural capital used over the year. Then GDP 
in the subsequent year would also be equal to $9,000,000. However, since the 
economy used 250,000 units of natural capital, its capital stock would be equal to 
750,000 and its inclusive wealth equal to $85,000,000. In this simple example, the 
economy could generate $9,000,000 in GDP for four years. On the other hand, 
inclusive wealth per capita is falling over time – hence, the economy’s growth pat-
tern is not sustainable.
In this simple example, GDP does not change and provides no indication the 
economy is approaching a cliff. The inclusive wealth measure, however, provides a 
warning, as inclusive wealth falls each period. As a sustainability index, it appears 
the Inclusive Wealth Index is superior to GDP (and any current measure of income 
changes) as a sustainability index. As such, the example illustrates why we might 
want to focus on wealth-based measures of sustainability. For an elegant mathemati-
cal argument underlying the superiority of wealth based sustainability measures, see 
Dasgupta (2009).
Of course, with no trade, and given the fixed coefficient production structure, 
the economy would be unable to produce any of the final good in the fifth year. 
This example, of course, is highly stylized but does show what can happen to a 
region in a country if an essential natural resource is improperly managed and if 
one ignores sustainability concerns. An extremely relevant example is the Aral Sea 
debacle, where water diversions for cotton and rice production caused the surface 
area of the Aral Sea to fall enough where ships could no longer reach the shores of 
existing cities – transforming a once economically vibrant water body into one with 
virtually no economic value.
Table 2.1  Productive base – capital quantities, unit flow and stock values, GDP and 
inclusive wealth
Factor Quantity Unit cost Unit stock 
value
Flow value Initial stock 
value
Physical capital 10,000,000 $0.10 $1.00 $1,000,000 $10,000,000
Human capital 150 $20,000 $400,000 $3,000,000 $60,000,000
Natural capital 1,000,000 $20 $20 $5,000,000 $20,000,000
GDP – – – $9,000,000 –
Inclusive wealth – – – – $90,000,000
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Substitution and sustainability indices
The GDP and inclusive wealth pattern in the above example occurs because the 
assumed production technology did not allow input substitution, e.g. did not allow 
the economy to use more human capital and less natural capital and get the same 
level of output. If it was possible to produce income without natural capital, or 
produce the same level of output with less natural capital and more human or physi-
cal capital, the economy or region could continue generating income as natural 
capital levels fell. This issue of substitution possibilities for natural capital is central 
to an ongoing discourse on policy formulation for sustainable development.
Many economists assume technological advances will offset the potential fall in 
productivity due to natural capital losses. This view implicitly assumes human and 
physical capital can serve as substitutes for natural capital. On the other hand, many 
ecological scientists assume the substitution possibilities between human, physical and 
natural capital are limited, and that natural capital stocks impose a limit on productiv-
ity; this notion borrows from the concept of carrying capacity (Ehrlich & Pringle). 
The ecologists implicitly assume a shrinking natural capital base implies a decreasing 
level of potential productivity – maintaining the life support system of the earth is 
required to ensure sustainability.
Concerns with the substitutability of natural, human and physical capital influence 
the way we define and measure sustainability indices. Two broad classes of sustain-
ability indices exist. One class assumes human and physical capital are unable to 
serve as substitutes for natural capital. Strong sustainability goals are linked to such 
restrictions. A sustainability index designed to satisfy strong sustainability goals would 
likely require the level of natural capital stocks per capita to not fall over time, and 
a separate index of human and physical capital per capita not fall over time.
The other class of sustainability indices accommodates substitution between natural, 
human and physical capital. Weak sustainability goals are linked to these require-
ments. The Inclusive Wealth Index is a single index composed of the values of 
human, physical and natural capital and yields a weak sustainability index. By con-
struction, it allows for an increase in inclusive wealth (per capita) in the face of 
natural capital depreciation – it can increase as long as the decrease in natural capital 
stocks is offset by enough of an increase in human and physical capital stocks.
Combining, or reconciling, the economists’ and ecologists’ perspectives should be 
possible if the context and character of resources are known. More to the point, the 
ecologists’ notion of substitution and sustainability are captured in the example above, 
where there are no substitution possibilities across human, physical and natural capital. 
The Aral Sea debacle is a real world example of such a case. An island tourism 
economy is an example of how substitution could lead to an opposite outcome. Say 
the island’s growth is linked to water recreation activities and, over time, loses natural 
capital through the degradation of its coral reef system. If the island invests in casinos 
and associated activities, it is possible the increase in physical and human capital could 
lead to an outcome where inclusive wealth per capita increases over time.
Some types of natural capital have little to no human or physical capital alterna-
tives. In poor nations the ability of climate conditions to control vector borne diseases 
may be limited. The regulative services inherent in nutrient cycling, soil formation 
and bioremediation also likely have few human and physical capital alternatives. The 
capital underlying these services is referred to as critical capital. If one could identify 
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and measure critical capital and monitor the levels and growth of that capital it 
might be possible to develop a sustainability index of critical capital, but it is unlikely 
a market value of the capital would enter GDP measures anytime soon.
The Aral Sea, island tourism and critical capital examples suggest the degree of 
ease with which an economy can substitute human or physical capital for natural 
capital will determine whether a strong or weak sustainability criteria is appropriate. 
Initial empirical studies suggest substitution possibilities exist for a wide range of 
production scenarios (Markandya, 2007, How substitutable is natural capital?).
The Inclusive Wealth Report (IWR) also suggests that, over the past 20 years, for 
over 100 countries, the negative wealth effects of a decline in natural capital have 
been offset by growth in human and physical capital. However, the emergence of 
concepts like critical natural capital and regulating services of ecosystems and their 
role in sustaining the extremely impoverished, suggests there remain significant defi-
ciencies in our current crop of sustainability indices. For instance, like GDP, the IWI 
has very little to say about income distribution and its impact on social welfare.
The Inclusive Wealth Index has the potential to measure a nation’s wealth in 
terms of economic progress and long-term sustainability. It measures the wealth of 
nations via implementing an analysis of a country’s productive base. The value of 
the productive base provides an index of an economy’s production potential: if the 
IWI increases over time, it signals the economy is making economic progress much 
the same way that per capita GDP does. If the health and human capital component 
of the IWI increases, it provides a signal that human well-being is improving as well. 
An increasing IWI also suggests past and current consumption is not coming at the 
cost of future generations’ consumption potential.
Using the IWI can scale up resource efficiency – by providing policymakers with an 
overview of changes in the productive base of a country. It provides insights into trends 
within the capital asset groups, particularly human and natural capital – the central 
pillars of inclusive wealth that remain underserved by current statistical collection efforts, 
and economic and policymaking analysis. The IWI can provide insights into whether 
current growth is sustainable or is based on overexploiting natural capital. This infor-
mation can help develop policy better suited to sustaining growth while better managing 
human and natural capital. For example, results from the 2014 Inclusive Wealth Report 
(IWR) demonstrate that investing in human capital would be most beneficial for coun-
tries with the highest rates of population growth. It also demonstrates the multiple 
benefits of investments in natural capital, in particular agricultural land and forest.
2. Wealth, income, growth and sustainability
Inclusive wealth and growth accounting
Section 1 provides an overview of the rationale for preferring changes in wealth per 
capita over GDP per capita as an index of sustainability. Although changes in per 
capita wealth is the preferred metric of sustainability, we should not assume GDP 
is devoid of policy relevance. We compared the per capita growth rates of inclusive 
wealth and GDP for 121 countries and found 47 averaged negative rates of growth 
in per capita inclusive wealth over the years 1990 through 2010.
Table 2.2 reports the growth rates of the 47 countries and reveals almost all of 
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experienced negative per capita GDP growth over the 20-year period. Almost half 
of the countries in Table 2.2 are in sub-Saharan Africa. The remaining 74 countries 
experienced positive rates of growth in both per capita inclusive wealth and per 
capita GDP (for a list of these countries, see Table 2.6 in the appendix).
Often, macroeconomists use an analytical tool called growth accounting to gain 
insight into economic growth dynamics. This tool can also be used to understand 
inclusive wealth dynamics, and albeit growth accounting provides a more clear 
understanding of what contributes to growth, it does not imply causality. Before 
writing the growth accounting expression, consider the following definitions: Let 
At denote the value of inclusive wealth at time t – a proxy for the aggregate value 
of physical capital, human capital and natural capital. Let kt, Ht and Nt denote the 
levels of physical capital, human capital and natural capital (respectively) at time t. 
Let PK, PH and PN denote the (respective) unit prices of physical, human and natural 
capital – to keep subsequent notation simply, these prices are assumed constant over 
time. Given this notation, we write inclusive wealth as:
A P K P H P Nt K t H t N t= + +
Given our Inclusive Wealth Index is defined in per capita terms, divide both sides 
of this equation by population, which we denote by Lt. Reasonably straightforward 
algebraic manipulations yield the following inclusive wealth growth accounting 
expression:7





















































   
(1)
Here at  is the (instantaneous) change in the level of inclusive wealth per capita. The 
remaining “dotted” variables represent the change in that variable given a change 
in time, e.g. Kt  is the instantaneous change in the physical capital. The following 
variables are inclusive wealth value shares at time t; αK t K t tP K A, /=  is physical 
capital’s share of inclusive wealth; αH t H t tP H A, /=  is human capital’s share of 
inclusive wealth; and αN t N t tP N A, /=  is natural capital’s share of inclusive wealth. 
The three shares sum to unity. Finally, the term a at t/  is the (instantaneous) rate 
of growth in inclusive wealth per capita – analogous definitions extend to the remain-
ing variables, e.g. L lt t/  is the rate of growth in population.
Equation (1) reveals seven sources of Inclusive Wealth Index growth. One source 
is population growth, which puts downward pressure on the IWI. Between 1990 
and 2015, the average annual rate of population growth in sub-Saharan Africa was 
2.7%, as compared to less than 1% annual growth in the Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries. Hence, even if a country did 
not over-exploit its natural resource base, high population growth rates could explain 
a large part of a pattern of unsustainable growth.
Changes in physical, human and natural capital account for three more sources 
of IWI growth. An increase in the stock of physical and human capital occurs 
when a nation invests enough of its income (GDP) to yield a net increase in 
physical or human capital. For example, when investment in physical capital is 
greater than the amount lost through depreciation, then physical capital growth 
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contributes positively to IWI growth. Investments in agricultural extension training 
can lead to soil conservation and lower levels of natural resource degradation, as 
could training in forest management – both forms of human capital investment. 
What we hope is clear is, even if an economy is experiencing a decline in natural 
resource stocks, the IWI index can increase if the economy reinvests enough of 
its income to increase its physical and human capital stocks.
The remaining three potential influences on IWI growth are the inclusive wealth 
asset shares. Consider two countries, both of which are depleting their natural 
resource base. “All else equal,” the country having the larger natural capital share 
will have the larger fall in its IWI. An implication for development is, arguably, the 
inclusive wealth share of natural resources in most developing countries will be 
higher than that for a typical developed country. If this is the case, to support sus-
tainable development a developing country will likely need larger rates of growth 
in physical (and human) capital stocks than the typical developed country. If the 
natural resource share in one country is 5% and the physical capital share is 50%, a 
10% fall in natural capital stocks can be offset by a 1% increase in physical capital. 
On the other hand, if the natural resource share in the country is 20% and the 
physical capital share is 50%, the country would need a 4% increase in the capital 
stock to offset a 10% fall in natural capital
Returning to Table 2.2, for almost all 47 countries, natural resources serve as an 
important source of GDP, and one can safely assume that the fall in per capita 
inclusive wealth is linked directly to natural resource extraction (e.g. minerals and 
oil) or harvesting (e.g. forest). Also, population growth is high in most of the 
countries, which further serves to hamper sustainable growth. Finally, at least for 
the developing countries in the list, natural resource shares are likely quite high. 
Hence, in spite of the relatively high rates of GDP growth experienced by some of 
the countries, these factors combine to make sustainable growth a difficult objective 
to achieve. Table 2.3 provides an example of inclusive wealth growth accounting 
for Malawi. Note, natural capital accounts for over 50% of Malawi’s inclusive wealth 
in 1990, and falls to 37% by 2010. The rates of growth in human capital are very 
low relative to the rates of decline in natural capital, as are the rates of growth in 
Table 2.3 Malawi inclusive wealth growth accounting
Asset type 2005 US$ per capita 5-year growth
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 1995 2000 2005 2010
Human 1,505 1,488 1,504 1,571 1,576 −0.011 0.011 0.045 0.003
Physical 889 871 749 671 789 −0.020 −0.140 −0.104 0.176
Natural 2,499 2,287 1,983 1,690 1,414 −0.085 −0.133 −0.148 −0.163
Inclusive 
wealth
4,893 4,646 4,236 3,932 3,779 −0.050 −0.088 −0.072 −0.039
Inclusive wealth shares Contributions to IWI growth
Human 0.308 0.320 0.355 0.400 0.417 −0.003 0.003 0.016 0.001
Physical 0.182 0.187 0.177 0.171 0.209 −0.004 −0.026 −0.018 0.030
Natural 0.511 0.492 0.468 0.430 0.374 −0.043 −0.065 −0.069 −0.070
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physical capital. These factors all contribute to the unsustainable wealth trajectory 
for the country.
As for the 74 countries in the appendix, even if a country’s natural capital stocks 
are falling, its reinvestment in physical and human capital more than offsets the 
wealth lost through depleted natural assets – the result being an increase in inclusive 
wealth, and hence, what appears to be a sustainable growth trajectory. Table 2.4 
reports inclusive growth accounting figures for China. China begins with a natural 
capital share of 42% in 1990, which falls to 21% by 2010. Note, however, the rates 
of growth in its human and physical capital stocks (relative to its decline in natural 
capital stocks). This reinvestment in human and physical capital is one of the reasons 
China’s Inclusive Wealth Index has outperformed all other countries.
3.  Wealth and the Sustainable Development 
Goals (SDGs)
Unlike the Millennium Development Goals, which were more focused on achieving 
certain development targets for developing nations, the proposed Sustainable Devel-
opment Goals (SDGs)8 are truly global in nature. Applicable to all nations, developing 
or developed, the SDGs emerged from an evolving and collaborative process, rep-
resenting collective aspirations, while taking into account different national realities, 
capacities and levels of development. Rooted in the outcome document, The Future 
We Want, from the Rio+20 summit in 2012, the SDGs were promulgated to reflect 
the pursuit of all three dimensions of sustainable development – social, economic 
and environmental. Through Rio+20, the Open Working Group was formed with 
representatives from 70 countries, which by July 2014 published a draft with a set 
of 17 goals and 169 targets. Assessing and valuing natural capital and the change 
in per capita inclusive/comprehensive wealth over time has the potential to keep 
track of progress on most Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
IWI is a multi-purpose, multi-target measure of sustainable development. An 
increase in IWI will suggest poverty eradication (SDG, 1) and an improvement in 
Table 2.4 China inclusive wealth growth accounting
Asset type 2005 US$ per capita 5-year growth
1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 1995 2000 2005 2010
Human 8,043 8,620 9,138 9,504 10,025 0.072 0.060 0.040 0.055
Physical 1,369 1,995 3,123 5,044 8,748 0.457 0.565 0.615 0.734
Natural 6,805 6,355 5,882 5,429 5,061 −0.066 −0.074 −0.077 −0.068
Inclusive 
wealth
16,217 16,970 18,143 19,977 23,834 0.046 0.069 0.101 0.193
Inclusive wealth shares Contributions to IWI growth
Human 0.496 0.508 0.504 0.476 0.421 0.036 0.031 0.020 0.026
Physical 0.084 0.118 0.172 0.252 0.367 0.039 0.066 0.106 0.185
Natural 0.420 0.374 0.324 0.272 0.212 −0.028 −0.028 −0.025 −0.018
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food security, while promoting sustainable agriculture (SDG 2) and healthy lives 
and well-being (SDG 3). An increase in IWI will also indicate sustained, but not 
necessarily inclusive economic growth (SDG 8), and sustainable consumption and 
production patterns (SDG 12). A decrease in IWI will indicate degradation of natural 
capital and failure to take steps to combat climate change and its impacts (SGD 13), 
conserve and sustainably using the oceans, seas and marine resources (SDG 14), 
protect, restore and promote the sustainable use of terrestrial ecosystems, sustainably 
manage forests, combat desertification, reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity 
loss (SDG 15). IWI can measure the strength of the means of implementation for 
sustainable development (SDG 17).
IWI has a specific role to play in complementing SDG Target 8.1, which is cur-
rently measured by GDP growth with a target of 7% per year (a measure of growth 
in the level of transactions). IWI complements this by emphasizing the growth of 
wealth – something that is much better aligned with the SDGs as the indicators and 
targets clearly link the sustainability with the productive base of the economy, water, 
air, soil and other natural assets.
The environmental dimension of SDGs is very explicit. Most of the targets are 
directly or indirectly related to the status of natural capital. The overarching message 
from Agenda 2030 is for nations to keep their natural capital stocks intact. Since 
GDP does not track natural capital levels, it will most certainly be inadequate for 
managing these resources.
Figure 2.1 highlights one conclusion we can draw from the chapters in this vol-
ume: that natural capital’s share (NC_Capital_Share) in inclusive wealth has fallen 
since 1990, while the share of human capital (HC_Capital_Share) and physical capital 
(PC_Capital_Share) has steadily increased. Under a weak substitutability criteria, the 
world has been experiencing sustainable growth. Our guess, however, is the world 
likely would not satisfy sustainability under a strong substitutability criteria.
One of the core strengths of the Sustainable Development Goals is their recogni-
tion of the complex interlinkages that prevail between human well-being, economic 
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prosperity and a healthy natural habitat. Thus, as we move towards exploring more 
sustainable ways of developing, we need forms of measure that reflect such objectives. 
In this regard, an indicator or a bundle of indicators that can reflect such interlink-
ages, connectivity and causality by recognizing impact on sustainability and inclusivity 
are key to measuring long-term progress.
Inclusive wealth index – sustainability and inclusivity
By incorporating changes in human and natural capital alongside the existing mea-
sures of produced capital, namely GDP, the IWI provides a balance sheet for nations 
that offers them a more comprehensive view of their asset endowments. Fundamen-
tally, the approach aims to address the major policy gaps that exist on growth and 
development that fail to address issues of sustainability, natural resource depletion 
and human well-being.
The 2014 Inclusive Wealth Report assessed data from 140 countries over a span 
of 20 years and observed changes in produced capital, human capital and natural 
capital. The aggregate data suggest that GDP and the Human Development Index 
(HDI) made significant strides over the period, but natural capital declined in 127 
of the 140 countries. Such analysis through the IWI enables countries to monitor 
their comprehensive capital pool and push for greater action and accountability and 
the pursuit of more sustainable pathways.
Assessing and valuing natural capital and the change in per capita inclusive/
comprehensive wealth over time has the potential to keep track of progress on several 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs). Figure 2.2 illustrates.
IWI has a specific role to play in tracking Sustainable Development Goals and 
related Targets 1, 2, 3 and 8.1. IWI complements the current target provided by 
technical work of the Sustainable Development Goals, of 7% per year in GDP (a 
measure of growth in the level of transactions) as the wealth estimates would keep 
track of the base from which income is generated. The wealth estimate is much 
better aligned with the SDGs as they are more reliable about information on the 
productive base of the economy.
The IWI’s key strength lay in its potential to serve as an indicator for guiding sustain-
able development policy. The wealth can inform planning and investment decisions that 
promote a low carbon, resource efficient and socially inclusive economy. Wealth estimate 
organizes information on various types of wealth and trade-off . As the estimates in this 
volume suggest, a number of countries are recording growth in human capital at the 
cost of natural capital (unsustainable agriculture and industrialisation leading to better 
port, roads and infrastructure, at least in the short-run). Unlike GDP, information on 
wealth can also be used as an instrument in designing more efficient and effective policy 
reforms and regulation changes that act as a catalyst for sustainable investment and 
development pathways.
Recognizing natural capital as an important source of wealth to the economy 
and its contributions to the poor can inform planning and policy decisions that 
prioritize investing in natural capital as a way of reinvesting in wealth. Inter alia, 
fighting poverty is conditional on the sustainable management of land. Without 
managing our natural resources such as agricultural land, forests and fish stocks we 
will not be able to ensure sustainable economic growth and inclusive green economy 
(UNEP, 2015).
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However, in order to monitor progress towards SDGs, we must be equipped with 
appropriate benchmark data, be capable of assessing progress from one year to the 
next and have a meaningful way to compare progress across countries. Such analysis 
through universally accepted indicators and statistical frameworks is key to under-
standing how the globe is faring. Significant data gaps exist, however, specifically 
with regards to natural capital measurement. As data is a key building block in the 
development framework, we must explore: (i) how innovation in information 
Figure 2.2  Institutional framework for IWI and Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs)
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technology and existing data infrastructures can be aligned to produce improved 
development data; (ii) how participatory mechanisms and qualitative methods and 
knowledge can strengthen quantitative information to enhance our understanding; 
and (iii) disaggregating data to enable more nuanced insights into the inequalities 
and challenges faced by particular groups within an given economy.
Moreover, the new sustainability indicators that emerged over the past decade – 
including the Inclusive Wealth Index – have pushed the envelope and called for a 
re-imagination of how we define and measure progress. Although these indicators 
are the results of efforts to capture the three domains of sustainable development – 
economic, social and political – it is important to more clearly identify and under-
stand the links, inter-dynamics and causality between these domains. Indeed, this 
is an area of work not limited to economists or statisticians, but entails the involve-
ment of policy analysts, academics and development practitioners from diverse fields.
In order to support all these initiatives, indices and measurement of SDG per-
formance, there is a fundamental need for policy coherence. Building capacities for 
integrated policy and data assessment as well as coherence and coordination among 
strategies to achieve the SDGs can allow for mutual co-benefits and avoid any 
counterproductive results.
Nonetheless it is important to acknowledge and appreciate the political processes 
thus far that have led to the culmination of the SDGs. Fundamentally, the SDGs 
and their widespread acceptance will not only represent the aspirations of both the 
developed and developing worlds but will reflect their mutual meeting ground. It 
is imperative that we continue to work past the challenges that may arise and strive 
to make the three common foundational principles of the SDGs – leave no one 
behind; ensure equity and dignity for all; and achieve prosperity within Earth’s safe 
and restored operating space (UNEP, 2015) – a reality.
4. Inclusive wealth and conservation policies
A large literature exists that argues the current System of National Accounts (SNA) 
undervalues natural capital and its contributions to human well-being. In such cases, 
policies aimed at protecting natural capital will at best be fraught with inefficiencies 
and likely lead to sub-optimal resource allocations. The inclusive wealth account can 
serve as a key tool in designing more efficient and effective environmentally sustain-
able policies that underpin economic and social progress, and overall sustainable 
development imperatives. This section discusses how the IWR can be used to inform 
policy decisions related to the conservation of natural capital, with a specific focus 
on forests, air pollution and fisheries.
Inclusive wealth and forestry policy
As demonstrated in Chapter 6, in many countries, forests comprise a major share 
of their capital stocks and are a source of a range of vital ecosystem services: pro-
visioning services (e.g. food, fuel and fibre); regulating (e.g. carbon regulation); 
supporting (e.g. biodiversity conservation); and sustaining cultural services (e.g. 
recreation and tourism) (MA, 2005). Yet in many countries, the present SNA does 
not adequately account for the contributions of forest capital to watershed protec-
tion, carbon storage, biodiversity conservation as well as the contributions of forest 
capital as a factor of production to other sectors of an economy.
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Under the IWR, the value of forest capital is calculated as the present value of 
the future net benefits expected over the life of a forest resource. It integrates the 
contributions of a wide range of forest services, although current data limitations 
preclude a full accounting of all contributions. The forest capital component of the 
IWR can serve as an indicator of whether forest resources are being used sustainably 
for the present and future generations. This information could be used to move 
resource managers and country authorities towards policy options aimed at: (i) man-
aging trade-offs among competing forest uses; (ii) designing effective and efficient 
economic policy instruments (e.g. property rights, taxes and subsidies, creating 
markets for non-market forest services); and (iii) providing the basis for monitoring 
policy implementation and effectiveness (Lange, 2004).
Lange (2004, 2003) outlines six key policy questions related to managing forest 
resources or developing cross-sectoral policies that facilitate forest management. 
These policy questions underlie World Bank initiatives like WAVES (Wealth Account-
ing and the Valuation of Ecosystem Services). Given that policy uses and management 
options likely vary from country to country, we do not attempt to provide an 
exhaustive list of relevant questions and policy options. The remaining section out-
lines how the IWR and, in particular, the forest account component of the IWR 
could be used to inform some of these policy questions.
What is the total economic contribution of forests  
and forest ecosystems, and what are the potential  
benefits from sustainable management?
The forest capital component of the IWI takes into account a wide range of forest 
contributions and, therefore, reflects a more accurate approximation of the value of 
forest resources. Consequently, the value of forest capital is likely to be higher than 
that typically embedded in GDP calculations. This higher valuation should help 
forest resources gain wider recognition in macroeconomic policy deliberations: a 
higher value of forest contributions to GDP could potentially increase the forestry 
sector’s bargaining power for a larger share of national budget for forest manage-
ment and investment.
How are benefits of forest resources distributed across society?
Presently, inclusive wealth measures provide country level aggregate measures of 
forestry assets. However, it has been argued that a more robust accounting needs 
to distinguish the spatial productivity of different forest assets. For instance, it is 
important to distinguish between forest benefits that accrue to commercial users 
(e.g. hydroelectric power, municipalities and fisheries) and those that accrue to 
subsistence users (charcoal for heating and cooking), and between benefits that 
accrue to direct and indirect beneficiaries. It would also be useful to distinguish 
between forest benefits to local communities, downstream users, non-local com-
munities and the global community (e.g. biodiversity and carbon storage).
The United Nations Framework for the System of Environmental and Economic 
Accounting (SEEA) highlights the importance of this information – particularly 
those regarding optimal forest management aimed at meeting both economic and 
social objectives (e.g. local community preservation versus increased equity). Policy 
response may include designing economic instruments like property rights – ensuring 
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that beneficiaries pay for the benefits (e.g. inform of environmental fees) to com-
pensate those who might be sacrificing the benefits. At watershed levels, the value 
of forest capital can be useful in designing Payment for Ecosystem Services (PES) 
schemes.
Is economic growth sustainable or is it based on  
the depletion of forests?
Inclusive wealth can be used for evaluating trade-offs between economic (gross 
domestic product) growth and forest wealth. This information is a key indicator of 
whether economic growth across a range of countries for which data are available 
is sustainable, or if economic growth comes at the expense of declining forest wealth 
triggered by deforestation and land use change. This information would be useful 
for re-evaluating existing forestry and economy-wide policy options for example:
1 Which sectors are the key contributors to economic growth?
2 How are these sectors linked to forestry resources, and what are the potential 
impacts?
3 What are the costs of forest asset depletion?
4 Can available resources be re-allocated across sectors to achieve at least the 
same level of economic growth with minimal or no damage to the forestry 
sector?
What are the economic trade-offs among competing users,  
and how can we optimize forest resource utilization?
Forest accounts from inclusive wealth could help assess the trade-offs among compet-
ing users: for example, forestry versus agricultural land use, and commercial logging 
versus catchment protection. Assessing the level of economic trade-offs could help 
in the design of appropriate economic instruments to minimize losses tied to these 
trade-offs – instruments like use fees, compensating payments and property rights.
What are the impacts of other sectors’ policies on forests?
Linking forestry values to other sectors and the wider economy would provide a 
convenient way of integrating forestry policy with national development and moni-
toring interactions and feedback across different sectors. This would make it possible 
to measure the winners and losers, and measure pressures on forest capital coming 
from alternative macroeconomic or development policies. Potential conflicts, for 
example, between forestry vs. agriculture, are relatively easy to identify – e.g. defor-
estation and cattle grazing. Policy response would include creating optimal forest 
management strategies aimed at addressing these conflicts. One set of strategies 
includes developing economic instruments like fees and compensating payments 
schemes to influence forest use. Another is to build social capital – for example, 
facilitate strategic alliances with stakeholders across sectors who are dependent on 
the forestry sector (agriculture, tourism, electric power and water).
Table 2.5 further illustrates how information from forest accounts can be used 










































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































It is possible that in various situations the gross domestic product (GDP), usually 
known as income (GDP at factor cost), correlates strongly with national wealth, but 
there are many critical information analogous to a balance sheet of the nations, 
which are revealed by the wealth of the nation. They are central not only to resolve 
the trade amongst various types of capital (produced for natural, for example) but 
to provide a better compass to measure progress and sustainability. And hence there 
is adequate rationale for inclusive national wealth accounts.
One of the key aspects of wealth estimate is robust methodology to value natural 
capital in the wealth estimate. It goes much beyond the transaction or exchange 
value which does not capture externality aspects. On the contrary, the shadow pric-
ing method for natural capital is more reliable and scientifically credible. It is well 
known, though, that the share of natural capital in total wealth of the nation would 
also depend on how well those assets are maintained as the value of natural capital 
are directly related to institutions and technological advancement of the nations 
which is reflected through rent from the natural assets. The shadow pricing method 
is well equipped to capture these aspects.
There should be a regular estimate of wealth at the national scale natural capital 
must get a priority, as they are likely to be pushed on the margin, as there is no 
well-functioning market especially in developing countries to capture their 
contribution.
Scale, unit and dimension of natural capital must be spelt out up front and each 
of the conservation policies should be clearly linked with the wealth of the natural 
capital and how they get affected.
At the institutional level, there should be a natural capital committee in every 
country to monitor and assess the trend and condition. They should closely work 
with the Ministry of Finance.
In order to see the impact of trade reform and agricultural policies like subsidies, 
the ease with which one capital can substitute should be estimated.
In the case of critical natural capital, assessment and monitoring is a must at the 
national scale.
Every country is in the process of designing means to achieve SDGs, so a detailed 
mapping of the goals and targets should be done vis a vis natural capital.
Policies on protected areas (marine/terrestrial), forest, land degradation neutrality, 
climate change and biodiversity have better prospect to be embraced by the public 
at large if their link with natural capital is delineated properly.
Finally, wealth information can supplement the information of the System of 
National Accounts (SNA), but eventually all the macroeconomic policies and alloca-
tion of resources should be cognizant of status of change in net per capita wealth 
and that would serve as the key lamp post for sustainability and equity including 
various targets of the Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs).
Notes
1 The long-run plan is to eventually define quantifiable measures of social and cultural 
capital, and introduce into future wealth measures.
2 One might have an equally difficult time arguing inclusive wealth is a measure of social 
inclusivity, too.
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3 See www.econlib.org/library/Enc/HumanCapital.html for a short discussion by Becker 
on human capital.
4 For example, see www.who.int/phe/health_topics/outdoorair/databases/cities/en/ 
for historical data on air pollution, and https://waqi.info/ for real-time (current) air 
quality data.
5 For more information, see https://unstats.un.org/unsd/envaccounting/seea.asp.
6 This production structure – one unit of natural capital, 40 units of physical capital 
and 0.006 units of labour – is often referred to as a fixed coefficient or Leontief pro-
duction function.
7 For the empirical exercises conducted in prior chapters, the change in time is a year, 
not instantaneous as depicted in this section. A rough approximation of equation (1) 























































8 For a full list of Sustainable Development Goals and Targets, see https://sustainable 
development.un.org/sdgs
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Table 2.6  Countries with negative (average) per capita growth rates* in inclusive wealth: 
1990–2015
Country Per capita 
growth
Country Per capita 
growth
Country Per capita 
growth
IWI GDP IWI GDP IWI GDP
Albania 3.9% 23.1% Gambia 0.2% 2.4% Norway 1.5% 10.0%
Argentina 1.6% 15.1% Germany 7.6% 6.6% Pakistan 3.2% 8.9%
Armenia 5.3% 25.2% Greece 5.0% 9.0% Panama 3.1% 18.7%
Australia 1.6% 9.8% Guatemala 1.3% 7.1% Philippines 2.5% 8.9%
Austria 5.8% 8.5% Iceland 0.1% 8.0% Poland 5.7% 20.9%
Bahrain 4.1% 4.2% India 3.8% 26.1% Portugal 5.2% 8.0%
Bangladesh 7.2% 17.5% Ireland 7.9% 21.6% Romania 5.3% 13.1%
Barbados 3.2% 4.0% Israel 4.4% 10.8% Russia 0.7% 7.2%
Belgium 5.3% 7.6% Italy 4.1% 4.0% Rwanda 3.3% 14.2%
Brazil 0.6% 9.0% Jamaica 3.4% 2.7% Singapore 9.7% 20.5%
Bulgaria 4.9% 14.7% Japan 4.6% 4.1% South Africa 0.5% 5.3%
Canada 1.4% 6.9% Jordan 3.5% 11.0% Spain 9.9% 8.4%
Chile 5.7% 21.5% Kazakhstan 1.6% 17.5% Sri Lanka 6.0% 23.7%
China 10.2% 58.4% Kenya 1.0% 1.2% Swaziland 1.6% 8.0%
Costa Rica 4.0% 13.7% Kyrgyzstan 0.8% 0.8% Sweden 3.2% 8.8%
Cuba 0.6% 11.3% Lesotho 4.5% 14.6% Switzerland 2.2% 4.0%
Cyprus 5.0% 10.0% Luxembourg 7.7% 12.6% Thailand 6.4% 20.4%
Czech 
Republic
5.8% 9.5% Malaysia 2.2% 19.4% Tunisia 5.7% 16.9%
Denmark 2.5% 7.0% Malta 8.5% 15.4% Turkey 4.6% 12.1%
Dom 
Republic
5.1% 20.8% Mauritania 1.4% 4.4% Ukraine 1.9% 0.5%
Egypt 3.3% 13.8% Mauritius 6.6% 21.3% UK 4.3% 8.0%
El Salvador 8.1% 12.9% Mexico 4.6% 5.7% Uruguay 3.8% 15.3%
Fiji 3.5% 5.8% Morocco 5.6% 13.6% USA 3.0% 7.6%
Finland 3.5% 9.0% Netherlands 4.7% 9.3% Vietnam 10.0% 31.5%
France 5.5% 5.8% New Zealand 2.4% 7.6%
Sources: This report and the World Bank Development Indicators.





3 More on natural wealth 
of nations and regions
Shunsuke Managi
Introduction
An economy may satisfy current sustainable development or may have satisfied the 
criterion in the recent past but might not continue to do so in the near future. 
Whether an economy can continue sustainable development depends on the scale 
of the economy (e.g. GDP), and if the scale becomes too large relative to the natural 
capital (NC) base, the economy will be unable to maintain the inclusive wealth. 
Therefore, maintaining the NC base for sustainable development is unavoidable.
This chapter focuses on the role and importance of natural capital in measuring 
the inclusive wealth of nations. The analysis is based on the same dataset used in 
Chapter 1: a 140-country analysis of inclusive wealth for 25 years (1990 to 2014). 
Following Arrow et al. (2012) and previous editions of Inclusive Wealth Report, 
the report expands the scope of NC and accounts for the national wealth to allow 
for a broader understanding. In this report, NC can be classified into two major 
categories: (1) renewable resources and (2) non-renewable resources.
As shown in Figure 3.1, renewable resources is further decomposed into (a) forest 
resources, which consists of timber and non-timber forest benefits; (b) fisheries, 
which are represented by the catch; and (c) agricultural land, which consists of 
cropland and pastureland, whereas non-renewable resources can be broken down 
to (d) fossil fuels (oil, natural gas and coal); and (e) minerals (bauxite, copper, gold, 
iron, lead, nickel, phosphate, silver, tin and zinc). A relatively common accounting 
method is used to value these resources. Total natural wealth is estimated by calcu-
lating the physical amount available and corresponding shadow prices (rent) of the 
resources.
As we have illustrated elsewhere in the current report, IWI is a linear index of 
produced, human and natural capital. In theory, however, shadow prices are defined 
as the additional contribution to social well-being. This contribution is expected to 
easily change as natural capital becomes relatively scarce, so shadow prices can also 
change in the long-term. This is true of produced and human capital as well but is 
especially relevant to natural capital, whose assumption of absolute substitutability 
is not a realistic one (UNU-IHDP, 2012).
Natural capital also deserves special attention because it can collapse with no 
advanced notice in a non-linear manner, which is related to the idea of thresholds 
and tipping points. Climate change is a prime example of this, which is why nego-
tiations have reached a consensus to set the 2-degree target in the Paris Agreement. 
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The non-linearity of natural capital is also observed in local contexts as well (e.g. 
Walker et al. 2010). This drives Section 3 of this chapter, in which we examine the 
regional disaggregation of natural capital change for the studied period. It appears 
to be misleading to talk about natural capital trends without differentiating regional 
disparities and types of natural capital (non-renewable vs. renewable, etc.).
In Section 4, we explore the interaction between natural capital and natural 
disasters. Some of the natural capital has been known to help vulnerable regions 
cope with natural disasters. The use of mangrove trees as a defence against flooding 
is a prime example (Barbier 2009; UNU-IHDP and UNEP, 2012). The same quali-
fier suggests that nature can provide benefits many times, while in other times, it 
could be a threat to human beings. We discuss this interconnectedness, citing recent 
examples of natural disasters.
In Section 5, we report the fishery capital stock of nations in more detail. We 
begin with a basis of renewable resource dynamics, on which our methodology of 
counting stocks is based. This stock trend is contrasted with that of the capture 
production of fishery. Overall, we show that global fishery capital is on the decline 
at an alarming rate, whereas capture production continues to rise, especially in Asia. 
This may be attenuated by investing in aquaculture and sustainable and responsible 
management of the industry.
Section 6 is devoted to, as far as we are concerned, the first estimate of renew-
able energy as capital stocks. Although renewable energy has been a focus of 
attention and massive investment in both developed and emerging economies for 
greener growth, this has not appeared in the accounting or even a debate of 
inclusive wealth accounting and sustainability assessment. Section 7 concludes.
The natural capital of nations
Nature is extremely important and different from human and manufactured capital 
stock: it always operates by its own complex laws and systems. The assumption 
of strong sustainability, which considers important aspects of natural capital as 
irreplaceable, is scientifically evident. The concept of environmental sustainability 
largely addresses the issue of critical natural capital (Ekins et al. 2003). It is 
important to distinguish between weak and strong sustainability. The maintenance 
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of human well-being is the main purpose of economic activity, as our inclusive 
wealth framework stresses, but at the same time, there is little doubt of the neces-
sity of natural capital by itself. This motivates this section that peeks at the past 
increase or decrease of natural capital independently.
Overall, 31 of 140 countries experience positive growth of natural capital. Natural 
capital indicators, for instance, show that forest resources increase in 55 of 140 
countries over 1990–2014. Renewable resources are an important contributor of 
natural capital, and 39 of 140 countries meaningfully increase their resources. 
Although natural capital is an important source of resources for developing and less 
developed countries, if the decreasing trend will continue, it could take its toll on 
their future development.
The average annual growth rate of wealth and natural capital per capita can be 
classified into four quadrants in Figure 3.2:
Quadrant 1: growth in wealth and natural capital
Quadrant 2: decline in wealth and growth in natural capital
Quadrant 3: decline in wealth and natural capital
Quadrant 4: growth in wealth and decline in natural capital
Our empirical findings show that most countries (123 of 140) experienced a declin-
ing trend of natural capital while achieving an increasing trend of wealth over 
1990–2014. A group of seven countries (Albania, Armenia, Estonia, Guyana, Lithu-
ania, Russia and Slovenia) experiences the most desirable situation in terms of 
experienced growth in wealth and natural capital (quadrant 1, Figure 3.2). These 
countries can be on a sustainable development path both from strong and weak 
sustainability perspectives. Additionally, five countries in our sample exhibit a decline 
in wealth while increasing the natural capital (quadrant 2, Figure 3.2).
For a better understanding of the contribution of natural capital on sustainability, 
Figure 3.3 intended to reveal the country conditions. We disaggregated the annual 
average growth rate of the natural capitals of nations per capita, to identify the 
contribution of agricultural land, forest, fisheries and fossil fuels differently. Countries 
are ordered according to their growth rate of natural capital per capita from 1990–
2014. Discrepancies are major among countries, and the decreasing trend of NC is 
clearly visible throughout the countries.
Renewable resources
In this section, we present an overview of renewable resources of natural capital, which 
contains agricultural land, fisheries and forest resources. Both natural capital and 
renewable resource growth was positive for 25 of the 140 countries. Belgium, Cote 
d’Ivoire and Tanzania have experienced positive growth in natural capital and renew-
able resources of over 1% from 1990 to 2014. In particular, 15 countries experienced 
1% growth or more in forest over this period, while only six countries achieved 1% 
growth or more in fisheries. Overall, only seven countries have reported a positive 
natural capital growth rate of over 1% from 1990 to 2014. Figure 3.4 represents the 
growth rate of renewable resources from 1990–2014 per capita, which is a gloomier 
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Figure 3.3  Annual average growth rate of natural capital per capita disaggregated by 
agricultural land, forest, fisheries and fossil fuels
Figure 3.4 Average annual growth rate of renewables per capita from 1990–2014
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Figure 3.5 Average annual growth rate of cropland per capita from 1990 to 2014
Figure 3.6 Average annual growth rate of pastureland per capita from 1990 to 2014
Agricultural land
As FAO defined, agricultural land comprises cropland and pastureland. Overall, 49 coun-
tries have experienced positive growth of cropland, while only 15 countries have a 
positive growth rate per capita (Figure 3.5). For pastureland, 36 countries reported 
positive growth and 7 countries identify positive growth per capita (Figure 3.6). How-
ever, the way in which these changes affect the natural capital depends on how important 
these changes are with respect to the total share of the natural capital.
Globally, food security is tremendously important, and available land is in high 
demand to keep the demand and supply chain balanced. However, the increasing 
population in developing countries where millions are under-nourished due to food 
shortages maintains continuous pressure on agricultural land. The demand of agri-
cultural land is directed by population growth, as well as the diet of the population 
(UNU-IHDP, 2014), and they together have been an obstacle to the achievement 
of sustainable economic development.
The alternative use of agriculture land is always important to measure food avail-
ability and security. For instance, the increased demand of pastureland and biofuel 
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in Brazil is a significant threat to the Amazon rainforest, which is being destroyed 
to accommodate continued demand for land. The growth of cropland has been 
positive in Latin American countries over the last 25 years, which continuously 
substitutes the other important use of the land.
Forest and fishery
Forest resources consist of timber and non-timber forest resources accessed by 
the population of the country. Forest sources of timber and non-timber generally 
move in the same directions because they are directly connected to the total 
forest surface of a country. The growth of forest resources is positive for Euro-
pean Union (EU) countries, Japan and Russia. On the other hand, the decline 
of forests in Africa, Latin America, China, India, Brazil, the US and Canada is 
creating pressure on their sustainable development process.
Forest accounts explain 37% of the natural capital of nations, although with major 
fluctuations among countries. Only 31 of 140 countries experience positive growth 
in forest resources per capita, whereas 54 countries reported an overall positive 
growth rate of forestry (Figure 3.7). Even within high-income countries, Singapore 
has had 8% growth of forest resources from 1990 to 2014 and has been identified 
as the foremost country that has also experienced 5% growth of forest resources per 
capita. In contrast, the United Kingdom has had a 6% reduction of forest resources 
over this 25-year period.
Fisheries are one of the most important renewable resources that directly relate 
to the food security of nations. Within each country, there is an enormous variation 
in fish stock and species. Fisheries are a small but essential part of natural capital, 
but most nations are experiencing a decreasing trend of the fishery stocks. Fish stock 
can be managed as a renewable resource by limiting the harvest of endangered spe-
cies and harvesting abundant species.
Overall, we find that 15 countries have successfully increased the fishery wealth 
of nations. However, 92 countries reported a negative growth rate of fishery wealth, 
while 33 countries reported no fishery wealth. Figure 3.8 shows the growth rate of 
global fishery wealth, where only Canada and some European countries have seen 
Figure 3.7 Average annual growth rate of forests per capita from 1990 to 2014
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their fish stock increase in the past 25 years. This is intuitive especially given high 
population growth in Asian and African countries and recent preferences of more 
sustainable fishery in western countries.
Fossil fuels
Non-renewable resources of energy are the main inputs for the energy system of 
most countries. Countries with abundant fossil fuel resources are greatly reducing 
their stock value over time. In Figure 3.10 and Figure 3.11, the per capita growth 
of oil and gas is negative for the countries from 1990 to 2014. The background of 
the reduced availability and production of fossil fuels is clearly visible, which is a 
good sign for sustainable development. As expounded in Section 5, alternative 
renewable energy is garnering attention and contributing to sustainable development 
by substituting fossil fuels.
Oil is considered the most widely used fossil fuel and contributes up to 22% of 
global natural capital. It is widely considered a carbon-intensive source of energy, 
and its non-renewable characteristics trivially result in a gradual decline of this 
resource. Figure 3.10 shows the average annual growth rate of oil per capita from 
1990 to 2014.
Natural gas is another important source of energy, which accounts for 7% of 
global natural capital. Natural gas has a lower carbon content than oil, which improves 
our carbon damage adjustment in IWI. Its use is also increasing due to its geopoliti-
cal diversity. According to Figure 3.12, except Ukraine, all countries have seen 
reduced growth in coal resources for 25 years.
The rule of the game has been changed in the field of non-renewable resources 
recently. In particular, after the steep rise in oil prices in the late 2000s, the United 
States has been aggressive in developing unconventional resources such as shale oil 
and gas, making North America an important fossil fuel exporter. This could change 
the future oil and gas in the future, as well as such important adjustments to well-
being as oil capital gains and carbon damage.
Figure 3.8 Average annual growth rate of fisheries per capita from 1990 to 2014
Figure 3.9  Average annual growth rate of non-renewables per capita from 1990–2014
Figure 3.10 Average annual growth rate of oil per capita from 1990 to 2014
Figure 3.11 Average annual growth rate of natural gas per capita from 1990 to 2014
86 Shunsuke Managi
Minerals
Non-renewable mineral resources are the smallest contributor of NC for nations 
(1% of NC) in terms of capital stocks. In Figure 3.13, the decline of minerals is 
consistent for countries from 1990 to 2014, and this is caused primarily by the 
downward trend of its mineral stock. In our analysis, 44 countries reported negative 
growth of mineral wealth from 1990–2014, and, notably, several countries reported 
mineral depletion that is more than 5%.
Regional natural capital growth and sustainability
This section describes natural capital growth at six regional levels, while an exami-
nation of disaggregated resources will provide a better understanding. Asia Pacific, 
Africa, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, West Asia, and North America 
are representative regions where natural capital and wealth have been observed 
from 1992 to 2014. Our regional category depends upon UNEP (2016) Global 
Environment Outlook (GEO-6) Assessment. This regional analysis can evaluate the 
development and sustainability of the region more specifically.
Asia and the Pacific
Economic growth in Asia and the Pacific no doubt has had a notable impact on 
increased welfare but also places significant pressure on natural capital. The climate 
change effect and increasing number of natural disasters is causing major damage in 
this region. Meanwhile, Asia Pacific countries are also taking action regarding green 
growth action, and environmental awareness is gradually increasing. Countries are 
taking initiatives in low carbon green growth and are investing in green technology.
This region is experiencing the fastest rate of urbanization and population growth, 
which creates significant environmental challenges (UNEP 2016). Stronger institu-
tions, good governance and strict monitoring are important for sustainable develop-
ment in the Asia and the Pacific region. Greater emphasis on regional and local 
climate change adaptation for increased resilience is also unavoidable.
Asia and the Pacific countries have decreased their natural capital base as well as 
population growth. However, this drawdown of natural capital does not necessarily 
reduce the wealth in this region. No countries in this sample exhibit a decline in 
Figure 3.12 Average annual growth rate of coal per capita from 1990 to 2014
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Figure 3.13 Average annual growth rate of minerals per capita from 1990–2014
Table 3.1  Measuring the changes of natural capital in Asia and the Pacific countries: 
average annual growth rates from 1990–2014








Australia −0.6% 1.3% −1.9% 0.0%
Afghanistan −0.1% 4.1% −4.0% 4.6%
Australia −0.6% 1.3% −1.9% 0.0%
Bangladesh −0.8% 1.7% −2.4% −0.2%
China −0.8% 0.8% −1.6% 2.2%
Fiji 0.1% 0.8% −0.7% −0.1%
Indonesia −1.1% 1.4% −2.4% −0.9%
India −0.4% 1.7% −2.1% 1.0%
Iran −0.6% 1.4% −2.0% 3.2%
Japan −0.9% 0.1% −1.0% 0.6%
Cambodia −1.3% 2.2% −3.5% −1.4%
Republic of Korea −0.3% 0.7% −0.9% 3.1%
Laos 0.0% 1.9% −1.8% −2.6%
Sri Lanka −0.9% 0.8% −1.7% 1.8%
Maldives −1.9% 2.6% −4.4% −0.2%
Myanmar −1.5% 1.0% −2.5% 0.1%
Mongolia −0.4% 1.2% −1.6% 1.5%
Malaysia −1.3% 2.1% −3.3% 0.5%
Nepal −1.1% 1.7% −2.8% 1.4%
New Zealand 0.3% 1.3% −1.0% −0.3%
Pakistan −2.7% 2.3% −4.9% −0.5%
Philippines −0.1% 2.0% −2.0% 1.0%
Papua New Guinea 0.8% 2.5% −1.6% 0.5%
Singapore −0.7% 2.5% −3.1% 2.9%
Thailand −1.0% 0.8% −1.7% 0.8%
Viet Nam −0.4% 1.3% −1.7% −1.8%
wealth while increasing natural capital in per capita form, as is clear from Table 3.1. 
Figure 3.14 clearly shows a declining trend of agricultural land, fossil fuel and fishery 
resources. In contrast, forestry is the only resource that indicates recovery after fac-
ing a decline from 1992 to 2010. Specifically, New Zealand and Japan are two 
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representative countries in the Asia Pacific that have successfully recovered their 
forest resources and indicate sustainability.
Africa
Africa faces environmental challenges due to weak environmental governance, 
climate change, loss of biodiversity and dependence on fossil fuels. Although Africa 
has large varieties of natural resources, the sustainable management of natural 
capital is critical, since natural capital accounts for a relatively large portion of 
natural capital in the region. Cropland and pastureland degradation takes place 
every year due to soil erosion, salinization, deforestation, etc. In addition, urban-
ization creates continuous pressure on agriculture, which impacts reduced agricul-
tural productivity.
It is important for Africa to improve land productivity and increase efforts to use 
renewable energy. Policies to reduce marine and ecosystem degradation and enact 
inclusive natural capital management should be implemented. Simultaneous economic 
development and promotion of ecosystem improvement can ensure the welfare of 
Africa.
Africa is rich in natural resources, but weak resource management reduces the 
gain from this resource. Most African countries have experienced a decline in natural 
capital and high growth in the population over 1992–2014. Figure 3.15 shows a 
clear declining condition of agricultural land, forests and fisheries. Fossil fuels facing 
decline was dramatic over the 1992–2007 period and started increasing from 2007 
to 2009. However, fossil fuels were decreasing from 2009 until 2014.
Table 3.2 shows a high population growth rate in the region, which has a potential 
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Figure 3.14  Percentage change in natural capital in Asia and the Pacific countries from 
1992 to 2014
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Table 3.2  Measuring the changes of natural capital in African countries: average annual 
growth rates from 1990–2014








Burundi −0.9% 2.8% −3.6% 2.4%
Benin −1.0% 3.2% −4.1% 2.5%
Central African Republic −0.1% 2.1% −2.1% −0.8%
Côte d’Ivoire 1.2% 2.5% −1.3% 3.6%
Cameroon −6.2% 2.7% −8.6% 0.7%
Congo D.R −0.2% 3.2% −3.3% −4.7%
Congo −0.3% 2.7% −2.9% −0.6%
Algeria −2.2% 1.7% −3.8% 1.4%
Egypt −2.6% 1.9% −4.4% 1.0%
Gabon −0.1% 2.4% −2.4% −3.3%
Ghana 0.0% 2.6% −2.5% 1.6%
Gambia −1.2% 3.1% −4.2% −3.2%
Kenya 0.1% 2.7% −2.6% 0.3%
Liberia −0.7% 3.1% −3.7% 6.8%
Morocco −0.5% 1.3% −1.7% 0.0%
Mali −2.1% 3.0% −4.9% 2.0%
Mozambique 1.2% 3.0% −1.7% 0.6%
Mauritania −1.8% 2.8% −4.5% 0.7%
Mauritius −1.5% 0.7% −2.2% 0.3%
Malawi −0.5% 2.4% −2.9% 3.4%
(Continued)
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Niger −1.2% 3.7% −4.7% 2.6%
Nigeria −1.3% 2.6% −3.8% 4.7%
Rwanda 1.6% 1.9% −0.2% 2.0%
Sudan (former) −2.9% 2.9% −5.6% −3.2%
Senegal −0.6% 2.8% −3.4% 0.1%
Sierra Leone −0.9% 2.0% −2.9% −0.1%
Togo −1.8% 2.7% −4.4% 1.8%
Tunisia −2.1% 1.3% −3.3% 2.4%
Tanzania 1.1% 3.0% −1.8% −0.5%
Uganda −1.0% 3.3% −4.2% 2.5%
Zambia −0.3% 2.8% −2.9% 2.6%
Zimbabwe −1.7% 1.6% −3.2% 1.9%
Table 3.2  (Continued)
the growth of wealth is not significant, and many African countries experience growth 
in inclusive wealth. By enhancing natural resource management, Africa is potentially 
able to enjoy higher growth in inclusive wealth.
Pan-European
Biodiversity loss, climate change and ecosystem degradation is affecting economic 
development in the pan-European region. Increased changes in land use and urban-
ization are some key reasons for biodiversity decline.
Despite the improvement in the environment, air pollution is the greatest health 
risk of the population. International shipping, transportation and extensive economic 
activities are responsible for air pollution in this region.
In addition, across the pan-European region, marine biodiversity is poor given 
that fishery resources have faced decline despite the regulations on fish catches by 
EU countries. Changing weather conditions and sea level increases may also affect 
marine biodiversity. This leads to revenue loss from fisheries, tourism, the shipping 
industry, etc., as well as the well-being of the residents.
The pan-European region has improved the condition of its natural resources, 
and the growth of natural resources and total wealth are representative of this 
region. It also leads to a comprehensive growth of wealth across Europe. In Fig-
ure 3.16, we note an increase or no change of renewables and a sharp decrease 
of non-renewables. This is an ideal condition for natural resources and represents 
sustainability.
Population growth in the Pan-European region is low, and it is remarkable that 
natural capital growth is positive or slightly negative, both in aggregate and per capita 

























































































NC NC per capita Agriculture per capita 
Forest per capita Fishery per capita Fossil fuel per capita 
Figure 3.16  Percentage change in natural capital in Pan-European countries from 1992 
to 2014
Table 3.3  Measuring the changes of natural capital in Pan-European countries: average 
annual growth rates from 1990–2014








Albania −0.3% −0.5% 0.3% 2.7%
Austria −0.1% 0.4% −0.6% 0.9%
Belgium 1.6% 0.5% 1.1% 0.0%
Bulgaria −1.6% −0.8% −0.8% −1.8%
Switzerland −0.1% 0.8% −0.9% 0.0%
Czech Republic −1.4% 0.1% −1.5% 0.6%
Germany −0.6% 0.1% −0.7% 0.3%
Denmark −3.3% 0.4% −3.7% −0.1%
Spain 0.2% 0.7% −0.6% 0.7%
Estonia 0.1% −0.7% 0.9% 0.6%
Finland −0.3% 0.4% −0.7% 0.4%
France 0.0% 0.5% −0.5% 0.6%
United Kingdom −4.4% 0.5% −4.9% 0.3%
Greece −0.8% 0.3% −1.1% −0.4%
Croatia 0.3% −0.5% 0.8% −0.9%
Hungary −0.8% −0.2% −0.6% 0.4%
Ireland −1.5% 1.1% −2.6% 2.9%
Iceland −0.3% 1.0% −1.4% 0.2%
Italy −0.2% 0.3% −0.5% 0.1%
Lithuania 0.1% −1.0% 1.0% 1.0%
Kazakhstan −0.1% 0.2% −0.4% 3.4%
(Continued)
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Kyrgyzstan 0.5% 1.2% −0.7% 0.0%
Luxembourg 0.7% 1.6% −0.9% 0.7%
Latvia 0.8% −1.2% 2.0% −0.3%
Republic of Moldova −5.5% −0.2% −5.4% 2.0%
Malta −0.7% 0.8% −1.5% −0.3%
Netherlands −3.0% 0.5% −3.5% 0.3%
Norway −3.5% 0.8% −4.2% 1.1%
Poland −0.8% 0.0% −0.8% 1.2%
Portugal −0.3% 0.2% −0.4% 0.5%
Romania −0.7% −0.6% −0.1% 0.9%
Russian Federation 0.3% −0.1% 0.4% 1.1%
Serbia 1.5% −0.3% 1.8% −1.9%
Slovakia −0.1% 0.1% −0.2% 1.8%
Slovenia 0.2% 0.1% 0.1% 0.6%
Sweden −1.3% 0.5% −1.8% 0.6%
Tajikistan 0.1% 1.9% −1.8% 2.0%
Ukraine 0.1% −0.6% 0.6% −1.0%
Table 3.3  (Continued)
the fastest growing element in this region. Nevertheless, countries manage a positive 
trend of wealth over 1990–2014 through economic activities.
Latin America and the Caribbean
Latin America and the Caribbean region (LAC) includes some of the most unique 
eco-regions in the world and provides valuable ecosystem service. However, land 
degradation is creating major challenges for its ecological zones, resulting in 
unsustainable land management. Deforestation in the Amazon and other forest 
ecosystems is a major challenge for LAC resource management. Although culti-
vatable land is increasing to maintain the food demand, this extension is not 
sustainable.
The LAC region is responsible for approximately 25% of fishery catches, and 
overharvesting is affecting the local ecosystem. This continued marine biodiversity 
loss in LAC has far-reaching consequences and risks. For instance, the biomass of 
some species will become extinct in the near future. However, the areas under 
protection increased over the 1990 to 2014 period.
LAC countries are identified as worrying and persistent through natural capital 
degradation. In Figure 3.17, there is a clear trend of reduction in all components 
of natural capital – for instance, agriculture, forest, fishery, fossil fuels, etc. This 
region is also facing biodiversity loss, climate change and unsustainable production 
and consumption patterns.
Figure 3.17  Percentage change in natural capital in Latin America and the Caribbean 
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Table 3.4  Measuring the changes of natural capital in Latin America and the Caribbean 
countries: average annual growth rates from 1990–2014








Argentina −0.3% 1.1% −1.5% 1.4%
Belize −0.5% 2.7% −3.1% −0.7%
Bolivia −0.5% 1.8% −2.2% −1.2%
Brazil −0.4% 1.3% −1.7% −0.1%
Barbados −1.6% 0.4% −2.0% −0.4%
Chile −0.6% 1.3% −1.8% −0.3%
Colombia −4.8% 1.4% −6.1% −0.6%
Costa Rica 0.7% 1.8% −1.1% 0.4%
Cuba 0.2% 0.3% −0.1% 1.9%
Dominican Republic −0.3% 1.6% −1.9% 1.0%
Ecuador −1.0% 1.9% −2.8% 1.8%
Guatemala −1.0% 2.4% −3.3% 0.8%
Guyana 0.6% 0.2% 0.3% 3.1%
Honduras −2.0% 2.0% −4.0% −1.7%
Haiti −1.8% 1.7% −3.4% −1.8%
Jamaica −0.3% 0.5% −0.8% −1.0%
Mexico −0.8% 1.6% −2.4% −0.3%
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West Asia
West Asia is facing serious risks of deforestation and land degradation. High popula-
tion growth is placing significant pressure on arable land, fresh water and food. 
Urbanization, soil salinity, soil erosion and converted wetland to dry land are some 
reasons for the degradation of the agricultural land. As a result, food security in this 
area will be at risk.
Biodiversity in West Asia is under threat due to overconsumption based on for-
estry, fossils and other biological resources. Beyond the biocapacity, continued 
anthropogenic actions pose a serious risk to natural resources. The exploitation rate 
of marine resources is also increasing dramatically in West Asia. Modification of the 
coast in Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) countries is also responsible for marine 
biodiversity damage.
West Asian countries are experiencing a slow decline of natural resources but rapid 
growth of the population. The impact of population growth is clearly visible in 
Figure 3.18, where the natural capital per capita is sharply declining. Natural resources 
in this region consist primarily of fossil fuels and are seen as dirty due to its high 
emission factor of greenhouse gases. Environmental governance, coupled with pru-
dent oil wealth management (Collier et al. 2010), is the process through which 
West Asia can achieve sustainability.
In Table 3.5, high population growth is contributing to the growth of human 
capital in the West Asia region, and consequently inclusive wealth is growing sig-
nificantly. The decline of natural capital is not guiding wealth into these countries. 
However, a multi-sectoral policy design can improve the resilience in West Asia.
North America
North America has rich biodiversity and diverse ecosystems. Agriculture land is 
well-managed and provides a sustainable food supply. Moreover, agricultural land is 
increasing overall. Some Canadian forests are converted to cropland. Despite the 
recent gains, the loss of forests to cropland can pose risks. Some natural consequences 
such as wildfire also put pressure on forest resources.








Nicaragua −0.7% 1.6% −2.2% 1.6%
Panama 0.1% 1.9% −1.7% 0.3%
Peru −0.1% 1.5% −1.6% 0.7%
Paraguay −0.6% 1.9% −2.4% 0.0%
El Salvador 0.3% 0.6% −0.4% 0.8%
Trinidad and Tobago −3.9% 0.4% −4.3% 3.8%
Uruguay −0.3% 0.4% −0.7% 0.8%
Venezuela −0.3% 1.8% −2.1% 5.7%
Table 3.4  (Continued)
More on natural wealth of nations, regions 95




























































































NC  NC per capita Agriculture per capita 
Forest per capita Fishery per capita Fossil per capita 
Table 3.5  Measuring the changes of natural capital in West Asia: average annual growth 
rates from 1990–2014








United Arab Emirates −0.9% 7.0% −7.3% 1.5%
Armenia 2.5% −0.7% 3.2% 1.4%
Bahrain −5.5% 4.3% −9.4% −0.4%
Cyprus 0.0% 1.7% −1.7% −0.1%
Iraq −0.4% 3.0% −3.3% 9.8%
Israel −0.6% 2.4% −2.9% 1.1%
Jordan −0.5% 3.4% −3.7% 1.0%
Kuwait −0.7% 2.5% −3.2% 6.1%
Qatar −1.0% 6.5% −7.1% 4.0%
Saudi Arabia −0.2% 2.7% −2.9% 1.9%
Syrian Arab Republic −3.3% 1.7% −4.9% −2.2%
Turkey −0.5% 1.5% −1.9% 0.2%
Yemen −0.4% 3.3% −3.6% 1.0%
Fisheries in North America and specifically in Canada are growing partly due to 
sustainable policies adopted by the government. The dependency on fossil fuel is 
also declining because of renewable energy technology development. Solar energy 
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Figure 3.19  Percentage change in natural capital in North America countries from 1992 
to 2014
North America has been performing relatively well on the natural capital front. 
In Figure 3.19, the decreasing trend of non-renewable fossil resources and the 
increasing trend of renewable fishery resources is a snapshot of the improved envi-
ronmental conditions. However, remaining and emerging environmental challenges 
could interfere with sustainable growth in the future.
Incorporating natural disaster resilience in  
the assessment of natural capital
It is a common understanding that the stage of economic development of a nation 
and its resilience to natural disasters have a positive relationship (Toya and Skidmore 
2007). As an easy way to confirm an aspect of this argument, the numbers of deaths, 
injuries and homeless people are reduced as national incomes rise (Kahn 2005).
We discuss the importance of natural capital and the inclusive wealth of nations 
in coping with natural disasters. Some forms of natural capital have been known to 
work as a natural protection against natural disasters. A prime example is the wealth 
Table 3.6  Measuring the changes of natural capital in North America: average annual 
growth rates from 1990–2014








Canada −1.2% 1.0% −2.2% 1.4%
United States of America −0.6% 1.0% −1.6% 0.1%
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of mangrove trees that have a regulating ecosystem service such as coastal protection 
(Barbier et al. 2008).
Of course, an abundance of natural capital may not translate into greater public 
awareness in vulnerable areas, and a stronger social response to disaster risk and 
management is essential. Governments may be less responsive and less efficient in 
handling disaster response initiatives in low-income countries.
However, lowering dependence on non-renewable resources is strongly correlated 
to awareness of climate change and damage from natural disasters. Moreover, we 
analysed the data on natural disasters from the EM-DAT for every recorded disaster 
from 140 countries over the 1990–2014 period, and identified that higher inclusive 
wealth is correlated with more damage reduction policies against natural disasters.
Asia Pacific countries are the most disaster-prone in the world, and most natural 
disasters that have been reported in this region have occurred over the past 25 years. 
In the absence of adaptation, hundreds of millions of people will be affected by 
disasters. What is worrisome is that this region is also continuously losing natural 
forests, mangroves and croplands. Cumulative climate change and natural resource 
degradation are threating sustainability in this area.
Africa is also highly vulnerable to natural disasters. Drought, salinity and wildfires 
are destroying agricultural and wild fauna and flora. This disaster also results in a loss 
of biodiversity in this region. Climate change-induced challenges are clearly visible 
in Africa. For instance, 90% of the population in Sub-Saharan Africa is exposed to 
air pollution and increased greenhouse gas emissions. The poor air quality in Africa 
is causing severe health problems for the inhabitants.
Climate change across Europe represents one of the largest risk factors and is 
responsible for extreme weather events. Temperature increases and the coastal sea 
level rises are affecting many areas in this region. Flash and coastal floods have 
become more intense, and storms are becoming more frequent. However, the ambi-
tious mitigation policy of the European Union (EU) has reduced emissions from 
1990 to 2014.
In the LAC region, the climate change impact on coastal areas is more visible 
and is causing disasters. Hurricanes, sea level rises, storm surges and coastal flooding 
have become more frequent and lead to significant damage. However, integrated 
coastal zone management action may improve the changing conditions in LAC.
Climate change-induced changes in weather are taking place in West Asian coun-
tries. Rainfall, temperature and humidity are showing variations. This region also 
experienced an increase in carbon dioxide emissions due to fossil fuel consumption. 
The sea level rise will affect the economy, agriculture and tourism in this area.
The impact of climate change is more evident in the North America region. 
Recent devastating droughts and floods have damaged many parts of the US and 
Canada. Hurricane Sandy in 2012 and Hurricane Katrina in 2005 were directly 
responsible for human and economic losses. Canada and the US are taking steps to 
mitigate and adapt to unavoidable climate change across regions and beyond.
Sustainability and resilience are important for understanding how the growth of 
the inclusive wealth of a nation is performing. For instance, in addition to agricultural 
production, groundwater conservation is having a significant impact on regional 
welfare (Walker et al. 2010). Resilience is the capacity of a system to sustain itself 
after a shock and the ability to absorb the shock without it being transferred to an 
alternate system. According to Walker et al. (2004), the more resilient a system is, 
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the more shock it absorbs without shifting. Walker et al. (2010) is an attempt to 
include resilience as an addition to the list of capital stocks. While intriguing in itself 
as a case study of the region, their approach poses a challenge when it comes to 
upscaling to the national level.
Renewable energy as capital stocks
Despite the fact that the shift from non-renewable to renewable energy sources for 
power plants has been seen as a more sustainable move, what this means in terms 
of inclusive wealth and sustainability assessment has not been clear. In this subsec-
tion, therefore, we aim to clarify how this substitution enters the framework of 
inclusive wealth as an indicator of sustainable development and to show the mag-
nitude of this power shift in the inclusive wealth of nations.
Investment into renewable energy power plants is recorded as an increase in 
produced capital. This may feel awkward in a sense, especially when other renewable 
resources, such as forest, agricultural land and fisheries are counted as part of natural 
capital in IWI. Indeed, inputs into renewable energy facilities, such as solar, wind, 
water, geothermal energy, etc., are actually renewable, and tend to substitute con-
ventional natural capital such as oil and natural gas.
However, it is acceptable to count renewable energy plants as produced capital, 
not only because they are literally manufactured structures but also because they 
do not meet certain characteristics unique to natural capital – for natural capital 
differs from produced capital in many important ways. First, the process is some-
times irreversible if its quantity in, for example, an ecosystem has surpassed the 
(lower bound) threshold level; it could be difficult to restore the system to its 
original state. This has been found in ecosystems at varied scales, from a non-convex 
shallow lake that faces phosphorous deposits (Dasgupta and Mäler 2003) to the 
global climate system (Lemoine and Traeger 2016). Second, some natural capital 
can be substituted by produced capital to a limited extent, as the strong sustain-
ability argument has stressed. Third, the response and change of natural capital can 
be unexpected and, more often than not, non-linear. It is non-debatable that 
renewable energy power plants do not meet these characteristics.
We may come up with at least two approaches to account for shadow prices of 
renewable energy (RE) capital. Given the current physical capital stock, shadow 
pricing can be performed based either on past unit cost data or on future income 
projection. In this illustrative analysis, we focus on the cost-based accounting of RE 
capital.1
Our dataset of past investments into solar and wind relies on BP (2015). We skip 
hydroelectricity here as it is considered conventional energy production, and the 
opportunity cost of using water is not necessarily nil, in contrast to solar and wind. 
We do not consider biofuels either due to its nature of competing use of land with 
food crops.
Solar energy
Based on the cumulative installed capacity of solar power (photovoltaic), we estimate 
annual gross investment into this power source. Applying a depreciation rate of 5% 
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per annum, net investment can be reached. It could be the case that the cumulative 
installed capacity already is free of decommissioned power plants, in which case the 
depreciation would be double counted. However, this would only result in a con-
servative undervaluation of cumulative stock.
To value the actual expenditure of laying out the solar energy power units, 
one has to assume unit costs. It is well known that the cost of renewable energy, 
both in terms of instalment and operation, has sharply declined in recent years. 
The use of past average unit cost would inflate the value of the current capital 
stock with vintages, although that would be an accurate depiction of the actual 
expenditure. It can also be considered that the unit cost of construction is lower 
in a larger capacity due to scale economies. Geographical factors matter as well; 
the unitary cost of installing solar power units in Japan is double that of Europe, 
for example. Nevertheless, for brevity and clarity of analysis, we simply assume 
that the unit cost of installing a plant is USD 2,000 per kW across the board.2 
Note that this treatment tends to overestimate the value of the current stock in 
Europe and the US and underestimate it in Japan and other less developed 
countries.
This depreciation adjusted solar energy capital in monetary units in 2014 turned 
out to be the highest in Germany ($64b), followed by China ($54b), Japan ($43b), 
the United States ($34b) and Italy ($32b). It is only in 2016 that Asia Pacific 
surpassed Europe and Eurasia in unadjusted capacity, aided by explosive growth in 
China afterwards.
In per capita terms, the big picture changes. By far the largest is Germany ($785), 
followed by Italy ($540), Belgium ($480), Greece ($418) and Japan ($335). These top 
five countries have adopted some supporting mechanisms for renewable energy, includ-
ing solar power, typically feed-in systems or quota obligations.
Wind energy
In much the same way as solar power capital, we can estimate wind power capital. 
Past data on capacity instalment can be used to compute the current stock of wind 
power plants in terms of kW, which can be converted to social value by using actual 
expenditures.
More specifically, to convert past investments into capital stock, we need 
assumptions for unit costs. The cost of wind turbines, which has been decreasing 
in recent years, makes up for most of the initial capital cost. The initial capital 
cost varies depending on the country, project, geographical condition and tech-
nologies. For example, an offshore wind farm, which is still in its infant stage, is 
likely to cost more than conventional wind farms provided that they are equipped 
with related infrastructure such as a subsea distribution network. However, we 
bypass this heterogeneity as our information is limited, which would yield com-
plexities in accounting. The U.S. DOE (2016) reports that in the US, the average 
turbine prices reached a low of $800/kW around the turn of the century, increased 
to $1,600/kW by the end of 2008, and then declined again to approximately 
$1,000. According to the same report, performance in terms of the capacity fac-
tor has improved significantly even within the past several years to 42.5% (those 
built in 2014 or 2015), compared to an average of 25%–32% for those built 
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around the turn of the century to the 2000s.3 Considering that our sample period 
ends in 2014 and the US can be one of the forerunners in the relevant technolo-
gies, we have no reason to adopt a number less than this figure. Thus, we assume 
that the unit cost of wind energy is simply $1,000 per kW for all periods and all 
countries, which happens to be half of our assumed unit cost of solar power. 
Again, this will make our estimates in some regions lower than the actual 
expenditure.
The cost-based capital stock of wind power turns out to have accumulated in 
China ($84b), the United States ($51b), Germany ($26b), India ($17b) and 
Spain ($15b). In regional aggregates, Asia Pacific is leading ($109b), followed 
by Europe and Eurasia ($98b) and North America ($61b). It is interesting to 
see this in per capita terms as the top countries are focused on Europe, in the 
order Sweden ($476), Denmark ($433), Ireland ($379), Spain ($328) and Por-
tugal ($325).
Summary
As we argued at the outset of this section, renewable energy output can be consid-
ered a joint product of renewable energy-produced capital and natural capital. 
Renewable energy capital (RE) is produced capital (PC) from a physical perspective, 
but it can substitute for natural capital (NC), especially non-renewable fossil fuels, 
such as coal, oil and gas. Thus, in Table 3.7, we show a comparison of our results 
with produced and natural capital (per capita) in selected countries. As Table 3.7 
illustrates, China, Germany, the United States, Japan and Italy are the top five 
countries in terms of the value of total renewable energy capital (RE) as of 2014. 
They are a mix of developed and emerging countries. Renewable energy capital per 
capita (REpc) has accumulated widely in Europe: Germany, Italy, Denmark, Belgium 
and Greece.
Table 3.7 also reports the share of RE in terms of produced capital, natural capital 
and inclusive wealth. In the current inclusive wealth framework, RE stocks have 
already been accounted for in the PC category. Apparently, RE does not account 
for most PC in any country, but in some Eastern European countries (Bulgaria and 
Romania), it accounts for 1 to 2% of the total PC. This may be because RE has 
been aggressively introduced across Europe and PC accumulates less in less developed 
parts of Europe.
More interesting is the ratio of RE to natural capital (NC), which varies widely 
since natural capital endowment differs from country to country. In Belgium, for 
example, the combined RE capital of solar and wind already surpassed the level 
of natural capital. Other European countries, including United Kingdom and 
Italy, and Israel already have RE capital, which is more than a 10% equivalent of 
natural capital of their nations. It could be the case that these countries have 
depleted their natural capital in exchange for investing in renewable energy. It 
could also be the case that they have invested in RE because they are poorly 
endowed with non-renewable resources in the first place. Another possibility is 
that they are replacing conventional power plants (produced capital) using fossil 
fuels or nuclear power.
Table 3.7  Renewable energy capital of selected countries, and its ratio compared to other 
capitals
Countries Solar Wind RE REpc RE/PC RE/NC RE/IW
Argentina – 254 254 6 0.000 0.000 0.000
Australia 7,262 3,290 10,551 449 0.003 0.004 0.001
Austria 1,440 1,604 3,044 353 0.002 0.054 0.001
Belgium 5,389 1,636 7,025 626 0.004 1.084 0.001
Bulgaria 1,836 530 2,366 328 0.021 0.043 0.005
Brazil – 5,503 5,503 27 0.002 0.001 0.000
Canada 3,507 8,162 11,669 328 0.003 0.003 0.001
Switzerland 1,945 – 1,945 236 0.001 0.023 0.000
Chile 434 716 1,150 65 0.002 0.004 0.001
China 53,869 84,342 138,211 99 0.008 0.018 0.003
Costa Rica – 132 132 28 0.002 0.002 0.000
Czech Republic 3,376 – 3,376 318 0.005 0.059 0.002
Germany 63,930 26,182 90,112 1,106 0.008 0.064 0.002
Denmark 1,112 2,455 3,567 630 0.004 0.104 0.001
Egypt – 427 427 5 0.001 0.004 0.000
Spain 8,242 15,253 23,496 505 0.005 0.076 0.001
Finland 18 528 546 100 0.001 0.004 0.000
France 10,103 7,461 17,564 274 0.002 0.064 0.000
United Kingdom 10,422 10,762 21,184 326 0.003 0.128 0.001
Greece 4,706 1,444 6,151 546 0.007 0.030 0.002
Honduras 8 – 8 1 0.000 0.000 0.000
Hungary 149 251 400 41 0.001 0.007 0.000
India 5,698 17,081 22,779 18 0.005 0.007 0.001
Ireland – 1,777 1,777 379 0.002 0.060 0.001
Israel 1,265 – 1,265 159 0.002 0.101 0.001
Italy 32,202 6,560 38,761 651 0.005 0.116 0.001
Japan 42,903 1,945 44,848 350 0.002 0.098 0.001
Morocco – 693 693 20 0.002 0.009 0.000
Mexico 191 2,216 2,407 19 0.001 0.003 0.000
Malaysia 386 – 386 13 0.001 0.001 0.000
Netherlands 2,091 1,810 3,901 231 0.001 0.052 0.000
Norway 12 666 678 132 0.001 0.003 0.000
New Zealand – 502 502 110 0.001 0.000 0.000
Pakistan 233 248 481 3 0.001 0.001 0.000
Philippines 38 272 310 3 0.001 0.002 0.000
Poland – 3,385 3,385 88 0.003 0.008 0.001
Portugal 737 3,407 4,144 396 0.005 0.071 0.001
Romania 2,506 2,667 5,173 259 0.010 0.028 0.003
Slovakia 918 – 918 169 0.004 0.065 0.001
Sweden 144 4,613 4,757 491 0.003 0.031 0.001
Thailand 2,440 208 2,648 39 0.003 0.010 0.001
(Continued)
102 Shunsuke Managi
Fish wealth of nations
Background
Fish and fisheries has long sustained humans – literally for many millennia. Not only 
has it been a primary source of protein for humans, but it has also had an important 
place in the food chain of the marine ecosystem. The increasing human population 
around the world, aided by preferences for health consciousness, has pushed demand 
for fish and related products. On the supply side, improving technology has given 
rise to more availability for human consumption. Moreover, aquaculture surpassed 
conventional capture fishery for human consumption for the first time in 2014 (FAO 
2016).
The FAO’s assessment of fishery stocks, however, is sobering. Approximately 
one-third of the total fishery stock was assessed as being “mined” at a biologically 
unsustainable level in 2013. In the context of the inclusive wealth accounting frame-
work, with such characteristics as contribution to human well-being, thresholds and 
irreversibility, non-substitutability and non-linearity, fishery is a prime example of 
natural capital. With poor substitutability for other nutrition, it is imperative to 
preserve this type of natural capital for the well-being of future generations. As is 
the case with other natural capital, the abundance of the stock and its management 
are important for sustainability. Somewhat contrary to other classes of natural capital, 
fishery resources are prone to yearly volatility. Thus, sustainability should be assessed 
in from a longer-term perspective.
Against this backdrop, the current edition of IWR is almost the first to estimate 
fish capital stock as part of renewable natural capital in the context of inclusive 
wealth accounting. The qualification “almost” refers to the accounting of fisheries 
in six selected countries in our pilot-inclusive wealth report (UNU-IHDP, 2012). 
IWR 2012 accounted for varying numbers of fish stocks from four countries in 
1990–2008: 12 from Australia, nine from Canada, ten from South Africa and 40 
from the United States. The fishery capital stock estimate was based on the avail-
able stock of fisheries within these countries’ fishing areas from the newly developed 
Countries Solar Wind RE REpc RE/PC RE/NC RE/IW
Tunisia – 203 203 18 0.001 0.012 0.000
Turkey 110 3,189 3,299 43 0.002 0.006 0.000
Ukraine 1,511 – 1,511 34 0.003 0.002 0.001
Uruguay – 518 518 151 0.007 0.014 0.002
United States of 
America
33,947 51,095 85,042 268 0.002 0.009 0.000
South Africa 2,012 554 2,566 47 0.003 0.007 0.001
Source: Based on BP (2016); U.S. DOE (2015); UN (2015); and other sources.
Note: See Yamaguchi (2017) for detailed methodology. RE, REpc, PC, NC and IW stand for 
renewable energy capital, renewable energy capital per capita, produced capital, natural capital 
and inclusive wealth (in the conventional IWR 2014 approach), respectively. Solar, wind and 
RE are expressed in million USD, while REpc is in USD.
Table 3.7  (Continued)
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RAM Legacy Stock Assessment Database (Ricard et al. 2012). To attach shadow 
prices, IWR 2012 derived prices per tonne from the total landing value and quantity 
of the Sea Around Us Project (SAUP 2011), which were averaged across species. 
This was finally converted to shadow prices using the fishery rental rate. Although 
IWR 2012 was commendable for partially including fisheries as part of natural 
capital, their scope and methodology was admittedly small and limited. In the fol-
lowing section, we illustrate how we attempted to extend our natural capital database 
to this important class of natural capital.
Methodology
Estimating fish stock is a herculean task, compared to other classes of natural capital, 
for many reasons. They cannot be estimated based on the habitat area, unlike forest 
or agricultural land, whose computation can be based on the area. Moreover, the 
sheer mobility of the resource not only makes the exercise harder but also poses a 
fundamental question: to what area can a given fishery be attributed, given that a 
marine fishery habitat is usually not within national borders? In the current exercise, 
we simplify the matter by assuming that the fish stock belongs to the country where 
harvest takes place and the resources are loaded. Of course, this is a crude treatment 
in many ways: just because fishery biomass is loaded to a particular country does 
not necessarily mean that the fishery belongs to that country. Having acknowledged 
this shortcoming, we have no alternative sound theory to allocate harvests to coun-
tries. In what follows, our estimates of the fishery wealth of nations should be 
interpreted as capital stocks that exist in the fisheries operating in these countries.
In renewable resource economics, or bioeconomics, there is a long tradition of 
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where St denotes the renewable resource biomass stock; G(St)is the growth func-
tion; and Ht is the harvest. The population, whether it is a renewable resource or 











where r and k are the parameters that represent the intrinsic (relative) growth 
rate and carrying capacity of the resource stock, respectively. The harvest, in turn, 
depends on the resource abundance. A simple but empirically supported harvest 
production function is to assume that it is proportional to the product of effort and 
stock, i.e.,
H qE St t t= ,
where q is called the catchability coefficient. Et stands for the effort put into the 
production process, which is often proxied by the number of vessels or fishermen’s 
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All this means that, to estimate the fishery stock, St, we can resort either to the 
harvest function, (1), or total resource dynamics, (2). Global fish stocks are com-
monly assessed by examining the trends in catch or harvest data. Although this 
catch-based assessment method has attracted significant criticism (see, for instance, 
Daan et al. (2011)) either due to its technical or conceptual flaws, it is still consid-
ered the most reliable method for assessing fish stock (Froese et al. 2012; Kleisner 
et al. 2013). The main reason is simply that the only data available for most fisheries 
are the weight of fish caught each year (Pauly et al. 2013). If effort and harvest are 
known data points as well as the catchability coefficient q, then St can be estimated 
solely from the Schaefer production function (Yamaguchi et al. 2016).
However, effort data are sparse worldwide, so we cannot employ this method for 
inclusive wealth accounting across the globe. Alternatively, we can appeal to resource 
dynamics. For the lack of reliable data on r and k for most fish stocks, we follow 
Martell and Froese (2013), who developed an algorithm to randomly generate 
feasible (r,k) pairs from a uniform distribution function. The likelihood of the gener-
ated (r,k) pairs is further evaluated using the Bernoulli distribution to ensure that 
the estimated stock meets the following assumptions: it never collapsed or exceeded 
the carrying capacity, and the final stock lies within the assumed range of 
depletion.
In cases where the values of (r,k) are not feasible, the stocks were simply estimated 
according to the following rules:
• If the year being studied follows the year of the maximum catch, then the 
biomass stock is estimated as twice the catch;
• Otherwise, the biomass stock is estimated as twice the maximum catch, net of 
the catch (2 × Maximum Catch – Catch).
The time-series data of the catch (tonnage and value) of each country’s economic 
exclusive zone (EEZ), either by domestic or foreign fleets, for the period of 1950–2010 
are obtained from the Sea Around Us Project (SAUP 2016). We only evaluate the 
stock with a catch record of at least 20 years and which has a total catch in a given 
area of at least 1,000 tonnes over the time span.
The shadow prices of fisheries, like other classes of natural capital, ideally reflect 
their marginal contribution to social well-being. More specifically, they also represent 
not only their marginal abundance but the substitution possibilities with other capital 
forms (Dasgupta 2009). In a case study of predator-prey dynamics in a Baltic Sea 
commercial fishery, Do Yun et al. (2017) showed that the shadow prices of species are 
interdependent on relative abundance and scarcity in a multispecies ecosystem-based 
management context. Applying a similar methodology to our current natural capital 
estimate would need a much more detailed dataset than ours. Moreover, there is an 
obvious trade-off between disaggregated, state-dependent shadow prices and clarity 
of accounting. For example, if we attach shadow prices that differ according to 
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countries, species, cohorts, years, etc., it would be difficult to disaggregate the reason 
for the change in the value of capital stocks, although this may be resolved by advanc-
ing the way the figures are presented. Additionally, the period-average shadow prices, 
which are adopted elsewhere in IWR, can be shown to be justified as a good approxi-
mation, either in a short period of time or the shadow price change is linear in time. 
Thus, currently, we choose to use a simple unit market rent that reflects a period-
average, species-average market price adjusted by the rental rate.
Results and discussion
In Figure 3.20, we show the past trend of catches from the top 10 countries. Asian 
demand has been on the rise, mostly driven by the increase in China, Indonesia and 
India. The US has been stable, and Russia and Japan have declined. Peru has been 
volatile, largely due to anchovy captures. Note that this figure only considers capture 
production for both marine and inland waters, which accounts for a portion of 
fishery production. Leading countries in aquaculture include China (59 m tonnes) 
and India (14 m tonnes). We also exclude aquaculture production, largely because 
this class of fishery production has more characteristics of produced capital. This is 
somewhat analogous to classifying cultivated forests as produced capital, not natural 
capital.
Figure 3.21 shows the capital stock levels in monetary value comparing 1990 and 
2014. Among countries affiliated with a large amount of fishery stock, it is only 
Canada and Spain that increased their level in the period from 1990 to 2014. In 
other major fishery producing countries, including China, Indonesia, Japan, Malaysia, 
Peru and Vietnam, capital stocks have decreased. In the US, capital stocks slightly 
decreased.
Figure 3.20 Top 10 countries in fishery capture production
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Figure 3.22 Average annual growth rate of fishery from 1990 to 2014
Around the world, the value of fishery stock has decreased from $2,325 billion 
to $1,713 billion (Figure 3.22). Although the methodology of shadow pricing can 
be improved, and the absolute figure has no welfare significance,4 this declining 
trend is an alarming one per se. Given that the capture production is on the increase, 
the downward pressure of production on the stock appears to remain prevalent.
Part of this problem may have been circumvented in the increase in aquaculture, 
as we have argued. In addition, there has been an effort to promote policy and 
management based on Maximum Sustainable Yield (MSY). MSY has its own limita-
tions in that multispecies and ecosystem interactions tend to be absent; however, it 
is a step in the right direction to modify MSY-based fishery policy. This has just 
begun, and its effect has yet to be seen, but we hope to have set the base to monitor 
policy intervention effects on the marine fish capital stock.
Concluding remarks
In this chapter, we took a deeper look at the natural capital of nations from regional 
perspectives. Data were also used to study the relationship between natural capital 
and natural disasters.
Some new insights were gained regarding regions and newer classes of natural capital – 
fishery and renewable energy capital. Admittedly, some challenges remain: shadow prices 
of fishery and renewable energy capital are still developing. In particular, they have to 
be estimated in a consistent manner with their addition to social well-being. As IWR 
2012 notes, “[w]e will never get shadow prices ‘right,’ but we can attempt to narrow 
the range in which they are taken by reasonable people to lie.” We believe that this 
chapter is a step in the right direction.
Notes
1 For a detailed discussion on cost- vs. income-based or backward- and forward-looking 
accounting of capital assets, and a further discussion and analysis of RE capital, see 
Yamaguchi (2017).
2 This is slightly more expensive than the cost in Europe in 2014 and is two-thirds of 
the cost in Japan (METI 2016).
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3 In all, “the capacity-weighted average installed project cost stood at nearly $1,690/
kW, down $640/kW or 27% from the apparent peak in average reported costs in 2009 
and 2010.” This has declined even more to $1,590/kW in 2016 (U.S. DOE 2016). 
In our cost-based accounting, we focus on actual investment expenditure, so the 
unweighted installed project cost should be used.
4 Note that the same price is applied to the whole stock for simplicity.
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Table 3.8  Growth rate of natural capital and renewable resources from 1990–2014








Afghanistan −0.1% 0.0% 0.0%
Albania −0.3% −0.1% 0.0% −3.4%
United Arab Emirates −0.9% −2.8% −2.8%
Argentina −0.3% −0.2% −0.3% −5.2%
Armenia 2.5% −0.5% −0.5%
Australia −0.6% −0.7% −0.8% −2.7%
Austria −0.1% 0.2% 0.5%
Burundi −0.9% −0.9% −1.6%
Belgium 1.6% 1.6% 1.5% 1.6%
Benin −1.0% −1.0% −1.0% −3.3%
Bangladesh −0.8% −0.7% −0.2% −1.5%
Bulgaria −1.6% −3.4% −4.7% 0.6%
Bahrain −5.5% −1.6% −6.4% −1.6%
Belize −0.5% −0.5% −0.6% −0.4%
Bolivia −0.5% −0.4% −0.5%
Brazil −0.4% −0.4% −0.4% −0.9%
Barbados −1.6% −0.7% −0.9% 0.2%
Botswana −0.9% −0.8% −0.9%
Central African Republic −0.1% −0.1% −0.1%
Canada −1.2% −1.6% −2.0% 2.2%
Switzerland −0.1% −0.1% 0.3%
Chile −0.6% −0.3% 0.1% −2.8%
China −0.8% −0.2% −0.8% −3.2%
Côte d’Ivoire 1.2% 1.3% 1.7% −1.3%
Cameroon −6.2% −6.4% −7.3% −3.8%
Democratic Republic of 
the Congo
−0.2% −0.2% −0.2%
Congo −0.3% 0.0% −0.1% 1.7%
Colombia −4.8% −5.9% −6.6% −0.3%
Costa Rica 0.7% 0.7% 2.6% −1.7%
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Cuba 0.2% 1.7% 1.9% −1.2%
Cyprus 0.0% 0.0% 0.3%
Czech Republic −1.4% −1.8% −1.8%
Germany −0.6% 0.3% 0.8% 0.8%
Denmark −3.3% −1.4% 1.2% −1.8%
Dominican Republic −0.3% −0.3% −0.2% −0.9%
Algeria −2.2% −1.1% −0.3% −2.8%
Ecuador −1.0% −0.6% −0.6% −1.3%
Egypt −2.6% 0.8% −2.3%
Spain 0.2% 0.4% 1.2% 1.3%
Estonia 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% −0.7%
Finland −0.3% −0.3% −0.3% −1.7%
Fiji 0.1% 0.1% 0.0% 0.4%
France 0.0% 0.0% 0.6% −1.4%
Gabon −0.1% 0.0% 0.0% −1.6%
United Kingdom −4.4% −1.0% −5.9% −2.3%
Ghana 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% −3.0%
Gambia −1.2% −1.2% 0.4% −2.9%
Greece −0.8% −0.5% 0.8% −2.1%
Guatemala −1.0% −1.0% −0.9% −2.4%
Guyana 0.6% 0.6% 0.7% −3.1%
Honduras −2.0% −2.0% −2.3% −3.4%
Croatia 0.3% 0.5% 0.6% −0.7%
Haiti −1.8% −1.8% −1.8% −1.7%
Hungary −0.8% −0.6% 0.8%
Indonesia −1.1% −0.8% −1.2% −3.0%
India −0.4% −0.1% 0.1% −2.3%
Ireland −1.5% −1.4% −1.3% −2.1%
Iran −0.6% −1.0% −0.9% −3.2%
Iraq −0.4% −0.2% 0.1% −3.4%
Iceland −0.3% −0.3% 3.5% −1.8%
Israel −0.6% −0.5% 0.5% −1.1%
Italy −0.2% 0.0% 1.1% −0.4%
Jamaica −0.3% −0.2% −0.1% 0.5%
Jordan −0.5% −0.1% 0.0% −0.3%
Japan −0.9% −0.7% 0.2% −0.8%
Kazakhstan −0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
Kenya 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.0%
Kyrgyzstan 0.5% 1.4% 1.4%
Cambodia −1.3% −1.3% −1.3% −5.3%
Republic of Korea −0.3% −0.1% 2.1% −1.4%
Kuwait −0.7% −1.1% −1.1%
Laos 0.0% 0.0% −0.1%








Liberia −0.7% −0.7% −0.7% −2.2%
Sri Lanka −0.9% −0.9% −0.9% −2.7%
Lesotho −0.2% −0.2% −0.2%
Lithuania 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% −2.3%
Luxembourg 0.7% 0.7% 0.7%
Latvia 0.8% 0.8% 0.8% −0.4%
Morocco −0.5% −0.5% 0.3% −1.7%
Republic of Moldova −5.5% −5.5% −5.5%
Maldives −1.9% −1.9% −6.5% −2.0%
Mexico −0.8% −0.1% −0.1% −1.2%
Mali −2.1% −2.1% −3.1%
Malta −0.7% −0.7% −6.5% 1.0%
Myanmar −1.5% −1.5% −1.3% −3.0%
Mongolia −0.4% −0.4% −0.3%
Mozambique 1.2% −0.4% −0.5% −0.8%
Mauritania −1.8% −2.4% −2.9% −2.3%
Mauritius −1.5% −1.5% −0.5% −3.4%
Malawi −0.5% −0.5% −1.3%
Malaysia −1.3% −0.5% −0.1% −2.2%
Namibia 0.7% 0.5% −0.9% 2.7%
Niger −1.2% −1.4% −2.5%
Nigeria −1.3% −0.3% −2.9% −3.8%
Nicaragua −0.7% −0.7% −1.3% −1.4%
Netherlands −3.0% −0.5% −0.8%
Norway −3.5% 0.3% 0.9% −0.6%
Nepal −1.1% −1.1% −1.2%
New Zealand 0.3% 0.3% 0.5% −3.0%
Pakistan −2.7% −2.9% −3.3% −2.7%
Panama 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% −1.7%
Peru −0.1% 0.0% 0.1% −4.0%
Philippines −0.1% −0.1% 0.2% −2.2%
Papua New Guinea 0.8% 0.9% 1.0% −2.2%
Poland −0.8% −0.9% 1.4% −2.8%
Portugal −0.3% −0.3% −1.3% 0.9%
Paraguay −0.6% −0.6% −1.2%
Qatar −1.0% −0.5% −1.8%
Romania −0.7% 0.0% 0.2%
Russian Federation 0.3% 0.0% 0.0% −1.7%
Rwanda 1.6% −0.4% −1.1%
Saudi Arabia −0.2% 1.7% 0.0% −2.2%
Sudan (former) −2.9% −3.3% −3.3% −0.8%
Senegal −0.6% −0.6% −0.6% −0.8%
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Singapore −0.7% −0.7% 7.7% −1.5%
Sierra Leone −0.9% −0.9% −0.9% −1.4%
El Salvador 0.3% 0.3% −1.5% 1.0%
Serbia 1.5% 1.2% 1.2%
Slovakia −0.1% 0.5% 0.5%
Slovenia 0.2% 0.9% 0.9% −3.5%
Sweden −1.3% −1.3% −1.4% −1.2%
Swaziland 0.8% 1.3% 1.3%
Syrian Arab Republic −3.3% −1.3% −6.5% −1.0%
Togo −1.8% −1.8% −5.7% 0.1%
Thailand −1.0% −0.3% 0.2% −2.0%
Tajikistan 0.1% 0.0% 0.0%
Trinidad and Tobago −3.9% −3.1% −4.0% −0.3%
Tunisia −2.1% −0.1% −0.5% −2.3%
Turkey −0.5% −0.4% −0.6% −2.1%
United Republic of 
Tanzania
1.1% 1.1% 1.2% −1.8%
Uganda −1.0% −2.9% −2.9%
Ukraine 0.1% 0.7% 0.8% −0.5%
Uruguay −0.3% −0.3% 0.3% −3.6%
United States of America −0.6% 0.2% 0.3% −0.1%
Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of)
−0.3% −0.2% −0.3% −4.5%
Viet Nam −0.4% 0.0% 0.6% −2.5%
Yemen −0.4% −0.4% 0.0% −3.3%
South Africa −1.2% 0.1% −0.1% 0.5%
Zambia −0.3% −0.2% −0.3%
Zimbabwe −1.7% −1.8% −1.8%
4 Reconciling inclusive wealth 
and Piketty




In his book Capital in the Twenty-First Century, Piketty (2014) documents the rise 
in the wealth-income ratios over 1970 to 2010 for eight high-income economies – 
the United States, Japan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, Italy, Canada and 
Australia. For each of these countries, the wealth-income ratio has increased from 
200–400% in 1970 to 400–600% in 2010. In addition, the rise in this ratio has 
been accompanied by another important trend. Over the past four decades, much 
of the accumulated capital in rich countries is predominantly private wealth, and it 
comprises largely financial and industrial capital and urban real estate (i.e. housing). 
The effect of these trends has contributed to what Piketty (2014, pp. 193–194) 
describes as the “financialization” of the global economy, and as a result, increasing 
wealth and income inequality:
Broadly speaking, the 1970s and 1980s witnessed an extensive “financialization” 
of the global economy, which altered the structure of wealth in the sense that 
the total amount of financial assets and liabilities held by various sectors (house-
hold, corporations, government agencies) increased more rapidly than net wealth. 
In most countries, the total amount of financial assets and liabilities in the early 
1970s did not exceed four to five years of national income. By 2010, this 
amount had increased to ten to fifteen years of national income (in the United 
States, Japan, Germany and France in particular) and to twenty years of national 
income in Britain, which set an absolute historical record.
To construct these measures of wealth and income for 1970 to 2010, Piketty (2014) 
uses official national accounts for each country, following the UN System of National 
Accounts (SNA). Wealth is defined conventionally as market value “national wealth,” 
which can be decomposed into domestic capital (including land and real estate) and 
net foreign assets.1 Income is “net-of-depreciation national income,” which is the 
sum of gross domestic product and net foreign income, less any domestic capital 
depreciation. Similarly, the national saving flow that adds to wealth is also measured 
net of capital depreciation.
As pointed out by Barbier (2015, 2017), the SNA approach used by Piketty 
(2014) to estimate wealth, net income and net savings does not include the depre-
ciation in natural resources essential to domestic production and income, such as 
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fossil fuels, minerals and forests. These resources are important sources of “natural” 
capital, and the value of their net depletion should also be deducted from annual 
income and savings (Arrow et al. 2012; Hamilton and Clemens 1999; Hartwick 
1977, 1990; Solow 1986; Weitzman 1976; World Bank 2011). The rationale is 
intuitive: if we use up more of energy, mineral and forest resources to produce 
additional economic output today, then we have less natural capital for production 
tomorrow; thus, net national income and savings today should also account for any 
natural capital depreciation.
Accounting for natural capital depletion in wealth accounts is, of course, a key 
and familiar contribution of the inclusive wealth approach, as highlighted in 
previous Inclusive Wealth Reports (UNU-IHDP-UNEP 2012, 2014). Barbier 
(2017) has shown that it is possible to reconcile this approach of accounting for 
natural capital depreciation with Piketty’s method of estimating net national 
income and saving. Specifically, this leads to two key indicators: the net national 
saving rate adjusted for natural capital depreciation, and the ratio of this saving 
rate with respect to the long-run average annual growth in adjusted net national 
income per capita. Using World Bank data, Barbier (2017) applies these two 
indicators to examine the impacts of depreciation of key natural resources, such 
as fossil fuels, minerals and forests, on the accumulation of adjusted net wealth 
over 1970–2013 for the same eight rich countries analysed by Piketty (2014) and 
Piketty and Zucman (2014), and for comparison, over 1979–2013 for 95 low 
and middle-income economies. Whereas in developing economies capital accu-
mulation has largely kept pace with rising natural capital depletion, in the rich 
countries adjusted net savings have fallen to converge with the rate of natural 
capital depreciation, suggesting less compensation by net increases in other 
capital.
In sum, natural capital depreciation clearly matters for wealth accumulation and 
long-run wealth-income ratios in all economies, including rich countries. Moreover, 
the result has important implications for Piketty’s explanation for growing global 
inequality. If overall wealth accumulation net of natural capital depreciation is slowing 
in rich countries, then the “financialization” of economies observed by Piketty (2014) 
will continue to worsen wealth and income inequality.
The purpose of this chapter is to explore further the implications of reconciling 
the inclusive wealth approach of Barbier (2017) to adjusting net income and savings 
for natural capital depreciation with Piketty’s method of estimating long-run trends 
in wealth-income ratios. In addition, the analysis is extended from Piketty’s original 
group of eight rich countries to 30 high-income economies that are members of 
the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) over 1970 
to 2014. Evidence suggests that growing income and wealth inequality has been 
pervasive in all OECD economies (OECD 2011), and thus determining whether 
natural capital depreciation impacts long-run wealth accumulation in these economies 
may be an important factor underlying this trend.
This chapter also extends the analysis by Barbier (2017) of these natural capital 
depreciation, net income and net savings trends to 113 low and middle-income 
(developing) economies from 1970 to 2014. For comparison, the sub-group of 26 
low-income countries is also analysed separately, which turn out to display different 
trends over 1970–2014 than either all developing or the rich OECD economies.
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The main findings are that, although over the past four decades the rate of natural 
capital depreciation has been on average five times larger in developing countries than 
in the rich OECD economies, in low and middle-income economies other forms of 
capital investments have largely compensated for the rising natural capital depletion 
that has occurred since the late 1990s. In contrast, in the rich countries, the rate of 
adjusted net savings has converged to the rate of natural capital depreciation. For 
low-income economies, adjusted net wealth accumulation fell on average each year at 
a rate that is four times more than long-run growth, although since 2000 this trend 
may have been reversing. If this rising trend continues, then low-income countries 
could experience accumulation in net adjusted wealth at a faster pace than long-run 
per capita income growth.
Over the past 40 years there may have been substantial accumulation of wealth 
relative to income in rich economies, but as this accumulation has proceeded, natural 
capital depreciation is being compensated less and less each year by net increases in 
other forms of capital. The overall implications are that, given that stocks of natural 
resources are depleted for current production and wealth accumulation, a measure 
of national wealth that excludes natural capital depreciation likely exaggerates the 
actual increase in an economy’s wealth over time, especially in those countries where 
accumulation of other forms of wealth is failing to compensate for diminishing natural 
capital. This suggests that income and wealth inequality may be worsening in rich 
countries, and in the global economy generally, as emphasized by Piketty (2014).
Conventional versus adjusted net income accounting
Because official national account statistics do not routinely account for changes in 
stocks of natural capital – even fossil fuels, minerals, forests and similar natural 
resources that can be bought and sold on markets – it is difficult to measure directly 
long-run trends in the natural capital/national income ratio for an economy. How-
ever, it is possible to indicate how natural resource depreciation affects wealth 
accumulation, through extending the approach to measuring national wealth devel-
oped by Piketty (2014) and Piketty and Zucman (2014).2
The appendix to this chapter outlines how this can be done, which is summarized 
here. Let Wt denote the market value of national wealth at time t, and Yt be conven-
tionally defined net national income (NNI), which is gross national income less any 
depreciation in domestic capital assets (e.g. factories, machines, equipment, buildings, 
etc.) that occurs in producing national income each year. Similarly, St is conventional 
net national savings (NNS) at time t, which is gross savings also adjusted for domestic 
capital depreciation. Consequently, Piketty (2014) and Piketty and Zucman (2014) 
focus on three important relationships among these conventional indicators:
• Net wealth accumulation:W W St t t+ − =1
• Net national saving rate: S Y st t t=
• Wealth-income ratio:W Yt t t= β .
However, as argued by Barbier (2017), an economy also contains a stock of available 
natural resources for production, with market value at time t of Nt ≥ 0. This 
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suggests that the adjusted net wealth of the economy is W W Nt t t
* = +  . As wealth 
now includes an endowment of natural capital, net national income Yt and net 
national savings St need to be adjusted for natural capital depreciated through its 
use in production over t and t+1. Let Yt
* and St
* represent the adjustments to net 
national income (ANNI) and savings (ANNS) for any natural capital depreciation, 
respectively. This leads to three additional indicators:
• Adjusted net wealth accumulation:W W St t t+ − =1
* * *
• Adjusted net national saving rate: S Y st t t
* * *=
• Natural capital depreciation rate:  N N Y nt t t t+ −( ) =1 * *.
Figure 4.1 outlines how the conventional economic indicators of gross and net national 
income can be adjusted for natural capital depreciation to derive adjusted net national 
income (ANNI). Similarly, Figure 4.2 shows how conventional gross and net savings 
can be adjusted to determine adjusted net national savings (ANNS).
Barbier (2017) also suggests that the savings rate st
* can also be expressed as a 
ratio with respect to the long-run average growth in ANNI per capita, g *. This 
leads to another indicator:
• Saving-ANNI growth ratio: s gt
* *.
Trends in this ratio indicate how the rate of wealth accumulation over time, 
W W Yt t t+ −1
* * *, compares with the long-run growth rate of an economy.
The rest of this chapter explores long-run trends in st
*, nt
* and s gt
* * for high-
income OECD, developing and low-income economies and the implications of these 
trends for the wealth and income inequality arguments of Piketty (2014). However, 
first we show the key trends that lead Piketty to conclude that inequality has been 
worsening in the major rich countries and the global economy.
Figure 4.1 Net national income (NNI) adjusted for natural capital depreciation
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Financialization and inequality
Piketty (2014) argues that rising wealth and income inequality is attributed to 
several important features in the pattern of wealth accumulation in the world 
economy. First, the ratio of conventionally measured national wealth to income has 
increased steadily over 1970 to 2010 for the eight richest economies. Figure 4.3 
recreates these trends in the wealth-income ratioW Yt t t= β for these countries. 
For the past four decades the average trend in the wealth-income ratio (dotted 
line) for this group of wealthy economies has been rising. In 1970, wealth ranged 
from two to four years (200% to 400%) of national income for these countries, 
and by 2010 wealth was four to six years (400% to 600%) of income.
Piketty (2014) also notes that national wealth in rich countries is predominantly 
private wealth, and it comprises largely financial and industrial capital as well as 
urban real estate (i.e. housing). In contrast, agricultural land is no longer a significant 
share of wealth in these economies. In particular, the ratio of financial assets to 
national income has risen markedly, which Piketty calls the extensive “financializa-
tion” of rich countries and thus the global economy. Figure 4.4 replicates Piketty’s 
trends in the financial asset-income ratio in rich economies from 1960–2010.3
Especially since the 1980s, the financial asset share of national income in all 
wealthy economies has risen sharply (see Figure 4.4). In 1980, this share amounted 
to four to nine years (400% to 900%) of income in these countries. By 2010, financial 
assets accounted for seven years (700%) of national income in Australia, ten to 
15 years of income in the United States, Japan and Germany, and 20 years in the 
United Kingdom. As can be seen from comparing Figures 4.3 and 4.4, the financial 
asset share of national income has risen much more quickly than the overall wealth-
income ratio in rich countries. It is this extensive and rapid “financialization” of the 
global structure of wealth that Piketty (2014) argues is the main cause of the jump 
in the growing income and wealth inequality in recent decades. In particular, the 
Figure 4.2 Net national savings (NNS) adjusted for natural capital depreciation
Gross National Savings (GNS) 
•Gross National Income less private and public 
consumption 
Net National Savings (NNS) 
•GNS less depreciation of domestic reproducible 
capital assets (consumption of fixed capital).
Adjusted Net National Savings (ANNS) 
•NNS less net changes in the value of renewable 




Figure 4.3 Wealth-income ratios in rich countries, 1970–2010
Source: Piketty and Zucman (2014), Appendix Table A1: National wealth-national income 
ratio 1870–2010 (annual series), available at http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/fr/capitalisback.
Note: Financial assets are the total amount of financial assets and liabilities held by various 
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Figure 4.4 Financial asset-income ratios in rich countries, 1960–2010
Source: Piketty and Zucman (2014), Appendix Table A30: Gross financial assets of all domestic 
sectors 1960–2010 (% of national income), available at http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/fr/
capitalisback.
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increasing gap between rich and poor is due to the increasing wealth of the world’s 
rich, who benefitted most from the financialization of the world economy.
For example, based on estimates by Piketty (2014) compiled from data on bil-
lionaires’ wealth in Forbes magazine, Table 4.1 indicates how the wealth of the very 
rich increased from 1987 to 2013 compared to average world wealth per adult. The 
richest billionaires in the world consisted of 30 adults out of 3 billion people in the 
1980s, and their average wealth was US$3.4 billion in 1980. Their accumulated 
assets grew each year by 6.8% to 2013, totalling US$32.3 billion. Billionaires num-
bered 150 adults out of 3 billion in the 1980s, and their average wealth grew at 
6.4% per year between 1987 and 2013, from US$1.6 billion to US$14.0 billion. 
In comparison, average world wealth per adult increased by only 2.1% annually from 
1987 to 2013, and average income per person by just 1.4%. Thus, the wealth of 
the global rich appears to be growing much faster than that of the average 
individual.
Most analysts agree that, although data on long-run trends are available for only 
a handful of countries, the wealth of the super-rich – the wealthiest 1% of all adults – 
has been increasing since the early 1970s for some economies and since 1980 for 
others.4 More importantly, worldwide:
• The top 1% today account for almost half of the all the wealth in the world,
• The richest 10% own 87% of all assets, and
• The lower half of the global population possess less than 1% of global wealth.5
Wealth inequality is not only continuing to rise but also spreading throughout the 
world economy. Table 4.2 depicts the level of inequality in 46 major economies and 
Table 4.1 Increase in wealth of the world’s rich, 1987–2013
Wealth or income in: Average annual growth 
(%) 1987–2013
1980 2013
The richest billionairesa $3.4 billion $32.3 billion 6.8%
Billionairesb $1.6 billion $14.0 billion 6.4%
Average world wealth 
per adult
$26,065 $76,628 2.1%
Average world income 
per adult
$7,759 $19,187 1.4%
World adult population 2.85 billion 4.68 billion 1.9%
World gross domestic 
product (GDP)
$22,119 billion $89,719 billion 3.3%
Source: Thomas Piketty. 2014. Capital in the Twenty-First Century. Harvard University Press, 
Cambridge, MA, Table 12.1 and Supplementary Table S12.3 http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/
capital21c.
 All values are in US dollars, and adjusted net of inflation (2.3% per year from 1987 to 2013).
a About 30 adults out of 3 billion in the 1980s, and 45 adults out of 4.5 billion in 2010.
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also indicates whether the level has been rising or falling from 2000 to 2014. Wealth 
inequality is high or very high in 30 of these countries. Moreover, since 2000, nine 
countries have experienced a rapid rise in inequality, five have seen a rise and three 
a slight rise. Of particular concern is that nine of these countries are members of 
the Group of 20, which comprises the largest and most populous economies. Wealth 
inequality also appears to be a problem for a number of developing economies, 
although for most of them it appears to be unchanged or falling.
If natural capital depreciation does matter for long-run wealth accumulation in 
all economies, including rich countries, then there may be further implications for 
Piketty’s explanation of growing global inequality. Current measures of national 
wealth, income and saving that excludes natural capital depreciation likely exaggerate 
the actual increase in an economy’s wealth over time, especially in those countries 
where accumulation of other forms of wealth is failing to compensate for diminish-
ing natural capital. This suggests that income and wealth inequality may be even 
worse than in the global economy generally, as emphasized by Piketty (2014) and 
other scholars. To examine whether this is the case, the next section explores long-
run trends in st
*, nt
* and s gt
* * for high-income OECD, developing and low-income 
economies.
Measuring adjusted net national income, 
saving and growth
The World Bank’s World Development Indicators contain time-series of the value 
of net natural resource depletion, net national saving rates and adjusted net 
national income from 1970 to 2014 for most countries of the world (World Bank 
2017). Using these data, it is possible to construct long-run trends in the natural 
capital depreciation rate nt
*, the adjusted net savings rate st
*, and the saving-ANNI 
growth ratio s gt
* * for high-income OECD, developing and low-income 
economies.
The World Bank defines the value of net natural resource depletion as the sum of 
net forest, fossil fuel and mineral depletion.6 Net forest depletion is unit resource 
rents times the excess of round wood harvest over natural growth. Energy depletion 
is the ratio of the value of the stock of energy resources to the remaining reserve 
lifetime (capped at 25 years). It covers coal, crude oil and natural gas. Mineral deple-
tion is the ratio of the value of the stock of mineral resources to the remaining reserve 
lifetime (capped at 25 years). It includes tin, gold, lead, zinc, iron, copper, nickel, 
silver, bauxite and phosphate.
The World Development Indicators (WDI) provide annual estimates over 1970–
2014 of the World Bank’s aggregate value of net natural resource depletion as a 
percentage of gross national income (GNI) for the eight high-income countries. 
Converting this estimate to natural resource depletion as a share of adjusted net 
national income (constant 2010 $), which is the natural capital depreciation rate nt
*, 
involves multiplying the WDI’s annual measure of net natural resource depletion as 
a percentage of gross national income (GNI) by its measure of GNI (constant 
2010 $), and then dividing the result by the WDI’s annual estimates of adjusted 
net national income (constant 2010 $).
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Annual net national savings, which are gross national savings less the value of 
consumption of fixed capital, are also calculated as a percentage of GNI in the WDI. 
To estimate the adjusted net savings rate st
* requires first adjusting the annual net 
national savings rate for natural capital depreciation as a share of GNI, multiplying 
by GNI (constant 2010 $), and then dividing by adjusted net national income 
(constant 2010 $). Finally, the average annual growth of adjusted net national income 
per capita over 1970–2014, which is already estimated in the WDI, serves as the 
measure of g *.
OECD high-income countries
Figure 4.5 depicts the estimates over 1970–2014 of nt
* and st
* averaged across 30 high-
income countries that are also members of the Organization of Economic Cooperation 











1970 1980 1990 2000 2010 
s* and n* OECD high income countries, 1970-2014 
s* OECD high income 
n* OECD high income 
Linear (s* OECD high income) 
Figure 4.5  Adjusted net savings and natural capital depreciation in OECD high-income 
countries, 1970–2014
Notes: The 30 OECD high-income countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium Canada, Chile, 
Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, 
Israel, Italy, Japan, Korea Republic, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovak Republic, Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States. 
High-income economies are those in which 2015 GNI per capita was $12,476 or more.
 The data are based on the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2017). The measure 
of s* is gross national savings less the value of consumption of fixed capital and the value of net 
natural resource depletion as a % of adjusted net national income (constant 2010 US$); the 
measure of n* is annual value of net natural resource depletion as a % of adjusted net national 
income (constant 2010 US$).
 Over 1970–2014, the average s* for these eight countries was 9.1%, and average n* was 1.4%. 
The margin of error (95% confidence level) associated with the sample mean for s* and n* was 
1.7 and 1.2, respectively.
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Piketty (2014) – the United States, Japan, Germany, France, the United Kingdom, 
Italy, Canada and Australia.
The adjusted net savings rate for these countries declined considerably during 
these four decades. It was around 15%–16% in the early 1970s but from the mid-
1990s to mid-2000s hovered around 8%–10%. The savings rate fell to below 4% 
during the Great Recession, but has recovered since to above 6%. On average from 
1970 to 2014, st
* was 9.1% (see Figure 4.5). In contrast, natural capital depreciation 
has remained between 1% and 2% of adjusted net national income for most of the 
past 40 years. Thus, it appears that st
* and nt
* have been converging for the rich 
economies of the world. The long-run fall in the adjusted net savings rate indicates 
that, in these economies, there is less accumulation of other forms of capital each 
year to compensate for ongoing natural capital depreciation. The result is that the 
overall annual accumulation in adjusted net wealth relative to income has been 
trending downwards since the 1970s.
Figure 4.6 shows the estimate in the saving-ANNI growth ratio s gt
* * averaged 
for the 30 OECD high-income economies over 1970–2014. For illustrative purposes, 
the figure also includes the trend in the (conventional) capital-income ratio βt t tW Y=  
averaged for the eight rich countries over 1970–2010 that was estimated by Piketty 
and Zucman (2014). Finally, Figure 4.6 also includes the average s gt
* * ratio over 
the four decades.
The trend in βt depicted in Figure 4.6 confirms Piketty’s finding that the capital-
income ratio for the eight wealthiest countries has increased steadily over 1970 to 
2010. In 1970, their average capital-income ratio was around 340% (i.e. more than 
three years) of national income, and has risen to 525% (more than five years) of 
national income in 2010.7
In contrast, the saving-ANNI growth ratio for all 30 OECD high-income countries 
displays a distinctly downward trend. In the early 1970s, this ratio was around 700%, 
which suggests that the annual rate of adjusted net wealth accumulation was more 
than seven times the long-run average growth rate for the 30 countries over 
1970–2014. But since the mid-2000s, the s gt
* * ratio has fallen below 300%, which 
indicates that the rate of adjusted net wealth accumulation each year has been less 
than three times the growth rate. On average over 1970–2014, the saving-ANNI 
growth ratio was 422%, i.e. the rate of adjusted net wealth accumulation each year 
was four times long-run growth.
The falling trends in st
* and s gt
* * depicted in Figures 4.5 and 4.6 indicate that 
the rate of net national saving adjusted for natural capital depreciation has declined 
even faster than any slowdown in long-run growth in rich economies from 1970 
to 2014. This could have implications for long-run adjusted net wealth relative to 
income in these countries. For example, it is possible that the decline in saving-
ANNI growth ratio over the past four decades in OECD high-income countries 
will continue into future years. If so, the rate of net wealth accumulation relative 
to growth will continue to fall well below the average rate of 422% over 1970–2014. 
Verifying this possible long-run trend will require more analysis of these trends in 
the coming years.
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Developing countries
In comparison, very different trends in st
*, nt
* and s gt
* * have occurred for low and 
middle-income countries over the past few decades.
Figure 4.7 indicates the average annual rates of adjusted net saving st
* and natural 
capital depreciationnt
* for 113 developing economies from 1970 to 2014. Both rates 
Figure 4.6  Wealth-income accumulation relative to growth in OECD high-income coun-
tries, 1970–2014
The 30 OECD high-income countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium Canada, Chile, Czech 
Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Israel, Italy, 
Japan, Korea Republic, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Slovak Republic, 
Slovenia, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, United Kingdom and United States. High-income 
economies are those in which 2015 GNI per capita was $12,476 or more.
 β is the capital/income ratio averaged for eight countries over 1970–2010, based on the 
national income-national wealth annual data series in Table A1 of the online technical appendix 
accompanying Piketty and Zucman (2014), available at http://piketty.pse.ens.fr/en/capitalis-
back (Accessed 12 June 2014). The eight countries are the United States, Japan, Germany, 
France, United Kingdom, Italy, Canada and Australia.
 The data for constructing the s*/g* ratio are based on the World Development Indicators 
(World Bank 2017). The measure of s* is gross national savings less the value of consumption 
of fixed capital and the value of net natural resource depletion as a % of adjusted net national 
income (constant 2010 US$); the measure of g* is average annual growth of net national 
income per capita adjusted for the value of net natural resource depletion (constant 2010 US$).
 Over 1970–2014, the average s* for these eight countries was 9.1%, and g* was 2.1%; con-
sequently, the average s*/g* ratio for this period was 422%. The margin of error (95% confidence 
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have varied considerably, and there were distinct periods when the adjusted net saving 
rate has been above then fallen below the rate of natural capital depreciation. For 
example, in the 1970s the rate of natural capital deprecation was generally below the 
rate of savings, whereas from the mid-1990s onward the rate of natural capital depre-
ciation has largely exceeded the adjusted net savings rate. One reason is that the natural 
capital depreciation rate begin rising from around 6% in the 1990s to peak at 14% in 
2008, before declining to 8% by 2014. However, since its low point in 2000, the 
adjusted net savings rate has also increased, and in more recent years has been hover-
ing around 6%–7%. On average from 1970 to 2014, both the rates of natural capital 
deprecation and adjusted net saving in developing countries were around 6%–7%. 
These long-run averages, plus the possibly converging trends in the two rates since 
2005, indicate that, by and large, increases in other forms of capital may be keeping 
pace with the large natural capital depreciation occurring in these economies.
Overall, the saving-ANNI growth ratio s gt
* * has declined for low and middle-
income countries from 1970 to 2014 (Figure 4.8). However, the ratio has been 
rising since 2000, although in more recent years it has tended to fluctuate around 
Figure 4.7  Adjusted net saving and natural capital depreciation in developing countries, 
1970–2014
Notes: Based on a sample of 113 low and middle-income (or developing) countries, which 
are economies with 2015 per capita income of $12,475 or less.
 The data are based on the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2017). The measure 
of s* is gross national savings less the value of consumption of fixed capital and the value of 
net natural resource depletion as a % of adjusted net national income (constant 2010 US$); 
the measure of n* is annual value of net natural resource depletion as a % of adjusted net 
national income (constant 2010 US$).
 Over 1970–2014, the average s* for these developing countries was 6.5%, and average n* 
was 7.3%. The margin of error (95% confidence level) associated with the sample mean for s* 
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the long-run average of 371%. This is still slightly lower than the average ratio of 
422% over 1970–2014 for the OECD high-income economies (see Figure 4.6). It 
is unclear whether the long-run average s gt
* * ratio for developing countries will rise, 
as that will require the current trend of accumulating more net wealth relative to 
increasing income to continue into the future.
Low-income countries
As shown in Figure 4.9, the adjusted net saving rate across 28 low-income economies 
has averaged 0.1% over 1975–2014, which is much lower than the average rate of 
6.5% for st
* over 1970–2014 for all 113 developing countries (see Figure 4.7). More-
over, for low-income countries, there is still a considerable gap between the long-run 
adjusted net saving rate and the natural capital depreciation rate, which is 6.9%. 
Although st
* has been rising since 1995 for poor economies, so hasnt
*. The result is 
that the gap between these two rates is still considerable, and may even be growing. 
Figure 4.8  Wealth-income accumulation relative to growth in developing countries, 
1970–2014
Notes: Based on a sample of 113 low and middle-income (or developing) countries, which 
are economies with 2015 per capita income of $12,475 or less.
 The data for constructing the s*/g* ratio are based on the World Development Indicators 
(World Bank 2017). The measure of s* is gross national savings less the value of consumption 
of fixed capital and the value of net natural resource depletion as a % of adjusted net national 
income (constant 2010 US$); the measure of g* is average annual growth of net national 
income per capita adjusted for the value of net natural resource depletion (constant 2010 US$).
 Over 1970–2014, the average s* for the sample of developing countries was 6.5%, and g* was 
1.8%; consequently, the average s*/g* ratio for this period was 371%. The margin of error (95% 
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Since the mid-2000s the adjusted net saving rate for low-income countries has 
fluctuated between 0% and 2%, whereas the rate of natural capital depreciation has 
risen from 8%–9% to around 13%–15%.
These trends in st
* andnt
* have important implications for long-run wealth-income 
accumulation relative to growth in poor economies (Figure 4.10). First, the long-
run average growth in ANNI per capita g * was only 0.5% for low-income countries 
over 1975–2014, which was much lower than the long-run rate for all developing 
countries of 1.8% (see Figure 4.8). Consequently, the average ratio of adjusted net 
saving to this growth rate over this period was only 24%, and there have been long 
stretches over the past four decades when this ratio has been significantly negative 
(see Figure 4.10). However, since 2000 the s gt
* * ratio for the 28 low-income 
economies has been rising, and over 2005–2014 has averaged 190%. If this positive 
trend continues, then low-income countries will continue to experience accumulation 
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Figure 4.9  Adjusted net saving and natural capital depreciation in low-income countries, 
1970–2014
Notes: Based on a sample of 28 low and middle-income (or developing) countries, which are 
economies with 2015 per capita income of $1,025 or less.
 The data are based on the World Development Indicators (World Bank 2017). The measure 
of s* is gross national savings less the value of consumption of fixed capital and the value of net 
natural resource depletion as a % of adjusted net national income (constant 2010 US$); the 
measure of n* is annual value of net natural resource depletion as a % of adjusted net national 
income (constant 2010 US$).
 Over 1970–2014, the average s* for these developing countries was 0.1%, and average n* was 
6.9%. The margin of error (95% confidence level) associated with the sample mean for s* and n* 
was 4.7 and 4.3, respectively.
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To summarize, the high and rising rate of natural capital depreciation in low-
income countries remains a concern. Although the rate of adjusted net saving has 
been rising since 1995, the fact that it remains very low – less than 2% – implies 
that in poor countries accumulation of other forms of wealth is not keeping pace 
with ongoing natural capital depreciation. The increase in wealth-income accumula-
tion relative to growth in poor economies is encouraging, but this is in large part 
due to the very low growth in ANNI per capita over the long-run (0.1%) in these 
countries. Reducing natural capital depreciation and increasing accumulation of other 
forms of capital is essential to improving long-run net wealth accumulation in poor 
economies over the long-term.
Implications for wealth-income ratios and inequality
As the above analysis indicates, the wealth-income ratios for OECD high-income 
economies over the past four decades are clearly influenced by the depreciation of 
key natural resources essential to domestic production, such as fossil fuels, minerals 
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Figure 4.10  Wealth-income accumulation relative to growth in low-income countries, 
1975–2014
Notes: Based on a sample of 28 low and middle-income (or developing) countries, which are 
economies with 2015 per capita income of $1,025 or less.
 The data for constructing the s*/g* ratio are based on the World Development Indicators 
(World Bank 2017). The measure of s* is gross national savings less the value of consumption 
of fixed capital and the value of net natural resource depletion as a % of adjusted net national 
income (constant 2010 US$); the measure of g* is average annual growth of net national 
income per capita adjusted for the value of net natural resource depletion (constant 2010 US$).
 Over 1975–2014, the average s* for the sample of developing countries was 0.1%, and g* was 
0.5%; consequently, the average s*/g* ratio for this period was 24%. The margin of error (95% 
confidence level) associated with the sample mean for s* and g* was 4.7 and 1.0, respectively.
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relative to income, natural capital depreciation in this rich economies is being com-
pensated less and less each year by net increases in other forms of capital. This 
implies that wealth accumulation, net of natural capital depreciation, has declined 
as a share of national income. As depicted in Figure 4.5, this trend has been steadily 
falling over the past four decades.
If these trends for rich countries continue into the future, there will be even less 
net wealth creation relative to growth in these economies. If this is accompanied 
by increased financialization as observed by Piketty (2014), then the result will be 
worsening wealth and income inequality. Recall that Piketty finds that national 
wealth in rich countries is predominantly private wealth, and it comprises largely 
financial and industrial capital as well as urban real estate (i.e. housing), and it is 
this concentration of wealth that is the source of much of the inequality in these 
countries and the global economy. If overall wealth accumulation net of natural 
capital depreciation as a share of national income is falling while private financial 
wealth is rising, then the gap between rich and poor will continue to widen in all 
economies (see Tables 4.1 and 4.2). Not surprising, studies of inequality in OECD 
countries already suggest that the problem is a serious one for these economies 
(OECD 2011).
For developing countries, although net wealth accumulation appears to have 
increased relative to income in recent years (see Figure 4.7), the high rate of natural 
capital depreciation remains a concern. Over the long-run, the current rate of over 
7% across all low and middle-income countries may adversely affect their net wealth 
accumulation. The overall trend of saving to ANNI growth has also been negative 
over the past four decades (see Figure 4.8). Finally, as indicated in Table 4.2, wealth 
inequality appears to be a problem for some developing economies. High rates of 
natural capital depreciation that reduce net wealth accumulation in low and middle-
income countries will only exacerbate this problem.
The high and rising rate of natural capital depreciation in low-income countries 
is a major concern (see Figure 4.9). The long-run average rate is around 7%, but 
in recent years it has climbed from 8%–9% to 13%–15%. The gap with the current 
adjusted net saving rate, which is 0%–2%, is therefore considerable, and indicates 
that investment in other forms of wealth is failing to compensate for the high rate 
of natural capital loss in poor economies. Not surprisingly, the long-run average 
growth in ANNI per capita (0.5%) and net saving relative to this growth (24%) is 
extremely low for these countries. Although it is difficult to determine the implica-
tions for wealth inequality in low-income economies, the lack of progress in net 
wealth accumulation does not bode well for either fostering sustainable development 
or reducing any inequality.
Conclusion
This chapter has demonstrated that it is possible to reconcile the inclusive wealth 
approach with Piketty’s efforts to analyse long-run trends in wealth-income ratios and 
the composition of wealth for major economies. Moreover, given improved data 
sources, it is feasible to extend such an analysis to a wider set of economies. Here, 
the approach of adjusting to net national saving, income and growth for natural capital 
depreciation has been extended to 30 high-income economies that are members of 
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the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) over 1970 
to 2014. We have also examined the resulting implications for net wealth accumula-
tion and inequality that have been observed by Piketty (2014) and other studies.
These trends have several important implications. For the OECD high-income 
countries, the long-run convergence of adjusted net savings rates with natural capital 
depreciation rates should raise concerns about overall wealth creation and growing 
inequality in these economies. For these countries, policies to encourage more 
economy-wide investment in other forms of capital to raise adjusted net saving rates, 
and especially the long-run rate of net wealth accumulation relative to growth, are 
urgently needed. Although human capital accumulation is not included in the analysis 
of this chapter, there is also concern that investments in skills, training and educa-
tion in these economies are lagging in these economies, both absolutely and relative 
to natural resource use (Barbier 2015; Goldin and Katz 2008; OECD 2011).
For developing countries, although net wealth accumulation appears to have kept 
pace with income growth in recent years, the high rate of natural capital depreciation 
is worrisome, especially in low-income economies where the problem appears to be 
worsening. Over the long-run, these high rates of depreciation are bound to affect 
adversely the sustainability of development efforts and to worsen inequality. A key 
focus of policies should be to improve the efficiency and sustainability of natural 
resource use so that natural capital depreciation in developing countries is diminished 
substantially. This could be especially important for low-income countries, where 
reducing natural capital depreciation may prove instrumental to improving the adjusted 
net wealth-income ratio of these poorer economies over the long-run.
To verify the long-run trends in net national saving, income and income growth 
adjusted for natural capital depreciation will require long-term data on natural capital 
stocks as well as depreciation rates. As we develop better measures of natural capital 
stocks and depreciation for 70–100 years or even longer, other considerations need 
to be taken into account, such as the role of demographic transitions, total factor 
productivity changes, appropriate accounting for long-run natural capital asset and 
price appreciation, and the economic contributions of ecosystems and other envi-
ronmental assets beyond fossil fuels, minerals and forests (Arrow et al. 2012; Fenichel 
and Abbott 2014; Greasley et al. 2014).
Finally, the long-run trends identified here confirm a bigger issue, which is explored 
by Barbier (2015). Namely, the world economy faces two major threats: increasing 
natural resource degradation and the growing gap between rich and poor. These 
two threats are symptomatic of a growing structural imbalance in all economies, 
which is how nature is exploited to create wealth and how it is shared among the 
population. As argued by Barbier (2015), the root of this imbalance is that natural 
capital is underpriced, and hence overly exploited, and the resulting proceeds are 
insufficiently invested in accumulating other forms of wealth, especially human capital. 
The long-run trends in net national saving, income and income growth analysed 
for rich and poor economies in this chapter gives some indication of this structural 
imbalance. We need further development of such indicators – and perhaps others 
too – to shed further light on the possible links between growing environmental 
and natural resource scarcity and inequality in all economies.
Appendix
Adjusting conventional national 
income and savings for natural capital 
depreciation
Following the approach developed by Barbier (2017), it is possible to modify the 
conventional income and savings measures used by Piketty (2014) and Piketty and 
Zucman (2014) to allow for natural capital depreciation.
Following their approach and notation, let Wt denote the market value of national 
wealth at time t, and St is the net national savings flow between time t and t+1. In 
the absence of any capital gains or losses between t and t+1, then wealth accumula-
tion is simplyW W St t t+ − =1 . If Yt is net national income (i.e. national income less 
domestic capital depreciation) at time t, then the corresponding net national saving 
rate in the economy is s S Yt t t= and the ratio of wealth (or capital) to income is
βt t tW Y= .
Suppose that, in addition to Wt, an economy also contains a stock of available 
natural resources for production, with market value at time t of Nt ≥ 0. The total 
wealth of the economy at time t is thereforeW W Nt t t
* = +  . As wealth now includes 
an endowment of natural capital, both net national income and net national sav-
ings in time t should be adjusted for any depreciation of natural capital depletion 
through its use in production over t and t+1, net of any changes in the endow-
ment due to new discoveries over the year and also renewable resource growth. 





* represent the adjustments to net national income and savings for 
any natural capital depreciation, respectively. It follows that the accumulation in 
adjusted net wealth between t and t+1 is
W W St t t+ − =1
* * *.















where s S Yt t t
* * *= is the net national saving rate adjusted for natural capital deprecia-
tion, or the adjusted net saving rate. As equation (1) states, st
* is an indicator of the 
annual change in wealth (inclusive of natural capital) relative to net national income 
(adjusted for natural capital depreciation).8
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The saving rate st
* can also be expressed as a ratio with respect to the long-run 
average annual growth in adjusted net national income per capita. For any period 



























The ratio indicates how annual changes in adjusted net wealth relative to income 
compare with the average annual income growth per capita over some defined time 
period of T years. For example, if this growth rate is 2% per year, and adjusted net 
saving is 10%, then the rate of adjusted net wealth accumulation each year is 500% 
of long-run growth. However, if the adjusted net saving rate falls to 4%, then the 
rate of annual wealth accumulation relative to income is only 200% of g *. Thus, this 
ratio is an important indicator as it depicts, over a defined period of T years, how 
the annual rate of net wealth accumulation compares to long-run growth over that 
period. Consequently, if there is a discernible trend in the s gt
* * ratio, it indicates 
whether or not adjusted net wealth is accumulating relative to increases in income 
in economies over the long-term.
Notes
1 See also Piketty and Zucman (2014) for a more detailed modelling approach and 
investigation of the 1970–2010 wealth trends analysed by Piketty (2014). Note that 
both Piketty and Zucman (2014) and Piketty (2014) use the terms “national wealth” 
and “national capital” interchangeably.
2 See the appendix of Barbier (2017), which shows analytically how the one-good wealth 
accumulation model of Piketty and Zucman (2014) can be modified to allow for 
natural capital depreciation in the context of intertemporal optimizing behaviour.
3 Piketty (2014) and Piketty and Zucman (2014) estimate financial assets as the total 
amount of financial assets and liabilities held by various sectors (household, corpora-
tions, government agencies) of an economy. Thus, this estimate of financial assets can 
exceed their measure of national wealth for some countries in some years.
4 See, for example, Alvaredo et al. (2013) and Stierli et al. (2014). The ten countries 
with long-term wealth inequality data that are the focus of Stierli et al. (2014) are 
Australia, Denmark, Finland, France, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, 
the United Kingdom and the United States. Alvaredo et al. (2013) also analyse long-
term trends for Canada and Japan, but not Denmark, Finland, the Netherlands, Norway 
and Switzerland.
5 Stierli et al. (2014, p. 13).
6 Further details on this methodology can be found in World Bank (2011) and in the notes 
accompanying World Bank (2017). Although the depreciation of key natural resources, 
such as fisheries and fresh water supplies, are missing from this measure, the net depletion 
of subsoil assets and forests by economies accounts for much of their natural capital used 
up in current production and wealth accumulation.
7 However, Jones (2015) shows that, when the value of the capital stock for the United 
States, France and the United Kingdom calculated by Piketty and Zucman (2014) 
and Piketty (2014) excludes land and housing, the rise in the capital-output ratios for 
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each of these three countries in recent decades is more gradual. For example, in France, 
“the rise in the capital-output ratio since 1950 is to a great extent due to housing, 
which rises from 85 percent of national income in 1950 to 371 percent in 2010” 
(Jones 2015, p. 41).
8 As shown in the appendix to Barbier (2017), the adjusted net savings rate is also an 
indicator of the annual change in adjusted net wealth per capita relative to adjusted 










, where ηt represents population growth and 
a “hat” (^) indicates a per capita variable.
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1.  Introduction
The inclusive wealth framework is a tool to analyse “society’s sustainability” (Dasgupta 
and Duraiappah 2012), which may be interpreted as non-declining human well-being 
over time. Dasgupta and Duraiappah (2012, p. 22) argues that the best index to track 
human well-being over time is society’s wealth, where “wealth is the social worth of 
an economy’s capital assets”. Further, the inclusive wealth framework defines the 
aggregate wealth as the shadow value (or price) of the stocks of all assets of an economy, 
and suggests that ecosystems should be included as an important form of “natural 
capital” in this wealth. Shadow values are a key measure to inclusive wealth. Dasgupta 
and Duraiappah (2012) define the shadow price/value of a capital asset as the monetary 
measure of the contribution a marginal unit of that asset is forecast to make to human 
well-being. The shadow value is thus a more comprehensive measure of value than, 
for example, (unadjusted) market prices. Shadow prices internalize environmental (and 
other) externalities and capture the substitutability of the capital assets not just in the 
present period but also in the future. The inclusive wealth framework can accommodate 
non-linear processes of natural systems and provide early warnings in the process to 
avert such thresholds from being reached if the shadow prices are estimated using 
certain valuation methods (e.g. the so-called production function approach).
The major challenge, however, is to estimate the shadow prices of the natural and 
ecosystem capital assets. For example, we do not have full knowledge of the production 
functions of life supporting systems. Dasgupta and Duraiappah (2012) recognize that 
we may never get the shadow prices “right,” instead we can simply try to estimate the 
range in which they lie. The next best solution, they argue, is to use shadow prices based 
on willingness to pay measures, while recognizing that these shadow prices may not 
capture threshold effects of an ecosystem (Farley 2012).
The inclusive wealth accounting framework proposes to expand the net domestic 
product (NDP), which equals the gross domestic product (GDP) adjusted for 
appreciation/depreciation of capital, as is currently measured in most national econo-
mies, in two ways:
1 The NDP should include the depreciation or appreciation of human and natural 
capital (i.e. natural resources and ecosystems) as well.
2 The basis for valuing the capital stocks should be shadow prices. Exchange 
values as is currently used in statistical offices may be used if the exchange values 
are a good approximation to the shadow prices.
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In the System of National Accounts (SNA) goods are valued using exchange values 
when such values are available. The reason is that national accounts aim to provide 
a measure of production, not welfare as such, and therefore exclude consumer surplus. 
While the exchange value often is the market price, it is important to be aware of 
some slight nuances between the concept of a market price and an exchange value. 
Market prices depend on level of scarcity and on market conditions. The following 
definition has been used for market price: “Market prices are the amounts of money 
that willing purchasers pay to acquire goods, services or assets from willing sellers” 
(EC et al. 2009, para 3. 119). In national accounting one refers to “exchange values” 
and not to “market prices” where an exchange value is “the value at which goods, 
services and assets are exchanged regardless of the prevailing market conditions” 
(Obst et al. 2016).
The inclusive wealth accounting framework and the System of Environmental 
Economic Accounting (SEEA) (United Nations et al. 2014a) of the UN have 
several challenges in common in terms of valuing natural resources and ecosystems. 
Both accounting frameworks have as a goal to account for the importance of 
ecosystem and natural capital stocks to society. SEEA aims to better account for 
the relationships between the economy and the environment and the stock of 
environmental assets and how environmental assets benefit humanity. The inclusive 
wealth framework considers the impact of changes in capital stocks on human 
welfare. A major difference between the two accounting frameworks, is that inclu-
sive wealth requires shadow prices for valuing capital stocks while SEEA requires 
exchange values in valuing capital stocks. Exchange values are required by the 
latter to be consistent with the accounting framework of the System of National 
Accounts (SNA), which countries use to estimate the asset value of produced 
capital stocks.
Here we focus on the SEEA system for ecosystem accounting, SEEA Experi-
mental Ecosystem Accounting (SEEA EEA) (United Nations et al. 2014b). SEEA 
EEA has a goal to account for the contribution of ecosystems to production and 
consumption of economic units including households – where the concept of 
production and consumption is broader than the standard SNA to include all 
types of contributions from ecosystems to economic units (Obst 2017, pers. 
comm.). Both the inclusive wealth framework and the SEEA EEA framework rely 
on non-market valuation methods for ecosystem assets. SEEA EEA requires that 
the non-market valuation methods are consistent with the methods used in the 
field of accounting. The inclusive wealth framework has in past reports drawn 
more generally on the non-market valuation methods used in environmental 
economics, and so far, a large number of studies using these methods have been 
performed. Thus, there is a need to clarify and bridge the gap between the dis-
ciplines of accounting and environmental economics when it comes to non-market 
valuation.
At the same time, there are challenges with the non-market valuation methods 
that are accepted within both the accounting and the environmental economics 
communities. Since many of the challenges with using the valuation methods are 
the same for both accounting frameworks, we will discuss some of the progress that 
has been made on meeting these challenges in the last version of the SEEA EEA 
(United Nations 2014b) and the associated draft Technical Recommendations 
(United Nations 2017).1 As development and practical implementation and testing 
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of SEEA EEA are moving forward, many of the measurement challenges with valu-
ation of ecosystem services will become better understood and potential solutions 
are already being discussed. This progress of SEEA EEA is of great relevance for 
addressing many of the measurement challenges within the inclusive wealth frame-
work (Perrings 2012). A criticism from the accounting community of the various 
forms of “green accounting” and different indicators proposed to measure macro-
economic welfare in the economic literature, where inclusive wealth is one of several 
such indicators, has been that they are situated at a very “high level of abstraction 
without searching any longer for any relationship to actual national accounting 
measurements” (Vanoli 2005; Obst et al. 2016).
In this chapter we provide an overview of recent progress on the SEEA. In Sec-
tion 3 we discuss the inclusions of spatially explicit physical and monetary accounts 
for ecosystems (SEEA EEA). In Section 4 we discuss some key challenges and ways 
forward for monetary valuation of ecosystem services, benefits and assets within this 
accounting framework. We use examples from Norway as illustrations. We end the 
chapter by discussing some limitations of the SEEA accounting framework and future 
directions.
2.  System of Environmental Economic 
Accounting (SEEA)
The main goal of the SEEA is to better monitor the interactions between the 
economy and the state of the environment to inform decision-making, typically 
at the national level. The SEEA framework is consistent with the System of 
National Accounts (SNA) to facilitate the integration of environmental and 
economic statistics and the adoption of the SEEA system by national statistical 
offices. Compared to SNA, the SEEA framework expands the production bound-
ary with the aim to include the whole biophysical environment and a broader 
set of ecosystem services. SEEA 2012 (United Nations et al. 2014a) builds upon 
revisions of SEEA 2003 (discussed in the Inclusive Wealth Report 2012 by Per-
rings (2012)) and SEEA 1993. SEEA contains the internationally agreed upon 
concepts for producing internationally comparable statistics on the environment 
and its relationship with the economy. By 2014, 18% of UN member countries 
had initiated a programme to enhance Environmental Economic Accounting, 
and 27% of developing countries and 8% of developed countries had a programme 
for Environmental Economic Accounting. Thus, the current initiatives of the 
United Nations Statistical Commission (UNSC) to revise and improve the SEEA 
system appear to be welcomed by member countries. SEEA consists of three 
parts:
• The SEEA Central Framework (SEEA CF).
• The SEEA Experimental Ecosystem Accounting (SEEA EEA).
• The SEEA Subsystems for Energy, Water, Fisheries and Agriculture. The “sub-
systems” are consistent with SEEA, but provide further details on specific topics.
The central framework of SEEA, SEEA CF, accounts for individual resources such 
as timber resources, land, energy and minerals resources, physical environmental 
flows (such as water, energy, emissions and waste) and environmentally related 
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transactions within the economy (such as environmental protection expenditure and 
environmental taxes). The SEEA CF was adopted by UNSC in 2012 as the first 
international standard for environmental economic accounting. The official version 
of SEEA CF was published in 2014.
Since the publication of the previous Inclusive Wealth Reports, rapid progress has 
been made in the effort to develop an accounting system for ecosystem flows and assets 
both in physical and monetary terms through the work on the SEEA Experimental 
Ecosystem Accounting (SEEA EEA). In 2013, the UNSC endorsed SEEA EEA for 
further development and testing, and the accounting framework was published in 2014. 
The SEEA EEA: Technical Recommendations (SEEA EEA TR) presents information 
that supports the testing and research on SEEA EEA and is motivated by the practical 
experiences with the accounting framework and advances in thinking on specific topics 
since the first SEEA EEA (United Nations 2017). The SEEA EEA TR is under revi-
sion, and work has been initiated to revise the SEEA EEA by 2020.
Monetary valuation of ecosystem services in SEEA EEA is motivated by several per-
spectives: input for wealth accounting, demonstration of the contribution of ecosystems 
to human welfare, and evaluation of policy alternatives. SEEA EEA provides insight into 
how ecosystems can be considered a form of capital that can appreciate and depreciate, 
in the same way as other forms of capital such as human, social and economic capital.
The development of the necessary accounting compatible concepts for a spatially 
explicit accounting system for ecosystem assets and their services is a challenging task, 
and currently work is in progress. The concepts and thinking developed and imple-
mented in SEEA EEA to date should be helpful in contributing to improve inclusive 
wealth accounting of natural capital.
3.  SEEA Experimental Ecosystem Accounting
SEEA EEA contains spatially explicit physical and monetary accounts for ecosystems. 
As such, compiling the accounts requires a multidisciplinary approach. To determine 
rates of asset appreciation or depreciation one also needs these accounts to be com-
piled regularly over time. SEEA EEA is termed experimental because many concepts 
for such spatially explicit and repeated accounts for ecosystem services and assets 
are still under testing and development (see e.g. Remme et al. 2015).
As noted above, the work on developing the SEEA EEA accounts is progressing 
fast. In the experimental phase the focus is generally on policy relevant case studies 
where concepts are being developed and tested. In this phase, numbers may not be 
as accurate as one would desire, but several argue that having approximate numbers 
that map ecosystems and that can demonstrate their importance to the general 
economy may be better than the current practice of implicitly valuing ecosystems 
through our decisions concerning maintaining or transforming ecosystems. Bateman 
et al. (2013, 2011) show, for example, in the context of the UK National Ecosystem 
Assessment (UK NEA), that taking account of multiple environmental objectives in 
systematic environmental and economic analysis of the benefits and costs of land 
use options, fundamentally alters decisions regarding optimal land use.
Figure 5.1 provides an overview of the conceptual thinking for the ecosystem 
accounting in SEEA EEA. At the basis for the accounting system are ecosystems. 
In the accounting terminology, individual contiguous ecosystems are considered 
ecosystem assets (element 1 in Figure 5.1).2 Ecosystems are characterized by their 
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extent, biotic and abiotic components and their processes. Ecosystem assets may be 
aggregated into the ecosystem types, for example forests or agricultural ecosystems 
within the accounting area under study. Ecosystem types are ecosystems with similar 
ecology and use and are typically not contiguous.
The relevant characteristics and processes describe the ecosystem functioning (ele-
ment 2). An ecosystem asset delivers ecosystem services, and the focus in SEEA EEA 
is on final ecosystem services (United Nations et al. 2014b) consistently with Banzhaf 
and Boyd (2012) and UK NEA (2011) (element 3 in Figure 5.1). Final ecosystem 
services are either, benefits to users (economic units) directly in themselves or the 
ecosystem service can be thought of as being an input to production of benefits 
along with other inputs such as labour and produced assets (e.g. built capital). Both 
for accounting purposes and for monetary valuation it is important to clarify this 
distinction between ecosystem services and ecosystem benefits (United Nations et al. 
2014b; Banzhaf and Boyd 2012). Making this distinction helps to avoid double 
counting. The SEEA EEA uses the classification of final ecosystem services into 
provisioning services (i.e. those relating to the supply of food, fibre, fuel and water); 
regulating services (i.e. those relating to actions of filtration, purification, regulation 
and maintenance of air, water, soil, habitat and climate); and cultural services (i.e. 
those relating to the activities of individuals in, or associated with, nature).
The benefits that are produced by ecosystem services may either be so-called SNA 
benefits meaning they are already accounted for in SNA (e.g. timber products) or 
they may be non-SNA benefits, which means they are benefits that are outside the 
Figure 5.1 Ecosystem accounting framework for SEEA EEA
Source: United Nations (2017).
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accounting boundary of SNA (e.g. flood protection) (see element 4 in Figure 5.1). 
It is important to be clear about whether an ecosystem service has already been 
accounted for in SNA to prevent potential double counting. It is important to make 
the role of ecosystem services explicit also for those ecosystem services that presently 
are within the accounting boundary of SNA.
The supply of final ecosystem services is matched with the economic units that 
receive the benefits (element 5 in Figure 5.1). The economic units are businesses, 
households and the government. To be consistent with the accounting framework, 
supply of ecosystem benefits must equal use. The benefits contribute to “individual 
and societal well-being,” the measure of which – according Figure 5.1 – is the 
ultimate purpose of the accounting framework. As we will discuss, this stated purpose 
may be misleading because the valuation methods that are consistent with account-
ing only aim to quantify ecosystems contribution to the economy, not societal 
well-being or welfare. The accounting system is designed to account for benefits 
both in terms of physical production and in monetary units where possible.
It should be noted that intermediate ecosystem services are also identified in the 
framework. Intermediate ecosystem services are those ecosystem services that are 
inputs to the supply of other ecosystem services. In ecosystem accounting, if one 
ecosystem produces services that contribute to produce ecosystem services in another 
ecosystem (e.g. pollination and flood control) these are also considered intermediate 
(SEEA EEA TR, paragraph 5.40).
Further, the SEEA EEA has five core accounts:
1 Ecosystem extent account – physical terms
2 Ecosystem condition account – physical terms
3 Ecosystem services supply and use account – physical terms
4 Ecosystem services supply and use account – monetary terms
5 Ecosystem monetary asset account – monetary terms
Figure 5.2 describes the relationship between these accounts as a series of physical 
(a) and monetary (b) steps, arriving at a set of integrated accounts. Even if one may 
describe this as a sequence of accounts, it should be emphasized that the develop-
ment of these accounts most often will be iterative permitting one to go back to 
adjust and make improvements. Hence, an arrow could be drawn from the final step 
back to the first. Each of the accounts is intended to provide useful information in 
itself while also being an input into other accounts. Considering the complexity in 
completing the accounting chain, the identification of ‘stand-alone’ policy uses of 
individual accounts is important to motivate further allocation of resources by policy-
makers to building the system of accounts. In Figure 5.2, ecosystem services supply 
and use accounts are included as two separate boxes to reflect the iterative process 
in generating ecosystem services supply and use accounts in physical terms.
SEEA EEA TR includes example tables for all the accounts. These tables are useful 
illustrations of the accounts but too extensive to include here. The ecosystem extent 
account maps the area of land in each land use/ecosystem type. Examples of eco-
systems here are forests, agriculture, wetlands and urban, although subcategories of 
these ecosystem types may be deemed necessary depending on the circumstances. 
For example, natural forest and planted forests for timber production will have quite 
different characteristics. For each of the ecosystem types, the condition account 
includes the available and appropriate indicators of the “overall quality of an ecosystem 
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asset in terms of its characteristics” (United Nations et al. 2014b, paragraph 2.35). 
The condition of the ecosystem is the basis for the capacity of the ecosystem to 
provide ecosystem services in the future, which in turn affects the ecosystem asset 
value. The ecosystem condition may be evaluated by comparing ecological indicator 
values now with the ecological indicator values in the reference condition for the 
ecosystem. What the reference condition should be is discussed in the Technical 
Recommendations (United Nations 2017) and is part of an ongoing debate, since 
some ecosystems in some countries have been affected by human beings for such a 
long time that the ecosystems have evolved to be dependent on human management. 
One suggestion is to identify the condition that existed when data collection began 
(United Nations 2017).3 Depending on the condition of an ecosystem, the ecosystem 
supplies a basket of ecosystem services, and the ecosystem services use and benefits 
are further attributed to economic units. Examples of economic units here are house-
holds, agriculture, the government and other economic sectors. Again, the subcatego-
ries one chooses for the economic units depends on the circumstances, in particular 
the policy analysis question which accounting should inform. The measurements 
necessary for the ecosystem condition account, the ecosystem services supply and 
ecosystem services use may be completed concurrently. This is indicated by the dotted 
line. Experience with urban ecosystem accounting at high spatial resolution in Oslo 
has shown that ecosystem extent and condition accounts also need to be determined 
concurrently, because, depending on the spatial resolution at which land cover is 
classified, it can also indicate ecosystem condition.
While the first row in Figure 5.2 contains all physical accounts, the second row 
in Figure 5.2 contains monetary accounts, that we are primarily concerned with 
a. Steps in physical terms
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Sequence of sector accounts
Balance sheets
Figure 5.2 Broad steps in ecosystem accounting
Source: United Nations (2017).
Challenges to ecosystem service valuation 143
here. The first box in the second row is the account for the ecosystem services use 
and supply values.
In the SEEA EEA TR the ecosystem monetary asset account is defined as accounts 
that “record the monetary value of opening and closing stocks of all ecosystem assets 
within an ecosystem accounting area and addition and reductions in those stocks” 
(United Nations 2017, paragraph 7.5). The motivation for monetary valuation of 
ecosystem assets in SEEA EEA is twofold. One motivation is that monetary valuation 
gives a common measurement unit which is – in principle – helpful when comparing 
alternative uses of ecosystem assets (in practice monetary valuation relies on the 
completeness of the physical accounts). A second motivation is that monetary valu-
ation permits the ecosystem asset account to be integrated with other accounts for 
the other capital assets discussed in Chapter 1 of this report. In that sense, compiling 
the SEEA EEA ecosystem asset accounts and integrating them with the net domestic 
product could contribute to giving a more complete assessment of a nation’s net 
wealth. As in the inclusive wealth framework, the SEEA EEA framework considers 
a depreciation of aggregate ecosystem assets a potential sign of unsustainable ecosystem 
use, but there are some important differences in the view on the meaning and treat-
ment of depreciation in the two frameworks (Obst 2017, pers. comm.).
The thinking regarding the construction of ecosystem asset accounts in SEEA EEA 
is related but slightly different than the ecosystem capital thinking in the inclusive 
wealth framework. SEEA EEA is an expansion of the accounting framework in the 
System of National Accounts. The SNA defines the gross domestic product as a 
measure of economic performance and states explicitly that GDP is not a measure 
of human welfare (United Nations et al. 2008). SEEA EEA TR recognizes that there 
are several perspectives that may be taken when it comes to estimating a nation’s 
wealth in terms of natural and ecosystem capital (United Nations 2017, paragraph 
7.1). In the perspective of the inclusive wealth framework, the goal is to maximize 
intergenerational human welfare derived from all capital stocks. When operationalizing 
this, the inclusive wealth framework proposes to expand the net domestic product 
(the depreciation adjusted GDP) to include all types of capital.
SEEA EEA holds that one may account for ecosystem asset, as for any other asset, 
using a capital theoretic framework. If there is no market for an asset, which is often 
the case for ecosystem assets, then the monetary value of the asset may be estimated 
in terms of the present value of the future flow of income attributable to an asset. For 
an ecosystem asset, estimation of the monetary asset value requires information on:
• The appropriate exchange values now and in the future;
• The expected future ecosystem service supply;
• The appropriate discount rate to calculate the net present value (NPV); and
• The expected life of the asset.
The expected ecosystem service supply should be as close as possible to what one 
actually expects to be used and the exchange values should be as close as possible 
to the exchange values one expects for the future.
The final box in Figure 5.2 refers to the integration of ecosystem accounts with the 
standard national accounts, one of the steps in EEA. Technical guidelines may give the 
impression that integration of monetary asset accounts with other capital assets is the 
final purpose of accounting. Further work is needed showing how integrated accounts 
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are a means to the ends of different policy analysis. This may be done in several ways 
depending on how closely one wants to integrate the accounts. The methods range 
from combined presentation of only physical data on ecosystem condition and services 
alongside with presentations of standard national accounts numbers to complete inte-
gration where the value of ecosystem assets is incorporated with the values of other 
capital assets in order to extend the measure of national wealth.
The SEEA EEA offers useful concepts and accounting structures ultimately lead-
ing to ecosystem asset accounts. Furthermore, the SEEA EEA provides a framework 
that is compatible with national accounts and therefore with statistical offices’ defini-
tions used in the net domestic product. However, SEEA EEA differs from the theo-
retical framework of the inclusive wealth model since the latter requires that all the 
economy’s capital assets should be valued at their shadow value.
4.  Valuation challenges for ecosystem services,  
benefits and assets
As noted above, the meaning of an exchange value is quite different from the mean-
ing of a shadow value in terms of its implications for human welfare. Yet, there are 
some commonalities in terms of the challenges that one may run into when attempt-
ing to determine these values. We now discuss some of these challenges.
4.1.  Ecosystem service delineation and some fundamental challenges
The definition of an ecosystem service has been widely discussed in the literature in 
recent years, and the definition in MEA (2005), for example, has been deemed 
inappropriate for valuation and accounting purposes both in the inclusive wealth 
framework and in SEEA EEA (Pearson et al. 2012; United Nations 2017, paragraph 
5.35). Instead, the need to focus on final ecosystem services and to separate between 
ecosystem services and ecosystem benefits to avoid double counting has been rec-
ognized in both the previous Inclusive Wealth Reports and in the SEEA EEA (see 
also discussion in Section 3 above). By making the distinction between benefits (also 
called goods in the UK NEA) and services it is possible to include several ecosystem 
services that are inputs in the production function of an ecosystem benefit. For 
example, while harvested fish is an ecosystem benefit, one must subtract the cost of 
harvesting to find the contribution of the ecosystem (that is the ecosystem service) 
to the benefit. Several definitions of ecosystem services and goods exist; for example, 
Barbier (2012) adopts the definition that “ecosystem services are the direct or 
indirect contributions that ecosystems make to the well-being of human populations 
(EPA 2009, p. 12).” Whichever definition one adopts, the literature has reached 
the conclusion that the definition be such that one avoids double counting, and 
this is possible by focusing on final ecosystem benefits (indirect) and services (direct).
Before we take a practical and pragmatic approach to estimating monetary values 
for ecosystem services, benefits and assets, it is necessary to recall that many eco-
systems are complex and poorly understood both by scientists, policy-makers and 
the general population (see e.g. the example of the recently discovered cold water 
corals in Norway discussed in Aanesen et al. 2015). Barbier (2012, p. 163), for 
example, states: “There is inadequate knowledge to link changes in ecosystem struc-
ture and function to the production of valuable goods and services.” Since knowledge 
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of ecosystem processes is never going to be complete or perfect, it is likely better 
to attempt with available knowledge to demonstrate the potential importance and 
value of ecosystems for human well-being under different methodological assump-
tions. Implicit valuation by a limited number of decision makers making policy 
choices uniformed by information on ecosystem services, is unlikely to reach efficient 
or welfare optimal choices (as noted above in the context of the UK NEA). This is 
also the argument made by the international project and process of The Economics 
and Ecosystems and Biodiversity (TEEB) (Kumar 2010).
In the following, we discuss some important challenges with valuation of ecosystem 
services and benefits that are market (section 4.2) and non-market (section 4.3), 
respectively, and the valuation of ecosystem assets (section 4.4). We relate the discus-
sion to the framework of experimental ecosystem accounting (cf. back to Figures 5.1 
and 5.2 above) and especially the use of methods for non-market services.
4.2. Market ecosystem services and benefits
Many ecosystem services and benefits such as fish, grains, timber and products 
derived from these have market prices which are relevant exchange values and 
therefore compatible with national accounting and SEEA EEA. When estimating 
the contribution of the ecosystem to harvested fish, one estimates the monetary 
surplus remaining after all costs related to harvesting have been subtracted from 
the total revenue. This monetary surplus is also denoted as the resource rent. In 
an accounting framework, it is important to be aware of the impact the institutional 
arrangement has on the value of the resource rent of many of the provisioning 
goods. The institutional arrangement may affect both the prices received by fishers 
and the costs of harvesting, and it is the prices and costs along with the quantity 
produced that in turn determine the size of the resource rent. For fisheries, examples 
of institutional arrangements may be open access, quotas or individually tradable 
quotas, and more. In an open access management regime, the value of the resource 
rents tends to zero and it is an open question how to value the resource under 
such circumstances (Hein et al. 2015). But other management regimes can con-
tribute to conceal the resource rent in national accounts even if access to the fishery 
is limited. Policies that make fishing artificially expensive, for example, may cause 
the resource rent to be masked in national accounts. For an example of this see 
Box 5.1. In such cases, there are likely to be other indicators than resources rents 
Box 5.1  Institutional arrangements affect the 
estimated contribution of the ecosystem 
service for fish
Traditionally, export of fish was a major source of income for Norway. Later 
other natural resource based income, particularly from oil and gas, overtook 
fish income. Opposition to new oil extraction in areas that are in important 
breeding grounds for Norwegian fish stocks confirms the fact that many Nor-
wegians consider fisheries an important natural capital asset to preserve for the 
future.
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that are of policy importance and which can be monitored, such as employment. 
In cases where exchange value principles do not provide any additional information, 
parallel accounts and complementary indicators must be relied upon.
As Figure 5.3 shows, the actual resource rent has generally been on an increasing 
trend from 1984 to 2016. Norwegian fisheries have in some of the later years had 
positive resource rent, apart from the period 2012–2014. Factors contributing to the 
increasing resource rent over time are a year by year reduction in the number of hours 
worked in the sector reducing total compensation of employees (including compensa-
tion to the vessel owner – there are differing views on whether compensation to the 
vessel owner should be included here). There has also been a year by year reduction 
in the number of vessels, thus reducing fixed costs and capital consumption, although 
the gross tonnage has remained fairly constant.
Greaker et al. (2017) hypothesize that the potential value of the fishery resources 
is higher than what the calculations show in Figure 5.3. The reason is that the values 
of all parameters entering the calculation of the resource rent are conditional on 
the existing management regime. This management regime has by law several goals, 
and one of them is that fisheries should contribute to maintaining viable coastal 
communities. To help reach this rural development goal, fishing quotas are distrib-
uted among fishing vessel with different technologies and geographical locations.
Greaker et al. (2017) explore what the potential resource rent could be in 2011, 
which was an average year in terms of catch (in the period 2006–2016), without 
the current distribution of fishing quotas. Using a numerical optimization model, 


















Entry to Norwegian fishery is currently managed through fishing licenses 
and quotas and the fish stocks are not considered overharvested. Yet, for many 
years, the income from fisheries as it appears in national accounts is negative. 
Thus, according to national accounts numbers, Norwegian fisheries contrib-
uted negatively to Norwegian national wealth in the period 1984–2014 with 
the exception of 2010–2011 (Greaker et al. 2017). Figure 5.3 shows the com-
ponents of the resource rent for the period 1984–2014.
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they find that the counter factual resource rent if the 2011 quotas were harvested 
efficiently with the available technology would be close to 1.6 billion USD. This is 
1.20 billion USD more than the observed resource rent.
When decomposing the change in potential resource rent compared to the actual 
rent into changes in total revenue and total costs, the results show that total revenue 
falls by about 10%. Simultaneously, total cost falls by around 80%. In 2010 and 
2012 the average fish prices were lower. However, if adjusting total revenue and 
total cost for the national accounts numbers in 2010 and 2012 correspondingly, the 
potential resource rent is 1.14 and 1.23 billion higher than the one observed in 
2010 and 2012, respectively. Even if this is a very simple adjustment, these numbers 
are not far from the rent dissipation of 1.20 billion USD in 2011. The potential 
resource rent found here is around 60% of the first-hand value in the fisheries in 
2011. This is similar to Wilen’s rule of thumb that says that half of the total revenue 
is resource rent (Wilen 2000).
Some have argued that the ongoing rent dissipation in Norwegian fisheries simply 
is a way to redistribute income in the fishery sector. But the resource rent could be 
increased by applying fewer fishers and fewer vessels, and per definition, one is in a 
situation with resource waste in the fishery sector because well as lower value creation 
in other sectors because both the fishers and vessels have an alternative value in other 
industries. However, in cases where the fishers and vessels that are removed from the 
fisheries have low/zero alternative value in other sectors, the present management 
system could be described as a more efficient way of financing employment in the 
fisheries through rent dissipation without leading to lower value creation in other 
industries as well.
4.3. Non-market ecosystem services and benefits
The most significant challenge for valuation of ecosystem services is that so many 
of them are non-marketed (Barbier 2014). The field of environmental economics 
has developed a number of methods to value non-market ecosystem services. Barbier 
(2012) provides an overview of the progress that has been made in environmental 
Box 5.2 Categories of non-market valuation methods
Stated preference methods: Willingness to pay/or to accept compensation for 
changes in provision of ecosystem services/benefits are elicited from respondents 
in surveys using structured questionnaires. Stated preference methods are the 
only methods that can cover non-use/existence values. Well-known methods 
include contingent valuation and choice experiments.
Revealed preference methods: Values are “revealed” through studying consum-
ers’ choices and the resulting price changes in actual markets that can then be 
associated with changes in provision of ecosystem services. A well-known method 
is hedonic pricing of property characteristics, i.e. where the impact of environ-
mental quality attributes on prices of properties is distinguished from other factors 
that affect prices. Travel cost methods used to value recreational benefits of eco-
systems are often also included in this category.
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economics on developing methodologies for valuation of non-market ecosystem 
services, and presents the non-market valuation methods that are currently available 
along with the ecosystem services for which each of the methods is appropriate. 
These valuation methods are summarized in Box 5.2.
Even if the coverage of environmental valuation studies may be considered patchy 
across ecosystem benefits and services (Barbier 2014), a large number of valuation 
studies for ecosystem benefits and services have been carried out in the last few years 
using environmental economic methods (e.g. Kumar 2010). The ideal would be to 
have valuation studies specifically designed for accounting purposes. This is rarely the 
case. This means that accountants and economists typically must use value or benefit 
transfer methods (see Box 5.2) based on suitable, existing studies to estimate exchange 
values with typically relatively large uncertainty (see e.g. Johnston and Wainger 2015).4
National accountants also have their set of accounting compatible valuation 
methods for non-market environmental goods (Vincent 2015). Only a subset of the 
non-market valuation methods developed in environmental economics are considered 
directly appropriate in an accounting framework (“accounting compatible”). This is 
because environmental economics is focused on finding estimates of welfare, and as 
a consequence, most non-market valuation methods that have been developed pro-
duce value estimates that include consumer surplus. SNA-compatible accounting 
requires exchange values, excluding consumer surplus. At the same time, finding 
accounting compatible monetary values for all ecosystem services is a significant 
challenge for SEEA EEA (United Nations 2014b). The SEEA EEA TR therefore 
offers several suggestions to bridge the gap between accounting and economics 
when it comes to valuation.
A subset of valuation methods developed in environmental economics does not include 
consumer surplus and has therefore been deemed appropriate for SEEA EEA. SEEA 
Production/damage function approaches: A group of methods used to value 
an ecosystem service, where intermediate ecosystem services are one of several 
“inputs” to the final service or good enjoyed by people. Ecosystems’ marginal 
contribution to the final service is valued.
Cost-based methods: Assume that expenditures involved in preventing, avoiding 
(“averting”), mitigating or replacing losses of ecosystem services represent a 
minimum value estimate of what people are willing to pay for the ecosystem 
service. In ecosystem accounting a distinction is made between replacement cost 
(of a particular ecosystem service) and restoration cost (of an ecosystem asset 
and its bundle of ecosystem services).
Benefits/value transfer methods: Refer to the use of secondary, existing study 
valuation estimates, from any of the valuation methods mentioned above, 
transferred to the “policy context” in need of value information. Values can 
either be transferred using unit value transfer methods or more advanced 
function-based transfers (e.g. based on meta-analysis of the literature).
Sources: Champ et al. (2017); Barton and Harrison (2017); Johnston et al. (2015); 
Barbier (2012); and Koetse et al. (2015).
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EEA TR (United Nations 2017, Table 6.1) provides a list of valuation techniques that 
are accounting compatible:
• Production, cost and profit function techniques addressing separate provision-
ing, regulating and cultural ecosystem services;
• Hedonic techniques, which can estimate the marginal contribution of a bundle 
of ecosystem services/amenity attributes on house prices; and
• Methods that provide information about expenditures such as defensive expen-
ditures and travel cost where information in the methods is used to estimate 
a market exchange value.
While national accountants typically use cost-based techniques (e.g. replacement 
cost), such techniques are only supported within the field of environmental econom-
ics if, “the alternative considered provides the same services; the alternative is the 
least cost alternative and if there is substantial evidence that the service would be 
demanded by society if it were provided by the least-cost alternative” (Barbier 2012, 
p. 180). These are relatively strict conditions.
Further research is needed to develop and test valuation techniques that reflect 
exchange values and hence exclude consumer surplus for non-market ecosystem 
services (Hein et al. 2015). The challenges of valuing ecosystem services without a 
market price while still being consistent with SNA, and while providing comple-
mentary information to support policy assessment, is one of the topics that is under 
testing and development in SEEA EEA.
Specifically, SEEA EEA TR proposes to develop methods where non-market 
valuation studies that originally were meant to derive values that include consumer 
surplus may later be used to derive the demand curve that would have existed 
if there was a marked for the good in question. Through combining such a 
demand function with the supply function for the ecosystem service or benefits 
one may be able to derive the exchange value. In this step, one would also have 
to make assumptions about the institutional arrangement for the exchange (see 
also discussion in Box 5.1 above). Here one might have to try to evaluate as 
realistically as possible what the institutional arrangement would have been had 
a market existed. Developing such credible provision scenarios is one of the 
strengths of stated preference methods when they are conducted to state-of-the 
art standards. This information combined with a supply curve for the ecosystem 
service could yield information about the exchange value of the ecosystem service 
or benefit. Caparros et al. (2017) provide an example of how this method may 
be put into practice.
In Boxes 5.3 and 5.4 below we show how one could use restoration cost and 
contingent valuation methods, normally considered inappropriate or incompatible 
with accounting standards, along the lines of the thinking above to arrive at esti-
mates of exchange values that could be decision-relevant and fit for accounting. 
The first example discusses the restoration costs of city trees as basic of exchange 
value and how to avoid double counting (Box 5.3). For an application of ecosystem 
service valuation for ecosystem accounting in a developing country context that 
includes provisioning, regulating and cultural services, see e.g. Sumarga et al 
(2015).
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Box 5.3 Use of restoration costs for replacing city trees
Restoration cost refers to the estimated cost to restore an ecosystem asset 
to an earlier, benchmark condition. The SEEA EEA Technical Recommen-
dations suggest that the methods are likely to be inappropriate since they 
do not determine a price for an individual ecosystem service, but may serve 
to inform valuation of a basket of services. Accounting incompatibility in 
this case is due to an increased risk of double counting when ecosystem 
services cannot be identified separately, and instead are valued as a bundle 
associated with a specific ecosystem site or green structure. The valuation 
method is nevertheless useful in municipal policy and can meet accounting 
requirements under special conditions. For example, in the city of Oslo, 
restoration costs of city trees are calculated as a basis for a compensation 
fee to be paid by parties responsible for damaging trees on public land. The 
replacement cost is adjusted for the age, health and physical qualities of 
the tree. The compensation cost is in many cases absorbed as a transaction 
cost of property development when destroying a tree is unavoidable. As 
such this is an exchange value, although it has been set through regulation 
rather than the market. Regarding the risk of double counting, this may be 
avoided by not including municipal trees in other valuation models (e.g. 
hedonic pricing models).
Source: Barton et al. (2015).
Box 5.4  Use of contingent valuation to assess cost-
recovery-based maintenance of city trees
Contingent valuation is based on survey responses to questions about will-
ingness to pay for ecosystem services and is used to estimate economic value 
for awareness raising purposes, or as input to benefit-cost analysis. The SEEA 
EEA Technical Recommendations suggest that using values directly from 
the method is inappropriate since it measures consumer surplus rather than 
exchange values. However, as the Technical Recommendations suggest, it is 
possible to estimate a demand curve from stated preference studies, and that 
this information may be used in forming exchange values for ecosystem services. 
As an example, the contingent valuation method was used in Oslo to obtain the 
willingness to pay a municipal fee for maintaining the density of public street 
trees. Aggregate willingness to pay across Oslo’s population was estimated at 
60 million NOK/year for maintaining or increasing street trees across the city. 
By comparison current municipal costs for maintaining trees in municipal parks 
and streets is only 12 million NOK/year. While these contingent valuation 
estimates cannot be used directly to estimate the accounting value of current 
street trees, the information is useful as decision support and for determining 
a financially feasible level of supply. Municipal utility services such as water and 
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The second example shows how a contingent valuation survey of people’s willing-
ness to pay to maintain or increase the density of street trees can be combined with 
the costs of supply, to arrive at an exchange price that may be deemed acceptable 
for accounting purposes (Box 5.4).
The SEEA EEA TR further proposes as a way to determine the most suitable 
valuation method to use for accounting purposes, to identify so-called “channels” 
(Atkinson and Obst 2017) through which an underlying ecosystem asset provides 
waste management are charged according to the cost recovery principle (i.e. 
no producer surplus). The contingent valuation estimates could be used to 
determine the increased level of street tree maintenance possible if the stated 
amount was actually charged to households following a cost recovery principle. 
Future increased supply – here increased maintenance of city trees – might be 
based on the findings from this contingent valuation study. The contingent 
valuation identifies feasible cost recovery fees per household and the maximum 
future maintenance costs that are feasible. While not determined by a market 
transaction, a public utility fee for maintenance costs of street trees should be 
accounting compatible as it is a service transaction price (although, as in nature, 
public utilities are rights-based, or technically difficult to withhold even if no 
payment is forthcoming from the user).
Source: Haavardsholm (2015).
Box 5.5  Valuation methods and links to accounting 
via channels to users
In order to see the relevance of the non-market valuation methods from environ-
mental economics for accounting purposes, it is useful to view the “channels” 
through which an underlying ecosystem asset ultimately provides benefits to, or 
affects the well-being of, the users or economic units. SEEA EEA TR (United 
Nations 2017, Atkinson and Obst 2017) summarizes three such channels:
1 Ecosystem services used as inputs for production (such as pollination for 
agricultural production).
2 Ecosystem services that act as joint inputs to household final consumption 
(such as nature recreation that requires time and travel expenditures on 
part of the household).
3 Ecosystem services that provide household well-being directly. This is an 
abstract channel that includes non-use values.
These channels have parallels in accounting, in the way GDP is affected either 
through inputs to existing (economic) production (channel 1) or to final 
household consumption (channels 2 and 3). The idea is to identify each buyer 
(producer or household) and seller (ecosystem), and identify valuation meth-
ods that can be used to estimate exchange values, under prevailing institutional 
conditions. Valuation methods can be grouped according to channels in a 
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benefits to the users or economic units (see Box 5.5). The next step is then to identify 
ecosystem services and benefits and respective valuation methods for each service 
channel and user. Some of the methods will be accounting compatible and some will 
require adjustments along the lines noted above, to arrive at exchange values.
Even for non-market valuation techniques from environmental economics that 
are considered accounting compatible, there are still other challenges related to using 
these methods for valuation.
As spatially explicit accounting frameworks both SEEA EEA and inclusive wealth 
accounting need spatially explicit valuation of ecosystem benefits and services. There 
is a lack of studies in general, though in recent years numbers have increased. Many 
valuation studies are not motivated by policy questions (Laurans et al. 2013). In 
those cases where valuation addresses policy, some questions tend to come up more 
often, and some services appear to be more frequently valued than others. Recreation 
benefits, for example, may be valued more often than some regulating services. This 
is also due to the complexity of modelling the ecosystems as well as some services 
and benefits.
Through adopting landscape, or land area, as the basic accounting unit, char-
acterizing the ecosystem as a natural asset is relatively straightforward. To match 
the accounting units, non-market valuation studies should also be spatially explicit. 
With increased availability and use of satellite data maps and geographical infor-
mation systems, and spatially explicit data analysis techniques, the number of 
valuation studies that are spatially explicit is expected to rise. But at present, 
SEEA EEA accounting efforts will by necessity rely on benefit transfer based on 
studies that are rarely spatially explicit in the sense required for accounting pur-
poses. For those valuation results that are available and site specific on some level 
of spatial resolution, a main challenge, pointed out by Hein et al. (2015), is to 
transfer values to other sites and scale the estimates to larger areas required for 
accounting purposes.
To transfer to other sites there must be sufficient ecological and economic corre-
spondence between the study and the policy sites (Johnston et al. 2015; Barbier 2014). 
The benefit transfer literature offers simple and more advanced (and sometimes more 
precise) methods for benefit transfer that sometimes use GIS and scaling-up procedures 
(see e.g. Brander et al. 2012). Meta-analysis requires knowledge of the values of the 
independent variables for the policy site of interest and assumes that the statistical 
relationship between the dependent and independent variables is the same between 
the study and the policy sites. It is not always guaranteed that more advanced methods 
supply and use context (Freeman et al. 2014). For industry users, for example, 
provisioning, regulating and cultural services would provide value through 
channel 1. For households, provisioning services work through channel 1, 
regulating through channel 2, and cultural through both channels 2 and 3. 
Once suitable services, channels, users and methods have been identified, the 
next step is to use the methods to construct an exchange value estimate for the 
non-market service. There are different ways this can be done, e.g. as illustrated 
in Boxes 5.3 and 5.4 above.
Sources: Atkinson and Obst (2017), Freeman et al. (2014) and United Nations (2017).
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perform better (Lindhjem and Navrud 2008). It is also important to delineate differ-
ent ecosystems and services, to avoid double counting (Barbier 2012).
For wealth accounting purposes it is often ideal to have aggregate values of eco-
system services at the regional or national level. If ecosystem services values have 
been estimated based on case studies at specific sites, one may question whether the 
target population of such studies will be appropriate for wealth accounting. That is, 
can the numbers based on a case study in one location be scaled up to a national 
level? It is not uncommon that local land use preferences differ from the national 
preferences for land use (see e.g. Lindhjem 2007 on forest services). Differences in 
preferences for a policy are not unexpected when a policy has a different impact 
locally than nationally. Local communities which are more affected by a policy may 
have per capita net benefits that are much greater (lower) than the average per capita 
net benefits nationally. But the aggregate net benefits at the national level may be 
much greater (lower) than the local net benefits.
Using a simple physical index of an area, such as hectares, to expand value esti-
mates to another scale may violate basic economic principles such as diminishing 
marginal utility, changing relative scarcity and substitutability. However, using average 
per hectare values is often the way scaling-up is done in practice, for lack of infor-
mation to adjust values for such factors we know from theory and empirical studies 
should affect values. In some cases average per hectare values for some degree of 
scaling may work as approximations that in any case are better than no such 
information.
To track the wealth of a nation the aggregate values of ecosystem services at the 
regional or national level should ideally be replicated and updated annually. An 
important use of such information is to track trends over time. But with the scarcity 
of non-market valuation studies one is forced to use outdated values. Preferences 
or demand may change over time, for example as incomes increase, people on aver-
age tend to prefer to use more cultural ecosystem services. Preferences are shown 
in some valuation studies to be stable for periods of up to five years, but for periods 
beyond 20 years this is not the case (Skourtos et al. 2010). Non-market valuation 
methods have also improved and can hopefully provide more reliable estimates than 
some older studies.
The current SEEA EEA process is geared towards testing the operationalization 
of the SEEA EEA TR in practical cases and through increased practice to gather 
experiences that may help solve some of the challenges in deriving exchange values 
for accounting. One relatively large-scale implementation of SEEA EEA principles is 
currently under way in the greater Oslo area in Norway (see Box 5.6). The aim is 
to test how the SEEA EEA framework can identify the economic contributions that 
urban ecosystems make to the municipal, household and commercial sectors in greater 
Oslo.
4.4. Accounting for the value of ecosystem assets in SEEA EEA
In estimating the expected ecosystem services supply it is important to assess possible 
trade-offs between different ecosystem services in particular policy contexts; for 
example, there may be a trade-off between forest recreation and production of 
timber. When valuing ecosystem assets, it requires aggregation of many ecosystem 
services under the assumption that the prices are independent (Hein et al. 2015). 
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Box 5.6 Ecosystem accounting at municipal level
Figure 5.4 shows the recommended system of accounts in the SEEA EEA (in 
grey), placed in the context of different municipal uses of information compiled 
for accounting. The framework emphasizes the need at the municipal level 
to base decisions on available information on value of ecosystems. The valu-
ation methods used – whether exchange-based or consumer surplus based – 
depend on the type of policy question at hand. Information stemming from 
different valuation and indicator methods is complementary and can be trian-
gulated. This approach has been called integrated or plural valuation (Jacobs 
et al. 2016), exploring the role of SEEA EEA as a contribution to “consid-
ering ecosystems through multiple analytical lenses.” Ecosystem accounting 
within such a plural valuation approach is being tested at the municipal level 
within the metropolitan area of greater Oslo, Norway. Local and city govern-
ments already make use of land use mapping and thematic environmental and 
socio-cultural indicators to inform impact assessments, municipal planning and 
zoning. The URBAN EEA project is testing SEEA EEA recommendation on 
how to identify the economic contributions that urban ecosystems make to 
the municipal, household and commercial sectors in greater Oslo. Ecosystem 
accounting offers a complementary set of indicators to municipal government 
aimed at making fragmented urban nature and blue-green infrastructure more 
Figure 5.4  Conceptual framework for municipal experimental ecosystem 
accounting
Source: Based on Barton et al. (2017).
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As discussed in the Technical Recommendations, while the link between physical 
flows and provisioning services is quite tangible, the same may not be the case for 
regulating and cultural services. The supply of these services depends on factors that 
often are not stable over time such as vegetation, management regimes and pollution 
levels. Further, one may have limited information about the capacity of the ecosystem 
to supply the service over time. Finally, for cultural services such as enjoying biodi-
versity and aesthetic aspects of nature, it may be difficult to identify and describe in 
general terms the specific link between the condition of the ecosystem in physical 
terms and the supply of cultural services. Hence, indicators for cultural services 
require the most further development at this stage, according to the Technical 
Recommendations (United Nations 2017, paragraph 7.16).
For integration of ecosystem asset accounts with national accounts, the SEEA 
EEA TR states that consistency with the exchange value concept in SNA, one also 
should use the market-based discount rates. Estimating using a variety of discount 
rates to demonstrate the sensitivity of the estimates is recommended. For a more 
thorough discussion on the application net present value (NPV) for natural resources 
see SEEA CF (United Nations 2014a, section 5.4).
The life (duration) of the ecosystem asset depends on how it is being used. 
If use is sustainable then one can assume an infinite asset life. But some ecosystem 
asset uses can be unsustainable and this will limit the asset life. But even in cases 
where the asset life is assumed to be infinite, discounting incomes at a high rate 
may cause the present value of incomes to be negligible after two or three 
decades. Thus, the decision about discount rate and asset life are not indepen-
dent. Since there is no a priori preferred asset life, the SEEA EEA TR highlights 
the need for sensitivity analyses on the asset life and the discount rate.
In finding NPV values, one must recognize that the expected future flows of 
ecosystem services for an ecosystem asset is affected by the ecosystem condition, 
which again is affected by the use of ecosystem services. The nexus between use 
visible in city planning. The project has found that characteristics of urban land-
scapes may limit the scope of monetary ecosystem accounts in the assessment 
of municipal policy targets. Urban green structures can be small and hard to 
identify in GIS, but still be locally valuable. Remnant and constructed urban 
nature is highly spatially fragmented, mixed-use density is high and highly 
localized. This makes it challenging to identify marginal values of particular 
green space qualities and ecosystem services from transactions in the property 
market. Municipal utilities such as water supply, rainwater management, sew-
age treatment and solid waste management operate according to cost recovery, 
meaning that the residual resource rent attributable to ecosystems is zero. Rec-
reational time use in neighbourhood public spaces is very high relative to travel 
expenses to use the areas, leaving little trace in market transactions. Given these 
and other challenges of valuation urban ecosystem services (Gomez-Baggethun 
and Barton 2013), urban EEA aims to provide municipal government with a 
suite of spatially explicit indicators of accounting compatible exchange value, 
as well as parallel indicators of ecological, welfare economic and socio-cultural 
values that are at stake across a cityscape.
156 Kristine Grimsrud et al.
and condition of an ecosystem leads us to the concept of ecosystem capacity. Hein 
et al. (2016) define the concept of ecosystem capacity for accounting purposes as 
“the ability of an ecosystem to generate an ecosystem service under current condi-
tions and uses at the maximum yield or use level that does not negatively affect the 
future supply of the same or other ecosystem services.” Thus, capacity may be 
thought of as the sustainable use of an ecosystem service for which there is demand, 
preferably at aggregate scales such as at the landscape level.
The SEEA EEA TR (United Nations 2017) states that “ecosystem capacity is 
considered a topic of ongoing research but with a very high priority” (paragraph 
7.68), and that the “concept of ecosystem capacity is a central one for explaining 
the ecosystem accounting model and applying the model in practice. This is especially 
the case in relation to developing information sets that can support the discussion 
of sustainability” (paragraph 7.33).
Some of the reasons why the concept of ecosystem capacity still is under develop-
ment is that it involves ecologically complex effects such as threshold effects, resilience, 
ecosystem dynamics and other non-linear effects. These effects also create challenges 
for standard valuation (exchange or welfare-based valuations, see e.g. discussion in 
Farley 2012). In addition, one needs to resolve how to measure capacity in practice.
The SEEA EEA TR discusses issues of the measurement of ecosystem capacity. 
Ecosystem capacity may be monetized in terms of the NPV of estimates for the 
future basket of services. To obtain an estimate of ecosystem capacity one needs 
to have an estimate of the future ecosystem service use that is as close as possible 
to the actual or revealed patterns of use under the expected legal and institutional 
arrangements. This implies that the estimated future use does not necessarily reflect 
sustainable uses. One may then compare the NPV of ecosystem use at capacity to 
the NPV of the actual use, and determine whether the ecosystem is being used 
above, below or at capacity. Sustainable ecosystem management ultimately requires 
managing ecosystems below capacity (safe minimum standards). If the ecosystem 
is used above capacity, it reduces the opportunity for this and future generations 
to manage the ecosystem sustainably. A decline in condition of an ecosystem asset 
as a result of economic and other human activity would in SEEA EEA be consid-
ered ecosystem degradation. How to include ecosystem degradation has also to 
be determined. While ecosystem degradation is clearly related to declining condi-
tion, it can be defined more specifically as reflecting either a decline in the ecosystem 
asset value as measured in relation to the change in the NPV of an ecosystem 
asset based on the expected flow of services, or in relation to the change in the 
NPV of an ecosystem asset based on its capacity. For both the concept of ecosystem 
degradation and for the concept of ecosystem capacity one needs to resolve some 
practical measurement issues that will also have bearings on how to value ecosystem 
assets within the SEEA EEA framework.
5.  Discussion, conclusion and future directions
SEEA and its developments are seen as an important step on the road to wealth 
accounting (Perrings 2012). We have discussed how the accounting framework SEEA 
EEA is currently moving towards developing operational solutions to important 
challenges related to monetary valuation as discussed in the SEEA EEA TR (United 
Nations 2017).
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The requirement only to permit exchange values in SEEA EEA is motivated by 
the goal of compatibility with national accounting. This would later make it possible 
to consistently estimate the asset value of a nation’s total capital stock. However, 
accounting that only includes exchange values will not fully reflect the importance 
of ecosystem services to society (Remme et al. 2015). For example, risks may be 
unaccounted for in the exchange values (Hein et al. 2015). Further, capturing the 
value of many regulating and cultural services with exchange value methods will 
remain a challenge. Further research and testing, is necessary in order to integrate 
values into an ecosystem accounting framework that is useful for policy assessment 
(e.g. Remme et al. 2015; Hein et al. 2015).
Another challenge with using exchange values for ecosystem services is that a 
large share of existing estimates of non-market ecosystem services are in the form 
of willingness to pay, which includes consumer surplus (i.e. a welfare-based approach) 
and not in the form of exchange values. However, research on how to derive the 
exchange value from welfare-based studies is ongoing (see e.g. Caparros et al. 2017; 
Day 2013; United Nations 2017).
Like SEEA EEA, inclusive wealth accounting is mainly constrained by the lack 
of shadow prices for ecosystem assets, and “there is insufficient experience with the 
calculation of these shadow prices at the scale required for accounting” (Hein et al. 
2015, p. 90; Barbier 2013). Dasgupta and Duraiappah (2012) recognize that we 
can never get the shadow prices “right.” Instead, we can simply try to estimate the 
range in which they lie. Given these challenges, empirical studies in the inclusive 
wealth framework have also resorted to using market prices (exchange value) for 
those ecosystem services/benefits that have market prices. However, research is also 
ongoing to find better estimates of shadow prices (Fenichel and Abbott 2014). The 
next best solution, suggested by Dasgupta and Duraiappah (2012, p. 26), is to use 
“willingness to pay shadow prices,” while recognizing that these prices may not 
capture threshold effects of an ecosystem.
Both for SEEA EEA and the inclusive wealth framework there is increasing inter-
est among researchers to tailor valuation studies for natural and ecosystem capital 
accounting, as recommended by Tallis et al. (2012). This would be the ideal situ-
ation, since the need for and challenges of benefit transfer and scaling-up would be 
reduced. For both wealth accounting frameworks, it may be difficult to account for 
non-use values such as existence values and other subtler cultural services/benefits, 
even though we know from many studies that such benefits can be important for 
people’s welfare (Lindhjem et al. 2015). If the goal is to demonstrate the importance 
of an ecosystem service, one may have to use other indicators of value (see Box 5.6 
and Barbier 2014) when direct valuation of the ecosystem service fails. This could 
be due to lack of data, difficulty in defining institutional arrangements that mimic 
exchange values or because accounting compatible values capture only a very small 
part of welfare (Jacobs et al. 2016).
Inclusive wealth accounting is a developing accounting framework for both human, 
natural and ecosystem capital with the goal of demonstrating the importance of 
these types of capital to human well-being. Since the focus is welfare-based one 
needs shadow values of the capital stocks, and estimates of shadow values are hard 
to come by. SEEA EEA specializes in ecosystem accounting using a national account-
ing framework. While the national accounting framework implies some restrictions, 
such as the use of exchange values, developing ecosystem accounts based on an 
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existing accounting framework may be quite helpful. The SEEA EEA has developed 
concrete solutions to several accounting challenges and contributed to operationalize 
measurement. Furthermore, the need to complement the SEEA EEA framework 
with ecosystem capacity accounts to better track sustainability of ecosystem use has 
been recognized.
On the other hand, inclusive wealth accounting emphasizes intergenerational welfare 
and is not restricted by national accounting standards. However, calculating the total 
value of natural capital for inclusive wealth calculations is also quite difficult and may 
go beyond what can currently be achieved. A more achievable goal might be to 
evaluate the marginal value of natural capital, which is how a small change will alter 
the present value of the flow of services. Further, in order to find the present value 
of future flows of ecosystem services one will need models to estimate the impact of 
changes in natural capital on the provision of ecosystem services. One also needs to 
predict the future prices and determine the appropriate discount rate. Other related 
challenges include issues related to resilience and thresholds of ecosystems.
Finally, equity is also a crucial part of sustainability. Solely focusing on aggregated 
numbers at the national level may not be the best way to evaluate sustainability 
because numbers at the national level might mask the impacts at the local level as 
well as inequalities among income groups in the current generation, and across 
generations. Thus, inclusive wealth accounting should also address the spatial and 
temporal distribution of wealth.
In the end, if attempting to account such complex assets as ecosystem assets, no 
matter which accounting system one applies, it is important one is aware of the 
assumptions and the limitations of the accounting framework and the benefits of an 
accounting framework that can be applied consistently over time.
Notes
1 See also the recent developments on a so-called Integrated system of Natural Capital 
and ecosystem services Accounting in the EU (KIP INCA) (La Notte et al. 2017). 
This system aims to work according to the SEEA EEA system and to further develop 
this based on EU experiences.
2 Note that in the ecosystem accounting framework biodiversity is treated as a component 
of the ecosystem asset rather than as an ecosystem service in its own right (United 
Nations 2017). In addition, biodiversity is also included in standalone thematic accounts.
3 Data collection started in many countries when ecosystems were already at a highly 
modified, depleted state. Hence, this view of the references condition has its 
problems.
4 It is worth noting that the international database of valuation studies, Environmental 
Valuation Reference Inventory (EVRI), has just recently been opened for the public: 
www.evri.ca
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1.  Introduction
Economic growth, the goal of all the countries, does not happen in a black box, but 
depends on the quality of the produced, natural, human and social capital. The skills, 
knowledge that the humans have is a form of capital and is a prerequisite for growth. 
The important role played by human capital in driving economic growth is well established 
(Lucas, 1988, Romer, 1989, Barro, 1991, Schultz, 1961). Human capital stock is impor-
tant to enhance the productivity of both labour and physical capital, and to drive the 
innovation and diffusion of technology. Very strong two-way association between eco-
nomic growth, human capital and life expectancy has been found in the literature.
Natural capital provides necessary and essential substitutable and non-substitutable 
materials and services (e.g. energy stocks, minerals, forests) for the economy to 
thrive and survive. For example, wood and coal are substitutes and the solar energy 
can be a substitute for oil, while the regulatory services (like carbon regulation) 
cannot be substituted by other forms of capital. Technology can offset some of the 
functions of resources but there are limits to technological possibilities. Ample but 
inconclusive evidence exists in the literature, which explored the relation between 
natural resources and economic growth. There are examples, where natural resources 
drive the economic growth (Norway, Malaysia, Botswana, Canada) as well as counter 
factual evidences on how higher natural resource base can lead to slower growth 
rates, low incomes, weak political institutions etc. Research by Sachs and Warner 
(1997), Auty (1993), for example, showed that countries which are rich in agricul-
tural and mining capitals grew more slowly during 1970 to 1990 compared to 
resource poor economies and this phenomenon has been named as natural resource 
drag. The abundance of natural resources pulls economic growth downwards (called 
natural resource drag). For example, many of the countries in Africa (Congo, Nigeria, 
Angola) have high poverty rates despite abundance of natural resources.
Some researchers argue that a natural resources curse exists not because the coun-
tries are resource rich but due to rent seeking behaviour and abundance of certain 
types of natural resources (for example energy resources) (see Congleton et al., 2008; 
Boschini et al., 2007). In countries with abundant natural resources, the rent seeking 
behaviour by political elites is responsible for the resource curse. Some studies take 
to the view that natural resource abundance can lead to Dutch disease and crowding 
out of human and physical capital (Atkinson & Hamilton, 2003; Gylfason & Zoega, 
2006). However, no consensus has emerged. Deaton and Rode (2012), Mehlum 
et al. (2006) opine that the mixed evidence relating to abundance in natural resources 
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and economic growth is because of the quality of the institutions (economic and 
political) in the countries – emphasizing that natural capital alone cannot explain the 
counter factual evidence. This aspect of other factors is supported by meta-analysis 
by Havranek et al. (2016). Havranek et al. (2016) based on a quantitative survey of 
605 estimates from 43 studies show that 20 percent of the papers found a positive 
relationship, 40 percent found no effect and 40 percent of the papers showed a 
negative effect of natural resources on the economic growth. The study concludes 
that the interaction between the quality of institutions, extent of natural resource 
dependence and abundance along with the level of investments impacts the economic 
growth. Interestingly, the level of natural capital also seems to influence the level of 
human capital. Gylfason (1999) shows that the school enrolment at all levels is 
inversely related to the natural resource abundance, as measured by the share of 
labour force engaged in primary production, across countries. However, social capital 
has got a role to play in understanding how the resources are invested back in various 
forms of capital. Norway, for example, despite being rich in energy resources, does 
not neglect the human capital. The human capital in turn also impacts the better 
conditions for governance by improving health and equality (Aghion et al., 1999). 
Thus the social capital provides the enabling conditions for rest of the capitals to 
thrive and in turn is enabled by other forms of capital.
The viewpoint until the 1990s that manufactured capital is the only productive 
base of the economy has been contested as the role of other forms of capital has 
been recognized (UNU and IHDP, 2012; United Nations University International 
Human Dimensions and Programme, 2015). Higher GDP need not translate into 
a higher quality of life or imply the well-being of the nation – which is derived 
from different forms of capital, and not from GDP alone. The GDP does not 
measure the impact of production activities on the quality of the environment 
and natural resources and thus on the human well-being. Substituting natural 
capital to achieve higher growth can impact the health of people which could 
impact the human capital and thus the produced capital. It is very clear that the 
capital is not additively separable but is strongly correlative with other forms of 
capital.
Inclusive wealth is based on measuring the capital stocks which influence the 
well-being, and thus it is important to track the changes in the value of nations’ 
stocks. As mentioned by Arrow, Dasgupta, Goulder, Munford, and Oleson (2012), 
the “state’s capacity to produce goods and services requires measuring growth in 
comprehensive wealth and not merely the capital stock formation alone”. “As long 
as the state is on optimal growth path, the growth in net capital formation can be 
a good measure of growth. If not, an income-based measure like GDP could lead 
to qualitatively different conclusions about economic growth than a direct measure 
of the growth of the capital stock”. (Arrow et al., 2012).
The objective of this study is to understand the link between economic growth 
and different forms of capital for the period 2001–2011 using comprehensive wealth 
as an indicator. To illustrate the arguments, two different forms of natural capital – 
renewable (forests) and non-renewable (minerals) – were considered along with 
human capital and the produced capital as a measure of wealth. These are then 
viewed in the context of other basic tenants of the quality of life measured from 
the perspective of human development index and health. In Section 2, some per-
spective on growth and development in India at the state level is discussed, Section 3 
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discusses the concept of measurement of produced, natural and human capital, and 
Section 4 links it to the state-level analysis.
2.  Some perspective on growth and the links to 
development in India at state level
Figure 6.1 gives the contribution of different states considered in the study to the 
GDP in India. It can be clearly seen that Maharashtra contributes 17% of the income, 
followed by Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, Gujarat, West Bengal and Karnataka, which 
together contribute to 56% of the GDP. A similar trend has been observed in 2001 
though the relative contributions differed. Uttar Pradesh, the most populous state 
in India with a share of 16.9% of population, contributes only 8.7% of the GDP in 
2011 and the other populous states in the order Maharashtra (9.4%), Bihar (8.8%), 
West Bengal (7.64%) and Andhra Pradesh (7.1%) contribute 17.1%, 2.7%, 6.6% and 
8.4% to GDP respectively.
In terms of the per capita income (per capita net state domestic product), of the 
states considered in this study, Goa has the highest per capita income (almost 10 
times that of Bihar the poorest state), followed by Sikkim, Haryana, Maharashtra 
and Tamil Nadu (Delhi has the second highest per capita income after Goa), while 
the states Bihar, Uttar Pradesh, Assam, Manipur and Madhya Pradesh are the poor-




























































Figure 6.1 States share of GDP and population in 2011
Note: The inner pie represents GDP in 2011.
Source: Figure based on data from http://mospi.nic.in/data, http://censusindia.gov.in/.
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The growth story presents a different picture. The highest cumulative growth 
during 2001–2011 occurred in Sikkim, Uttarakhand, Goa, Gujarat and Tamil Nadu 
while Assam, Manipur, Jammu and Kashmir, West Bengal and Uttar Pradesh had 
low growth. During the first half of the decade (2001–2006), the states Uttarakhand 
Gujarat, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu and Karnataka were the fastest while in the second 
half of the decade (2006–2011), Sikkim, Uttarakhand, Goa and Bihar grew faster 
than the other states.
Thus GDP and its decadal growth is influenced not only by the demographic 
factors and size, but also by the workforce and the quality, along with the invest-
ments made in the state. Figure 6.3 presents the indicators on change in output 
per worker, the work participation rate along with the gross capital formation in 
these states. It is apparent that these are all related but are not the only factors 
in the Indian context. The fast-growing state Uttarakhand and Sikkim has very 
high gross capital formation (data not available for Sikkim) and has seen an 
increase in work participation rates (an indicator of expansion in economic activ-
ity), which explains the growth as well as the increase in gross value added per 
unit of worker. Some of the slow growing states have suffered from low capital 
formation as well as have seen a decline in the value of output per worker. Thus 
the human capital measure can be used to explain the economic growth to an 
extent.
How are the states faring in terms of the overall development, measured in terms 
of HDI? HDI has been measured using different approaches. Based on the analysis 
by Mukherjee et al. (2014), the state of Kerala has been consistently well off the mark. 
The next in HDI rank are Goa, Himachal Pradesh, Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra. 
UP, the most populous state, contributing to 8.5% of GDP in India and Bihar, 
Figure 6.2 Cumulative growth in per capita income during 1993–2012
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rank very low on the Human Development Index. Most of the northeastern states 
are yet to catch up and have registered low decadal growth as well (with the excep-
tion of Sikkim, whose growth has been phenomenal). Uttarakhand has registered 
significant growth and ranked 11 in terms of HDI, next only to Gujarat. Andhra 
Pradesh, despite being an economically important state, does not figure in the top 
15, and Karnataka does not figure in the top 10.
The study does find some evidence between economic growth and development, 
but however does not explain the complete story. The initial stock of the state’s 
assets are important as well and thus a capital perspective becomes important. It is 
useful to understand how different states have used their natural capital and accu-
mulated their produced and human capital. To reiterate Arrow et al. (2012), “the 
state’s capacity to produce goods and services requires a measure of the growth in 
comprehensive accounting of all forms of capital and not merely the capital stock 
formation alone. As long as the state is on an optimal growth path, the growth in 
net capital formation can be a good measure of growth. If not, an income-based 
measure like GDP could lead to qualitatively different conclusions on economic 
growth than a direct measure of the growth of the capital stock” (Arrow et al., 
2012).
Figure 6.3  Decadal change in per capita income, output per worker, work participation 
rates and gross capital formation
Source: Figure drawn based on data compiled from different sources from http://niti.gov.in/, 
http://mospi.nic.in/data, http://censusindia.gov.in/.
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3.  Methodology for measuring comprehensive wealth 
and investments of states
The national accounts recognize the importance of capital stock as an important 
indicator in assessing the growth potential of the economy. However, the capital stock 
estimates are limited to include produced assets and some non-produced assets (like 
land) but do not consider the natural capital (renewable and non-renewable) and 
human capital stocks. Here we give the estimates of natural capital stock and human 
capital stocks for different states in India for the year 2001, for which the estimates 
are available consistently across the states. The study considers forest capital and mineral 
assets – under the categories renewable and non-renewable natural capital. The meth-
odology used in estimating the natural capital stocks and human capital stocks is given 
below and is extracted from the work carried out by the author earlier.
3.1. Renewable natural capital – forests
Natural capital is an asset and change in natural wealth is akin to capital formation 
of produced assets. In this paper, the forest capital is included as an example of 
renewable natural capital. Estimating the value of natural capital formation requires 
estimating the flow of ecosystem services from forests and valuing them at their 
shadow process. Based on the summary of earlier studies by the author ((Gundimeda, 
Figure 6.4 Decadal cumulative growth in GDP (2001–2011) vs. HDI 2011
Source: Author’s illustration.
168 Haripriya Gundimeda
Sanyal, Sinha, & Sukhdev, The value of Timber, Carbon and Non-timber forest 
products in India Monopgraph 1, 2005); (Gundimeda, Sanyal, Sinha, & Sukhdev, 
The Value of Biodiversity in India’s Forests, 2006); (Gundimeda, Sanyal, Sinha, & 
Sukhdev, 2007); (Gundimeda & Atkinson, Accounting for India’s forest wealth, 
2006)), the value of forest wealth is obtained as the discounted present value of 
flows from six forest products for which the estimates are available – timber, fuel-
wood, non-timber forest products (NTFPs), forest biomass carbon and recreational 
and genetic services. The data for the stock of forests come from the Forest Survey 
of India, which documents forest changes every two years based on satellite data 
and ground verification.
Timber is the most obvious component of forest wealth, which can be directly 
estimated from the volume of growing timber. To obtain carbon stocks, the volume 
of forest biomass was first estimated from the growing stock estimates and then con-
verted to carbon, assuming a carbon content of 0.5 Mg C per Mg oven dry biomass 
(Gundimeda, Estimation of Biomass in Indian Forests, 2000b), (Gundimeda, Carbom 
Budget of the Indian Forest Ecosystem, 2003)). Since forests cannot be used for 
timber extraction and carbon sequestration at the same time, reserved forests has been 
assumed to be used for carbon sequestration and protected forests for timber, fuelwood, 
non-timber products, etc. Forests also provide erosion control, hydrological services, 
biodiversity, etc. Changes in these services are more difficult to assess.
The biggest challenge in estimating changes in wealth arises from establishing 
shadow prices. As Arrow et al. (2012) show, shadow prices reflect contributions to 
well-being by the direct and indirect use of forest goods and services. Various methods 
were used to obtain the shadow values of different components of India’s forest 
wealth. The shadow price of timber equals net rent, i.e. price less the cost of extrac-
tion. Resource rent is estimated as the average prices of round wood and fuelwood 
minus the unit costs of extraction (Gundimeda, 2000a, 2001). (Gundimeda, (Gun-
dimeda, Integrating Forest Resources in the System of National Accounts, 2000a), 
(Gundimeda, Accounting for the Forest Resources in the National Accounts in India, 
2001)). Carbon was valued at $20/tC, based on its global market value at that time. 
The shadow price of NTFPs was computed as the discounted value of products per 
hectare (Gundimeda, 2000a, 2001). The shadow price of recreation has been esti-
mated using the consumer surplus derived for tourists, estimated using a benefit 
transfer approach. The biodiversity values of forests were estimated by assessing the 
value of marginal species for medicinal purposes. Here the approach was to establish 
the incremental contribution of a species to the probability of making a commercial 
discovery (Rausser, 2000). Methodological details on shadow values of biodiversity 
and recreational services are provided in Gundimeda et al. (2006).
3.2. Non-reproducible capital – mineral wealth
“India produces around 89 minerals including four fuel minerals, 52 non-metallic 
minerals, 11 metallic minerals and 22 minor minerals. The sector’s contribution to 
GDP hovered around 2% to 2.3% during 1979 to 2005. The production statistics of 
2004 show that fuels account for about 79%, metallic minerals about 8%, non-metallic 
minerals around 3% and minor minerals the remaining 10% (IBM, 2004). Among the 
fuel minerals, petroleum and natural gas contributed to around 43% and coal and 
lignite 36%. In terms of geographical distribution of mineral resources, the offshore 
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accounted for 29% value of the mineral production while the remaining was accounted 
for mainly by Andhra Pradesh (9%), Gujarat, Jharkhand (8% each), Chhattisgarh (7%), 
Orissa, Madhya Pradesh (6% each), Assam (5%), Maharashtra, Rajasthan, Uttar Pradesh 
(4% each) and West Bengal (3%). With its contribution of about 16% in exports and 20% 
in imports, the mineral sector is an important component of India’s foreign trade. The 
majority of the exports (75%) are contributed by cut diamond and crude petroleum 
accounts for 67% of imports. As 85% of the value addition comes from coal, iron ore, 
oil, natural gas and limestone, only these were included for analysis ” (Gundimeda, 2017).
“The value of stock of a natural resource (RV) can be computed as the net pres-
ent value of the stream of the future resource rents the resources yield till exhaustion. 
Estimating net present value requires knowledge on (1) the resource rent, (2) rate 
of extraction of the resource, (3) the life span of the resource and (4) the discount 
rate. However, NPV approach is complicated due to the uncertainties in future price 
of the commodity, the technology, the true size of the deposits and the quality of 
the deposits that are yet to be found. In this study, the estimates of asset prices are 
based on net price method. The data have been obtained from the Central Statistical 
Organization and the annual reports of the mining companies ” (Gundimeda, 2016).
The physical stock data were obtained from the publication “Indian Minerals Year 
book” published by Indian Bureau of Mines. What is considered as stock is an 
important issue worth exploring here. The most commonly used system of classifica-
tion is McKelvey classification, which classifies mineral resources based on the two 
combined criteria i.e. the degree of uncertainty (proven, probable or classified as 
measured, indicated, inferred, potential and speculative) and economic feasibility of 
extraction (economic, marginally-economic, sub-economic). “Proven” reserves are 
those where it is known that it is both technically feasible and economically viable 
to extract the mineral resource. “Probable” includes the reserves that are known to 
exist but where some doubt exists over whether they are technically or economically 
viable. “Possible” covers reserves where there is considerable doubt over the techni-
cal and or financial viability of extraction. “Potential” reserves are known to exist 
but thought to be not technically or economically feasible to extract. “Speculative” 
reserves cover estimates which have not been positively identified but which, based 
on previous geological experience, it is reasonable to expect in proximity to that 
already in the “proven” and “probable” categories (Lange & Wright, 2004). For 
computing the wealth estimates, only proven reserves were considered.
The biggest challenge comes from valuation of the physical stock of minerals. 
Market prices if available provide a good description of the scarcity. However, these 
prices are often distorted due to institutional arrangements. If the private parties own 
the asset, it is possible to get market prices but if the assets are owned by govern-
ment and are not sold, market prices do not exist. If there are no market prices, 
(SEEA, 2012) suggests using the cost of extracting the assets as a lower bound on 
its value. The argument behind using such an approach is that assets would not be 
extracted unless the benefits obtained were at least as high as the costs.
3.3. Human capital
The following section is an extract from Gundimeda et al. (2007). Human capital is 
one of the most important assets of a country and a key determinant of a nation’s 
economic performance. Human capital can be defined in many ways, but in this 
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paper we have used the following definition adopted by OECD (Organization for 
Economic Cooperation and Development) (1998): “The knowledge, skills, compe-
tences and other attributes embodied in individuals that are relevant to economic 
activity.” Human capital, in this paper, is captured through returns to education as 
done by other seminal contributions Becker (1966); Mincer (1974); and Schultz 
(1961). In the literature we find three different approaches to estimate the value of 
human capital – the “cost-based approach” (cost-of-production approach), the 
“income-based approach” (capitalized earnings procedure), and the “educational 
stock-based approach.” In cost-based approach, the human capital is estimated using 
the depreciated value of the dollar amount spent on an individual. The income-based 
approach (capitalized earnings procedure) measures the total human capital embodied 
in an individual who has completed his schooling by the total discounted values of 
expected future stream of lifetime earnings. The most commonly used measures for 
“educational stock-based approach” include education-augmented labour input, adult 
literacy rates, school enrolment ratios and the average years of schooling of the 
working-age population. As activities like formal education, on-the-job training, 
specific training and other recognized investments in human capital have an influence 
on earnings, which also include some costs. Thus, the total amount invested in human 
capital and the rate of return on this investment can be estimated from using the 
information on observed earnings and costs of schooling and foregone earnings.
The estimates of human capital are obtained as follows (based on Gundimeda 
et al. (2007)). The stocks of population categorized by age cohorts, rural and urban, 
male and female by educational qualifications for different years is obtained from 
the Census data published by the Government of India. The shadow price on edu-
cational capital stock is obtained by first estimating a Mincerian earning function 
where in the wage of an individual is regressed on the level of schooling, skills 
possessed, technical qualifications, on-the-job training (job experience used as a 
proxy) and other socio-economic characteristics that represent the innate abilities of 
the individual. From the estimated Mincerian function, the predicted wages for 
different age cohorts by the educational levels has been obtained from the marginal 
rate of return for different educational qualifications, gender and geographical loca-
tion. The predicted wage for different educational levels, gender and geographic 
locations were used to obtain the net present value of the lifetime labour income. 
The present value of the lifetime labour income of an individual is the discounted 
value of future income weighted by the probability of survival and the discount rate. 
For estimating the lifetime labour income two stages were used: (1) work and study 
stage (age group 15–25) and (2) work only. The total value of the human capital 
in different Indian states is obtained by multiplying the present value of annualized 
life income for different educational qualifications for different age cohorts with the 
population in each educational group in different age cohorts from the Census data.
3.4. Physical capital
Capital stock of a country is broadly referred to as that part of national wealth which 
is reproducible; it consists of all resources which contribute to the production of 
goods and services. The United Nations Guidelines in 1977 defined the national 
wealth as “total of various kinds of net tangible and intangible non-financial assets 
of residents, plus financial claims on non-residents less financial liabilities to 
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non-residents.” “Tangible assets have been further classified into (i) reproducible 
tangible assets (i.e. capital stock) comprising fixed assets and stocks (i.e. inventories) 
and (ii) non-reproducible tangible assets comprising, land, timber tracts and forests, 
subsoil assets and extraction sites, fisheries and historical monuments. The reproduc-
ible fixed tangible assets (i.e. fixed assets used for the production of goods and 
services) commonly known as fixed capital stock comprise assets in the form of resi-
dential buildings, non-residential buildings, dams, irrigation and flood control proj-
ects, other construction works, transport equipment, machinery and equipment, 
breeding stock, drought animals, dairy cattle and the like, and capital expenditure 
on land improvement, plantations, orchard developments and afforestation. These 
fixed assets include uncompleted construction assets also”. However, while net fixed 
capital stock estimates by type of institution are available from the Central Statistical 
Organization, the capital stock estimates are not available at the state level in India. 
The gross fixed capital formation by assets and industry for the public sector are 
available for some of the states. Thus, in this chapter a comparison is made by gross 
fixed capital formation alone.
4.  Links to state-level analysis and changes in different 
forms of capital in India
Figure 6.5 gives the share of capital stocks in different states in India. The states 
Himachal Pradesh, Mizoram, Tripura, West Bengal, Tamil Nadu and Kerala emerge 
as the wealthiest states in terms of natural capital, and the states Bihar (including 
Figure 6.5 Share of forest, subsoil assets and human capital in Indian states




















































































Jharkhand), Madhya Pradesh (including Chhattisgarh), Karnataka, Rajasthan, Andhra 
Pradesh and Orissa have rich mineral capital. The states Uttar Pradesh (including 
Uttarakhand), Maharashtra, Andhra Pradesh, West Bengal and Tamil Nadu have 
very high human capital.
The data on produced capital stock estimates at the state level are not available, 
but based on the cumulative gross capital formation in the decade, the states 
Gujarat, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, Karnataka, Andhra Pradesh and Orissa top. 
So if we take comprehensive wealth (sum of all capitals – produced, human and 
natural capital) and produced capital proxied by cumulative gross fixed capital 
formation, together, we see that the states Gujarat, Maharashtra, Tamil Nadu, 
Karnataka and Uttar Pradesh (including Uttarakhand) emerge the richest in terms 
of absolute comprehensive wealth. Estimating separate capital stock estimates for 
these states is required to know their exact ranking. However, viewed in terms 
of per capita wealth, the states Goa, Gujarat, Himachal, Karnataka, Haryana, 
Orissa, Maharashtra and Sikkim emerge in the top eight. The data for gross fixed 
capital formation are not available for Sikkim and despite this, Sikkim is ranked 
among the top ten richest states. The state has seen an increase in GDP growth 
and has seen very proactive environmental measures. These are also the states 
which have high per capita income and have registered above average growth 
rates during the decade.
5.  Conclusions
Table 6.1 summarises the results. The analysis indicates that the states are at differ-
ent stages of development but to understand the long-term sustainability of these 
economies requires a much deeper capital perspective. The economic thinking should 
embed within it the connections between different forms of capital and their inter-
linkages. The states which have registered high decadal growth rates – Sikkim, 
Uttarakhand, Goa, Gujarat and Tamil Nadu – are also the ones with rich natural 
capital and comprehensive wealth. In terms of the per capita wealth, the states Goa, 
Gujarat, Himachal, Karnataka, Haryana, Orissa, Maharashtra and Sikkim emerge in 
the top eight, in line with per capita income. There is clear evidence that develop-
ment of a state is not explained by GDP growth alone but is clearly impacted by 
the interaction between institutions and natural resource abundance along with the 
level of investments in education and physical capital, as seen from the growth in 
some of the northeastern states in India. Kerala tops in HDI and natural capital but 
in terms of per capita income it is among the bottom eight. Different forms of 
capital can be substitutes or complements, and the degree of substitutability or 
complementarity should be analysed. Population growth exerts pressure on the 
natural resources, thereby diminishing the income prospects of the economies if 
adequate investment does not take place.
The study has certain limitations. The estimates in this study are very conserva-
tive. In the mining states, the value of mineral wealth may be severely undervalued 
because the mining operations are mostly under the control of government regula-
tion. The rents captured by the Indian mining sector are also very low. Moreover, 
the market is far from perfect because of subsidies, imperfect prices and low cost of 
labour. Though Indian government levies a number of taxes and fees on its mineral 
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minerals, the net rents are negative. All these could result in an underestimate of 
the value of minerals. It should also be remembered that mining is often involved 
with significant environmental degradation and health impacts, which are not con-
sidered in the study because of lack of data. Similarly, the forests have a lot of 
unaccounted benefits and they are not properly reflected in the national accounts 
and thus these values are to be viewed as conservative. The data on produced capital 
stocks are not available and the data on gross capital formation are not available for 
all the states, limiting the analysis. These are some of the limitations of this study 
and more recent estimates of capital stock will be useful and these estimates are 
being updated by the author and are still under progress.
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Human capital is an essential component of individual well-being and vital for a 
country’s sustainability (e.g. OECD, 2013; UNU-IHDP and UNEP, 2014). Arguably 
more attention around the world has been paid to gross domestic product (GDP) 
than any other indicators, including human capital. Although GDP is an important 
macroeconomic construct, it fails to consider environmental and inequality impacts, 
and the future viability of a country (e.g. Stiglitz et al., 2010).
Human capital and other wealth measures as presented in this report will help to 
fill the gaps in GDP. This chapter focuses on human capital, particularly on those 
that are captured in levels and trends in country’s educational attainment, with 
reference to the United Nations’ Millennium Project and Sustainable Development 
education goals.
The UN Millennium Project, an international effort which operated from 2002 
through 2006, established eight goals and 18 technical indicators with 48 associated 
targets to measure progress towards the Millennium Development Goals (MDGs). 
Two goals relate to education: Goal 2 – Achieve Universal Primary Education and 
Goal 3 – Promote Gender Equality and Empower Women. The stated objective of 
Target 3 of Goal 2 is to have all boys and girls complete a full course of primary 
schooling by 2015. The stated objective of Target 4 of Goal 3 is to eliminate gender 
disparity in primary and secondary education in the short-run (2005) and in all levels 
of education in the intermediate run (2015).
However, as stated in the report of the UN Secretary-General, despite progress, 
the world failed to meet the MDGs of achieving universal primary education by 
2015. For instance, in 2013, 59 million children of primary school age were out 
of school. Estimates show that, among those 59 million children, 1 in 5 of those 
children had dropped out. In addition, recent trends suggest that 2 in 5 of out-of-
school children will never set foot in a classroom (UN, 2016).
In 2015, the United Nations’ member states reached agreement on 17 Sustainable 
Development Goals (SDGs) with 169 associated targets. SDG 4 and SDG 5 are 
similar to MDG 2 and MDG 3, respectively. SDG 4 calls for inclusive and quality 
education for all and the promotion of lifelong learning by 2030. SDG 5 calls for 
gender equality by 2030, noting the importance of education and the elimination 
of discrimination in jobs, unpaid work and political office in achieving the goal.
Following an indicators-based approach to measuring human capital,1 human 
capital developed due to education is frequently proxied by educational attainment, 
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such as average years of schooling. A famous example in this field is the Barro-Lee 
dataset that has been established through many years’ research (see Barro and Lee, 
2001, 2013). The previous Inclusive Wealth Reports (IWR) also used the Barro-
Lee dataset as one of the primary data sources for calculating monetary estimates 
of human capital (e.g. IWR, 2012, 2014).
This chapter, by using numerical estimates based mainly on the latest Barro-Lee 
dataset (Barro and Lee, 2016), tries to investigate educational attainment progress 
across major regions in the world, and over the time period of 1950–2010. We 
also investigate what has been achieved during this time period with reference to 
the educational attainment gender gaps and age differences in different regions. 
As the quality of education matters as well as the average years of schooling, 
discussions are also provided around the methods about how the quality side of 
educational attainment is practically taken into account.
In the next section, the methodology for compiling the Barro-Lee dataset is sum-
marized. This is followed by the section presenting and discussing several numerical 
results. A subsequent section focuses on the quality of education, where by using 
the implicit quality-adjustment method, the findings drawn from the progress of 
primary, secondary and tertiary education are presented and discussed as well. The 
final section concludes.
2. Barro-Lee methodology
Barro-Lee average years of schooling estimates enter into the IWR human capital (due 
to education) calculations in two ways. The IWR uses a country representative adult 
approach. The representative adult’s educational attainment by gender (Edu) comes 
from the Barro-Lee average years of schooling. The minimum age of an adult in a 
country by gender is determined by Edu+5. The total number of adults by gender is 
equal to the number of individuals in the country who are at least the minimum age. 
All adult individuals are counted whether or not they perform paid work. A complete 
description of the IWR human capital measuring methodology is in Annex 2.
The Barro-Lee dataset (2016) is available by gender in five calendar year incre-
ments from 1950 through 2010 for five-year age groups from age 15 through 74, 
and for age 75 and over, for 146 countries. The data used in this chapter by age 
groups and gender include population, the no school percentage and the average 
years of total schooling, as well as the average years of primary, secondary and 
tertiary schooling, respectively.
The Barro-Lee benchmark data are collected from various census and/or survey 
information and compiled by UNESCO, Eurostat, national statistic agencies and 
other sources.2 The Barro-Lee dataset uses a variety of techniques to fill in gaps in 
observations and educational attainment subcategories, with the purpose to avoid 
misestimating of average years of schooling.
To fill in missing observations (as benchmarks are not available for all five-year 
periods), they begin by calculating the distribution of educational attainment among 
four broad categories: no formal education (hu), primary (hp), secondary (hs) and 
tertiary education (hh). Primary and tertiary are further divided into complete and 
incomplete; secondary is further divided into lower secondary and upper secondary.
Most missing observations are filled in with backward or forward extrapolation 
with an appropriate time lag. The 13 five-year age groups are referred to by ag = 1 
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(15–19 years old) through to ag = 13 (75 years and over). The forward extrapolation 
method assumes that the educational attainment distribution of the age group ag at 










where j = u, p, s, h and ag = 3 (25–29 years old), through to ag = 11 (65–69 years old).
This forward extrapolation applies to individuals who have completed their school-
ing by time t – 5. As those younger than 25 are potentially still in school, a different 
methodology is employed.
Similarly, the backward extrapolation assumes that the educational attainment 
distribution of the age group ag at time t is the same as that of the age group that 










where j = u, p, s, h, and ag = 2 (20–24 years old), through to ag = 10 (60–64 
years old).
As a result, the net effect of this methodology is to hold an individual’s educa-
tional attainment constant from age 25 through to 64.
For older individuals, the probability of dying is observed to differ by educational 
attainment level. Accordingly, for the three oldest age groups: ag = 11 (65–69 years 
old), ag = 12 (70–74 years old) and ag = 13 (75 years and over), survival prob-
abilities are estimated by educational attainment level. Highly educated individuals 
live, on average, longer than their less educated peers; this correction is necessary to 
ensure accurate estimations of average educational attainment for older age groups. 
For all younger age groups (ag = 10 (60–64 years old) and below), it is assumed 
that survival rates do not differ by educational attainment.
The process for creating subcategories of educational attainment (complete and 
incomplete for primary and higher education; lower and upper for secondary school) 
depends upon the age level. For primary school, the Barro-Lee dataset uses country and 
age-specific completion ratio profiles to estimate the subcategories for ag = 1 (15–19 years 
old) and ag = 2 (20–24 years old). For ag = 3 (25–29 years old), the primary school 
completion rate is set equal to the ratio of the number of individuals who completed 
primary school, but did not enter secondary school, to the number of individuals who 
entered primary school. Backward and forward extrapolation and other methods are 
used to fill in any missing observations for ag = 3 (25–29 years old) and above.
When there are missing observations, secondary school enrollees for ag = 1 
(15–19 years old) are assumed to be incompletely educated at the secondary level, 
and higher-school enrollees for ag = 2 (20–24 years old) are assumed to be incom-
pletely educated at the higher level.
Other estimation problems arise because some countries do not report the pro-
portion of the population who have no formal education, but do report on the 
proportion of the educated population who have achieved primary, secondary or 
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tertiary level of education. Alternatively, the proportion of the population with no 
formal education, or who have achieved at most some level of primary education, is 
often reported as a single number. The Barro-Lee dataset uses illiteracy rate, primary 
enrolment ratio and/or data from other census years to resolve such inconsistencies.
Finally, estimations are made for the average number of years of schooling for 
the population aged 15 and above, and separately for each of the 13 five-year age 
groups. For those aged 15 and above, the average years of total schooling at time 








where the summation is over all age groups (i.e. ag = 1 (15–19 years old), ag = 2 
(20–24 years old), . . ., ag = 13 (75 years old and over); lt
ag  is the population share 
of the group ag in the total population aged 15 and above; st
ag  is the average number 
of years of schooling for age group ag.
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where the summation is over educational attainment levels j = p, s (incomplete, 
complete), h (incomplete, complete); h j t
ag
,  is the fraction of the group ag with the 
educational level j; d j t
ag
,  is the corresponding duration of school attendance in years.
3.  Educational attainment, gender gaps and 
age differences
To examine educational attainment progress in the world and across the different 
regions, the 146 countries covered by the Barro-Lee dataset are divided first into two 
broad groups: Advanced and other economies. The Advanced Economies consist of 
24 countries, other economies are divided into six regions: East Asia and the Pacific 
(19 countries or special administrative districts); Europe and Central Asia (20 coun-
tries); Latin America and Caribbean (25 countries); Middle East and North Africa 
(18 countries); South Asia (7 countries); and Sub-Saharan Africa (33 countries).3
In Table 7.1, information on the educational attainment (in terms of the average 
years of total schooling) is presented for the total population aged 15 and above, for 
both males and females, in all the seven regions over the period covered by Barro 
and Lee (2013), i.e. 1950–2010. As shown, all regions in the world have made 
significant progresses in educational attainment during this period.
By 2010, the Europe and Central Asia region has almost caught up with the 
Advanced Economies, and its average educational attainment levels for both males 
and females are just slightly lower than those of the latter. Until the most recent 
period of 2000–2010, the average rate of percentage increase per year for the Europe 
and Central Asia exceeds that for the Advanced Economies.
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Not surprisingly, the Sub-Saharan Africa region has the lowest average 2010 
educational attainment, and for the period as a whole (1950–2010), and in the first 
subperiod (1950–2000), its average percentage increase per year is not among the 
highest in all regions. This is also true for males in the second subperiod (2000–2010). 
Only for females and in the second subperiod has its average percentage increase 
per year reached the second place among all regions.
For the whole period (1950–2010) and the first subperiod (1950–2000), the 
Middle East and North Africa region has the highest average percentage increase per 
year for both males and females, but in the last subperiod (2000–2010), although 
its average percentage increase per year is still the highest for females, it recedes 
to the third place for males in all regions. The South Asia region has the second 
highest average percentage increase per year both for the whole period (1950–2010) 
and the first subperiod (1950–2000), but in the second subperiod (2000–2010), 
its average percentage increase per year is the highest for males, while it falls to the 
third place for females in all regions. For all seven regions, the average percentage 
increase per year is lower in 2000–2010 than in 1950–2000, regardless of gender.
The slowdown in percentage growth rate of educational attainment progress is 
quite noticeable in the East Asia and the Pacific, the Europe and Central Asia, the 
Middle East and North Africa, and the South Asia regions, where the average per-
centage increase per year in 2000–2010 roughly halved for females, and more than 
halved for males, compared to the corresponding 1950–2000 percentage rates. For 
males in the Sub-Saharan Africa region, the average percentage increase per year in 
2000–2010 more than halved its 1950–2000 percentage rate.
Average yearly percentage increases tend to fall as the level of educational attain-
ment rises, indicating that advancement relative to existing levels may be significantly 
easier when educational attainments are low compared to when they are higher.
To answer the question whether the current educational attainment gaps among 
the regions can be filled up by 2030, a simulation analysis is carried out based on 
the estimates shown in Table 7.1. Three scenarios are simulated where Scenario M, 
Table 7.1 Educational attainment, aged 15 and above, by region and gender
Average years Average increase per year (percentage)
2010 1950–2010 1950–2000 2000–2010
Female Male Female Male Female Male Female Male
Advanced Economies 11.4 11.7 1.03 0.96 1.04 1.01 1.00 0.71
East Asia and the Pacific 7.6 8.3 3.17 2.21 3.48 2.48 1.67 0.87
Europe and Central Asia 11.2 11.4 1.72 1.35 1.90 1.51 0.82 0.54
Latin America and 
Caribbean
8.3 8.3 2.04 1.77 2.14 1.85 1.55 1.37
Middle East and North 
Africa
6.8 7.9 4.75 3.39 5.18 3.80 2.66 1.35
South Asia 4.8 7.3 4.23 2.62 4.68 2.86 2.03 1.41
Sub-Saharan Africa 4.8 5.9 2.81 2.19 2.94 2.40 2.19 1.14
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Barro-Lee February 2016 version (www.barrolee.com).
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Scenario H and Scenario L refer to that all regions, starting from the 2010 educational 
attainment level, follow the average annual percentage increase rate of 1950–2010, 
1950–2000 and 2000–2010, respectively. In other words, Scenario M, H and L 
represent relatively Middle, High and Low growth scenarios, respectively.
The simulation results are displayed in Figure 7.1, separately for males and 
females. Using the 2030 educational attainment level in the Advanced Economies 
as the target, the predicted 2030 levels in the Europe and Central Asia and the 
Middle East and North Africa regions, for both males and females, will be higher 
in Scenario M and Scenario H, while lower in Scenario L, than the corresponding 
levels in the Advanced Economies.
For the East Asia and the Pacific region, the predicted 2030 educational attainment 
level for females is higher than that in the Advanced Economies in Scenario M and 
Scenario H, while lower in Scenario L. For males, the predicted 2030 level in this 
region is lower in all three scenarios. As for the Latin America and Caribbean, the 
South Asia, and the Sub-Saharan Africa regions, their predicted 2030 educational 
attainment levels, for both males and females, and regardless of the scenario, are all 
lower than the corresponding levels in the Advanced Economies.
The situation is even more critical for the last mentioned three regions. For the 
Latin America and Caribbean region, the predicted 2030 educational attainment 
level in Scenario L is even lower than the 2010 level in the Advanced Economies. 
This is also true for the South Asia region; in addition for females in Scenario M, 
the predicted 2030 educational attainment level is lower than the 2010 level in the 
Advanced Economies. In the Sub-Saharan Africa region, in all scenarios and regardless 
of gender, the predicted 2030 levels are significantly lower than the corresponding 
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Figure 7.1  Predicted educational attainment in 2030 in different scenarios, by region, 
gender
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Barro-Lee February 2016 version (www.barrolee.com).
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Apparently, a variety of external factors in a number of countries may add to the 
difficulty of realizing educational gains, such as conflicts, poverty and recessions. 
Since the general state of many countries in the world, especially in the three last 
mentioned regions, points to the difficulty in attaining MDGs or SDGs educational 
attainment goals, more efforts are needed in order to catch up in the future.
Both MDGs and SDGs call for gender equity. As also shown in Table 7.1, in all 
regions, the average educational attainment of females is in general less than that of 
males in 2010. Only in the Latin America and the Caribbean region is there gen-
der parity. In the Advanced Economies, East Asia and the Pacific, and Europe and 
Central Asia, the difference is at most 0.7 of a year of total schooling, but in the 
Middle East and North Africa, the Sub-Saharan Africa and the South Asia regions, 
it is substantially greater, i.e. 1.1, 1.1 and 2.5 years of total schooling, respectively.
However, for all periods and regions considered, the average percentage increase 
in educational attainment per year for females is without exception greater than that 
for males (see Table 7.1). As Table 7.2 shows, for the overall period, the Middle 
East and North Africa region is the leader in closing the gender gap in education, 
but the progress is notable for all regions except in the Advanced Economies and 
in the Latin America and the Caribbean region, which have the smallest average 
educational gender gaps already in 1950.
Note that the regions which have the largest educational attainment gender gaps 
in 2010 (the South Asia and the Sub-Saharan Africa regions) as shown in Table 7.2 
are also those having lowest average years of total schooling as shown in Table 7.1. 
For the Sub-Saharan Africa region, the 2010 educational attainment gender gap can 
almost be filled up by 2030 if following the latest average annual gap reduction, while 
for the South Asia region, even faster (than that shown in Table 7.2) annual reduc-
tions are needed to fill the 2010 gap, which is the largest among all regions in 2010.
Literature review on private returns to schooling has demonstrated that returns 
to schooling seem to be higher in low or middle-income economies than in high-
income economies. Moreover, estimated returns to schooling are higher for females 
Table 7.2 The gender educational attainment gap*, aged 15 and above, by region
Average gap (percentage) Average reduction per year  
(percentage points)






Advanced Economies 6.5 5.0 2.2 0.07 0.03 0.28
East Asia and the Pacific 48.1 15.6 8.6 0.66 0.65 0.70
Europe and Central Asia 20.8 4.3 1.6 0.32 0.33 0.27
Latin America and Caribbean 15.0 1.6 –0.1 0.25 0.27 0.17
Middle East and North Africa 60.4 23.5 13.0 0.79 0.74 1.05
South Asia 74.2 38.0 34.2 0.67 0.72 0.39
Sub-Saharan Africa 43.4 26.6 18.6 0.41 0.34 0.80
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Barro-Lee February 2016 version (www.barrolee.com).
* The gender educational attainment gap in percentage points is defined as (1 − (female 
educational attainment/male educational attainment)) × 100.
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than for males (e.g. Psacharopoulos, 1994; Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2004). 
This conclusion holds both for the world as a whole and for all regions individually 
(Montenegro and Patrinos, 2014). Therefore, investments in education are more 
rewarding in these regions than in others, as well as for females than for males.
A comparison of educational attainment of 25–34-year-olds to 55–64-year-olds 
gives a sense of what the future might look like given current levels of educational 
attainment of younger potential workers. Because younger workers have longer 
remaining working years than their elder counterparts, they will contribute more 
to the future economic growth. Table 7.3 reports on the educational attainment 
of aged 25–34 relative to those of aged 55–64 by percentage range groups. The 
individual cells of Table 7.3 show how many countries in each region fall in the five 
percentage range categories. For example, there are two countries in the Advanced 
Economies having the calculated percentage points between 50% and 100%, and 
nine countries in the range of 20% to 50%, etc.
As shown in Table 7.3, clearly the largest concentrations of the Sub-Saharan Africa 
and the South Asia countries are in the range of greater than 50% to at most 500% 
category. The largest concentrations of the Latin America and Caribbean and the 
East Asia and the Pacific countries are in the greater than 20% to at most 100% 
range category. The largest concentration of the Advanced Economies, however, is 
in the greater than 0% to at most 50% range category. Finally, the largest concentra-
tion of the Europe and Central Asia countries are in the range of 0 or less percent 
to at most 20% category, while the countries in the Middle East and North Africa 
regions are more or less evenly distributed over the five percent range categories.
These results in particular point toward the future educational attainment 
potential gains of the Sub-Saharan Africa countries, and the potential slowdown in 
Table 7.3  Country distribution by educational attainment differences of younger (25–34) 
vs. older (55–64) in 2010
Percentage range (%) (100–500] (50–100] (20–50] (0–20] (-∞-0] No. of 
countries
Advanced Economies 0 2 9 12 1 24
East Asia and the Pacific 3 7 7 2 0 19
Europe and Central Asia 0 0 1 13 6 20
Latin America and Caribbean 2 9 9 4 1 25
Middle East and North Africa 6 3 4 2 2 17
South Asia 4 2 1 0 0 7
Sub-Saharan Africa 16 11 5 1 0 33
SUM 145
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Barro-Lee February 2016 version (www.barrolee.com).
Notes:
1.  The educational attainment differences of younger (25–34) vs. elder (55–64) in percentage 
points are defined as (educational attainment of aged 25–34 – educational attainment of aged 
55–64)/ educational attainment of aged 55–64;
2.  Yemen (in Middle East & North Africa) is excluded from this table as its educational 
attainment of 25–34 year olds is approximately 5000% higher than that of 55–64 year olds.
3.  The symbol “(” denotes greater than and the symbol “]” denotes less than or equal to.
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educational attainment gains in Europe and Central Asia, as well as in Advanced 
Economies.
A goal of SDG 4 is for all youths to achieve literacy and numeracy by 2030. 
The facts and figures section of SDG 4 notes that almost half of all children not 
in school are in the Sub-Saharan Africa region. This comment is also reflected in 
analysis results based on the Barro-Lee dataset.4 In 2010, the Sub-Saharan Africa 
region still has a larger number of countries than other regions with a high share of 
individuals aged 15–19 who have no years of schooling: 17 of 33 countries with no 
school percentages over 20%. In contrast, the other regions each have at most three 
countries with such a high percentage of individuals aged 15–19 with no school.
On the other hand, almost 25% (eight countries) of the Sub-Saharan Africa 
countries have at most two percent of individuals aged 15–19 without school. For 
all other regions in the Barro-Lee dataset, this low category of no school contained 
much larger shares of countries in each region, from a low of about 43% of coun-
tries for the South Asia to a high of 85% of countries for the Europe and Central 
Asia. In many countries of the regions considered, the goal of universal literacy has 
essentially been accomplished, but in others progress has yet to be made.
4. Quality of education
Up to now, focus has been put solely on the quantitative side of educational attain-
ment, in terms of the average years of total schooling. An obvious fact is that human 
capital accumulated due to education will be different if the quality of education 
varies. Since quality education is more explicitly addressed in SDG 4, this section 
will discuss the quality side of educational attainment progress.
In contrast to the quantity of education, the quality of education is non-observable. 
It can only be reflected by indicators of outcomes, either directly (such as by test 
scores) or indirectly (such as by differentials of economic or non-economic benefits),5 
through the use of human capital. But all these direct or indirect outcomes are 
determined not only by human capital alone, but also by many other environmental 
factors that will play important roles leading to the occurrence of certain outcomes 
(see Liu and Fraumeni, 2016).
In order to take into account the qualitative side of the educational attainment, 
there are in general two ways, either explicitly or implicitly.
4.1. Education quality – treated explicitly
Taking quality explicitly is to directly focus on some quality indicators, which are 
constructed based on various outcomes. For instance, test scores are often used as 
good indicators of quality of educational attainment (e.g. Hanushek and Kimko, 
2000; Angrist et al., 2013; Altinok et al., 2014; Barro and Lee, 2015). In some 
cases, internationally comparable test scores are even considered to be a direct 
measure of human capital stock (e.g. Hanushek and Kimko, 2000; Hanushek and 
Woessmann, 2012).
As mentioned, outcomes are jointly determined by many factors. Thus, one major 
challenge is how to separate the effects that are attributable to education from those 
due to other factors. For instance, innate ability is regarded as one of the important 
determinants of student’s test achievements (see Hanushek, 1986; Hanushek and 
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Woessmann, 2011). Despite one element of human capital in a broad sense (see 
Liu and Fraumeni, 2014), at least some of the innate ability (such as natural-born 
talent) is not that type of human capital that is developed solely due to education.
Another difficulty of using test scores lies in translating test scores of different 
subject matters (e.g. reading, mathematics, science) into an aggregate common metric. 
The estimated relationship between the test scores (quality) and the average years of 
schooling (quantity) may depend on how the aggregate test scores are constructed.
In a recent dataset, the aggregate test scores are constructed based on scores for 
mathematics and science only, with those for reading excluded. It has been shown that 
the correlation coefficient of the average years of schooling and aggregate test scores 
for secondary students in 2010 among 146 countries is 0.70 (Barro and Lee, 2015).
However, as shown in Figure 7.2, the PISA aggregate test scores and the average 
years of schooling for those aged 15–19 in 2010 is not strongly correlated among 
57 countries, with the calculated correlation coefficient between the corresponding 
rankings being just 0.24.6,7 Note that here the PISA aggregate test scores are an 
equally weighted average of mean test scores of reading, mathematics and science.8
Results have also shown that in two small groups of economies (one group 
with 15 top-performers in educational attainment quantity, the other with 15 top-
performers in secondary aggregate test scores), the correlation coefficient between 
the quantity (average years of schooling) and the quality (test scores) within each 
group is negative and low (Barro and Lee, 2015).
Therefore, the empirical results as regards the relationship between the average 
years of schooling (quantity) and the test scores (quality) drawn from internationally 
comparable test are mixed, and they depend not only on how the aggregate test 
scores are constructed, but also on the sample size as well.
To combine both the quantity and the quality side of educational attainment, 
research has been conducted by using the quality indicators to adjust the educational 
attainment quantity, the quality indicator including test scores (e.g. Barro and Lee, 
2015), labour earnings (e.g. Barro and Lee, 2015) or lifetime income (IWR Reports, 
2012, 2014). Since the data sources and the detailed choice of methodologies vary 
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Figure 7.2 PISA aggregate test scores and average years of schooling (aged 15–19) in 2010
Sources: Barro-Lee February 2016 version (www.barrolee.com) and PISA mean test scores
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4.2. Education quality – treated implicitly
Taking quality implicitly is to stratify quantitative educational attainment (e.g. average 
years of total schooling) into disaggregate categories (e.g. average years of primary, 
secondary and tertiary schooling), with the assumption that in terms of quality, all 
disaggregate categories are considered to be heterogeneous with each other, while 
homogenous within each single category.
Based on the Barro-Lee dataset, instead of using the average years of total 
schooling as discussed in previous sections, focus now is placed on the educational 
attainment progress in terms of average years of schooling by different categories, 
namely, primary, secondary and tertiary levels, across the world major regions and 
over 1950–2010.
As shown in Figure 7.3, in all regions, all three levels of educational attainment 
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Figure 7.3  Average years of primary, secondary and tertiary schooling by regions, aged 
15 and above, 1950, 2000, 2010
Source: Authors’ calculations based on Barro-Lee February 2016 version (www.barrolee.com).
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the Advanced Economies, the beginning all levels for other regions were lower in 
1950, but progresses made in these regions are significant. For instance, the Europe 
and Central Asia region has acquired approximately the same corresponding levels 
as the Advanced Economies in 2010.
The Latin America and Caribbean regions has roughly the same primary educa-
tional level as the Advanced Economies in 2010.
Note that Advanced Economies had achieved almost the primary educational 
level of 2010 already in 2000, so had the Europe and Central Asia region. Using 
the education levels in 2010 in these two regions as target, the educational gaps are 
still visible for many other regions. And the secondary and tertiary levels in most 
of these regions are still lagging behind.
Human capital developed through education is one of the crucial driving forces 
for modern economic growth (e.g. Lucas, 1988; Romer, 1990a, 1990b), so demand 
for higher educated and skilled people is bound to be ever increasing in the days to 
come, both for the developed and for the developing countries as well.
Recent research has found that the private returns to tertiary education are 
higher than those to either primary or secondary education, in most of the regions 
considered in this chapter. In addition, among all regions, they are highest with a 
substantial margin in two regions with the lowest average years of tertiary school-
ing as shown in Figure 7.3, i.e. the South Asia and the Sub-Saharan Africa regions. 
These findings also hold for both males and females. Moreover, the returns to 
tertiary education for females are, without exception, larger than those for males in 
all regions (Montenegro and Patrinos, 2014).
5. Conclusions
Based on the Barro-Lee dataset, this chapter focuses on the level and trend of 
educational attainment progress, with reference to the MPGs and SDGs. In terms 
of the average years of total schooling, educational attainment has made significant 
progresses in the world and across the regions over 1950–2010. However, in 2010 
the distribution of educational attainment is still uneven across the regions consid-
ered in the chapter, with some regions significantly lagging behind, if compared 
with Advanced Economies.
Filling these gaps by 2030 is challenging, especially for the Latin America and 
Caribbean, the South Asia and the Sub-Saharan Africa regions. Although some of 
these regions have shown considerable growth rates during the period of 1950–2010, 
because of low starting levels in 1950, their educational attainment levels in 2010 
are still lower than that in Advanced Economies with sizable margins.
Simulation analyses indicate that even in the high growth scenario, the 
predicted 2030 educational attainment level in these regions (i.e. the Latin 
America and Caribbean, the South Asia and the Sub-Saharan Africa regions) 
will be lower than the corresponding level in Advanced Economies. Given 
that the average growth rate of the last subperiod (2000–2010) is significantly 
lower, compared to that in the first subperiod (1950–2000), to remove the 
currently existent gaps, more bolder efforts are needed, beyond the measures 
undertaken in the past.
MDGs and SDGs strongly support the reduction of gender disparity in education. 
Over the period of 1950–2010, the observed educational attainment gender gaps 
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have been decreasing. In particular, a significant progress has been achieved in the 
Middle East and North Africa, and the East Asia and the Pacific regions. However, 
large gaps are visible in the South Asia and the Sub-Saharan Africa regions in 2010, 
even though annual reduction of gender gaps in the two regions has accelerated and 
are the highest among all regions in the last subperiod (2000–2010). Thus, filling 
these gender gaps by 2030 demands more active actions.
In many regions considered in the chapter, the goal of universal literacy has 
essentially been accomplished in 2010, reflected by very low share of individuals 
aged 15–19 who have no years of schooling in the country of these regions. Unfor-
tunately, in other regions, and in particular, in the Sub-Saharan Africa region, there 
are a large number of countries where the youth aged 15–19 are without school, 
and thus substantial progress needs to be made for these countries.
The quantity and equity of educational attainment are important, so is the quality. 
Education quality is more addressed in the SDGs. However, unlike the quantity, the 
quality of education is non-observable, and can only be proxied by some indicators, 
which are drawn based on various outcomes, such as test scores and labour earnings.
Research focusing on international comparable test scores and combining them 
with the quantitative average years of schooling is plentiful. However, due to the 
differences among the data sources, as well as the detailed methodological choices, 
results from these studies have yet to be further investigated.
Instead of focusing explicitly on the quality indicators, the chapter, by implicitly 
taking quality dimension into account, examines the educational attainment progress 
in terms of the average years of primary, secondary and tertiary schooling. Despite 
substantial progress in all levels, the secondary and tertiary levels are still significantly 
lagging behind for many of the regions, compared to Advanced Economies and the 
Europe and Central Asia region in 2010.
As economic development necessitates wide employment of higher educated 
people in the future, and research results have shown that private economic returns 
to the investments in higher education are larger than in primary education, and 
the returns are highest in the least developed regions, such as the South Asia and the 
Sub-Saharan Africa regions, more investments in higher education in these regions 
are therefore rewarding.
Notes
1 For discussions on other approaches to measuring human capital, as well as the 
strengths and weaknesses associated with each measuring approach, please refer to Liu 
and Fraumeni (2014).
2 The description of the Barro-Lee methodology draws heavily from Chapter 4 of the 
2014 Inclusive Wealth Report (Fraumeni and Liu, 2014), which is the description of 
the methodology applied in Barro and Lee (2013).
3 The 24 Advanced Economies include: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Luxembourg, Neth-
erlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, the 
United Kingdom, and the United States. The 19 East Asia and the Pacific countries 
or special administrative districts include: Brunei Darussalam, Cambodia, mainland 
China, China – Hong Kong, China – Macao, Fiji, Indonesia, Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic, Malaysia, Mongolia, Myanmar, Papua New Guinea, Philippines, Republic of 
Korea, Singapore, Taiwan, Thailand, Tonga and Viet Nam. The 20 Europe and Central 
Asia countries include: Albania, Armenia, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Hungary, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Republic of Moldova, 
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Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Tajikistan and Ukraine. The 25 
Latin America and Caribbean countries include: Argentina, Barbados, Belize, Bolivia, 
Brazil, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Cuba, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, 
Guatemala, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, 
Peru, Trinidad and Tobago, Uruguay and Venezuela. The 18 Middle East and North 
Africa countries include: Algeria, Bahrain, Cyprus, Egypt, Iran (Islamic Republic of), 
Iraq, Israel, Jordan, Kuwait, Libyan Arab Jamahiriya, Malta, Morocco, Qatar, Saudi 
Arabia, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, United Arab Emirates and Yemen. The seven 
South Asia countries include: Afghanistan, Bangladesh, India, Maldives, Nepal, Pakistan 
and Sri Lanka. The 33 Sub-Saharan Africa countries include: Benin, Botswana, Burundi, 
Cameroon, Central African Republic, Congo, Cote d’Ivoire, Democratic Republic of 
the Congo, Gabon, Gambia, Ghana, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Malawi, Mali, Mauritania, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Reunion, Rwanda, Senegal, Sierra Leone, 
South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Uganda, United Republic of Tanzania, Zambia 
and Zimbabwe.
4 Detailed analysis and the results are not fully presented here but are available upon 
request.
5 Here “direct” or “indirect” is a relative concept, with indirect outcomes being fur-
ther away than direct outcomes from the development/production process of human 
capital. From direct to indirect outcomes, more and more environmental factors other 
than human capital itself will play a part giving rise to certain outcomes (see Liu and 
Fraumeni, 2016).
6 The Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) is an OECD test of 
subject matter competencies. The core tests are in reading, mathematics and science 
for 15–16-year-old students. PISA has been administered every three years, beginning 
in 2000, through to 2015 (see www.oecd.org/pisa/).
7 The 57 countries include Albania, Argentina, Australia, Austria, Brazil, Bulgaria, 
Canada, Chile, Colombia, Costa Rica, Croatia, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, 
Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hong Kong-China, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, 
Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, 
Macao-China, Malaysia, Mexico, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Peru, Poland, 
Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russian Federation, Serbia, Singapore, Slovak, Slovenia 
Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Tunisia, Turkey, United Kingdom, 
United States and Uganda.
8 To make it more comparable, the aggregate test scores are an arithmetic average of 
those for 2006 and 2009, because the average years of schooling refer to those aged 
15–19 in 2010.
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Economics is a simple yet complex subject. Sounds oxymoronic but in many ways 
correct. A key objective of economics is about finding the most efficient use of 
limited resources. But the actual decision-making of making the nearly infinite set 
of choices with different combinations of inputs and outputs makes it a non-trivial 
task. Economic policymaking is not an exact science. This is especially the case at 
the macro level where governments need to make decisions on investments for 
economic growth and ensuring high rates of return of these investments towards 
the gross domestic product (GDP).
Most governments have traditionally focused on maximizing GDP growth as their 
prime objective. They understood economic growth measured by income growth as 
synonymous with improving human well-being (Stiglitz, Sen, & Fitoussi, 2010). The 
focus, therefore, had been on maximizing income accruing from resources and the 
question of sustainability was never an issue (Dasgupta, 2009). This has, however, 
changed over the past few years. The increasing recognition of the finite nature of 
resources and the increasing attention to negative externalities accruing from eco-
nomic activities has made it necessary for governments to address the sustainability 
dimension of economic activities. Equally important has been the recognition that 
just growth in income or GDP does not automatically contribute to well-being 
(Dasgupta & Duraiappah, 2012).
There has been increasing recognition that well-being is dependent on a number 
of constituents and determinants of well-being including subjective and objective 
notions of well-being as critical for countries to achieve. This has led in many ways 
a move from seeing economic growth as the key development agenda to a more 
nuanced and comprehensive agenda that includes sustainability of well-being. This can 
be seen very clearly of the transition by the global community from the Millennium 
Development Goals which made the first move from a “one variable” approach to 
well-being to a multidimensional perspective to well-being. But this was still seen as 
incomplete and a call for incorporating the sustainability of well-being was growing 
among the global community.
In 2015, 193 countries signed 17 ambitious goals called the Sustainable Develop-
ment Goals. Targets and indicators were set for each of these goals and a timeframe 
of 15 years was established. The key progress was the acknowledgement among 
countries that these goals were relevant to all countries and not as in the past just 
directed towards the poorer countries. The universality of the SDGs suggested a 
need for cooperation among countries to improve the well-being of their societies. 
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For example, SDG 13 on climate change definitely requires all countries to do their 
part in curtailing greenhouse gas emissions so as to minimize the global impact of 
climate change.
The challenge for every government, of course is to find the resources, sometimes 
financial but also human resources, to achieve these goals. For example, countries 
wanting to achieve SDG 4 on education would require resources to build schools, 
train teachers and put in place Information Technology (IT) infrastructure to avail 
students of the latest pedagogical advances. These resources, unfortunately, are not 
infinite and the need to find ways and means to use them in the most effective 
manner is crucial if the achievements are to be sustainable.
The present system of accounts used by governments provides a good starting 
point. However, these accounts are still incomplete with major gaps in the account-
ing and tracking of natural and human capital. The development of the inclusive 
wealth accounts and the corresponding index offers some guidance to evaluate if 
the achievement of the SDGs is sustainable over the longer-term. The focus of the 
Index on the productive base of the country offers valuable insights on the efficient 
use of its resources and the rate of return on each of the assets within the overall 
productive base for achieving the various SDGs.
This chapter offers insights on economic investment policymaking in the use of 
the asset/productive base of an economy and demonstrates how students of eco-
nomics and sustainable development can learn from playing games through scenario 
role-playing. Section 2 offers some insights on the use of IWI in policymaking and 
the various factors that should be taken into account when making investment 
decisions on the use of a country’s productive base. This is then followed by a sec-
tion highlighting the strengths of using games as a learning pedagogy for students 
of economics and sustainability. The last two sections offer some insights on some 
preliminary results emerging from the game developed for the IWI followed by 
ideas for future work to be done.
IWI and policymaking
The SDGs require resources if the targets are to be achieved. Policymakers will 
need access to the right type of information to make the right decisions. At the 
present, policymakers rely on the System of National Accounts (SNA) to give them 
an idea of how much resources their respective countries have at their disposal to 
meet demands such as achieving literacy rates, reducing malnourishment, providing 
hospitals and medical support to meet health standards and so forth. In fact, one 
of the main challenges facing countries post signing the SDG agreement is to fund 
the ambitious development agenda set out by the SDGs.
This is where a dilemma emerges. Let us illustrate this with an example. A key 
requirement of the SDG 4 which is on education is to reduce illiteracy rates, provide 
higher and vocational education, and improve the quality of schools and teach-
ers. This requires funds to build schools, teacher training and technology support 
among other demands. Governments have to set aside budgets for accomplishing 
these targets. The question is where are these resources to come from. It does not 
matter if the funds are sourced within a country or aid is provided by others, the 
bottom line is that resources have to be used to produce the funds to achieve the 
SDGs. This key element was not factored within the SDG agenda.
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A framework is needed that can provide policymakers the information to make 
the choices on where to appropriate the resources. The inclusive wealth accounts as 
illustrated in the earlier chapters offer such a framework. As already demonstrated, 
a country’s asset base, or also called its productive base, is comprised of three main 
categories of capitals; produced, natural and human capital. In many ways, the state 
of some of these capitals can be mapped directly to some of the SDG goals. For 
example, literacy rates are directly reflected in the state of human capital. Education 
levels are a key variable in the computation of human capital. In similar fashion, 
schools are reflected in the produced capital asset category.
The IW framework offers policymakers and students of policymaking a framework 
to look at the following three main issues. These are:
1 Understanding trade-offs across different assets bases and across time when 
making decisions on sustainability.
2 Understanding interconnected externalities.
3 Understanding the role of population growth.
4 Understanding social prices and market prices and their deviations.
Trade-offs present and in future
The notion of trade-offs is not new. In a world of limited resources with a large 
set of demands, trade-offs are inevitable. Difficult decisions have to be made when 
prioritizing goals. The main question on our mind is if we can achieve all the SDGs 
without having to forego one for the other. For example, will countries have suf-
ficient resources to achieve poverty reduction while at the same time having the 
resources to build the schools and train teachers at the same time? The issue takes 
on another level of complexity if the achievements achieved can be maintained 
across a time span greater than just the 15 years that have been given to achieve 
the SDGs. So, even if all the SDGs are achieved by 2030, the magic question is if 
these gains can be maintained and not slip back as resources get exhausted. These 
are questions that the IW can provide policymakers. It maintains a close track on 
the state of the country’s productive base; a declining asset base implies a non-
sustainable trajectory.
Interconnected externalities
One of the most challenging and emerging issues facing present societies is climate 
change. Let’s assume that we accept the consensus of the world scientific commu-
nity that climate change is being caused by the excessive greenhouse gases emitted 
by anthropogenic activities by countries across the world, some more than others. 
The IW framework accounts for these impacts. Damages caused by greenhouse 
gases have been computed using the latest findings from global model simulations 
and appropriated across countries. The impacts are not the same across countries. 
The countries that emit the most greenhouse gases are not necessarily the countries 
which are impacted the most. The IW framework captures these dichotomies and 
helps policymakers prepare for the impacts of climate change but also prepare them 
when they negotiate for reductions in greenhouse gases as well as for compensations 
accruing from climate change.
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Population growth
One variable ignored in the SDGs is population. The world has seen the fastest 
growth in human population ever witnessed in human history. The impacts of this 
population growth have not been considered in most policymaking in nearly every 
country. In fact, many countries seeing a decline in their populations have initiated 
population boosting policies fearing the demise of a workforce required to main-
tain economic activity. There are consequences of these types of policies in a world 
where resources are finite and becoming scarce. Some of the results from previous 
IW reports have shown conclusively how countries can move from being sustain-
able when computed in absolute terms and become unstainable when population 
growth is factored in the computation. Understanding population growth and the 
impact it has on the productive base is a critical variable that policymakers should 
begin to factor in their policymaking process. This will have huge implications on 
the achievement of the SDGs. Population growth was not factored when the SDGs 
were designed and are based on an assumption of a static world from the perspective 
of population numbers and their needs.
Social prices and market prices
Many of the assets that are critical for maintaining the productive base are either 
not priced or are priced at much lower levels than they should rightly be. This is 
especially true for natural capital and human capital assets. Natural capital assets 
such as forests and water bodies such as mangroves have only been valued for the 
products they provide for the market. These include timber and aquatic products 
such as fish. However, these ecosystems offer a much larger suite of services such 
as water purification, water regulation and habitat provisioning for species among 
many others. These are not priced when valuing these assets.
Individual SDGs and sustainability of SDGs
The individual SDGs have fairly well-designed metrics and parameters that a poli-
cymaker can deploy in order to ensure that the impact of policies can be measured 
and course corrections are performed at the right time. The challenge, however, for 
policymakers stems from the fact that they have limited resources at their disposal 
to improve “performance” and will have to prioritize between various investment/
improvement options. Therefore, real world changes can render the long-term 
deployment of SDG oriented development a challenge for policymakers. The game 
will provide the policymakers a “sandbox” environment with which they will be able 
to understand long-term deployment of SDG oriented policy planning.
Games as a policy learning tool
Definition of the game
Shubik argues that “games provide a structured, non-confrontational, realistic envi-
ronment which allows players to immerse themselves in the situation, experience the 
consequences of their actions, and subsequently learn from them” (Shubik, 1975). In 
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a similar vein, Igor Mayer interprets games as experi(m)ent(i)al, rule-based, interactive 
environments in which players learn by taking actions and experiencing their effects 
through feedback mechanisms that are deliberately built into and around the game. 
Mayer here argues that gaming is based on the assumption that the individual and 
social learning that emerges in the game can be transferred to the world outside 
the game and therefore has resonance with reality (Mayer, 2009).
Planning at the country level is a wicked problem (Rittel & Webber, 1973). 
There are no true or false solutions, rather what we have are a range of options. In 
order to grapple with wicked problems, we need a space that allows us to explore 
possible options, understand their implications and learn from that experience. 
Games have been widely used to understand wicked problems and to explore ways 
to tackle them. They provide a space for reflection, collaboration and learning. A 
game places a player or a group of players in a simulated environment to recre-
ate the sensations of the intended scenario. The target persons can then be made 
to “experience” various situations (Abt, 1987; Breuer & Bente, 2010; Crookall, 
2010; Duke & Geurts, 2004; Susi, Johannesson, & Backlund, 2007). The game 
can be used to understand trade-offs in the policy decisions, which will enable 
players to then understand consequences and impact of their choices (Duke & 
Geurts, 2004; Mayer, 2009). In order to understand the complexity of the choices 
at their disposal, players often have greater incentive to rule out least desirable 
consequences after having experienced such outcomes (Haug, Huitema, & Wen-
zler, 2011; Hoysala, Murthy, Palavalli, Subrahmanian, & Meijer, 2013; Palavalli, 
Krishna, & Hoysala, 2011).
In order to learn concepts in policy planning and analysis, it becomes essential 
for the policymakers to understand and evaluate various options both qualitatively 
and quantitatively. Games allow players to weigh various parameters that can be 
quantified and tangible with those that are often intangible and unquantifiable, 
thereby determining their next steps. Policymakers need to be equipped to make 
decisions under uncertainties and to factor changing scenarios into their strategies. 
Games provide policymakers with the experience to test their hypotheses without 
the consequences of real world failure but will provide them with the experience. To 
simulate the uncertainties involved in governing a complex socio-economic system 
such as a country, the game can provide the players with different events and external 
factors. It is this process that forms the space for the players to observe and reflect, 
helping them process the experiences in the game to turn it to learning (Bots & 
Van Daalen, 2007; Brewer, 1986; Crookall, 2010; Duke, 1982; Fischer & Forester, 
1993; Haug, Huitema, & Wenzler, 2011; Roth & Erev, 1995; Wenzler, 1993).
Experiential learning
David Kolb, an American educational theorist, popularised the idea of experiential 
learning. Kolb’s model of experiential learning consists of four elements: concrete 
experience, observation and reflection, the formation of abstract concepts and test-
ing in new situations (Kolb, 2014). This process itself is a cycle, although learning 
can begin at any stage. Role-playing also reinforces what has already been learned 
elsewhere, say a textbook. Games, thus, can be used to complement traditional 
learning methods used in classrooms. In a game, the player’s choices chart the 
course of the game, which in turn lets the player invest more in the narrative built. 
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With different players interacting with each other, the different narratives build to 
become a site for experiential learning.
In order to demonstrate the various capabilities and components of IWI, it will 
be used in a game for a policy design exercise. We propose to incorporate IWI 
into a computer supported game to help demonstrate its use by simulating different 
scenarios. In a computer supported game, the game is played with the aid of a 
computer rather than use the computer as the platform. This type of game allows 
for physical interactions among the players (classroom). A computer based game 
will also be able to manage data intensive models. The graphical capabilities sup-
ported by a computer supported game allows us to provide different views of the 
underlying models to ease understanding.
Impact of IWI in policymaking through the game
Objectives of and in the game
The broad objectives of the game are to understand (i) the implications of policy 
decisions, (ii) the relationship between the three capitals (produced, human and 
natural) and (iii) what it could mean to achieve the sustainable development goals 
in the future. In order to make policy decisions, it often becomes important that 
the trade-offs between resources and constraints of policy operationalization are 
mapped. Often, the challenge that policymakers have is the differences between 
short-, medium- and long-term impact of policy choices. This often translates into 












Figure 8.1 Kolb’s Experiential Learning Cycle
Source: Derived from Kolb (2014).
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continued political stability. The long-term nature (often intergenerational or decadal) 
of high impact policies is again at odds with the pressure that policymakers face to 
deliver results in the short-term which is achieved by piecemeal short-term projects.
The transition from having targets such as economic growth measured by GDP to 
including human development, emissions and the use of natural resources requires 
an understanding of the interlinkages of the various factors that exist between the 
human, natural and produced capitals. This translates to elements such as making 
use of natural resources in order to improve economic growth in the short-term, 
and to understand the impact of growth with high carbon emission on long-term 
sustainability and climate change. Given the increasing adoption of SDGs and the 
need to operationalize SDGs, the game will take into account the three SDGs 4, 7 
and 13. This decision was based on the parameters that are included in the Inclu-
sive Wealth Index as described in Table 8.5. In order to ensure the data is available 
(temporal availability and granularity) for the players and to ensure consistency of 
data (variation in different datasets and statistical significance of new parameters 
being introduced to IWI), SDG 1 had to be ruled out. The targets on economic 
growth and development have been incorporated as individual targets. Therefore, 
SDGs 4, 7 and 13 were shortlisted as specific targets for all players in the game.
Game design
Given the complexity of the subject matter, the game is designed to be used as a 
classroom teaching aid with multiple students participating simultaneously and not 
as a standalone single-player game. The target audience for the game will include 
policymakers; graduate students of sustainability studies, environmental economics, 
public policy and economics; and mid-career policy professionals. As discussed in the 
earlier section, testing hypotheses learned in the class by experimenting in the game 
will allow the players to learn the concepts better. Figure 8.2 presents a conceptual 
model of each round for every player-group in the proposed game. The different 
interconnected parameters that underlie a country’s social, political and economic 
context will be modelled based on the parameters and variables available in the 
Inclusive Wealth Index. The players make changes to the various parameters in the 
game through specific policy interventions that are either monetary investment in 
nature or regulatory change or providing subsidies in the game. Examples of such 
actions are described in the subsequent sections.
Shortlisting of countries
In order to ensure that the players are not overwhelmed by the data in the game 
and to ensure that players experience the challenges from different perspectives, the 
number of countries in the playing environment is restricted. In order to decide the 
countries of interest, the following criteria were used:
1 “Resource Rich” or “Resource Poor” and “Developed” or “Emerging”.
2 There must be a significant change in the growth rates of per capita and total 
GDP and IWI.
3 The country must be subject social, political and environmental shocks.
4 Continental representation and percentage of global population.
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Figure 8.2 Conceptual model of the game
As this “sandbox” environment must allow the player to understand implications of 
policy choices and the nature of unforeseen circumstances, two additional cycles of 
filtration were carried out using educational attainment and risk of disasters.
The change in IWI and GDP was factored in first by directionality of change of 
IWI and GDP (Table 8.1) and then using the significant change in IWI and GDP 
(Table 8.2). The change is considered significant if the growth rate of GDP/IWI 
for the given country is above the third quartile of the growth rates of all countries. 
This gives rise to 16 possible combinations (4 × 4) of countries that are of interest 
for the game (Table 8.3).
Within each of the groups, the countries were ranked according to their strengths 
in the following parameters: Total Affected Natural Capital, Total Damage Natural 
Capital, Total Affected Tech, Total Damage Tech, GDP Per Capita 2005, GDP 
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Per Capita 2010, Population Density 2005, Population Density 2010, Educational 
Attainment 2010. The top five countries in each group were first shortlisted based 
on the above parameters. The countries were further shortlisted based on the value 
of the damage function. They were ranked in descending order, i.e. the ones with 
higher damage function values are ranked higher as these are significant from the 
game design perspective. We then ensured that percentage of the global popula-
tion and continental representation was accounted for in these countries (point 4). 
Based on this filtration procedure the final set of countries is presented in Table 8.4.
Table 8.1 Directionality of change between IWI and GDP
IWI +ve IWI -ve
GDP +ve
GDP -ve
Table 8.2 Significance of change in IWI and GDP
IWI significant IWI marginal
GDP significant
GDP marginal
Table 8.3  Combinations of change in IWI and GDP, where P = CAGR of per capita IWI 
and Q = CAGR of per capita GDP
Amount of change/ 
Directionality of change
G1 G2 G3 G4
T1 P++, Q++ P++, Q+ P+, Q++ P+, Q+
T2 P++, Q – P++, Q − P+, Q – P+, Q −
T3 P – , Q++ P – , Q+ P −, Q++ P −, Q+
T4 P – , Q – P – , Q − P −, Q – P −, Q −
Table 8.4 Shortlisted countries
Group/
Type
G1 G2 G3 G4 Countries added based 
on the 4th criteria
T1 China Chile Indonesia Japan United States
India Republic of 
Korea
Peru Germany Brazil




T3 Myanmar Iraq Cambodia Algeria Russia
Mozambique Saudi Arabia Ecuador Australia
T4 Nigeria
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Equations guiding the flow of the game
As discussed earlier, players are given an option to make a monetary investment 
in key areas of their choice and deciding on the policies that they would like to 
improve. The monetary investments are defined by the amount of money at their 
disposal, and for the purpose of the game, it is defined as a function of the pro-
duced capital in the country. It is determined by the produced capital as described 
































































1, , ,c t c t cBD L− +− −1 1
Where,
Bt,c = Annual budget at time t for country c
Bt−1,c = Annual budget in previous year for country c
PC t−1,c = Produced capital at time t – 1 or in previous year for country c
PC t−2,c = Produced capital at time t – 2 year for country c
BS t−1,c = Budget surplus in previous year or at time t – 1
BD t−1,c = Budget deficit in previous year or at time t – 1
L t−1,c = Borrowing or Loans for the country c at time t – 1
However, in order to ensure that a certain amount of pedagogical control is available 
to the facilitator, the deviation of a parameter in the game world from the value in 






















































Δ = Deviation from the rate being set by the facilitator (0<=Δ<=1)
Avt,c = Action variable at time t for country c
In order to help the player to understand the interconnected nature of the parameters, 
the effect of SDG on the individual parameter is captured in the game. The effect 
of the player decisions on the sustainable development goal is defined as follows,
SDG P *
A























SDGt,c = Percentage of SDG achieved at time t for country c
PSDG,c = Priority for SDG for country c and PSDG,c =∑  1
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At−1,c = Achieved value of independent indicator at time t−1






























It, V = Investment at time t for variable V by the player
rV, C = Correlation between the variable V and the corresponding Capital
α + β = 1 where α and β will be decided by the facilitator based on the weight-
age given to player’s investment to a certain sector and weightage for prioritizing 
different SDGs.
While the previous equations describe the changes in variables based on player 
decisions, it is restricted only to the countries chosen by players, i.e. in a classroom 
size of X (where X is less than 27), then only the parameters of these X countries 
will change. However, in order to ensure that the game world remains consistent 
for believability and player experience, we need to show changes in the non-played 
countries. We ensure that the changes in the other countries are a function of the 
average change in the other countries in the same year.
R G Et c v t c v t c v− − −= +1 1 1, , , , , ,
R G Et c v t c v t c v− − −=− −1 1 1, , , , , ,
Where,
Rt−1,c,v = Rate of change of variable V for previous year for country c
Gt−1,c,v = Rate of change of variable V for previous year for country c which is not 
shortlisted for the game
Et−1,c,v = Average rate of change of variable V for previous year for country c which 
is not shortlisted for the game
E
n
kt c v t c v− −= ∑1 1
1
, , , ,
Where,
kt−1,c,v = Rate of change of variable V for previous year for shortlisted country c
n = Number of shortlisted countries c (i.e. n = 26)
V R * Vt c t c v t c, , , ,( )= + − −1 1 1
Where,
Vt,c = Variables at time t or current year for country c which is not shortlisted for 
the game
Rt−1,c,v = Rate of change of variable V for previous year for country c
Vt−1,c = Variables at previous year for country c
Preliminary results
The IWI is measured based on the interconnectedness of economic health, human 
well-being and environmental condition of an economy. The index to measure a 
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country’s environmental condition is the wealth of natural capital. The natural capital 
has been included as an addition to the measurement of gross domestic product 
(GDP) and Human Development Index (HDI) through the introduction of IWI. 
The aim of the game is to highlight the relationship between GDP and wealth of 
produced, human and natural capitals. The game also allows the players to understand 
the relationship between the wealth of all three capitals and all independent variables.
Annual growth rate and CAGR over the review period (1990–2010) of all depen-
dent and independent variables of the game demonstrate the trend of each parameter. 
Correlation between trends of each capital, GDP and all independent variables can 
be used to understand the relationship between trends of these parameters.
We have selected 27 countries for the game, based on macroeconomic indicators 
and disaster parameters, out of 140 listed countries in Inclusive Wealth Report 2014. 
Out of these 27 countries, only Myanmar shows a negative correlation between 
IWI and GDP during the review period. Apart from Nigeria and Russia, 25 other 
selected countries show a significant and positive correlation between the wealth 
of produced capital and GDP. Correlation between the wealth of human capital 
and GDP is always significant and positive for all selected countries. However, the 
wealth of natural capital shows significant and negative correlation with GDP, with 
an exception for South Korea, Luxembourg and Italy.
The correlation between all stock variables and a country’s wealth of natural capi-
tal is mostly opposite as compared to the correlation with the wealth of produced 
capital and IWI. Based on this alternative relationship amongst these independent 
variables and wealth of capitals, the countries have to balance with all stock variables 
of natural capital and the economic output.
Dichotomy between achieving individual 
SDGs and sustainability
Players of the game have to achieve both country-specific goals and global goals 
at the same time. However, there are two targeted global objectives in the game. 
First is to achieve 7.0% global GDP growth rate and the second is to achieve the 
Sustainable Development Goals (SDGs 4, 7 and 13). The players have to prioritize 
sectors to allocate funds from a country’s annual budget, so that, they can manage 
both country level and global goals.
Correlation between GDP and wealth of natural capital is negative for most of the 
shortlisted countries, whereas IWI is positively correlated with GDP. This explains 
that the growth in produced capital surpasses the effect of decreasing natural capital 
and leads to a growth in both GDP and IWI. Players have to decide how to create 
trade-off between use of natural resources and economic growth.
Our focus is mainly on SDG 4 (quality education for all), SDG 7 (sustainable 
energy) and SDG 13 (climate action). We have mapped each SDG of all selected 
countries to the nodal ministries, both public and private investments, respective 
schemes and policy description. The game also allows the players to observe the 
direct and indirect impact of investment and policy implementation. Player actions 
concerning each of the three SDGs in the game can be broadly divided into three 
categories: direct investments, indirect investments, and regulatory or policy changes. 
The impact on SDGs for each shortlisted country will be based on the allocated 
annual budget into different sectors of the economy. Each country has a specific 
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information matrix to understand the impact of policy implementation and the 
inflow of investments to schemes which are targeted towards achieving the objec-
tives under the considered SDGs.
Country vs. global
Comparison between each country and the global scenario is an important param-
eter in the game to understand a country’s standing globally. Global comparison of 
each country includes a comparison of the share of each capital in IWI and CAGR 
of capitals. The wealth of human capital accounted for the largest share of 62.4% 
out of the global IWI at an average basis, during the period 1990–2010. However, 
the share has declined from 64.3% in 1990 to 61.3% in 2010. Likewise, the wealth 
of produced capital at global perspective accounted for an average of 22.5% share, 
whereas the remaining of 15.1% has been accounted as the wealth of natural capital 
out of global IWI. Due to rise in economic growth, the wealth of produced capital 
at global context has increased significantly from 19.0% in 1990 to 26.6% in 2010. 
On the other hand, extensive use of natural resources to generate more economic 
output led to a noticeable decline in the share of the wealth of natural capital out 
of the global IWI from 16.7% in 1990 to 12.1% in 2010.
Global IWI accounted for a 1.6% CAGR over the period of 2000–2010. The 
growth in IWI is mainly driven by a continuous rise in the wealth of both produced 
(CAGR of 3.3%) and human (CAGR of 1.5%) capital over the period. However, 
due to continuous reduction in stocks of natural resources, the wealth of natural 
capital at global scenario has declined by a CAGR of 0.7% during the review period.
In the game, the players would be able to notice their respective country’s posi-
tion at the global scenario based on the shares and growth of each capital. Players 
have also to compare their respective country’s economic growth with the global 
targeted growth rate.
Short term vs. long-term
Players are responsible to balance between short-term and long-term goals for the 
respective countries. It is all about the adjustment within the use of natural resources 
and economic output. Players have to decide whether to invest more on the country’s 
output or production to achieve high economic growth rate after a decade as targeted 
for the game or minimize the extensive use of natural resources. To achieve the 
global and country’s economic growth in a sustainable way, the players are entitled to 
trade-off between short-term and long-term outcomes for the country’s perspective.
Future work
In this chapter, we present a game that helps operationalize IWI for policymaking. 
The game provides the players with a “sandbox” environment where they can test 
various policy formulations and the impact of their choices on the macro-indicators. 
The players are able to understand the dichotomy between the growth rates and 
sustainability, individual SDG and sustainability, short vs. long-term and an indi-
vidual country and the global needs. The players can factor trade-offs that have been 
operationalized as game elements in order to understand the dynamics of interaction 
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of the various constituent elements and the resulting impacts at multiple levels. In 
the future, it would be possible to bring in more contextual elements of climate 
change, gender, global trade and migration into this “game world” to help the players 
understand the impact of their actions. It is possible to be able to understand the 
role of preferences (and biases) on policies through the game as the players have to 
set these priorities in the game. As we conduct more game sessions, it is possible 
to map the role of gender, disciplinary/domain background and similar contextual 
elements on the player’s decisions in the game. This can then be explored further 
to understand the deviations in the real world and the game world. It is then pos-
sible to design appropriate pedagogical responses to help policymakers deal with the 
complexity of the real world.
As the game does not provide a definite “winning” condition, the traditional 
model of a single winner and multiple “losers” is brought into question. It is pos-
sible to then test if this changed value system will affect the player behaviour in the 
game. The potential motivation map for policy choices will, therefore, change over 
a period of time during the game. With a sufficient number of game sessions, we 
are then able to understand if such a change is uniform across future policymakers 
or if there are trigger conditions that enable this change. The data generated by 
the game provide the future policymakers a window into potential alternatives for 
the chosen 27 countries. These alternatives become powerful as the game provides 
a year on year trajectory of this change based on human preference and bias for 
certain policies (modelled on the real world scenario).
MAPPING VARIABLES IN SDGS AND IWI
Table 8.5 Relationship between variables in IWI and SDGs
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OBJECTIVES OF THE GAME
Table 8.5 (Continued)
Table 8.6 Mapping between objectives of the game and the various game elements
Sl. 
No.




1 Taking policy decisions 
and understanding their 
impacts on the three 
capitals (IWI) and the 
SDGs 4, 7 and 13
X X X
2 To see how policy decisions 
of different temporal scales 
impact sustainability
X X X
3 To understand the 
relationship between 
produced capital and 
human capital
X X X X
4 To realize the conflict 
between individual country-
wise objectives and global 
objectives for achieving 
SDGs 4, 7 and 13
X X X
5 To realize the trade-
offs, resources and 
constraints of policy 
operationalization and its 
impact on productivity and 
sustainability
X X
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Sl. 
No.




6 To understand the link and 
the nature of relationship 
that human capital shares 
with natural capital and 
produced capital and the 
overall impact on IWI
X X
7 Short term vs. long-term 
decisions that are made and 
how each of them affect 
sustainability, specifically 
SDGs 4, 7 and 13 in the 
game
X X
8 To understand the short-, 
medium- and long-term 
impacts of policy decisions 
on IWI in the game by 
choosing different levers 
attached to different 
capitals
X X




and their impacts on SDGs 
4, 7 and 13
X X X
10 GDP (produced capital) 
vs. well-being (human 
capital) and carbon 
emissions (natural capital) 
vs. well-being (human 
capital)
X X X X
OBJECTIVES IN THE GAME
Table 8.7 Mapping between objectives in the game and the game elements




1 Bring in 7% 
GDP growth for 
the world
X X X X X
2 Achieve SDGs 4, 
7 and 13 targets 
for individual 
countries
X X X X
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Introduction
The purpose of genuine savings and inclusive wealth clearly lies in sustainability 
analysis. The analysis can indicate whether the national productive base is on the 
increase or decrease, in accordance with intergenerational well-being. As such, pro-
ceeding from sustainability analysis to policy implication is not straightforward. 
Specifically, even if the shadow price of a given asset is known to be high, it does 
not necessarily mean that the given asset should be the focus of investment. A cost-
benefit analysis, using the same set of shadow prices, should be performed to 
determine what kind of policy should be the means to increase social well-being 
(Dasgupta, 2009).
However, inclusive wealth figures on their own are not silent about policy impli-
cations. For example, if a particular component class of inclusive wealth is on a rapid 
decline within a relatively short period of time, the necessity for policy intervention 
should be reflected, perhaps even in the absence of cost-benefit analysis. In this 
chapter, we first discuss those implications that may arise from certain classes of 
capital assets. Investing in human capital, which has not been the focus of previous 
chapters, is something that we all agree on, but the questions of how and to what 
extent this investment should be made remain. As our previous edition (UNU-IHDP, 
2014), there are many critical aspects that are not captured by the current exercise 
of human capital measurement. Health status of mothers, early childhood education, 
home environment, vocational training and non-cognitive development are all exam-
ples of these aspects. Among others, we highlight vocational training and child 
labour.
We also examine fishery resources, which is another area of contentious debate 
in natural capital management. Globally, it is a growing industry facing the threat 
of overfishing, but there are many positive sides of the industry, such as aquaculture 
and recent experiences of sustainable fishery and green labelling.
We next address an important area of negative capital stock, which is not previ-
ously addressed in inclusive wealth accounting, aside from carbon damage. As long 
as a capital-like source of pollution causes direct disutility or damage to capital stock 
(health capital), this source should be one of the capital assets relevant to social 
well-being. The World Bank has plausibly included particulate matter emission in 
their account of genuine savings, which we will review in our context.
Certain policy implications can also be derived for investing in technological 
advancements. Total factor productivity (TFP) measures all the residual contributions 




to social well-being, after accounting for all the relevant capital assets (Arrow et al., 
2012). It is known to affect the bottom line figure of IWI adjusted (UNU-IHDP, 
2014).
Finally, we also note how to put the concept and measurement into policy action. 
In this chapter, we address this issue from a different perspective. In particular, we 
suggest a new financial policy tool, where national or local governments may consider 
issuing financial bonds that are linked with the Inclusive Wealth Index (IWI) of 
their sovereignty. As the asset side of the national balance sheet is now expanded 
to include human and natural capital, the liability side can also increase, analogous 
to the corporate finance structure. Not only is this idea inspired by the proposal 
and recent practice of GDP-linked bonds, but it also appears to be more plausible 
than the original argument, in that the capital asset we assume is wider and more 
comprehensive from a well-being perspective.
We hope that the debates in this chapter will provide suggestions for policymakers 
committed to returning their regions to (more) sustainable paths.
Policy lessons for education
Education is an important contributor to human capital, and countries can increase 
their productivity by increasing their investment in education. Thus, investment in 
education provides a high rate of return to the inclusive wealth of countries, both 
directly through accumulating human capital and through enhancing total factor 
productivity adjustment.
But how can we boost investing in education? Many things come to mind, from 
physical infrastructure (school building, toilets), to consumables (textbook, uniform, 
nutritious meal), and to human capital (quantity and quality of teachers, class size). 
All of them can potentially be behind still the low average years of schooling shown 
in Figure 9.1.
The educational portion of human capital is explained in inclusive wealth account-
ing. However, this accounts for only a small portion of human capital. It does not 
Figure 9.1 Average years of schooling from 1990 to 2014
Source: Author, using Barro and Lee (2013).
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mean that the other factors are irrelevant. Indeed, it is only that we should start from 
the most measurable chunk. For example, what is missing can include parenting, 
on-the-job training, informal education/learning, adult education, healthcare, migra-
tion and others (Boarini et al., 2012).
In fact, vocational training is an important means of education to increase human 
capital in developing countries. Vocational training generally benefits low-income 
students, enabling them to become earners and contribute to the economy quicker 
than regular schooling. This training is also effective in reducing child labour in 
many developing countries and assists in human capital performance. The vocational 
school should benefit a special group of students, and they should have specific skills 
in the sector of their own interest.
Figure 9.2 shows the average proportion of vocational students in total enrolment 
in secondary education. The success of vocational schooling depends on the orienta-
tion of special skills and techniques, which can be managed scientifically. Many 
developing countries experience challenges in obtaining benefits from vocational 
schooling due to less efficient curriculums and management.
Investments in the education infrastructure can lead a country to improve both 
current welfare and future well-being by accumulating human capital. The majority 
of low-income countries have a child labour problem, and this problem is widespread 
in the developing world. In particular, child labour has been known to suppress 
educational attainment (e.g. Psacharopoulos, 1997). Of course, poverty is one of 
the driving forces leading children to perform physical labour. It can be easily imag-
ined that a child gives up schooling when faced with its trade-off with getting paid 
for work.
Care should be taken, however, as many factors come in to create this problem 
and thus abolishing child labour altogether may not be a solution (Basu and Tzan-
natos, 2003). Ranjan (1999, 2001) has shown that child labour might arise in poor 
households with credit constraints. In a second-best world, child labour may provide 
the only way to finance their own school attendance, as debated in a mining case 
study by Maconachie and Hilson (2016). Moreover, the majority of child labour 
exists in the agricultural sector, typically operated by their own farms (Bhalotra and 
Heady, 2003).
Figure 9.2 Percentage of vocational students in total secondary school enrolment
214 Shunsuke Managi
Figure 9.3 shows the percentage of children (7–14 years) employed in the labour 
market; apparently, most of the African nations and certain Asian and Latin American 
countries have alarming levels of child labour. Understanding the reasons for low 
years of schooling and the economics of child labour can improve the education 
condition in low-income countries. These problems should be examined also with 
poverty and credit constraints in rural households. A most obvious policy lesson for 
those countries, therefore, is to resolve poverty, human capital investment, child 
labour and other market imperfection problems simultaneously.1
Regulating pollution and inclusion in inclusive wealth
Including the regulating ecosystem services in the inclusive wealth measure is impor-
tant. They span from flood prevention at local scale to climate control at global 
scale. IWR 2012 and 2014 have employed carbon damage to account for climate 
change damage. Being a global public bad, this needs to be reckoned based on the 
global aggregate. A flow damage cost of a nation, regardless of how much she emits, 
is subtracted from IWI, to reflect true social well-being. This is a plausible move to 
account for negative pressure on social well-being; however, at the other end of the 
spatial spectrum lies local air pollution, which is yet unaddressed in inclusive wealth 
accounting. Local air pollution is especially relevant to policymakers at national and 
local scales. Regulating air pollution will benefit human health by improving the 
mortality rate and reducing healthcare expenses.
Among many potential sources of air pollution, the anthropogenic sources of 
PM2.5 are fast-growing which creates a chronic effect on human health. PM in 
ambient air is considered to be related to an increased risk of premature death, as 
well as other less severe health end-points like respiratory and cardiac emergencies 
(WHO, 2006), although some mechanisms remain still uncertain (Harrison and Yin, 
2000). Many sources of PM2.5 are noted: for instance, transportation, energy resource 
usage, construction, agriculture and international trade are major emitting industries. 
In addition, the exposure exists at the local and international levels, implying that 
Figure 9.3 Percentage of children (aged 7–14) employed in labour
Source: Author, using Barro and Lee (2013).
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PM2.5 affects more people in developing economies in Asia. For instance, China, 
Russia, India, Vietnam, Thailand, Indonesia and Afghanistan are encountering sig-
nificant health damage due to the adverse impact of PM2.5. Figure 9.4 reports the 
annual average growth rate of PM2.5 damages based on the World Bank (2017) 
database. On the aggregate level, the intensity of damages is also very high in the 
United States, Japan, Brazil and the European Union (Figure 9.5), but their envi-
ronmental policies seemingly significantly reduce this growth (Figure 9.4). BRICS 
countries also experience major damages from PM2.5 exposure.
Figure 9.6 shows the growth of PM2.5 damages in per capita terms; emerging 
economies are increasingly vulnerable to the exposure of damages. The average 
damages per capita over 25 years (1990 to 2014) are reported in Figure 9.7, where 
Saudi Arabia, South Africa, the United States, Japan, China and European Union 
countries show relatively high per capita damages, surpassing 10 USD per person.
What is distinct about ambient air pollution caused by PM is that it is transbound-
ary (WHO, 2006; Anenberg et al., 2010), so that it should be treated as regional 
public bad, if not global public bad. In our inclusive wealth accounting, we adjust 
carbon damage as it affects human well-being as a global public bad. We therefore 
Figure 9.4 Growth of PM2.5 damages from 1990–2014 (percentage)
Figure 9.5 Average PM2.5 damages from 1990–2014 (million USD 2005)
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might want to consider PM damage as another adjustment to IWI, while avoiding 
double counting with health capital accounts.
Fisheries policy
Fisheries are an essential part of the natural capital, which significantly contribute 
to the total wealth. However, the ability of a marine ecosystem to provide non-
declined utility is limited by its regenerative capacity, which is currently being 
threatened by increasing human activities to satisfy food needs and to pursue higher 
economic development. The growing population of the world has led to an increase 
in annual global fish consumption from 9 kg/capita in 1961 to 16.5 kg/capita in 
2003, and this figure is expected to increase further to 17 kg/capita in 2020 (Del-
gado, 2003). The increasing demand of fish consumption was followed by the 
industrialization of the marine fisheries sector in the first half of the 20th century 
through the mechanization of fishing fleets and the improvement of marketing 
systems, which led to increasing productivity and employment in the fisheries sector 
Figure 9.6 Growth of the PM2.5 damages per capita from 1990–2014 (percentage)
Figure 9.7 Average PM2.5 damages per capita from 1990–2014 (USD 2005)
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(Coulthard et al., 2011). However, despite the industrialization of the marine fisher-
ies sector and the increasing demand of consumption, the total catches of global 
marine fisheries eventually achieved their peak in the mid-1990s (see Figure 9.8). 
This finding is also followed by the increasing number of overfished and collapsed 
stock (Branch et al., 2011; Froese et al., 2012) and the declining mean trophic level 
of catch (Myers and Worm, 2003; Pauly et al., 1998; Pauly and Palomares, 2005). 
These factors have led to persistent debates regarding the sustainability of marine 
fisheries over the last two decades.
Sugiawan et al. (2017) argue that the sustainability of global marine fisheries is 
correlated with economic development. The researchers find a non-linear relationship 
between economic growth and both marine fisheries catch and estimated stock, 
suggesting the existence of turning points in the economy beyond which the benefi-
cial impacts of economic growth on a marine ecosystem will be achieved. Hence, 
declines in resource abundance arising due to the development of the fisheries sector 
are only temporary. As the economy grows, the structural changes in the economy 
lead to more stringent environmental regulations, better fisheries management and 
new technologies. These changes will lead to a decline in catch levels in the short-
run and stock recovery in the long-run. Similarly, by using the Ocean Health Index 
(OHI), a novel index to quantify and observe the health of human-marine ecosystem 
interactions, Halpern et al. (2012) show that, in general, developed countries have 
healthier oceans than developing countries. Flaaten (2013) discusses the institutional 
influence on the relationship between economic growth and fishing.
In terms of wealth accounting, sustainability is achieved if the capital stock of 
marine fisheries is non-declining over time (strong sustainability) or if the decline 
in marine fisheries stock can be compensated by a sufficient increase in other types of 
capital stock (weak sustainability). Figure 9.9 shows a comparison of capital stock 
of marine fisheries in 1976, 1990 and 2014 for selected countries having fish capital 
of more than 25 billion USD. The size of the bubble indicates the size of the popu-
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Figure 9.8  Time-series data of global marine fisheries catch, population and world GDP 
per capita
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over time as a result of continuously increasing fishing efforts, which are driven by 
economic development and population growth. Only a few countries, such as Canada 
and Spain, can maintain or increase their level of stock. From Figure 9.9, we can 
also see different patterns of fish stock depletion between developed and developing 
countries. Certain rich countries, regardless of their population, are found to have 
a declining rate of fish stock depletion. This finding may have resulted from the 
institution of better management systems and policies and the adoption of more 
advanced technologies. On the other hand, developing countries, which are char-
acterized by increasing economies of scale, tend to have a steadily declining rate of 
fish stock depletion. In addition, we can see that the rate of stock depletion is also 
influenced by the size of the population. Countries that have a relatively large popu-
lation, such as China, India and Indonesia, are very likely to have an increasing rate 
of stock depletion. However, Sugiawan et al. (2017) argue that this rapid depletion 
is inevitable but only occurs temporarily. The researchers argue that as the economy 
grows, there will be declining pressures on the marine ecosystem that will lead to 
stock recovery in the long-run.
From the discussion, we highlight certain important policy implications. First, 
the composition and technical effect of the economy, which are marked by, among 
others, the institution of better management systems and policies, investment in 
cleaner and more advanced technologies, and adoption of more stringent envi-
ronmental regulations, are essential for decoupling economic growth from fish 
stock depletion. The immediate impact of these effects would be in reducing the 
volume of fish catches and discards. However, stock recovery is likely to be 
observed only in the long-term. These findings suggest the need to implement 
better fishing practices and fisheries management to achieve sustainability in the 
fisheries sector. Second, to maintain positive growth of total wealth, the inevitable 
stock depletion in the earlier stage of the economy should be compensated by a 
sufficient increase in other types of capital. Consequently, the constant pressure 
of population growth on fish stock should not only be considered a threat to 
sustainability but should be viewed as a potential asset, which needs to be man-
aged to increase the productive base of an economy, that will compensate the 
declining level of natural capital.
Figure 9.9 Comparison of fish stock capital for selected countries
The IWR and policy lessons 219
TFP and social capital
TFP and sustainability implications
Arrow et al. (2004, 2012) suggested that total factor productivity (TFP) can con-
tribute to social well-being not through three capital changes. Formally, TFP can 
be regarded as shadow value of time as a capital asset (UNU-IHDP and UNEP, 
2012). IWR thus includes the change in TFP as an adjustment term, based on the 
finding that we need merely to add TFP growth to inclusive investment (Arrow et al., 
2012).
A in the production function A(t)F(K(t)), where K(t) is the vector of capital 
assets and F(.) is the constant-returns-to-scale production function, can be interpreted 
to be an aggregate index of knowledge and the economy’s institutions. In conven-
tional growth accounting, K(t) include produced and human capital. In a remarkable 
move to include natural capital in growth accounting, however, Vouvaki and Xepa-
padeas (2009) observe that dismissing natural capital can mislead the analyst to 
interpret degradation of the environment as an improvement of knowledge and 
institutions. Brandt et al. (2013) argued that failing to account for natural capital 
tends to lead to a biased estimation of productivity growth. Natural capital has also 
remained largely hidden to policymakers due to the limitations of traditional eco-
nomic indices (Fujii and Managi, 2013; Managi et al., 2004; Johnstone et al., 2017; 
Kurniawan and Managi, 2017).
In this report, therefore, we calculated TFP as a residual by expanding natural 
capital (forest, agriculture land, fish, fossil and minerals) as an explicit factor of input 
into the production process. By integrating natural capital, we can understand that 
the same productive base of a country can lead to an increase (decrease) in aggregate 
output over time regarding the effective utilization of its productive resources. In 
particular, the frontier approach in IWR 2018 measures TFP adjustment by captur-
ing the efficient utilization of natural capital, as well as produced and human capital, 
by using the Malmquist Productivity Index approach. The result shows 55 of the 
140 countries – more than one-third of our sample – have negative average TFP. 
Increasing investments in R&D tend to be focused on areas revolving around pro-
duced and human capital, but we need to shed a new light on ways to efficiently 
employ natural capital and the environment in modern economy. This brings us to 
the question of how environmental policy actually improves productivity.
Productivity and environmental policy
Porter and van der Linde (1995) postulated an apparent link between productivity 
and environmental policy. According to their hypothesis, well-designed environmental 
regulation can provide “a free lunch” and can trigger innovation, which in turn, 
can decrease and offset the costs of pollution abatement and enhance competitive-
ness. New evidence from the OECD countries shows that the more stringent envi-
ronmental policies of recent years have had no negative effect on overall productivity 
growth (Ambec et al., 2013). The researchers found that before tighter environmental 
policies came into effect, the overall productivity growth of a country slowed, pos-
sibly because firms anticipated the changes and prepared themselves for new operating 
conditions. However, a rebound in productivity growth soon followed, with no 
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cumulative loss reflected in the data. Lanoie et al. (2008) also found a positive 
relationship between lagged regulatory stringency and productivity; innovations may 
take several years to develop, and capital expenditures are often delayed for a few 
years through normal budgetary cycles and building lags.
These results imply that more stringent environmental policies, when properly 
designed, can be introduced to benefit the environment with no loss of productivity. 
Well-designed market-based instruments, such as taxes on externalities or cap-and-
trade schemes, score better in dynamic efficiency than environmental standards and 
effectively induce broadly defined innovation, providing firms more flexibility in the 
way they adapt to new environmental policy (De Serres et al., 2010). Global society 
is required to innovate environmental practices based on incentives for industries to 
perform well in their environmental management and formulate economic and 
environmental policies simultaneously to achieve the sustainability of the growth 
process.
Productivity on sectoral case
Innovations have minor importance in sustainable development issues with respect 
to exploiting resources for production, consumption and disposal by a better means. 
Thus, it has been pivotal to work toward a more advanced technological shift and 
shift in the progress up to this point, through the deployment of sustainable tech-
niques and products (Hemmelskamp, 1999). Technology innovation and efficiency 
catch-up are driven by productivity growth. Consequently, environmentally friendly 
technologies, such as waste heat to electricity conversion, may lead to an improve-
ment in productivity regarding which resources (energy) are used.
The widespread adoption of energy-saving technologies is necessary to have policy-
induced impulses that help companies cope with the adoption barrier. Particularly, 
regarding energy efficiency, Jaffe and Stavins (1994) argued that several factors that 
cause energy-efficient technologies are not widely used without policy inducement. 
Contributing factors are a lack of information about available technologies, particu-
larly when there are no incentives, principal/agent problems, low energy prices and 
high implicit discount rates. The most powerful driver to support energy efficiency 
is an economical aspect; if an energy efficiency project is profitable, everyone will 
participate in the projects. Investments in energy efficiency have many positive effects, 
not only an economic impact through maintaining energy security and increasing 
competitiveness but also environmental and health impacts by reducing GHG emis-
sions. Arvanitis et al. (2016) proved that there is a direct positive effect of investment 
spending for energy-related technologies on labour productivity and indirect positive 
effects of energy taxes through investments in energy-related technology. Conse-
quently, countries need to induce more investment in the energy efficiency sector.
In the agricultural sector, public policies, such as investments in research exten-
sion, education and infrastructure, and natural resource management have been the 
major sources of TFP growth. Chand et al. (2011) found that public investment in 
research has enhanced a significant source of TFP growth in most crops. The vari-
ables for natural agricultural resource management and produced capital have been 
important sources of TFP growth for most crops. Among natural resources, a 
dependable supply of irrigation revealed by the proportion of groundwater in total 
irrigation, in addition to the balanced use of fertilizers, has played a significant role 
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in increasing TFP. Investments in agricultural technologies, such as drought-resistant 
seed varieties, soil-improving technologies and solar energy sources, are options that 
may increase the productivity of the agricultural sector.
These results and previous discussions provide several noteworthy contributions 
to policymakers. First, these findings enhance our understanding of how particular 
countries can measure and manage their sustainability by incorporating natural capital 
into TFP. Second, countries need to develop well-designed environmental regulations 
to trigger innovation and utilize their productive assets in a more effective manner. 
Third, policymakers are encouraged to support the research and development of 
renewable resource technologies, although their impact on social well-being is yet 
to be captured (but see also Chapter 3). The contribution of investment in technol-
ogy is crucial to confront the dwindling natural resources and to achieve the desired 
productivity growth in terms of social well-being.
Policy instruments: IWI-linked bonds
In its inaugural report, IWR 2012 has proposed that inclusive wealth, rather than 
GDP, interest rate, unemployment or other indicators, should be “mainstreamed” 
to be used in economic policymaking. We believe that conventional economic indices 
continue to play a key role in economic policymaking, as they represent how the 
economy, rather than social well-being, is performing overall. Conventional aspects 
of the economy have many ramifications. For instance, inflation and unemployment 
certainly affect our short-term well-being. It is well-known that job security is an 
important constituent of subjective well-being and a sense of dignity. Moreover, our 
index of inclusive wealth pertains more to the question of whether a productive 
base is on the increase in the long-run, rather than short-run fluctuations. Thus, 
we should be humble in what our index says about the sustainability of social well-
being and the productive base in the long-run.
Having acknowledged this difference in focus, we also trust that inclusive wealth 
should be more highlighted in economic policymaking, if not mainstreamed. Political 
administrations naturally tend to increase their reputations and can thus be short-
sighted. For example, it is expected that current administrations have an incentive 
to prefer policies that cater to the current generation and leave the policy burden 
to be dealt with by future generations. Therefore, inclusive wealth can be a headline 
index in economic, as well as social and ecological, policymaking, as a sort of com-
mitment device for sustainable development.
There could be many alternative means to operationalize the idea of making 
inclusive wealth a headline index, as with the interest rates of stock prices. In a 
recent thought experiment, Yamaguchi and Managi (2017) proposed that national 
governments could issue bonds that are linked to the level or the growth rate of 
inclusive wealth. By linking bond coupons (fixed income) to inclusive wealth, holders 
of this financial asset would be “in the same boat” with the trend of inclusive wealth, 
an indicator of sustainable well-being.
However, the main intention of this proposal is much wider than garnering focus 
on inclusive wealth in the policy arena. In theory, this instrument would create 
macro-financial markets for a previously unnoted but important portion of wealth. 
Kamstra and Shiller (2009) refer to human capital, which accounts for a large pro-
portion of wealth, particularly in high-income countries, but there is no reason not 
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to extend this discussion to natural capital. Therefore, the proposed financial vehicle 
can be seen as a plausible extension of the recent proposals of GDP-linked bonds 
(Borensztein and Mauro, 2004; Kamstra and Shiller, 2009; Barr et al., 2014).
By properly designing new bonds, governments could offer institutional and other 
investors opportunities to mobilize their financial resources into investments in the 
components of inclusive wealth: produced, human and natural capital. One way to 
accomplish this mobilization is to set aside the proceeds from the general budget 
and establish a bond revenue fund to be used for reinvestment in capital assets that 
comprise inclusive wealth.
In this case, the government, with the aid of the voice of citizens, is expected to 
craft investment strategies in capital assets. Suppose that, hopefully from the future 
editions of Inclusive Wealth Report, the shadow price of a forest in a given country 
is rising, due to aggressive deforestation and rising scarcities. Then, the national 
government would conduct a cost-benefit analysis, using the same shadow prices as 
well as cost estimates, to determine whether and how investment in the forest is 
justified (see, e.g., Collins et al., 2017). If the investment is indeed rationalized, 
then the government taps into the revenue from the proposed inclusive wealth-linked 
bonds for afforestation, reforestation or protection from illegal logging.
The bond of this kind can face some obstacles in practice. First, government 
budget deficits may increase, at least in the short-run, in a sluggish economy. GDP-
linked bonds, it is argued, have an advantage of being countercyclical, by automati-
cally suppressing interest payments when the output is not increasing. In the current 
proposal of IWI-linked bonds, interest payments are linked with a long-run productive 
base, which may conflict with the short-run trend in output. Second, unless we have 
a very transparent institution of measuring the shadow prices of the list of capital 
assets and democratically prioritizing public investments, the government may have 
an incentive to report (the growth rate in) inclusive wealth that is higher than the 
true value. This finding is particularly true of administrations facing the threat of 
being expelled from power. However, this mechanism may be attenuated to a certain 
extent due to the obligation of the government to pay IWI-linked interests.
To fix ideas, take India as an example. As Table 9.1 shows, produced, human and 
natural capital represented 8%, 61% and 31% of total capital of the nation in 1990, 
respectively. The relatively high position of natural capital in inclusive wealth is typical 
of developing countries, as discussed in Chapter 1. However, this position is reduced 
to as low as 15% in the latest figure. More fossil fuel (oil, natural gas and coal) experi-
enced an across-the-board decline. Fisheries nearly halved, and pastureland also witnessed 
Table 9.1 Inclusive wealth in India, 1990–2014
Year 1990 2014 Annual change rate
$billion Share $billion Share Weighted
Produced 867 7.5% 5,049 23.5% 7.62% 1.36%
Human 7,110 61.4% 13,215 61.5% 2.62% 1.61%
Natural 3,605 31.1% 3,242 15.1% −0.44% −0.09%
Total 11,582 21,505 2.61% 2.88%
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a decline. In contrast, forest resources somewhat increased during the period. The last 
quarter century has also observed massive investment in infrastructure, contributing to 
the elevated share of produced capital in 2014 (24%). Interestingly, the relative share 
of human capital remained at 60%. Apparently, we could argue that the country has 
invested in produced capital, at the expense of certain natural capital resources.
Let us review the order of the magnitude of this financial instrument in this example. 
First, we study a possible bond whose interest payment is linked with the level of 
inclusive wealth of India. Suppose that the social discount rate is 5% per annum. 
Assuming, at a cost of rigour, that the NNP is the return on wealth (the latter being 
$21,505 billion in monetary units in 2014), we can simply estimate that the NNP in 
2014 would be $1,075 billion (=$21,505 billion times 0.05). The interest payment 
would be a share of the corresponding NNP, which should be fixed before the issu-
ance of the bond. Suppose that this constant share is 100 billionths of the current 
NNP. Then, the coupon payment would be $10.75 (=$1,075 billion/100 billion).
Second, we could also consider a potential bond that is linked to the growth rate 
of wealth. Table 9.1 shows that inclusive wealth has increased at a rate of 2.6% 
annually since 1990.2 This growth rate can be directly used as the coupon interest 
rate of this possible bond. As is often the case with an emerging economy, the ten-
year government bond in India is higher than its peers in developed countries, with 
the latest figure being approximately 6.5% as of September 2017. This comparison 
shows that a premium would be needed to compensate investors for taking risks in 
the growth of inclusive wealth; in this case, the interest payment could be based on 
a benchmark rate, such as short-term government debt.
Finally, comparisons with other similar initiatives are in order. The proposal of 
GDP-linked bonds was innovative and provocative (Shiller, 1993), but their focus 
is on fiscal sustainability and the inclusion of capital assets, the income of which is 
revealed in the GDP boundary. This focus naturally needs to be extended to sustain-
able development and the inclusion of income from the non-GDP boundary (Yama-
guchi and Managi, 2017).
Another relevant trend in the financial market is the increasing issuance of green 
bonds. As case studies demonstrate (Cochu, Annica, et al., 2016), green bonds are 
issued for specific projects that should be green in the fields of renewable energy, 
energy efficiency, low carbon transport, sustainable water, and waste and pollution, 
some of which overlap with natural capital investments. The IWI-linked bonds have 
an advantage of prioritizing projects on a macro scale, based on shadow prices for 
a wide variety of human and natural capital. This advantage would also enable the 
issuer to shift investments to more needy projects when relative scarcity changes in 
the long-run. Moreover, interest payments are linked with nationally aggregated 
IWI, such that the return to bond holders decreases when wealth does not increase 
sufficiently. This finding also demonstrates that the risk of the decreased well-being 
of the future generation is shared with investors in the current generation.
Notes
1 See Fors (2012) for a survey. Islam and Choe (2013) have investigated the role of 
microcredit in child labour and human capital formation. Shimamura and Lastarria-
Cornhiel (2010) discuss the effect of credit programme participation.
2 If consumption does not grow, this rate should be equal to the growth in green NNP.
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Table A1.1 Key statistics of Inclusive Wealth Report 2018





AFG Afghanistan South-Central 
Asia
Low Income 4.4% 0.1% 4.3% 0.0%




0.7% 0.6% 0.1% 0.0%
ARE United Arab 
Emirates
Western Asia High Income 3.0% 0.5% 2.8% −0.3%




1.4% 0.6% 0.9% −0.1%
ARM Armenia Western Asia Lower Middle 
Income
0.1% 0.3% −0.2% 0.1%
AUS Australia Australia/
New Zealand
High Income 1.6% 1.3% 0.5% −0.3%
AUT Austria Western 
Europe
High Income 1.7% 1.3% 0.4% 0.0%
BDI Burundi Eastern Africa Low Income 2.9% 0.0% 2.8% 0.0%
BEL Belgium Western 
Europe
High Income 1.9% 1.4% 0.6% 0.0%
BEN Benin Western 
Africa
Low Income 3.3% 0.0% 3.3% 0.0%
BGD Bangladesh South−
Central Asia
Low Income 1.8% 0.1% 1.7% 0.0%




−0.7% 0.1% −0.7% −0.1%
BHR Bahrain Western Asia High Income 4.3% 2.5% 2.0% −0.4%












0.2% 0.1% 0.5% −0.4%




0.7% 0.5% 0.5% −0.3%
BRB Barbados Caribbean High Income 1.0% 0.6% 0.5% 0.0%




2.1% 0.2% 2.0% −0.1%
CAF Central African 
Republic
Middle Africa Low Income 1.7% 0.0% 1.7% 0.0%
CAN Canada Northern 
America
High Income 0.8% 0.9% 0.4% −0.6%
CHE Switzerland Western 
Europe
High Income 2.2% 1.8% 0.5% 0.0%




2.2% 1.6% 0.9% −0.2%
(Continued)
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CHN China Eastern Asia Upper Middle 
Income
2.4% 1.4% 1.1% −0.2%




2.3% −0.1% 2.3% 0.0%
CMR Cameroon Middle Africa Lower Middle 
Income




Middle Africa Low Income −0.1% 0.0% 0.2% −0.2%
COG Congo Middle Africa Lower Middle 
Income
2.5% 0.1% 2.5% −0.1%




0.2% 0.8% 0.8% −2.1%




2.5% 1.5% 0.9% 0.3%
CUB Cuba Caribbean Upper Middle 
Income
0.7% 0.0% 0.7% 0.0%





High Income 1.3% 1.1% 0.3% −0.1%
DEU Germany Western 
Europe
High Income 1.1% 0.9% 0.2% 0.0%
DNK Denmark Northern 
Europe
High Income 1.6% 1.4% 0.3% −0.1%
DOM Dominican 
Republic
Caribbean Upper Middle 
Income
2.9% 1.5% 1.4% 0.0%




1.5% 0.5% 1.6% −0.7%




0.9% 0.6% 0.9% −0.5%




2.3% 0.2% 2.2% −0.1%
ESP Spain Southern 
Europe
High Income 2.6% 1.9% 0.7% 0.0%
EST Estonia Northern 
Europe
High Income 1.0% 1.0% −0.1% 0.0%
FIN Finland Northern 
Europe
High Income 1.4% 1.0% 0.5% 0.0%
FJI Fiji Melanesia Lower Middle 
Income
1.3% 0.6% 0.7% 0.0%
FRA France Western 
Europe
High Income 1.9% 1.4% 0.5% 0.0%
GAB Gabon Middle Africa Upper Middle 
Income
0.0% 0.0% 0.1% −0.1%
Table A1.1 (Continued)
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High Income 1.9% 1.6% 0.5% −0.1%




2.3% 0.1% 2.1% 0.0%
GMB Gambia Western 
Africa
Low Income 2.7% 0.6% 2.5% −0.4%
GRC Greece Southern 
Europe
High Income 1.2% 0.8% 0.5% −0.1%




2.1% 0.1% 2.0% −0.1%




0.6% 0.1% 0.0% 0.6%




0.1% 0.9% 0.6% −1.2%
HRV Croatia Southern 
Europe
High Income 1.0% 0.9% 0.1% 0.0%
HTI Haiti Caribbean Low Income 1.9% 0.0% 1.8% 0.0%
HUN Hungary Eastern 
Europe
High Income 1.0% 0.7% 0.3% 0.0%




1.4% 0.7% 1.2% −0.4%




1.6% 0.0% 1.5% 0.0%
IRL Ireland Northern 
Europe
High Income 3.2% 2.5% 0.8% −0.1%






0.4% 0.3% 0.5% −0.4%
IRQ Iraq Western Asia Lower Middle 
Income
0.9% 0.1% 1.1% −0.3%
ISL Iceland Northern 
Europe
High Income 0.7% 0.7% 0.3% −0.2%
ISR Israel Western Asia High Income 3.6% 2.0% 1.5% 0.0%
ITA Italy Southern 
Europe
High Income 1.5% 1.1% 0.4% 0.0%
JAM Jamaica Caribbean Upper Middle 
Income
1.1% 0.7% 0.5% −0.1%
JOR Jordan Western Asia Upper Middle 
Income
4.4% 0.9% 3.4% 0.0%
JPN Japan Eastern Asia High Income 1.3% 1.1% 0.3% 0.0%




0.5% 0.3% 0.3% −0.1%
KEN Kenya Eastern Africa Low Income 3.0% 0.1% 3.0% 0.0%
KGZ Kyrgyzstan South-Central 
Asia
Low Income 1.7% 0.1% 1.6% 0.0%
(Continued)
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KHM Cambodia South-Eastern 
Asia
Low Income 0.3% 0.2% 1.0% −0.8%
KOR Republic of 
Korea
Eastern Asia High Income 4.2% 3.8% 0.7% 0.0%
KWT Kuwait Western Asia High Income 0.3% 0.3% 0.4% −0.4%







1.3% 0.2% 1.1% 0.0%
LBR Liberia Western 
Africa
Low Income 2.9% 0.0% 2.9% 0.0%




1.8% 0.6% 1.4% −0.1%




0.3% 0.0% 0.2% 0.0%




0.5% 0.5% 0.0% 0.0%
LUX Luxembourg Western 
Europe
High Income 3.4% 2.4% 1.0% 0.0%




0.7% 0.9% −0.4% 0.1%




1.6% 0.2% 1.4% 0.0%






−0.1% −0.4% 0.4% −0.3%




3.2% 1.5% 2.1% −0.4%




2.3% 1.4% 1.2% −0.1%
MLI Mali Western 
Africa
Low Income 2.9% 0.0% 2.9% 0.0%
MLT Malta Southern 
Europe
High Income 3.0% 2.1% 1.0% 0.0%
MMR Myanmar South-Eastern 
Asia
Low Income 1.3% 0.0% 1.3% −0.1%
MNG Mongolia Eastern Asia Lower Middle 
Income
0.5% 0.1% 0.7% −0.2%
MOZ Mozambique Eastern Africa Low Income 2.9% 0.0% 2.9% 0.0%
MRT Mauritania Western 
Africa
Low Income 2.6% 0.0% 2.5% 0.0%
MUS Mauritius Eastern Africa Upper Middle 
Income
2.6% 1.8% 0.9% −0.1%
MWI Malawi Eastern Africa Low Income 2.8% 0.0% 2.7% 0.0%




2.0% 2.0% 0.8% −0.6%




2.2% 0.4% 1.6% 0.2%
Table A1.1 (Continued)
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NER Niger Western 
Africa
Low Income 3.6% 0.0% 3.6% 0.0%




2.6% 0.0% 2.6% 0.0%




1.6% 0.2% 1.5% −0.1%
NLD Netherlands Western 
Europe
High Income 1.7% 1.5% 0.4% −0.1%
NOR Norway Northern 
Europe
High Income 0.8% 1.1% 0.4% −0.7%
NPL Nepal South-Central 
Asia
Low Income 1.9% 0.0% 1.8% −0.1%
NZL New Zealand Australia/
New Zealand
High Income 0.8% 0.4% 0.2% 0.2%




0.8% 0.3% 1.5% −1.1%




2.7% 1.6% 1.0% 0.0%
PER Peru South America Upper Middle 
Income
0.8% 0.4% 0.4% −0.1%




2.6% 0.4% 2.2% 0.0%
PNG Papua New 
Guinea
Melanesia Lower Middle 
Income
2.4% 0.0% 2.3% 0.0%
POL Poland Eastern 
Europe
High Income 1.2% 1.0% 0.3% −0.1%
PRT Portugal Southern 
Europe
High Income 2.0% 1.6% 0.5% 0.0%




0.8% 0.4% 0.7% −0.3%
QAT Qatar Western Asia High Income 2.0% 1.8% 0.7% −0.8%











0.2% 0.1% 0.0% 0.1%
RWA Rwanda Eastern Africa Low Income 2.7% 0.0% 2.6% 0.0%







2.4% 0.0% 2.5% −0.1%




2.7% 0.0% 2.6% 0.0%
SGP Singapore South-Eastern 
Asia
High Income 5.3% 4.0% 1.5% 0.0%
SLE Sierra Leone Western Africa Low Income 1.5% 0.0% 1.5% 0.0%




1.7% 0.6% 1.1% 0.0%
(Continued)
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0.2% 0.2% 0.0% 0.1%
SVK Slovakia Eastern 
Europe
High Income 1.2% 0.9% 0.3% 0.0%
SVN Slovenia Southern 
Europe
High Income 1.7% 1.4% 0.3% 0.0%
SWE Sweden Northern 
Europe
High Income 1.6% 1.2% 0.5% −0.1%




2.4% 0.7% 1.6% 0.1%
SYR Syrian Arab 
Republic
Western Asia Lower Middle 
Income
1.6% 0.4% 1.6% −0.3%
TGO Togo Western 
Africa
Low Income 2.9% 0.0% 2.9% 0.0%




2.1% 1.3% 1.1% −0.1%
TJK Tajikistan South-Central 
Asia
Low Income 2.2% −0.1% 2.2% 0.0%
TTO Trinidad and 
Tobago
Caribbean High Income −0.7% 0.0% 0.4% −1.3%




2.5% 0.9% 1.8% −0.1%
TUR Turkey Western Asia Upper Middle 
Income




Eastern Africa Low Income 3.1% 0.0% 3.1% 0.0%
UGA Uganda Eastern Africa Low Income 3.6% 0.0% 3.6% 0.0%




−0.6% 0.0% −0.6% 0.0%




1.0% 0.5% 0.5% 0.0%












0.1% 0.2% 0.3% −0.3%




2.0% 1.0% 1.3% −0.1%
YEM Yemen Western Asia Lower Middle 
Income
3.4% 0.1% 3.3% 0.0%




1.6% 0.3% 1.4% −0.1%
ZMB Zambia Eastern Africa Lower Middle 
Income
3.1% 0.0% 3.1% 0.0%
ZWE Zimbabwe Eastern Africa Low Income 1.2% 0.0% 1.2% 0.0%
Table A1.1 (Continued)
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Annex 2: methodological annex1
1. Overall framework
In this Annex, we lay out the methodology and data used for the computation of 
inclusive wealth shown in Chapter 1. To recap our conceptual framework, we are 
interested in the change of intertemporal well-being at:
V t U C e d
t
t( )= ( )
∞
− −( )∫ τ δ τ τ.
Assuming equivalence between wealth and well-being, this is measured by wealth in 
practice. Denoting produced, human and natural capital as K, H and N, the change 
in inclusive wealth W is expressed by:
















= + + +
∂
∂
where pK, pH and pK are the marginal shadow prices of produced, human and natural 




















given a forecast of how produced, human and natural capitals, as well as other 
flow variables, evolve in the future in the economy in question. Practically, shadow 
prices act as a weight factor attached to each capital, resulting in the measure of 
wealth, or IWI:
IWI p K p H p NK H N= + + .
In practice, we can use W and IWI interchangeably, although they can differ in 
that IWI also uses shadow prices on the margin. In addition, the unit of IWI is 
dollar (monetary) terms, rather than utility units. Of course, this does not affect 
sustainability assessment.
Another point worth exploring is the effect of population. Aside from simple 
Malthusian effect (Arrow et al. 2004; Ferreira et al. 2008), wealth per capita may not 
represent well-being divided by current population (Arrow et al. 2003). Moreover, as 
expounded in Arrow et al. (2012), even if we employ well-being divided by future 
population, i.e. adopting dynamic average utilitarianism, inclusive wealth per capita 
is shown to be in line with social well-being, under simple assumptions. When these 
assumptions do not hold, sustainability assessment may change (Yamaguchi 2017).
2. Produced capital
Produced capital, also referred to as manufactured or reproducible capital, includes 
physical infrastructure, land, property and facilities of private firms, houses, etc. Upon 
calculation, we follow the method originated by Harberger (1978) and applied by 
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King and Levine (1994) and Feenstra et al. (2013). In particular, we employ per-
petual inventory method (PIM), which is a simple summation of gross investment 
net of depreciation that occurs in each period. One cannot keep track of investment 
and depreciation indefinitely into the past, so should start from somewhere. This is 
called a benchmark year t = 0, in which the initial capital stock K 0( ) is set. Formally, 
produced capital stock at t is:
K t K It
t







where I t( ) and δ stand for investment at t and depreciation rate. In our computation, 
the initial capital stock K 0( )  is estimated by assuming a steady state of capital-output 











I K Kδ γ/  where y is the economic 




Finally, it is worth noting that the shadow price of produced capital is unity, since 
national statisticians measure investment in produced capital in dollar terms, which 
is the unit of inclusive wealth. The dataset we employ is summarized in Table A2.1.
3. Human capital
As we mentioned in the main text of Chapter 1, we employ two approaches to human 
capital, and report them separately. However, both approaches have in common the 
education-induced human capital, so we start from that bit.
3.1. Education
Education pays off later in life as a raised lifetime income and well-being, both at 
personal and aggregate levels. In line with the literature on human capital, and for 
practical reasons, we focus on the return on formal education, but this does not 
mean that other non-formal education (e.g. early childhood education, vocational 
training) is not adequate as part of wealth. We estimate the value of human capital 
on the output of education production function. This is generally called income 
approach to human capital computation. In contrast, some other estimates use the 
input side of education production function, typically by educational expenditure 
(World Bank 2014). For a more detailed excellent review of human capital in general 
and a detailed account of this, see Chapters 3–4 of IWR 2014.
Table A2.1 Data sources and assumptions for the calculation of produced capital
Variables Data sources/assumptions
Investment, I United Nations Statistics Division (2013a)
Output, y United Nations Statistics Division (2013a)
Depreciation rate, δ 4% (as taking the country average from Feenstra et al. (2013))
Capital lifetime Indefinite
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We estimate the value of human capital based on the idea that educational attain-
ment yields returns to human capital. Following Arrow et al. (2012) and Klenow and 
Rodríguez-Clare (1997), educational attainment is proxied by the average years of 
total schooling per person, A, which is obtained from Barro and Lee (2013). The rate 
of return on education is assumed to be constant at p = 8.5%. This is multiplied by 
the population who has had education, P edu5+ . Thus, the stock of human capital is:
H e PA edu= +
ρ * 5
Regarding the shadow price of one unit of human capital, it is calculated by the 
present value of lifetime income, which is proxied by the average compensation to 
employees, w, per unit of human capital times the expected working years, T. This 
brings us to the following formula:
p t w e dH
T t





The dataset we employ is summarized in Table A2.2.
3.2. Health
The state of health affects human well-being through at least three channels: 
by directly contributing to well-being, raising productivity and extending life 
years (UNU-IHDP, 2014). We have computed the latter third value of health 
capital, largely because it is still challenging to account for the first and second 
contributions.
Health capital of an individual of age a is defined by
H a f t t a V a t
t a









Barro and Lee (2013)
Population P by age, 
gender, time
United Nations Population Division (2016)
Interest rate, ρ 8.5% (Klenow and Rodríguez-Clare 1997)
Discount rate, ρ 8.5%




United Nations Statistics Division (2013a); OECD (2016); 
Feenstra et al. (2013); Lenzen et al. (2013); Conference Board 
(2016)
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where conditional density of age of death given survival to age a is
f t t a
f t
F a
| ,≥( )= ( )











is the discount factor. Total health capital of a country is
H H a P a
a






where P(a) is the population of age a.
The shadow price of health capital is simply the value of statistical life year (VSLY). 
For more detailed illustration, see Arrow et al. (2012, 2013) and UNU-IHDP and 
UNEP (2014).
3.3. Shadow price of human and health capital
In the frontier approach of calculation, we determine shadow prices of education- 
and health-induced human capital by employing a non-parametric method. In 
this subsection we outline this method. Previous measurement of that portion 
of longevity of health capital is based on the assumption that marginal will-
ingness to pay to reduce the risk of death is common for all the age groups. 
Alternatively, we use non-parametric estimation of shadow prices with inputs 
being capital assets.
In particular, we assume a production possibility set, P, with input vector (pro-
duced, human, health and natural capital), x, output (GDP), y, and a directional 
vector g g y=  with g
M∈R . Formally,
P x x y x y( )= ( ){ }, : can produce
D x y g y g P xy, ; max :( )= + ∈ ( ){ }
β
β β
D is called the distance function, which maximizes the output, controlling the coef-
ficient, β. By solving the revenue-maximizing problem and parametrizing DDF, the 
shadow price of human and health capital can be derived. For details, see Färe 
et al. (2005) and Tamaki et al. (2017).
4. Natural capital
For natural capital, the current edition of IWR accounts for non-renewable resources 
(fossil fuel and mineral) and renewable resources (agricultural land, forest and fish-
ery). We illustrate how we account for the five classes in turn.
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4.1. Fossil fuels
Our account scope for fossil fuels is coal, natural gas and oil. For a given resource, 
we start from the current stock, and then trace back past stocks by using each year 
production. In this way, we can construct a consistent time-series dataset that reflects 
more recent accurate flow (extraction) variables. In other words, the corresponding 
stock under study in year t − 1,S(t − 1) is derived from the production, P(t) and 
the stock in year t, S(t) by
S t S t P t−( )= ( )+ ( )1 .
The unit shadow price of a non-renewable resource, pS , is the price net of extraction 
cost, which is sometimes called rental price. Ideally, the marginal cost of extraction 
should be used for corresponding remaining stock, but it is known to be hard to 
obtain. We instead assume that the rental rate of the total price is constant, which 
is obtained from Narayanan et al. (2012).
4.2. Metals and minerals
The methodology for accounting for minerals is much the same as fossil fuels, the 
other form of non-renewable resources. For rental rates, we retrieved sectoral rental 
rates of different mineral industries from Narayanan et al. (2012). For other data of 
reserves, extraction and prices are obtained from U.S. Geological Survey (2015), which 
is the most authorized dataset on the subject.
4.3. Agricultural land
Agricultural land is composed of cropland and pastureland. The methodology for 
accounting for these two classes is much the same. For the quantity of this natural 
capital, permanent cropland/pastureland area data from Food and Agricultural 
Organization (FAO 2015a) are simply employed.
Table A2.3 Data sources and assumptions for the calculation of fossil fuels
Variables Data sources/assumptions
S: reserve U.S. Energy Information Administration (2015)
P: extraction U.S. Energy Information Administration (2015)
Prices BP (2015)
•  Coal: averaged prices from US, northwestern Europe, Japan coking, 
and Japan steam
• Natural gas: averaged prices from EU, UK, US, Japan and Canada
•  Oil: averaged prices of Dubai, Brent, Nigerian Forcados and West 
Texas Intermediate
•  adjusted for inflation before averaging over time using the US GDP 
deflator
Rental rates Narayanan et al. (2012)
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To quantify the marginal shadow price of a unit of agricultural land, we cannot 
use the market price as in the case of non-renewable resources, since there does not 
usually exist a market for agricultural land. Instead, we compute the shadow price 
as the net present value of the annual flow of services per hectare that the parcel 
yields, in line with World Bank (2011) and past editions of IWR. More specifically, 
















where A, R, P and Q are the harvested area in crops, rental rate, crop price and crop 
quantity produced, respectively. N stands for the number of crops, which is as many 
as 159 (k = 1,. . .,159) in the current study. t is the year of analysis, from 1990 to 
2014. For the estimation of the rental rate by crop group, we mapped FAO crop 
classification (HS) with those sectoral rental rates provided by Narayanan et al. (2012).
Note that the above rental price corresponds to an annual flow of services; we 
need to capitalize it to be employed as the shadow price. Formally, the NPV of this 




















where r is the discount rate, set at 5% per annum. Finally, to avoid unnecessary 









which is used as the shadow price of cropland.
For the calculation of pastureland wealth, the difference from cropland lies in the 
fact that it is difficult to link rents to a particular amount of land involved in the 
production process. Thus, we opted to assume the shadow price of pastureland to 
be equal to cropland, which is a limitation of the current accounting.
4.4. Forest
In the current forest accounting, we follow IWR 2014 methodology. The forest 
wealth is composed of timber value and non-timber forest benefits (NTFB).
Table A2.4  Data sources and assumptions for the calculation of metal and 
mineral resources
Variables Data sources/assumptions
S: reserve U.S. Geological Survey (2015)
P: Extraction U.S. Geological Survey (2015)
Prices U.S. Geological Survey (2015)
Rental rates Narayanan et al. (2012)
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4.4.1. TIMBER
We estimate the volume of timber resources commercially available. For the quantity 
of this specific capital, the total forest area, excluding cultivated forest, is multiplied 
by timber density per area, and percentage of total volume that is commercially 
available. The exclusion of cultivated forest could be debatable, as it is regarded as 
contributing to timber and non-timber values. It is due to the fact that the activity 
of cultivating forest is categorized as a production activity in the System of National 
Accounts. In line with this reasoning, we have registered cultivated forest under 
produced capital in IWR 2014 and 2017.
For the computation of shadow prices, there are several steps involved, follow-
ing IWR 2014. First, we followed the World Bank’s (2006) method by adopting 
a weighted average price of two different commodities: industrial round wood 
and fuelwood, which are also country-specific parameters. The weight attached 
to the different prices is based on the quantity of the commodity manufactured, 
while industrial round wood and fuelwood prices are obtained from the value and 
quantity exported and produced, respectively. Second, we converted the annual 
estimated values from current to constant prices by using each country-specific 
gross domestic product (GDP) deflator. Third, we used information on the regional 
rental rates for timber estimated by Bolt et al. (2002). Such rates are assumed 
to be constant over time. Fourth, we then estimated the average price over the 
entire study period (1990 to 2014), thereby obtaining our proxy value for the 
shadow price of timber.
Finally, in the same manner as other resources, wealth corresponding to timber 
value is calculated as the product of quantity, price and average rental rate over time.
4.4.2. NON-TIMBER FOREST BENEFITS (NTFB)
Aside from provisioning services in the form of timber production, forest capital 
yields many ecosystem services. Following IWR 2014, we have accounted for this 
non-timber forest benefits in the following manner.
First, total forest area in the country under analysis excluding cultivated forest 
is retrieved from FAO (2015b), which we denote Q (ha). Second, fraction of the 
total forest area which is accessed by individuals to obtain benefits is assumed to 
be γ. The ecological literature has stressed that only the portion of the forest that 
contributes to well-being should be accounted for. For want of better assumptions, 
we assume γ to be 10%, following World Bank (2006).
Table A2.5 Data sources and assumptions for the calculation of agricultural land
Variables Data sources/assumptions
Quantity of crops produced, Q FAO (2015a)
Price of crops produced, P FAO (2015a)
Rental rate, R Narayanan et al. (2012)
Harvested area in crops, A FAO (2015a)
Discount rate, r 5%
Permanent cropland/pastureland area FAO (2015a)
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Table A2.6 Data sources and assumptions for the calculation of forest
Variables Data sources/assumptions
Forest stocks FAO (2015b)
Forest stock commercially available FAO (2006)
Wood production FAO (2015b)
Value of wood production FAO (2015b)
Rental rate, R Bolt et al. (2002)
Table A2.7 Accounting of non-timber forest benefits





1 food 23 107
2 water 146 137





7 air quality 868 223
8 climate
9 extreme events 0 33
10 water flows 2 14
11 waste 40 343
12 erosion 1 342
13 soil fertility 37 129
14 pollination 418 54
15 bio control 20 13
Habitat services
16 nursery 17
17 genepool 506 396
Cultural services
18 aesthetic





Source: Van der Ploeg and de Groot (2010).
Third, the unit benefit of non-timber forest to intertemporal social well-being 
is taken from Ecosystem Service Valuation Database (ESVD) database of van der 
Ploeg and de Groot (2010). We denote this by P (USD/ha/year). The average 
value per hectare should be different for temperate and boreal, and tropical forest, 
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as shown in Table A2.7. Accordingly, we weighted the corresponding values by the 
share of each forest type in the total forest of the country. Fourth, to make this 
benefit into capital asset value, we take its net present value, using the discount 
rate of r = 5%.





















This edition is the first to estimate fish capital stock as part of renewable natural 
capital. Estimating the fish stock is a herculean task, compared to other classes of 
natural capital, for many reasons. They cannot be estimated based on the habitat area, 
unlike the case of forest or agricultural land, whose computation can be based on 
the area. Moreover, the sheer mobility of the resource not only makes the exercise 
harder, but also poses a fundamental question: to which area can a given fishery 
be attributed, given that a marine fishery habitat is usually not within national 
borders? In the current exercise, we simplify the matter by assuming that the fish 
stock belongs to a country where harvest arises and the resource is loaded. Of 
course, this is a crude treatment in many ways. In particular, just because a fishery 
biomass is loaded to country A does not necessarily mean that the fishery belongs 
to A. Having acknowledged this shortcoming, we have no alternative sound theory 
to allocate harvest to countries.
In renewable resource economics, or just bioeconomics in short, there is a long 




G S Ht t t= ( )− ,
where St denotes the renewable resource biomass stock; G(St) is the growth function; 
Ht is the harvest. Population, whether it is renewable resource or human being, is 











where r and k are the parameters which represent intrinsic (relative) growth 
rate and carrying capacity of the resource stock, respectively. Harvest, in turn, 
depends on the resource abundance. A simple but empirically supported harvest 
production function is to assume it is proportional to the product of effort 
and stock, i.e.,
H qE St t t= ,
where q is called catchability coefficient. Et stands for effort put in the production 
process, which is often proxied by the number of vessels or fishermen working 
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All this means that, to estimate the fishery stock, St, we can resort either to 
harvest function, (1), or total resource dynamics, (2). World’s fish stocks are 
commonly assessed by examining the trend in catch or harvest data. Although this 
catch-based assessment method has attracted a lot of criticism (see for instance 
Daan et al. (2011)), either due to its technical and conceptual flaws, it is still 
being considered as the most reliable method for assessing fish stock (Froese 
et al. 2012; Kleisner et al. 2013). The main reason is simply because the only 
data available for most fisheries are the weight of fish caught each year (Pauly 
et al. 2013). If effort and harvest are known data, as well as catchability coef-
ficient q, then st can be estimated solely from the Schaefer production function 
(Yamaguchi et al. 2016).
But effort data are sparse worldly, so we cannot employ this method for inclusive 
wealth accounting all over the globe. Alternatively, we use the resource dynam-
ics; however, there is no reliable data on r and k for most fish stocks. Given this 
constraint, we followed Martell and Froese (2013) who developed an algorithm to 
randomly generate feasible (r, k) pairs from a uniform distribution function. The 
likelihood of the generated (r, k) pairs are further evaluated by using Bernoulli 
distribution to ensure that the estimated stock meets the following assumptions: it 
has never collapsed or exceeded the carrying capacity, and that the final stock lies 
within the assumed range of depletion.
In a case where the values of (r, k) are not obtainable, the stocks are simply 
estimated according to the following rules:
• If the year under study is after the year of maximum catch, then the biomass 
stock is estimated as twice the catch;
• Otherwise, the biomass stock is estimated as twice maximum catch, net of catch 
(2 × Maximum Catch − Catch).
Time-series data of catch (tonnage and value) of each country’s economic exclu-
sive zone (EEZ) for the period of 1950–2010 are obtained from Sea Around Us 
Project (SAUP 2016). We only evaluate the stock that has a catch record for at 
least 20 years and which has a total catch in a given area of at least 1,000 tonnes 
over the time span.
5. Adjustments
As we outlined in Chapter 1, we treated three adjustments that are not covered by 
familiar capital assets that however contribute to social well-being change: carbon 
damage, oil capital gain and total factor productivity. We basically follow IWR 2014 
methodology for these adjustments.
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5.1. Carbon damage
Following Arrow et al. (2012), we can think of carbon damage as a mostly exog-
enous change in social well-being, as this does not correspond to each country’s 
emission. As in IWR 2014, the key methodological steps can be described as follows:
1 Obtain the total global carbon emissions for the period under analysis, 1990 
to 2014;
2 Derive the total global damages as a function of the emissions; and
3 Allocate the global damages to the countries according to the potential effect 
of global warming in their economies.
Global carbon emissions: Two sources of carbon emissions were taken into 
account: (i) carbon emissions stemming from fuel consumption and cement, which 
were obtained from the Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Centre (Boden et al. 
2011); and (ii) emissions resulting from global deforestation. In this case, we used 
FAO (2013) data on the changes in annual global forest land. It is further esti-
mated that the average carbon release per hectare is equal to 100 tonnes of carbon 
(Lampietti and Dixon 1995).
Global carbon damages: The damages per tonne of carbon released to the atmo-
sphere are estimated at US$50 (see Tol 2009). By multiplying the total amount of 
global tonnes of carbon released to the atmosphere by the price per tonne, we obtain 
the total global carbon damages. Note that this parameter is constant over time.
Assigning carbon damages to countries: To calculate the distribution of the dam-
ages that each region suffers, we referred to the study of Nordhaus and Boyer (2000). 
This study presents the distribution of damages which different regions and the global 
economy as a whole will suffer as a percentage of the corresponding regional and global 
GDP. By using country and global GDP information, we were able to reestimate regional 
percentage damages in terms of the total global GDP – and not related to the country 
GDP – as initially presented in Nordhaus and Boyer (2000). Finally, we apportioned 
the global damages estimated in previous steps according to this latter percentage.
5.2. Oil capital gain and loss
If oil price goes up, oil-rich nations enjoy wealth increase. This is not a gain in 
quantity of natural capital, but so long as countries can tap into this windfall to 
improve social well-being, this should be accounted for in wealth accounting. An 
annual increase of 3% in the rental price of oil is assumed, which corresponds to the 
annual average oil price increase during 1990–2014 (BP 2015). Conversely, import-
ing countries may have fewer investment opportunities due to higher oil prices, so 
oil capital losses are distributed to consuming countries.
5.3. Total factor productivity
Total factor productivity of a nation is a source of resource that can be accessed 
even though they are tangible. We take different methods in computing TFP: for 
frontier analysis, we used a non-parametric analysis called Malmquist productivity 
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index, which in turn is based on the concept of data envelopment analysis. For IWR 
2014 methods, we directly use the TFP data calculated conventionally by Conference 
Board (2017), in line with Arrow et al. (2012) and IWR 2012 (UNU-IHDP, 2012).
For frontier analysis, let
• xt: Inputs (produced, human and natural capital)
• yt: Outputs (GDP)
• Distance function: d x y x y T tt t t t, max ; , )( )= ∈ ( ){ }δ δ( |
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where d is the geometric distance to the production frontier caused by production 
inefficiency, while the frontier denotes the best available technology from the given 
inputs and outputs. i refers to the country under analysis, running i from 1 up to 
140 nations in our sample; Y is the corresponding value of gross domestic product; 
K, H and N stand for produced, human and natural capital inputs.
Note
1 Rintaro Yamaguchi and Moinul Islam have provided excellent research assistance in 
preparing this methodological appendix.
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Table A3.1 Wealth (Inclusive wealth in billions of constant 2005 US$)
Country/year 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
1 Afghanistan 177 237 283 353 422 493
2 Albania 118 116 118 125 135 141
3 Algeria 1,426 1,509 1,596 1,692 1,853 2,032
4 Argentina 2,364 2,497 2,655 2,789 3,046 3,273
5 Armenia 129 120 117 119 129 134
6 Australia 6,270 6,592 7,048 7,666 8,480 9,207
7 Austria 1,613 1,792 1,955 2,124 2,272 2,394
8 Bahrain 49 57 65 81 121 134
9 Bangladesh 9,243 10,336 11,433 12,427 13,372 14,088
10 Barbados 21 22 23 24 26 27
11 Belgium 1,770 1,946 2,142 2,352 2,609 2,803
12 Belize 17 17 18 18 19 19




882 888 900 908 918 931
15 Botswana 528 581 612 684 799 877
16 Brazil 11,367 11,624 11,943 12,261 12,731 13,407
17 Bulgaria 2,425 2,273 2,172 2,108 2,097 2,056
18 Burundi 2,747 2,915 3,377 3,959 4,715 5,436
19 Cambodia 341 346 348 348 357 368
20 Cameroon 2,240 2,516 2,814 3,195 3,679 3,951
21 Canada 9,663 10,046 10,545 11,179 11,937 11,659
22 Central African 
Republic
681 746 806 861 951 1,024
23 Chile 779 847 937 1,036 1,170 1,315
24 China 34,176 37,795 41,374 45,731 52,592 60,253
25 Colombia 1,797 1,909 2,005 2,085 2,246 1,878
26 Congo 1,014 1,118 1,223 1,391 1,681 1,845
27 Costa Rica 112 120 132 147 168 203
28 Côte d’Ivoire 2,263 2,623 2,936 3,234 3,618 3,912
29 Croatia 370 373 385 421 463 470
30 Cuba 439 461 475 489 507 522
31 Cyprus 77 92 105 120 140 146
32 Czech Republic 1,068 1,131 1,197 1,269 1,399 1,468
33 Democratic 
Republic of the 
Congo
1,389 1,378 1,365 1,357 1,356 1,361
34 Denmark 1,168 1,244 1,367 1,492 1,629 1,707
35 Dominican 
Republic
223 253 299 342 398 439
36 Ecuador 538 552 564 581 610 665
37 Egypt 3,737 4,179 4,545 5,090 5,792 6,512
38 El Salvador 150 167 183 199 214 225
(Continued )
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Country/year 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
39 Estonia 132 123 122 144 158 166
40 Fiji 25 27 28 29 31 34
41 Finland 1,207 1,269 1,363 1,466 1,635 1,690
42 France 9,425 10,349 11,354 12,592 13,859 14,733
43 Gabon 1,176 1,173 1,171 1,170 1,171 1,179
44 Gambia 12 13 15 17 20 23
45 Germany 17,894 19,362 20,605 21,486 22,377 23,091
46 Ghana 1,349 1,495 1,633 1,832 2,080 2,321
47 Greece 1,395 1,482 1,591 1,749 1,910 1,873
48 Guatemala 1,358 1,518 1,688 1,864 2,072 2,248
49 Guyana 208 209 209 209 210 242
50 Haiti 3,038 3,405 3,808 4,201 3,678 4,724
51 Honduras 139 137 134 136 140 142
52 Hungary 910 952 998 1,063 1,122 1,155
53 Iceland 163 165 171 180 192 193
54 India 320,231 341,430 375,521 407,938 440,219 465,400
55 Indonesia 5,429 5,769 6,137 6,542 7,035 7,497
56 Iran (Islamic 
Republic of)
6,169 6,242 6,353 6,533 6,792 6,867
57 Iraq 1,908 1,964 2,029 2,111 2,227 2,362
58 Ireland 595 640 766 975 1,186 1,268
59 Israel 477 600 730 826 971 1,105
60 Italy 8,332 9,010 9,758 10,727 11,582 11,917
61 Jamaica 109 119 127 134 139 142
62 Japan 26,237 29,594 32,324 34,102 35,458 36,085
63 Jordan 97 130 151 177 227 269
64 Kazakhstan 1,761 1,866 1,811 1,815 1,912 1,995
65 Kenya 2,606 2,996 3,351 3,917 4,736 5,345
66 Kuwait 2,400 2,224 2,282 2,343 2,469 2,572
67 Kyrgyzstan 149 160 175 189 208 226
68 Lao People’s 
Democratic 
Republic
262 278 293 306 325 357
69 Latvia 168 164 167 177 193 197
70 Lesotho 1,011 1,057 1,043 994 1,058 1,078
71 Liberia 1,833 1,691 2,362 2,658 3,366 3,662
72 Lithuania 271 278 284 291 303 308
73 Luxembourg 100 116 137 163 194 222
74 Malawi 3,551 3,653 4,076 4,728 5,882 6,924
75 Malaysia 931 1,039 1,148 1,223 1,328 1,481
76 Maldives 9 11 12 14 17 19
77 Mali 3,695 4,174 4,787 5,611 6,580 7,417
78 Malta 21 25 30 35 40 43
79 Mauritania 1,055 1,223 1,371 1,559 1,766 1,945
Table A3.1 (Continued)
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Country/year 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
80 Mauritius 33 37 43 49 55 60
81 Mexico 4,361 4,876 5,483 6,099 6,893 7,581
82 Mongolia 345 348 365 360 369 393
83 Morocco 3,146 3,444 3,727 4,011 4,330 4,596
84 Mozambique 10,425 12,809 14,617 16,216 18,475 20,599
85 Myanmar 3,120 3,371 3,623 3,843 4,049 4,226
86 Namibia 141 157 175 190 217 240
87 Nepal 2,873 3,298 3,646 3,941 4,194 4,467
88 Netherlands 2,914 3,179 3,542 3,889 4,230 4,413
89 New Zealand 2,038 2,076 2,131 2,146 2,599 2,495
90 Nicaragua 209 234 253 270 288 307
91 Niger 4,024 4,719 5,603 6,733 8,174 9,482
92 Nigeria 26,856 30,327 34,102 38,984 44,866 49,966
93 Norway 1,868 1,886 1,934 1,981 2,124 2,263
94 Pakistan 2,637 2,705 2,784 2,873 3,027 3,172
95 Panama 97 104 116 125 146 183
96 Papua New 
Guinea
4,247 4,823 5,473 6,165 6,835 7,452
97 Paraguay 170 176 188 192 201 205
98 Peru 1,696 1,716 1,756 1,780 1,849 2,031
99 Philippines 1,665 1,932 2,221 2,525 2,830 3,092
100 Poland 2,471 2,552 2,718 2,857 3,097 3,306
101 Portugal 804 900 1,052 1,195 1,301 1,309
102 Qatar 500 496 498 525 671 812
103 Republic of 
Korea
2,595 3,444 4,358 5,280 6,249 6,938
104 Republic of 
Moldova
129 134 132 132 133 125
105 Romania 1,415 1,420 1,451 1,468 1,562 1,618
106 Russian 
Federation
26,878 29,296 28,635 28,060 28,226 28,491
107 Rwanda 799 635 968 1,134 1,355 1,528
108 Saudi Arabia 6,746 7,333 7,307 7,402 7,677 8,141
109 Senegal 1,986 2,254 2,538 2,899 3,341 3,722
110 Serbia 880 882 878 889 922 920
111 Sierra Leone 4,189 3,856 3,788 4,821 5,517 5,961
112 Singapore 258 349 481 574 746 898
113 Slovakia 408 428 459 483 521 548
114 Slovenia 200 209 230 257 289 297
115 South Africa 4,121 4,449 4,788 5,074 5,609 6,058
116 Spain 4,460 5,045 5,729 6,846 7,958 8,272
117 Sri Lanka 406 447 489 511 536 626
118 Sudan (former) 6,699 8,211 9,335 10,679 11,151 11,880
119 Swaziland 27 33 38 41 44 47
120 Sweden 1,970 2,105 2,260 2,466 2,726 2,893
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Country/year 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
121 Switzerland 2,068 2,542 2,850 3,009 3,295 3,502
122 Syrian Arab 
Republic
460 518 581 648 749 665
123 Tajikistan 160 182 197 218 244 268
124 Thailand 1,801 2,116 2,350 2,555 2,759 2,963
125 Togo 289 323 377 431 502 572
126 Trinidad and 
Tobago
173 169 167 166 158 145
127 Tunisia 251 287 323 361 415 458
128 Turkey 2,101 2,381 2,720 3,034 3,453 3,928
129 Uganda 8,879 10,463 12,130 14,883 17,941 20,789
130 Ukraine 18,805 18,568 17,495 16,637 16,481 16,308
131 United Arab 
Emirates
2,599 2,925 3,330 3,868 4,736 5,224
132 United 
Kingdom




8,561 9,934 11,219 13,092 15,526 17,857
134 United States 
of America
54,549 59,962 67,699 76,021 83,540 88,166




5,599 5,602 5,584 5,567 5,654 5,749
137 Viet Nam 1,000 1,102 1,212 1,328 1,488 1,626
138 Yemen 1,864 2,288 2,678 3,118 3,663 4,120
139 Zambia 6,020 6,770 7,673 8,960 10,895 12,415
140 Zimbabwe 10,731 11,113 10,964 10,660 11,562 14,264
Table A3.1 (Continued)
Table A3.2  IW per capita (Inclusive wealth per capita in thousands of constant 2005 US$)
Country/year 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
1 Afghanistan 15 14 14 14 15 16
2 Albania 36 36 38 42 46 49
3 Algeria 55 52 51 51 51 52
4 Argentina 72 71 72 71 74 76
5 Armenia 36 37 38 39 43 44
6 Australia 367 365 368 376 385 392
7 Austria 210 226 244 258 272 280
8 Bahrain 99 101 97 93 96 98
9 Bangladesh 87 87 87 87 88 89
10 Barbados 81 82 84 89 92 94
11 Belgium 178 192 209 224 239 250
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12 Belize 90 83 72 64 58 54
13 Benin 417 417 420 418 422 425
14 Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 129 117 108 100 93 88
15 Botswana 383 369 352 367 390 395
16 Brazil 76 71 68 65 64 65
17 Bulgaria 278 270 266 272 284 285
18 Burundi 489 467 499 499 498 503
19 Cambodia 38 32 29 26 25 24
20 Cameroon 186 181 177 176 179 173
21 Canada 348 342 343 346 351 328
22 Central African Republic 232 224 216 212 214 213
23 Chile 59 60 62 64 69 74
24 China 30 31 33 35 39 44
25 Colombia 52 51 50 48 49 39
26 Congo 425 411 393 397 413 409
27 Costa Rica 36 34 34 35 37 43
28 Côte d’Ivoire 186 182 178 178 180 177
29 Croatia 77 80 87 95 105 111
30 Cuba 41 42 43 43 45 46
31 Cyprus 100 108 111 116 126 127
32 Czech Republic 103 110 117 124 134 140
33 Democratic Republic of the Congo 40 33 28 24 21 18
34 Denmark 227 238 256 275 294 302
35 Dominican Republic 31 32 35 37 40 42
36 Ecuador 53 48 45 42 41 42
37 Egypt 66 67 67 68 71 73
38 El Salvador 29 30 32 33 35 37
39 Estonia 84 85 87 106 118 126
40 Fiji 34 35 35 35 36 38
41 Finland 242 248 263 280 305 309
42 France 161 174 186 199 213 222
43 Gabon 1,235 1,079 951 849 760 699
44 Gambia 13 12 12 12 12 12
45 Germany 225 237 251 261 274 285
46 Ghana 92 89 87 86 86 87
47 Greece 137 140 147 159 172 172
48 Guatemala 148 147 144 141 141 140
49 Guyana 289 288 282 282 279 317
50 Haiti 428 435 445 453 368 447
51 Honduras 28 24 21 20 19 18
52 Hungary 88 92 98 105 112 117
53 Iceland 638 616 608 608 603 591
54 India 368 355 357 357 358 359
55 Indonesia 30 29 29 29 29 29
56 Iran (Islamic Republic of) 110 103 96 93 91 88
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Country/year 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
57 Iraq 109 97 86 78 72 67
58 Ireland 169 177 201 234 260 275
59 Israel 102 108 116 119 127 135
60 Italy 147 159 171 185 195 196
61 Jamaica 46 48 49 51 52 52
62 Japan 212 236 255 267 277 284
63 Jordan 29 30 32 33 35 36
64 Kazakhstan 108 118 122 120 117 115
65 Kenya 111 109 108 111 117 119
66 Kuwait 1,166 1,358 1,183 1,035 807 685
67 Kyrgyzstan 34 35 36 37 38 39
68 Lao People’s Democratic Republic 62 57 55 53 52 53
69 Latvia 63 66 71 79 92 99
70 Lesotho 633 602 562 516 526 511
71 Liberia 872 813 817 813 850 833
72 Lithuania 73 77 81 88 98 105
73 Luxembourg 261 284 315 351 382 398
74 Malawi 377 372 364 371 398 415
75 Malaysia 51 50 49 47 47 50
76 Maldives 42 41 43 45 46 48
77 Mali 436 433 433 436 434 434
78 Malta 60 68 77 85 96 101
79 Mauritania 521 524 506 494 492 490
80 Mauritius 31 33 36 40 44 47
81 Mexico 51 52 53 56 58 60
82 Mongolia 158 152 152 143 136 135
83 Morocco 126 127 129 132 135 135
84 Mozambique 780 805 800 768 760 757
85 Myanmar 74 75 76 77 78 79
86 Namibia 100 95 92 94 99 100
87 Nepal 153 154 154 155 156 159
88 Netherlands 195 206 222 238 255 262
89 New Zealand 612 565 553 519 597 553
90 Nicaragua 50 51 50 50 50 51
91 Niger 509 504 499 499 502 496
92 Nigeria 281 280 277 279 281 281
93 Norway 440 433 431 428 434 440
94 Pakistan 25 22 20 19 18 17
95 Panama 39 38 38 38 40 47
96 Papua New Guinea 1,021 1,023 1,018 1,013 998 998
97 Paraguay 40 37 35 33 32 31
98 Peru 78 71 68 64 63 66
99 Philippines 27 28 28 29 30 31
Table A3.2 (Continued)
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100 Poland 65 66 71 75 81 87
101 Portugal 81 90 102 114 123 126
102 Qatar 1,050 991 840 627 380 374
103 Republic of Korea 61 76 93 110 126 138
104 Republic of Moldova 35 36 36 37 37 35
105 Romania 61 63 65 69 77 81
106 Russian Federation 181 197 195 196 198 198
107 Rwanda 110 107 121 126 132 135
108 Saudi Arabia 412 389 342 299 273 264
109 Senegal 264 259 257 257 258 254
110 Serbia 116 116 117 119 126 129
111 Sierra Leone 1,066 1,005 933 951 955 944
112 Singapore 85 99 119 135 147 164
113 Slovakia 77 80 85 90 97 101
114 Slovenia 100 105 116 128 141 144
115 South Africa 117 114 109 107 110 112
116 Spain 115 128 142 157 171 178
117 Sri Lanka 24 25 26 26 27 30
118 Sudan (former) 335 333 332 334 309 302
119 Swaziland 31 35 36 37 37 37
120 Sweden 230 238 255 273 291 298
121 Switzerland 308 361 397 405 421 428
122 Syrian Arab Republic 37 36 36 36 36 35
123 Tajikistan 30 31 32 32 32 32
124 Thailand 32 36 37 39 41 44
125 Togo 76 75 77 77 79 80
126 Trinidad and Tobago 142 135 132 128 119 107
127 Tunisia 31 32 34 36 39 42
128 Turkey 39 41 43 45 48 51
129 Uganda 511 513 511 531 541 550
130 Ukraine 362 360 356 353 359 360
131 United Arab Emirates 1,435 1,245 1,092 863 569 575
132 United Kingdom 145 155 170 183 194 201
133 United Republic of Tanzania 336 332 330 335 340 345
134 United States of America 219 225 240 257 270 276
135 Uruguay 84 86 88 90 93 97
136 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 282 252 228 208 195 187
137 Viet Nam 15 15 16 16 17 18
138 Yemen 156 150 150 152 155 157
139 Zambia 739 732 725 744 783 790
140 Zimbabwe 1,023 951 877 821 827 936
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Table A3.3  IW Growth (unadjusted) (Inclusive wealth change (%) with respect to base 
year 1990)
Country/year 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
1 Afghanistan 6.0% 12.5% 18.8% 24.3% 40.7%
2 Albania −0.4% −0.2% 1.4% 3.3% 6.1%
3 Algeria 1.1% 2.9% 4.4% 6.8% 12.5%
4 Argentina 1.1% 3.0% 4.2% 6.5% 11.5%
5 Armenia −1.4% −2.4% −2.1% −0.1% 1.1%
6 Australia 1.0% 3.0% 5.2% 7.8% 13.7%
7 Austria 2.1% 4.9% 7.1% 8.9% 14.1%
8 Bahrain 3.0% 7.0% 13.1% 25.1% 39.7%
9 Bangladesh 2.3% 5.5% 7.7% 9.7% 15.1%
10 Barbados 0.6% 2.0% 3.9% 5.1% 8.3%
11 Belgium 1.9% 4.9% 7.4% 10.2% 16.6%
12 Belize 0.4% 1.1% 1.8% 2.4% 3.8%
13 Benin 3.7% 8.8% 13.2% 17.8% 29.3%
14 Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 0.1% 0.5% 0.7% 1.0% 1.8%
15 Botswana 1.9% 3.8% 6.7% 10.9% 18.4%
16 Brazil 0.4% 1.2% 1.9% 2.9% 5.7%
17 Bulgaria −1.3% −2.7% −3.4% −3.6% −5.4%
18 Burundi 1.2% 5.3% 9.6% 14.5% 25.5%
19 Cambodia 0.3% 0.5% 0.5% 1.2% 2.6%
20 Cameroon 2.4% 5.9% 9.3% 13.2% 20.8%
21 Canada 0.8% 2.2% 3.7% 5.4% 6.5%
22 Central African Republic 1.8% 4.3% 6.0% 8.7% 14.5%
23 Chile 1.7% 4.7% 7.4% 10.7% 19.1%
24 China 2.0% 4.9% 7.6% 11.4% 20.8%
25 Colombia 1.2% 2.8% 3.8% 5.7% 1.5%
26 Congo 2.0% 4.8% 8.2% 13.5% 22.1%
27 Costa Rica 1.5% 4.2% 7.1% 10.8% 21.9%
28 Côte d’Ivoire 3.0% 6.7% 9.3% 12.4% 20.0%
29 Croatia 0.2% 1.0% 3.3% 5.7% 8.3%
30 Cuba 1.0% 2.0% 2.8% 3.7% 6.0%
31 Cyprus 3.7% 8.0% 11.8% 16.1% 23.8%
32 Czech Republic 1.1% 2.9% 4.4% 7.0% 11.2%
33 Democratic Republic of the Congo −0.2% −0.4% −0.6% −0.6% −0.7%
34 Denmark 1.3% 4.0% 6.3% 8.7% 13.5%
35 Dominican Republic 2.6% 7.6% 11.3% 15.6% 25.3%
36 Ecuador 0.5% 1.2% 1.9% 3.2% 7.3%
37 Egypt 2.3% 5.0% 8.0% 11.6% 20.3%
38 El Salvador 2.1% 5.1% 7.3% 9.2% 14.4%
39 Estonia −1.5% −2.1% 2.1% 4.5% 7.9%
40 Fiji 2.0% 3.4% 4.1% 5.9% 10.9%
41 Finland 1.0% 3.1% 5.0% 7.9% 11.9%
42 France 1.9% 4.8% 7.5% 10.1% 16.1%
43 Gabon −0.1% −0.1% −0.1% −0.1% 0.1%
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44 Gambia 1.1% 4.7% 9.1% 13.8% 23.8%
45 Germany 1.6% 3.6% 4.7% 5.7% 8.9%
46 Ghana 2.1% 4.9% 8.0% 11.4% 19.8%
47 Greece 1.2% 3.3% 5.8% 8.2% 10.3%
48 Guatemala 2.3% 5.6% 8.2% 11.1% 18.3%
49 Guyana 0.1% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 5.2%
50 Haiti 2.3% 5.8% 8.4% 4.9% 15.9%
51 Honduras −0.4% −1.0% −0.6% 0.2% 0.7%
52 Hungary 0.9% 2.3% 3.9% 5.4% 8.2%
53 Iceland 0.3% 1.3% 2.6% 4.2% 5.9%
54 India 1.3% 4.1% 6.2% 8.3% 13.3%
55 Indonesia 1.2% 3.1% 4.8% 6.7% 11.4%
56 Iran (Islamic Republic of) 0.2% 0.7% 1.4% 2.4% 3.6%
57 Iraq 0.6% 1.6% 2.6% 3.9% 7.4%
58 Ireland 1.5% 6.5% 13.1% 18.8% 28.7%
59 Israel 4.7% 11.2% 14.7% 19.4% 32.3%
60 Italy 1.6% 4.0% 6.5% 8.6% 12.7%
61 Jamaica 1.8% 3.8% 5.3% 6.2% 9.1%
62 Japan 2.4% 5.4% 6.8% 7.8% 11.2%
63 Jordan 6.1% 11.8% 16.4% 23.8% 40.7%
64 Kazakhstan 1.2% 0.7% 0.8% 2.1% 4.2%
65 Kenya 2.8% 6.5% 10.7% 16.1% 27.1%
66 Kuwait −1.5% −1.2% −0.6% 0.7% 2.3%
67 Kyrgyzstan 1.4% 4.1% 6.1% 8.6% 14.8%
68 Lao People’s Democratic Republic 1.2% 2.8% 3.9% 5.5% 10.8%
69 Latvia −0.4% −0.1% 1.4% 3.5% 5.4%
70 Lesotho 0.9% 0.8% −0.4% 1.1% 2.2%
71 Liberia −1.6% 6.5% 9.7% 16.4% 26.0%
72 Lithuania 0.5% 1.2% 1.8% 2.9% 4.4%
73 Luxembourg 3.1% 8.4% 13.2% 18.1% 30.5%
74 Malawi 0.6% 3.5% 7.4% 13.4% 24.9%
75 Malaysia 2.2% 5.4% 7.1% 9.3% 16.7%
76 Maldives 2.9% 8.0% 11.9% 17.0% 28.6%
77 Mali 2.5% 6.7% 11.0% 15.5% 26.1%
78 Malta 3.2% 8.4% 12.7% 16.6% 26.4%
79 Mauritania 3.0% 6.8% 10.3% 13.7% 22.6%
80 Mauritius 2.8% 7.3% 10.6% 14.1% 22.4%
81 Mexico 2.3% 5.9% 8.7% 12.1% 20.2%
82 Mongolia 0.2% 1.4% 1.1% 1.7% 4.4%
83 Morocco 1.8% 4.3% 6.3% 8.3% 13.5%
84 Mozambique 4.2% 8.8% 11.7% 15.4% 25.5%
85 Myanmar 1.6% 3.8% 5.4% 6.7% 10.7%
86 Namibia 2.1% 5.5% 7.7% 11.4% 19.4%
87 Nepal 2.8% 6.1% 8.2% 9.9% 15.8%
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88 Netherlands 1.8% 5.0% 7.5% 9.8% 14.8%
89 New Zealand 0.4% 1.1% 1.3% 6.3% 7.0%
90 Nicaragua 2.3% 4.9% 6.7% 8.4% 13.7%
91 Niger 3.2% 8.6% 13.7% 19.4% 33.1%
92 Nigeria 2.5% 6.2% 9.8% 13.7% 23.0%
93 Norway 0.2% 0.9% 1.5% 3.3% 6.6%
94 Pakistan 0.5% 1.4% 2.2% 3.5% 6.4%
95 Panama 1.5% 4.5% 6.6% 10.8% 23.7%
96 Papua New Guinea 2.6% 6.5% 9.8% 12.6% 20.6%
97 Paraguay 0.7% 2.5% 3.1% 4.3% 6.4%
98 Peru 0.2% 0.9% 1.2% 2.2% 6.2%
99 Philippines 3.0% 7.5% 11.0% 14.2% 22.9%
100 Poland 0.6% 2.4% 3.7% 5.8% 10.2%
101 Portugal 2.3% 6.9% 10.4% 12.8% 17.6%
102 Qatar −0.2% −0.1% 1.2% 7.6% 17.5%
103 Republic of Korea 5.8% 13.8% 19.4% 24.6% 38.8%
104 Republic of Moldova 0.8% 0.6% 0.5% 0.9% −1.0%
105 Romania 0.1% 0.6% 0.9% 2.5% 4.6%
106 Russian Federation 1.7% 1.6% 1.1% 1.2% 2.0%
107 Rwanda −4.5% 4.9% 9.1% 14.1% 24.1%
108 Saudi Arabia 1.7% 2.0% 2.3% 3.3% 6.5%
109 Senegal 2.6% 6.3% 9.9% 13.9% 23.3%
110 Serbia 0.0% 0.0% 0.2% 1.2% 1.5%
111 Sierra Leone −1.6% −2.5% 3.6% 7.1% 12.5%
112 Singapore 6.2% 16.8% 22.1% 30.4% 51.5%
113 Slovakia 1.0% 3.0% 4.3% 6.3% 10.3%
114 Slovenia 0.9% 3.5% 6.5% 9.7% 14.0%
115 South Africa 1.5% 3.8% 5.3% 8.0% 13.7%
116 Spain 2.5% 6.5% 11.3% 15.6% 22.9%
117 Sri Lanka 2.0% 4.8% 6.0% 7.2% 15.5%
118 Sudan (former) 4.2% 8.7% 12.4% 13.6% 21.0%
119 Swaziland 4.4% 9.2% 11.2% 13.3% 20.6%
120 Sweden 1.3% 3.5% 5.8% 8.5% 13.7%
121 Switzerland 4.2% 8.4% 9.8% 12.4% 19.2%
122 Syrian Arab Republic 2.4% 6.0% 9.0% 13.0% 13.1%
123 Tajikistan 2.6% 5.4% 8.0% 11.1% 18.8%
124 Thailand 3.3% 6.9% 9.1% 11.3% 18.0%
125 Togo 2.3% 6.9% 10.5% 14.8% 25.6%
126 Trinidad and Tobago −0.5% −0.9% −1.0% −2.3% −5.8%
127 Tunisia 2.7% 6.4% 9.5% 13.4% 22.1%
128 Turkey 2.5% 6.7% 9.6% 13.2% 23.2%
129 Uganda 3.3% 8.1% 13.8% 19.2% 32.8%
130 Ukraine −0.3% −1.8% −3.0% −3.2% −4.6%
131 United Arab Emirates 2.4% 6.4% 10.5% 16.2% 26.2%
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132 United Kingdom 1.6% 4.8% 7.6% 10.1% 16.1%
133 United Republic of Tanzania 3.0% 7.0% 11.2% 16.0% 27.8%
134 United States of America 1.9% 5.5% 8.7% 11.2% 17.4%
135 Uruguay 1.1% 2.9% 3.5% 4.7% 8.3%
136 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 0.0% −0.1% −0.1% 0.2% 0.9%
137 Viet Nam 2.0% 4.9% 7.3% 10.4% 17.6%
138 Yemen 4.2% 9.5% 13.7% 18.4% 30.3%
139 Zambia 2.4% 6.3% 10.5% 16.0% 27.3%
140 Zimbabwe 0.7% 0.5% −0.2% 1.9% 9.9%
Table A3.4  IW per capita growth (unadjusted) (Inclusive wealth per capita change (%) 
with respect to base year 1990)
Country/year 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
1 Afghanistan −0.7% −0.5% −0.4% 0.7% 2.1%
2 Albania 0.2% 1.4% 3.6% 6.4% 10.7%
3 Algeria −1.0% −1.8% −2.0% −1.7% −1.7%
4 Argentina −0.2% −0.2% −0.3% 0.6% 1.8%
5 Armenia 0.4% 1.1% 1.9% 4.5% 6.9%
6 Australia −0.1% 0.0% 0.6% 1.2% 2.2%
7 Austria 1.4% 3.8% 5.3% 6.6% 10.1%
8 Bahrain 0.3% −0.6% −1.6% −0.9% −0.3%
9 Bangladesh 0.0% 0.0% −0.1% 0.3% 0.5%
10 Barbados 0.2% 1.1% 2.6% 3.3% 5.3%
11 Belgium 1.6% 4.2% 6.0% 7.8% 12.0%
12 Belize −1.5% −5.6% −8.2% −10.5% −15.8%
13 Benin 0.0% 0.2% 0.1% 0.3% 0.6%
14 Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of)
−1.8% −4.3% −6.2% −7.9% −11.8%
15 Botswana −0.7% −2.0% −1.1% 0.5% 1.1%
16 Brazil −1.1% −2.6% −3.7% −4.0% −4.9%
17 Bulgaria −0.6% −1.1% −0.5% 0.5% 0.8%
18 Burundi −0.9% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.9%
19 Cambodia −3.1% −6.8% −8.9% −10.0% −14.1%
20 Cameroon −0.5% −1.2% −1.3% −0.9% −2.2%
21 Canada −0.3% −0.4% −0.1% 0.2% −1.9%
22 Central African Republic −0.7% −1.7% −2.2% −2.0% −2.8%
23 Chile 0.1% 1.0% 2.1% 3.8% 7.7%
24 China 0.8% 2.1% 3.9% 6.9% 13.6%
25 Colombia −0.6% −1.4% −2.1% −1.7% −9.2%
26 Congo −0.7% −1.9% −1.7% −0.7% −1.2%
27 Costa Rica −1.1% −1.8% −1.0% 0.6% 5.7%
28 Côte d’Ivoire −0.4% −1.1% −1.0% −0.9% −1.7%
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29 Croatia 0.6% 3.0% 5.2% 7.8% 12.7%
30 Cuba 0.4% 0.8% 1.2% 2.0% 3.5%
31 Cyprus 1.4% 2.6% 3.7% 6.0% 8.0%
32 Czech Republic 1.2% 3.1% 4.7% 6.6% 10.5%
33 Democratic Republic of 
the Congo
−3.8% −8.0% −11.7% −15.2% −22.9%
34 Denmark 0.9% 3.0% 4.9% 6.6% 10.0%
35 Dominican Republic 0.6% 3.0% 4.5% 6.7% 10.8%
36 Ecuador −1.7% −4.0% −5.3% −6.1% −7.4%
37 Egypt 0.2% 0.1% 0.6% 1.6% 3.1%
38 El Salvador 0.9% 2.5% 4.0% 5.4% 8.8%
39 Estonia 0.3% 0.8% 5.9% 8.9% 14.5%
40 Fiji 0.8% 0.6% 1.0% 1.6% 3.9%
41 Finland 0.5% 2.1% 3.7% 5.9% 8.5%
42 France 1.5% 3.7% 5.5% 7.3% 11.2%
43 Gabon −2.7% −6.3% −8.9% −11.4% −17.3%
44 Gambia −1.9% −2.7% −2.5% −2.4% −3.3%
45 Germany 1.0% 2.7% 3.7% 5.0% 8.2%
46 Ghana −0.7% −1.5% −1.8% −1.9% −2.1%
47 Greece 0.5% 1.9% 3.9% 5.9% 7.9%
48 Guatemala −0.2% −0.7% −1.2% −1.3% −1.8%
49 Guyana −0.1% −0.6% −0.7% −0.9% 3.1%
50 Haiti 0.3% 1.0% 1.5% −3.7% 1.5%
51 Honduras −2.9% −6.8% −8.7% −9.9% −14.3%
52 Hungary 1.0% 2.7% 4.7% 6.3% 10.1%
53 Iceland −0.7% −1.2% −1.2% −1.4% −2.5%
54 India −0.7% −0.8% −0.8% −0.7% −0.8%
55 Indonesia −0.4% −0.8% −0.9% −0.7% −0.5%
56 Iran (Islamic Republic of) −1.2% −3.2% −4.0% −4.5% −7.2%
57 Iraq −2.3% −5.8% −8.0% −9.8% −15.0%
58 Ireland 0.9% 4.4% 8.4% 11.3% 17.5%
59 Israel 1.1% 3.2% 3.9% 5.6% 9.5%
60 Italy 1.5% 3.9% 5.9% 7.4% 10.1%
61 Jamaica 1.1% 1.7% 2.6% 3.1% 4.5%
62 Japan 2.1% 4.7% 5.9% 6.8% 10.1%
63 Jordan 0.9% 2.4% 3.7% 4.9% 8.0%
64 Kazakhstan 1.8% 3.1% 2.7% 2.1% 2.3%
65 Kenya −0.3% −0.8% −0.1% 1.4% 2.3%
66 Kuwait 3.1% 0.4% −2.9% −8.8% −16.2%
67 Kyrgyzstan 0.7% 1.3% 1.9% 2.9% 4.4%
68 Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic
−1.5% −2.9% −3.6% −4.2% −4.8%
69 Latvia 1.0% 2.9% 5.9% 9.9% 16.1%
70 Lesotho −1.0% −2.9% −5.0% −4.5% −6.9%
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71 Liberia −1.4% −1.6% −1.7% −0.6% −1.5%
72 Lithuania 0.9% 2.6% 4.6% 7.5% 12.8%
73 Luxembourg 1.7% 4.8% 7.7% 10.0% 15.2%
74 Malawi −0.3% −0.9% −0.4% 1.4% 3.2%
75 Malaysia −0.4% −1.0% −1.9% −2.0% −1.0%
76 Maldives −0.2% 0.9% 1.6% 2.7% 5.0%
77 Mali −0.1% −0.1% 0.0% −0.1% −0.1%
78 Malta 2.3% 6.4% 9.0% 12.1% 18.7%
79 Mauritania 0.1% −0.7% −1.3% −1.4% −2.0%
80 Mauritius 1.6% 4.3% 6.5% 9.5% 15.5%
81 Mexico 0.3% 1.2% 2.2% 3.4% 5.9%
82 Mongolia −0.8% −0.9% −2.5% −3.6% −5.1%
83 Morocco 0.1% 0.5% 1.1% 1.7% 2.4%
84 Mozambique 0.6% 0.7% −0.4% −0.6% −1.0%
85 Myanmar 0.3% 0.6% 0.9% 1.3% 2.1%
86 Namibia −1.0% −1.9% −1.6% −0.1% 0.1%
87 Nepal 0.1% 0.0% 0.2% 0.4% 1.1%
88 Netherlands 1.1% 3.4% 5.2% 6.9% 10.3%
89 New Zealand −1.6% −2.5% −4.0% −0.6% −3.3%
90 Nicaragua 0.1% −0.1% −0.1% −0.1% 0.5%
91 Niger −0.2% −0.5% −0.5% −0.3% −0.8%
92 Nigeria −0.1% −0.3% −0.1% 0.1% 0.1%
93 Norway −0.4% −0.6% −0.7% −0.3% 0.0%
94 Pakistan −2.1% −4.8% −6.5% −7.7% −11.2%
95 Panama −0.5% −0.6% −1.0% 0.7% 6.5%
96 Papua New Guinea 0.0% −0.1% −0.2% −0.6% −0.8%
97 Paraguay −1.7% −3.2% −4.8% −5.4% −8.1%
98 Peru −1.7% −3.4% −4.6% −5.1% −5.5%
99 Philippines 0.6% 1.5% 2.2% 3.1% 5.1%
100 Poland 0.4% 2.3% 3.7% 5.8% 10.3%
101 Portugal 2.2% 6.1% 9.0% 11.2% 16.0%
102 Qatar −1.2% −5.4% −12.1% −22.4% −29.1%
103 Republic of Korea 4.8% 11.2% 16.0% 20.2% 31.5%
104 Republic of Moldova 0.9% 1.0% 1.2% 1.8% 0.3%
105 Romania 0.5% 1.5% 3.1% 6.1% 10.0%
106 Russian Federation 1.7% 1.9% 1.9% 2.2% 3.0%
107 Rwanda −0.5% 2.3% 3.4% 4.6% 7.0%
108 Saudi Arabia −1.2% −4.6% −7.7% −9.8% −13.9%
109 Senegal −0.4% −0.7% −0.7% −0.6% −1.4%
110 Serbia −0.1% 0.2% 0.7% 2.2% 3.6%
111 Sierra Leone −1.2% −3.3% −2.8% −2.7% −4.0%
112 Singapore 3.1% 9.0% 12.3% 14.7% 24.7%
113 Slovakia 0.7% 2.6% 4.0% 5.9% 9.5%
114 Slovenia 1.0% 3.7% 6.4% 9.0% 12.9%
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115 South Africa −0.6% −1.8% −2.1% −1.4% −1.4%
116 Spain 2.2% 5.5% 8.1% 10.5% 15.7%
117 Sri Lanka 0.8% 2.5% 2.7% 2.9% 8.2%
118 Sudan (former) −0.1% −0.2% −0.1% −2.0% −3.4%
119 Swaziland 2.1% 3.6% 4.5% 4.5% 6.1%
120 Sweden 0.7% 2.6% 4.4% 6.0% 9.0%
121 Switzerland 3.2% 6.5% 7.1% 8.1% 11.6%
122 Syrian Arab Republic −0.4% −0.9% −0.8% −0.5% −1.3%
123 Tajikistan 0.8% 1.4% 1.4% 1.6% 2.3%
124 Thailand 2.3% 4.2% 5.1% 6.8% 11.2%
125 Togo −0.2% 0.3% 0.3% 0.7% 1.8%
126 Trinidad and Tobago −1.0% −1.9% −2.5% −4.3% −9.0%
127 Tunisia 0.7% 2.3% 4.0% 6.3% 10.6%
128 Turkey 0.9% 2.5% 3.5% 5.3% 9.2%
129 Uganda 0.1% 0.0% 1.0% 1.5% 2.5%
130 Ukraine −0.1% −0.5% −0.6% −0.2% −0.3%
131 United Arab Emirates −2.8% −6.6% −11.9% −20.7% −26.3%
132 United Kingdom 1.4% 4.1% 6.1% 7.6% 11.5%
133 United Republic of 
Tanzania
−0.2% −0.5% −0.1% 0.3% 0.8%
134 United States of America 0.6% 2.4% 4.2% 5.4% 8.2%
135 Uruguay 0.4% 1.2% 1.7% 2.6% 5.0%
136 Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of)
−2.2% −5.2% −7.3% −8.8% −12.7%
137 Viet Nam 0.2% 0.8% 1.6% 3.1% 5.8%
138 Yemen −0.8% −0.9% −0.6% −0.1% 0.3%
139 Zambia −0.2% −0.5% 0.2% 1.4% 2.2%
140 Zimbabwe −1.5% −3.8% −5.4% −5.2% −2.9%
Table A3.5 Human capital (Human capital in billions of constant 2005 US$)
Country/year 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
1 Afghanistan 139 200  248  316  382  451
2 Albania 73 73  74  75  75  76
3 Algeria 526 639  757  871  1,019  1,154
4 Argentina 1,009 1,116  1,222  1,336  1,455  1,559
5 Armenia 111 103  101  100  101  103
6 Australia 1,596 1,734  1,901  2,095  2,341  2,545
7 Austria 750 796  816  853  882  919
8 Bahrain 17 20  25  34  52  58
9 Bangladesh 9,128 10,212 11,285 12,243 13,128 13,778
10 Barbados 10 11  11  12  12  13
11 Belgium 890 937  988  1,045  1,124  1,191
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12 Belize 1 1  2  2  2  3




132 149  171  193  217  240
15 Botswana 453 504  532  600  708  776
16 Brazil 1,925 2,174  2,429  2,717  2,987  3,185
17 Bulgaria 2,296 2,147  2,045  1,964  1,920  1,887
18 Burundi 2,739 2,908  3,370  3,952  4,707  5,426
19 Cambodia 90 108  125  137  153  167
20 Cameroon 1,962 2,250  2,557  2,945  3,429  3,837
21 Canada 2,137 2,315  2,511  2,705  2,895  3,088
22 Central African 
Republic
467 532  594  650  742  815
23 Chile 337 380  423  465  508  545
24 China 23,086 26,012 28,448 30,647 32,811 34,371
25 Colombia 523 601  677  757  838  902
26 Congo 698 802  912  1,084  1,370  1,522
27 Costa Rica 37 43  50  56  61  66
28 Côte d’Ivoire 2,054 2,403  2,692  3,012  3,413  3,727
29 Croatia 253 254  250  260  266  263
30 Cuba 297 322  340  356  367  376
31 Cyprus 36 43  50  58  65  70
32 Czech Republic 605 636  643  645  679  692
33 Democratic 
Republic of the 
Congo
19 24  29  35  43  51
34 Denmark 572 592  615  635  655  676
35 Dominican 
Republic
139 158  179  200  223  241
36 Ecuador 115 134  156  177  201  221
37 Egypt 3,423 3,864  4,219  4,746  5,398  6,088
38 El Salvador 118 130  141  151  160  167
39 Estonia 81 76  77  76  77  77
40 Fiji 11 13  13  13  14  16
41 Finland 501 531  552  574  656  668
42 France 3,997 4,244  4,530  4,861  5,176  5,439
43 Gabon 11 14  16  20  23  27
44 Gambia 6 7  9  11  14  16
45 Germany 9,052 9,467  9,692  9,806  9,890  9,928
46 Ghana 1,241 1,389  1,526  1,723  1,960  2,158
47 Greece 567 623  671  718  759  763
48 Guatemala 1,207 1,368  1,534  1,705  1,908  2,071
49 Guyana 2 2  2  2  2  2
50 Haiti 3,022 3,389  3,790  4,180  3,655  4,699
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51 Honduras 17 20  24  27  31  34
52 Hungary 554 585  604  617  627  636
53 Iceland 25 27  29  32  35  37
54 India 315,760 336,737  370,475  402,271  433,257  457,110
55 Indonesia 2,145 2,472  2,793  3,145  3,533  3,851
56 Iran (Islamic 
Republic of)
844 961  1,124  1,303  1,489  1,655
57 Iraq 307 383  478  586  717  853
58 Ireland 268 285  313  363  419  439
59 Israel 260 315  366  408  482  536
60 Italy 3,484 3,644  3,808  4,045  4,280  4,510
61 Jamaica 42 46  50  53  56  57
62 Japan 12,310 12,931  13,528  13,987  14,505  14,688
63 Jordan 63 90  106  127  165  197
64 Kazakhstan 571 567  552  576  648  705
65 Kenya 2,526 2,913  3,262  3,822  4,624  5,208
66 Kuwait 708 554  651  745  869  966
67 Kyrgyzstan 125 135  150  164  179  195
68 Lao People’s 
Democratic 
Republic
110 127  143  156  172  185
69 Latvia 114 110  108  106  102  99
70 Lesotho 1,007 1,051  1,036  986  1,050  1,069
71 Liberia 1,792 1,652  2,324  2,622  3,330  3,627
72 Lithuania 186 194  197  193  188  183
73 Luxembourg 49 55  60  66  74  84
74 Malawi 3,519 3,622  4,046  4,698  5,850  6,892
75 Malaysia 168 207  252  298  344  381
76 Maldives 5 7  8  9  11  12
77 Mali 3,614 4,092  4,704  5,528  6,497  7,355
78 Malta 15 16  17  19  20  22
79 Mauritania 1,030 1,200  1,349  1,536  1,741  1,915
80 Mauritius 23 25  28  29  31  32
81 Mexico 1,747 2,045  2,363  2,631  2,968  3,247
82 Mongolia 110 121  130  140  152  165
83 Morocco 2,947 3,228  3,484  3,730  3,980  4,186
84 Mozambique 10,148 12,536  14,347  15,947  18,087  20,200
85 Myanmar 2,864 3,130  3,398  3,631  3,838  4,000
86 Namibia 75 88  102  111  126  141
87 Nepal 2,642 3,083  3,448  3,751  3,998  4,266
88 Netherlands 1,344 1,426  1,507  1,584  1,640  1,688
89 New Zealand 217 245  264  288  308  324
90 Nicaragua 148 174  192  210  228  241
91 Niger 3,998 4,695  5,581  6,710  8,148  9,452
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92 Nigeria 25,718 29,233 33,063 38,005 43,909 49,003
93 Norway 596 623  653  683  735  788
94 Pakistan 1,033 1,207  1,397  1,603  1,853  2,087
95 Panama 33 38  44  50  56  62
96 Papua New 
Guinea
3,912 4,497  5,155  5,853  6,529  7,032
97 Paraguay 37 43  50  58  64  70
98 Peru 211 245  278  309  343  374
99 Philippines 1,342 1,579  1,823  2,085  2,329  2,533
100 Poland 1,501 1,560  1,599  1,637  1,674  1,707
101 Portugal 341 360  392  429  458  466
102 Qatar 21 23  27  39  82  102
103 Republic of 
Korea
1,301 1,465  1,635  1,762  1,903  1,996
104 Republic of 
Moldova
87 91  93  96  98  100
105 Romania 920 933  957  947  931  940
106 Russian 
Federation
12,773 12,865  12,753 12,543 12,708 12,962
107 Rwanda 794 629  962 1,127  1,343  1,513
108 Saudi Arabia 452 572  695  890  1,091  1,267
109 Senegal 1,891 2,160  2,444  2,803  3,239  3,614
110 Serbia 793 794  788  787  789  783
111 Sierra Leone 4,167 3,834  3,767  4,801  5,497  5,939
112 Singapore 121 150  182  199  254  285
113 Slovakia 246 253  261  264  272  279
114 Slovenia 99 101  104  107  111  114
115 South Africa 3,163 3,491  3,807  4,050  4,459  4,801
116 Spain 1,796 1,982  2,132  2,433  2,709  2,796
117 Sri Lanka 292 331  369  385  392  449
118 Sudan (former) 6,279 7,807  8,939 10,271 10,727 11,597
119 Swaziland 14 17  20  22  25  28
120 Sweden 807 861  903  951  1,014  1,070
121 Switzerland 1,047 1,117  1,159  1,210  1,295  1,365
122 Syrian Arab 
Republic
336 397  464  527  618  535
123 Tajikistan 141 162  179  200  227  252
124 Thailand 1,146 1,263  1,406  1,555  1,657  1,752
125 Togo 276 311  365  420  490  558
126 Trinidad and 
Tobago
52 55  57  60  63  65
127 Tunisia 157 184  211  237  273  305
128 Turkey 952 1,076  1,214  1,359  1,498  1,662
129 Uganda 8,820 10,403  12,068 14,814 17,859 20,695
130 Ukraine 17,579 17,244  16,241 15,419 15,267 15,132
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131 United Arab 
Emirates
971 1,309  1,719  2,245  3,008  3,396
132 United 
Kingdom




8,259 9,635 10,926 12,798 15,218 17,381
134 United States 
of America
22,901 24,852 26,787 28,289 30,118 31,265




315 367  419  478  536  587
137 Viet Nam 618 703  777  846  924  991
138 Yemen 1,758 2,185  2,575  3,016  3,529  3,981
139 Zambia 5,642 6,401  7,309  8,597 10,529 12,037
140 Zimbabwe 10,625 11,013 10,872 10,575 11,484 14,190
Table A3.6  Human capital per capita (Human capital per capita in thousands of constant 
2005 US$)
Country/year 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
1 Afghanistan 11.6 11.9 12.6 12.9 13.7 14.2
2 Albania 22.3 23.0 24.0 24.8 25.7 26.2
3 Algeria 20.3 22.1 24.3 26.2 28.3 29.6
4 Argentina 30.8 31.9 33.0 34.1 35.3 36.3
5 Armenia 31.4 31.9 32.7 33.3 34.1 34.4
6 Australia 93.5 95.9 99.3 102.7 106.3 108.4
7 Austria 97.7 100.2 101.9 103.7 105.4 107.6
8 Bahrain 33.9 35.7 37.2 39.2 41.6 42.7
9 Bangladesh 86.1 86.2 85.9 85.7 86.6 86.6
10 Barbados 39.7 41.1 40.9 42.8 43.2 45.9
11 Belgium 89.3 92.4 96.4 99.8 103.2 106.1
12 Belize 6.7 6.9 7.1 7.2 7.4 7.6
13 Benin 407.3 409.2 413.3 412.1 417.0 420.1
14 Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of)
19.2 19.7 20.6 21.2 21.9 22.7
15 Botswana 328.2 319.9 306.5 321.6 345.5 349.4
16 Brazil 12.8 13.4 13.8 14.4 15.0 15.5
17 Bulgaria 263.4 255.4 250.3 253.7 259.5 261.2
18 Burundi 487.9 466.1 498.0 498.1 497.5 501.7
19 Cambodia 9.9 10.1 10.3 10.3 10.7 10.9
20 Cameroon 162.5 161.5 160.6 162.4 166.5 168.5
21 Canada 76.9 78.9 81.6 83.7 85.1 86.9
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22 Central African Republic 158.9 159.6 159.3 160.3 166.9 169.7
23 Chile 25.6 26.7 27.9 28.9 29.9 30.7
24 China 20.3 21.6 22.5 23.5 24.5 25.2
25 Colombia 15.3 16.1 16.8 17.5 18.2 18.9
26 Congo 292.3 294.8 293.3 309.5 336.9 337.9
27 Costa Rica 11.9 12.3 12.7 13.1 13.5 13.8
28 Côte d’Ivoire 168.8 166.9 163.0 166.1 169.5 168.2
29 Croatia 52.9 54.3 56.6 58.6 60.3 62.0
30 Cuba 28.1 29.5 30.5 31.6 32.4 33.1
31 Cyprus 46.9 49.8 52.8 56.1 59.0 61.0
32 Czech Republic 58.6 61.6 62.7 63.2 64.8 65.7
33 Democratic Republic of 
the Congo
0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.7
34 Denmark 111.3 113.2 115.1 117.1 118.1 119.7
35 Dominican Republic 19.4 20.0 20.9 21.6 22.6 23.2
36 Ecuador 11.2 11.7 12.3 12.9 13.4 13.9
37 Egypt 60.7 61.9 61.7 63.3 65.8 68.0
38 El Salvador 22.4 23.3 24.3 25.3 26.4 27.4
39 Estonia 51.8 53.1 55.0 56.4 57.9 58.6
40 Fiji 15.3 16.8 16.3 15.8 16.5 18.1
41 Finland 100.5 104.0 106.7 109.4 122.2 122.2
42 France 68.3 71.3 74.4 76.9 79.6 81.8
43 Gabon 11.7 12.5 13.3 14.3 15.1 15.8
44 Gambia 6.5 6.8 7.2 7.6 8.0 8.4
45 Germany 114.0 115.9 117.9 118.9 120.9 122.6
46 Ghana 84.9 82.8 81.1 80.5 80.6 80.6
47 Greece 55.6 59.0 62.1 65.4 68.2 70.1
48 Guatemala 131.7 132.1 131.2 129.3 129.5 129.3
49 Guyana 2.5 2.6 2.6 2.7 2.8 2.8
50 Haiti 425.7 433.4 443.3 451.3 365.6 444.5
51 Honduras 3.5 3.6 3.8 3.9 4.1 4.2
52 Hungary 53.4 56.7 59.1 61.2 62.7 64.5
53 Iceland 99.5 101.2 103.9 107.5 110.2 112.5
54 India 362.7 350.4 351.8 351.6 352.0 353.0
55 Indonesia 11.8 12.5 13.2 13.9 14.6 15.1
56 Iran (Islamic Republic of) 15.0 15.9 17.1 18.6 20.1 21.2
57 Iraq 17.5 18.9 20.3 21.7 23.2 24.2
58 Ireland 76.3 78.9 82.3 87.4 91.9 95.1
59 Israel 55.7 56.9 58.2 58.9 63.3 65.3
60 Italy 61.4 64.1 66.9 69.8 72.2 74.2
61 Jamaica 17.8 18.7 19.5 20.2 20.7 21.1
62 Japan 99.7 103.1 106.7 109.4 113.2 115.6
63 Jordan 18.7 20.8 22.3 23.9 25.3 26.6
64 Kazakhstan 35.0 35.9 37.1 38.1 39.7 40.8
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65 Kenya 107.7 106.4 105.0 108.1 114.7 116.1
66 Kuwait 343.7 338.2 337.6 329.1 283.9 257.3
67 Kyrgyzstan 28.4 29.6 30.6 31.7 32.8 33.5
68 Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic
25.8 26.2 26.7 27.2 27.5 27.7
69 Latvia 42.7 44.2 45.7 47.3 48.5 49.5
70 Lesotho 630.5 599.3 558.0 512.1 522.2 506.7
71 Liberia 852.3 794.3 803.6 801.8 841.4 824.9
72 Lithuania 50.4 53.4 56.2 58.2 60.7 62.4
73 Luxembourg 129.3 133.8 137.2 142.0 146.9 151.0
74 Malawi 374.1 368.7 361.5 368.5 396.1 412.8
75 Malaysia 9.3 10.0 10.8 11.5 12.2 12.8
76 Maldives 24.7 25.8 27.1 28.2 30.2 30.0
77 Mali 426.1 424.4 425.8 429.2 428.3 430.5
78 Malta 41.5 42.9 44.8 46.7 48.7 50.8
79 Mauritania 508.9 514.3 497.7 487.1 484.7 482.4
80 Mauritius 21.5 22.2 23.2 24.0 24.8 25.3
81 Mexico 20.4 21.7 23.0 24.0 25.0 25.9
82 Mongolia 50.6 52.6 54.4 55.4 56.0 56.6
83 Morocco 118.1 118.8 120.4 122.7 123.9 123.4
84 Mozambique 758.9 787.8 785.5 754.8 743.7 742.2
85 Myanmar 68.2 70.0 71.3 72.6 74.2 74.9
86 Namibia 52.7 53.0 53.5 54.9 57.5 58.7
87 Nepal 141.0 144.1 145.2 147.0 148.8 151.4
88 Netherlands 89.9 92.2 94.6 97.0 98.7 100.1
89 New Zealand 65.1 66.8 68.5 69.7 70.9 71.9
90 Nicaragua 35.6 37.7 38.2 39.0 39.7 40.0
91 Niger 505.3 501.5 497.2 497.6 500.1 494.5
92 Nigeria 269.0 269.7 269.0 272.2 275.5 276.1
93 Norway 140.5 142.9 145.3 147.8 150.4 153.5
94 Pakistan 9.6 9.8 10.1 10.4 10.9 11.3
95 Panama 13.2 13.9 14.5 15.0 15.6 16.0
96 Papua New Guinea 941.0 953.6 959.2 961.6 953.4 942.2
97 Paraguay 8.8 9.1 9.5 9.9 10.4 10.6
98 Peru 9.7 10.2 10.7 11.2 11.7 12.1
99 Philippines 21.7 22.6 23.4 24.2 25.0 25.6
100 Poland 39.4 40.4 41.8 42.9 44.0 44.9
101 Portugal 34.1 35.9 38.1 40.8 43.3 44.8
102 Qatar 43.1 44.9 45.7 46.5 46.5 46.8
103 Republic of Korea 30.4 32.5 34.8 36.6 38.5 39.6
104 Republic of Moldova 23.6 24.8 25.7 26.6 27.5 28.1
105 Romania 39.6 41.1 42.6 44.4 46.0 47.2
106 Russian Federation 86.1 86.7 87.0 87.4 89.0 90.1
107 Rwanda 109.3 106.4 119.9 125.2 130.5 133.4
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108 Saudi Arabia 27.6 30.4 32.5 36.0 38.8 41.0
109 Senegal 251.7 248.0 247.9 248.7 250.0 246.3
110 Serbia 104.5 104.1 104.9 105.8 108.2 109.8
111 Sierra Leone 1,059.9 999.0 927.7 946.6 951.6 940.4
112 Singapore 39.8 42.6 45.2 46.8 50.1 52.1
113 Slovakia 46.4 47.1 48.4 49.2 50.5 51.5
114 Slovenia 49.5 50.8 52.1 53.4 54.3 55.4
115 South Africa 89.9 89.2 86.5 85.7 87.8 88.8
116 Spain 46.2 50.3 53.0 55.7 58.2 60.2
117 Sri Lanka 17.1 18.3 19.8 19.9 19.5 21.6
118 Sudan (former) 313.8 316.2 318.4 321.1 297.0 294.7
119 Swaziland 16.1 17.2 18.4 19.7 21.1 22.3
120 Sweden 94.3 97.6 101.8 105.4 108.1 110.3
121 Switzerland 156.0 158.6 161.4 162.7 165.5 166.7
122 Syrian Arab Republic 27.0 27.7 28.3 29.1 29.8 28.5
123 Tajikistan 26.6 28.0 28.9 29.4 29.9 30.3
124 Thailand 20.3 21.3 22.4 23.6 24.8 25.9
125 Togo 72.8 72.6 74.9 75.2 76.7 78.5
126 Trinidad and Tobago 42.2 43.7 45.3 46.1 47.4 48.2
127 Tunisia 19.2 20.6 22.0 23.6 25.9 27.7
128 Turkey 17.6 18.4 19.2 20.0 20.7 21.4
129 Uganda 507.3 509.6 507.9 528.3 538.8 547.7
130 Ukraine 338.8 334.8 330.3 327.3 332.8 333.6
131 United Arab Emirates 536.0 557.0 563.5 500.9 361.1 373.8
132 United Kingdom 69.2 71.0 73.4 75.3 77.2 79.4
133 United Republic of 
Tanzania
324.4 322.2 321.4 327.6 333.4 335.4
134 United States of America 91.7 93.3 94.9 95.7 97.4 98.0
135 Uruguay 61.0 61.9 63.1 64.4 65.2 65.9
136 Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of)
15.9 16.5 17.1 17.9 18.5 19.1
137 Viet Nam 9.4 9.8 10.0 10.3 10.6 10.9
138 Yemen 147.0 143.1 144.7 147.1 149.6 152.0
139 Zambia 692.9 691.7 690.5 713.8 756.5 765.7
140 Zimbabwe 1,013.4 942.7 869.8 814.4 821.8 930.8
Table A3.7  Human capital growth (Human capital change (%) with respect to base year 
1990)
Country/year 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
1 Afghanistan 7.5% 15.4% 22.7% 28.7% 47.8%
2 Albania 0.1% 0.4% 0.6% 0.6% 1.3%
3 Algeria 4.0% 9.5% 13.5% 18.0% 30.0%
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4 Argentina 2.0% 4.9% 7.3% 9.6% 15.6%
5 Armenia −1.5% −2.5% −2.5% −2.3% −2.4%
6 Australia 1.7% 4.5% 7.0% 10.0% 16.8%
7 Austria 1.2% 2.1% 3.3% 4.1% 7.0%
8 Bahrain 3.6% 10.2% 19.2% 32.9% 51.3%
9 Bangladesh 2.3% 5.4% 7.6% 9.5% 14.7%
10 Barbados 1.1% 1.7% 3.2% 4.0% 8.0%
11 Belgium 1.0% 2.6% 4.1% 6.0% 10.2%
12 Belize 2.5% 8.5% 13.0% 17.4% 28.5%
13 Benin 3.8% 9.0% 13.4% 18.1% 29.8%
14 Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 2.5% 6.8% 10.0% 13.3% 22.1%
15 Botswana 2.2% 4.1% 7.3% 11.8% 19.6%
16 Brazil 2.5% 6.0% 9.0% 11.6% 18.3%
17 Bulgaria −1.3% −2.9% −3.8% −4.4% −6.3%
18 Burundi 1.2% 5.3% 9.6% 14.5% 25.6%
19 Cambodia 3.9% 8.7% 11.3% 14.4% 23.0%
20 Cameroon 2.8% 6.9% 10.7% 15.0% 25.1%
21 Canada 1.6% 4.1% 6.1% 7.9% 13.1%
22 Central African Republic 2.7% 6.2% 8.6% 12.3% 20.4%
23 Chile 2.4% 5.9% 8.4% 10.8% 17.4%
24 China 2.4% 5.4% 7.3% 9.2% 14.2%
25 Colombia 2.8% 6.7% 9.7% 12.5% 19.9%
26 Congo 2.8% 6.9% 11.7% 18.4% 29.7%
27 Costa Rica 3.2% 7.9% 10.8% 13.6% 21.2%
28 Côte d’Ivoire 3.2% 7.0% 10.0% 13.5% 22.0%
29 Croatia 0.1% −0.2% 0.7% 1.3% 1.3%
30 Cuba 1.6% 3.4% 4.6% 5.4% 8.2%
31 Cyprus 3.4% 8.5% 12.6% 16.0% 25.1%
32 Czech Republic 1.0% 1.5% 1.6% 2.9% 4.6%
33 Democratic Republic of the Congo 4.7% 10.8% 16.4% 22.5% 38.4%
34 Denmark 0.7% 1.8% 2.6% 3.4% 5.7%
35 Dominican Republic 2.6% 6.5% 9.5% 12.6% 20.2%
36 Ecuador 3.2% 7.9% 11.4% 15.0% 24.4%
37 Egypt 2.5% 5.4% 8.5% 12.1% 21.2%
38 El Salvador 2.1% 4.6% 6.3% 7.9% 12.4%
39 Estonia −1.2% −1.4% −1.5% −1.3% −1.7%
40 Fiji 3.1% 4.2% 3.7% 6.2% 12.8%
41 Finland 1.2% 2.5% 3.5% 6.9% 10.0%
42 France 1.2% 3.2% 5.0% 6.7% 10.8%
43 Gabon 4.1% 10.1% 15.2% 20.2% 33.6%
44 Gambia 3.9% 10.1% 16.1% 22.7% 39.0%
45 Germany 0.9% 1.7% 2.0% 2.2% 3.1%
46 Ghana 2.3% 5.3% 8.5% 12.1% 20.2%
47 Greece 1.9% 4.3% 6.1% 7.5% 10.4%
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48 Guatemala 2.5% 6.2% 9.0% 12.1% 19.7%
49 Guyana 0.7% 2.3% 2.9% 4.0% 6.0%
50 Haiti 2.3% 5.8% 8.4% 4.9% 15.8%
51 Honduras 3.5% 8.3% 12.1% 15.8% 25.5%
52 Hungary 1.1% 2.2% 2.7% 3.2% 4.7%
53 Iceland 1.3% 3.6% 5.9% 8.4% 13.2%
54 India 1.3% 4.1% 6.2% 8.2% 13.1%
55 Indonesia 2.9% 6.8% 10.0% 13.3% 21.5%
56 Iran (Islamic Republic of) 2.6% 7.4% 11.5% 15.3% 25.2%
57 Iraq 4.5% 11.7% 17.6% 23.7% 40.7%
58 Ireland 1.2% 4.0% 7.9% 11.8% 17.9%
59 Israel 4.0% 9.0% 11.9% 16.7% 27.3%
60 Italy 0.9% 2.2% 3.8% 5.3% 9.0%
61 Jamaica 1.8% 4.4% 5.9% 7.0% 10.6%
62 Japan 1.0% 2.4% 3.2% 4.2% 6.1%
63 Jordan 7.5% 14.1% 19.4% 27.4% 46.5%
64 Kazakhstan −0.2% −0.9% 0.2% 3.2% 7.3%
65 Kenya 2.9% 6.6% 10.9% 16.3% 27.3%
66 Kuwait −4.8% −2.1% 1.3% 5.3% 10.9%
67 Kyrgyzstan 1.6% 4.8% 7.0% 9.4% 16.2%
68 Lao People’s Democratic Republic 3.0% 6.8% 9.2% 11.9% 19.0%
69 Latvia −0.7% −1.2% −1.8% −2.7% −4.6%
70 Lesotho 0.9% 0.7% −0.5% 1.0% 2.0%
71 Liberia −1.6% 6.7% 10.0% 16.8% 26.5%
72 Lithuania 0.8% 1.4% 0.9% 0.2% −0.6%
73 Luxembourg 2.1% 4.9% 7.5% 10.8% 19.4%
74 Malawi 0.6% 3.5% 7.5% 13.5% 25.1%
75 Malaysia 4.2% 10.6% 15.3% 19.6% 31.3%
76 Maldives 4.1% 9.5% 13.9% 19.7% 30.6%
77 Mali 2.5% 6.8% 11.2% 15.8% 26.7%
78 Malta 1.6% 3.8% 6.5% 8.3% 13.9%
79 Mauritania 3.1% 7.0% 10.5% 14.0% 23.0%
80 Mauritius 1.9% 4.9% 6.7% 8.1% 12.0%
81 Mexico 3.2% 7.8% 10.8% 14.2% 22.9%
82 Mongolia 1.8% 4.2% 6.1% 8.3% 14.3%
83 Morocco 1.8% 4.3% 6.1% 7.8% 12.4%
84 Mozambique 4.3% 9.0% 12.0% 15.5% 25.8%
85 Myanmar 1.8% 4.4% 6.1% 7.6% 11.8%
86 Namibia 3.3% 8.0% 10.5% 14.0% 23.6%
87 Nepal 3.1% 6.9% 9.2% 10.9% 17.3%
88 Netherlands 1.2% 2.9% 4.2% 5.1% 7.9%
89 New Zealand 2.5% 5.1% 7.4% 9.2% 14.3%
90 Nicaragua 3.3% 6.8% 9.2% 11.5% 17.7%
91 Niger 3.3% 8.7% 13.8% 19.5% 33.2%
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92 Nigeria 2.6% 6.5% 10.3% 14.3% 24.0%
93 Norway 0.9% 2.3% 3.5% 5.4% 9.8%
94 Pakistan 3.2% 7.8% 11.6% 15.7% 26.4%
95 Panama 3.1% 7.7% 11.1% 14.6% 23.6%
96 Papua New Guinea 2.8% 7.1% 10.6% 13.7% 21.6%
97 Paraguay 3.2% 8.0% 11.6% 14.7% 23.4%
98 Peru 3.0% 7.1% 10.0% 12.9% 21.0%
99 Philippines 3.3% 8.0% 11.6% 14.8% 23.6%
100 Poland 0.8% 1.6% 2.2% 2.8% 4.4%
101 Portugal 1.1% 3.6% 5.9% 7.7% 11.0%
102 Qatar 1.9% 7.2% 17.3% 41.4% 70.5%
103 Republic of Korea 2.4% 5.9% 7.9% 10.0% 15.3%
104 Republic of Moldova 0.9% 1.8% 2.3% 2.9% 4.6%
105 Romania 0.3% 1.0% 0.7% 0.3% 0.7%
106 Russian Federation 0.1% 0.0% −0.5% −0.1% 0.5%
107 Rwanda −4.5% 4.9% 9.2% 14.1% 24.0%
108 Saudi Arabia 4.8% 11.3% 18.4% 24.6% 41.0%
109 Senegal 2.7% 6.6% 10.3% 14.4% 24.1%
110 Serbia 0.0% −0.1% −0.2% −0.1% −0.4%
111 Sierra Leone −1.7% −2.5% 3.6% 7.2% 12.5%
112 Singapore 4.4% 10.7% 13.3% 20.3% 33.0%
113 Slovakia 0.6% 1.5% 1.8% 2.6% 4.3%
114 Slovenia 0.4% 1.2% 2.0% 3.0% 5.0%
115 South Africa 2.0% 4.7% 6.4% 9.0% 14.9%
116 Spain 2.0% 4.4% 7.9% 10.8% 15.9%
117 Sri Lanka 2.6% 6.1% 7.2% 7.7% 15.5%
118 Sudan (former) 4.5% 9.2% 13.1% 14.3% 22.7%
119 Swaziland 3.6% 9.0% 11.9% 16.1% 26.8%
120 Sweden 1.3% 2.9% 4.2% 5.9% 9.8%
121 Switzerland 1.3% 2.6% 3.7% 5.5% 9.2%
122 Syrian Arab Republic 3.4% 8.4% 11.9% 16.5% 16.8%
123 Tajikistan 2.8% 6.2% 9.2% 12.7% 21.4%
124 Thailand 2.0% 5.2% 7.9% 9.6% 15.2%
125 Togo 2.4% 7.3% 11.1% 15.5% 26.5%
126 Trinidad and Tobago 1.2% 2.7% 3.8% 5.1% 8.2%
127 Tunisia 3.3% 7.6% 10.8% 14.9% 24.8%
128 Turkey 2.5% 6.3% 9.3% 12.0% 20.4%
129 Uganda 3.4% 8.2% 13.8% 19.3% 32.9%
130 Ukraine −0.4% −2.0% −3.2% −3.5% −4.9%
131 United Arab Emirates 6.2% 15.3% 23.3% 32.7% 51.8%
132 United Kingdom 0.8% 2.2% 3.5% 5.2% 9.0%
133 United Republic of Tanzania 3.1% 7.2% 11.6% 16.5% 28.2%
134 United States of America 1.6% 4.0% 5.4% 7.1% 10.9%
135 Uruguay 1.0% 2.5% 3.1% 3.8% 5.9%
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136 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 3.1% 7.4% 11.0% 14.2% 23.0%
137 Viet Nam 2.6% 5.9% 8.2% 10.6% 17.1%
138 Yemen 4.4% 10.0% 14.4% 19.0% 31.3%
139 Zambia 2.6% 6.7% 11.1% 16.9% 28.7%
140 Zimbabwe 0.7% 0.6% −0.1% 2.0% 10.1%
Table A3.8  Human capital per capita growth (Human capital per capita change (%) with 
respect to base year 1990)
Country/year 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
1 Afghanistan 0.7% 2.1% 2.9% 4.3% 7.2%
2 Albania 0.7% 1.9% 2.8% 3.7% 5.7%
3 Algeria 1.7% 4.6% 6.6% 8.6% 13.5%
4 Argentina 0.7% 1.7% 2.6% 3.5% 5.6%
5 Armenia 0.3% 1.1% 1.5% 2.1% 3.1%
6 Australia 0.5% 1.5% 2.4% 3.2% 5.1%
7 Austria 0.5% 1.1% 1.5% 1.9% 3.3%
8 Bahrain 1.0% 2.4% 3.7% 5.2% 8.0%
9 Bangladesh 0.0% 0.0% −0.1% 0.1% 0.2%
10 Barbados 0.7% 0.8% 1.9% 2.1% 5.0%
11 Belgium 0.7% 1.9% 2.8% 3.7% 5.9%
12 Belize 0.5% 1.3% 1.9% 2.6% 4.2%
13 Benin 0.1% 0.4% 0.3% 0.6% 1.0%
14 Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 0.5% 1.7% 2.4% 3.3% 5.7%
15 Botswana −0.5% −1.7% −0.5% 1.3% 2.1%
16 Brazil 0.9% 1.9% 3.0% 4.1% 6.5%
17 Bulgaria −0.6% −1.3% −0.9% −0.4% −0.3%
18 Burundi −0.9% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 0.9%
19 Cambodia 0.4% 0.8% 0.9% 1.8% 3.0%
20 Cameroon −0.1% −0.3% 0.0% 0.6% 1.2%
21 Canada 0.5% 1.5% 2.1% 2.6% 4.2%
22 Central African Republic 0.1% 0.1% 0.2% 1.2% 2.2%
23 Chile 0.9% 2.1% 3.0% 3.9% 6.2%
24 China 1.2% 2.6% 3.7% 4.8% 7.4%
25 Colombia 1.0% 2.4% 3.5% 4.6% 7.3%
26 Congo 0.2% 0.1% 1.4% 3.6% 5.0%
27 Costa Rica 0.7% 1.7% 2.4% 3.2% 5.1%
28 Côte d’Ivoire −0.2% −0.9% −0.4% 0.1% −0.1%
29 Croatia 0.6% 1.7% 2.6% 3.3% 5.4%
30 Cuba 1.0% 2.1% 3.0% 3.7% 5.7%
31 Cyprus 1.2% 3.0% 4.6% 5.9% 9.2%
32 Czech Republic 1.0% 1.7% 1.9% 2.6% 3.9%
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33 Democratic Republic of the 
Congo
0.9% 2.4% 3.5% 4.6% 7.3%
34 Denmark 0.3% 0.9% 1.3% 1.5% 2.5%
35 Dominican Republic 0.7% 1.9% 2.8% 3.9% 6.2%
36 Ecuador 0.9% 2.4% 3.5% 4.6% 7.3%
37 Egypt 0.4% 0.4% 1.1% 2.0% 3.8%
38 El Salvador 0.8% 2.0% 3.1% 4.2% 6.9%
39 Estonia 0.5% 1.5% 2.1% 2.8% 4.2%
40 Fiji 1.8% 1.5% 0.7% 1.9% 5.7%
41 Finland 0.7% 1.5% 2.1% 5.0% 6.7%
42 France 0.9% 2.1% 3.0% 3.9% 6.2%
43 Gabon 1.4% 3.2% 5.0% 6.6% 10.4%
44 Gambia 0.9% 2.4% 3.7% 5.2% 8.5%
45 Germany 0.3% 0.9% 1.1% 1.5% 2.5%
46 Ghana −0.5% −1.1% −1.3% −1.3% −1.7%
47 Greece 1.2% 2.8% 4.1% 5.2% 8.0%
48 Guatemala 0.1% −0.1% −0.5% −0.4% −0.6%
49 Guyana 0.5% 1.5% 2.1% 2.8% 4.0%
50 Haiti 0.4% 1.0% 1.5% −3.7% 1.4%
51 Honduras 0.9% 1.9% 3.0% 4.1% 6.7%
52 Hungary 1.2% 2.6% 3.5% 4.1% 6.5%
53 Iceland 0.3% 1.1% 1.9% 2.6% 4.2%
54 India −0.7% −0.8% −0.8% −0.7% −0.9%
55 Indonesia 1.2% 2.8% 4.1% 5.5% 8.6%
56 Iran (Islamic Republic of) 1.2% 3.2% 5.5% 7.5% 12.1%
57 Iraq 1.5% 3.7% 5.5% 7.3% 11.3%
58 Ireland 0.7% 1.9% 3.5% 4.8% 7.6%
59 Israel 0.4% 1.1% 1.4% 3.2% 5.4%
60 Italy 0.9% 2.1% 3.2% 4.1% 6.5%
61 Jamaica 1.0% 2.4% 3.2% 3.9% 6.0%
62 Japan 0.7% 1.7% 2.4% 3.2% 5.1%
63 Jordan 2.2% 4.6% 6.4% 8.0% 12.5%
64 Kazakhstan 0.5% 1.5% 2.1% 3.2% 5.3%
65 Kenya −0.2% −0.6% 0.1% 1.6% 2.5%
66 Kuwait −0.3% −0.5% −1.1% −4.7% −9.2%
67 Kyrgyzstan 0.9% 1.9% 2.8% 3.7% 5.7%
68 Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic
0.3% 0.9% 1.3% 1.5% 2.3%
69 Latvia 0.7% 1.7% 2.6% 3.2% 5.1%
70 Lesotho −1.0% −3.0% −5.1% −4.6% −7.0%
71 Liberia −1.4% −1.5% −1.5% −0.3% −1.1%
72 Lithuania 1.2% 2.8% 3.7% 4.8% 7.4%
73 Luxembourg 0.7% 1.5% 2.4% 3.2% 5.3%
74 Malawi −0.3% −0.9% −0.4% 1.4% 3.3%
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75 Malaysia 1.5% 3.9% 5.7% 7.3% 11.3%
76 Maldives 0.9% 2.3% 3.4% 5.1% 6.6%
77 Mali −0.1% 0.0% 0.2% 0.1% 0.3%
78 Malta 0.7% 1.9% 3.0% 4.1% 7.0%
79 Mauritania 0.2% −0.6% −1.1% −1.2% −1.8%
80 Mauritius 0.7% 1.9% 2.8% 3.7% 5.7%
81 Mexico 1.2% 3.0% 4.1% 5.2% 8.3%
82 Mongolia 0.8% 1.8% 2.3% 2.6% 3.8%
83 Morocco 0.1% 0.5% 1.0% 1.2% 1.5%
84 Mozambique 0.7% 0.9% −0.1% −0.5% −0.7%
85 Myanmar 0.5% 1.1% 1.6% 2.1% 3.2%
86 Namibia 0.1% 0.4% 1.0% 2.2% 3.6%
87 Nepal 0.4% 0.7% 1.1% 1.4% 2.4%
88 Netherlands 0.5% 1.3% 1.9% 2.4% 3.6%
89 New Zealand 0.5% 1.3% 1.7% 2.1% 3.3%
90 Nicaragua 1.2% 1.8% 2.3% 2.8% 4.0%
91 Niger −0.2% −0.4% −0.4% −0.3% −0.7%
92 Nigeria 0.1% 0.0% 0.3% 0.6% 0.9%
93 Norway 0.3% 0.9% 1.3% 1.7% 3.0%
94 Pakistan 0.5% 1.3% 2.1% 3.2% 5.5%
95 Panama 1.0% 2.4% 3.2% 4.1% 6.5%
96 Papua New Guinea 0.3% 0.5% 0.5% 0.3% 0.0%
97 Paraguay 0.7% 1.9% 3.0% 4.1% 6.5%
98 Peru 1.0% 2.6% 3.7% 4.8% 7.6%
99 Philippines 0.9% 1.9% 2.8% 3.7% 5.7%
100 Poland 0.5% 1.5% 2.1% 2.8% 4.5%
101 Portugal 1.0% 2.8% 4.6% 6.1% 9.5%
102 Qatar 0.9% 1.5% 1.9% 1.9% 2.8%
103 Republic of Korea 1.4% 3.5% 4.8% 6.1% 9.2%
104 Republic of Moldova 1.0% 2.1% 3.0% 3.9% 6.0%
105 Romania 0.7% 1.8% 2.9% 3.8% 6.0%
106 Russian Federation 0.1% 0.2% 0.4% 0.8% 1.5%
107 Rwanda −0.5% 2.3% 3.4% 4.5% 6.9%
108 Saudi Arabia 1.9% 4.1% 6.8% 8.9% 14.0%
109 Senegal −0.3% −0.4% −0.3% −0.2% −0.7%
110 Serbia −0.1% 0.1% 0.3% 0.9% 1.7%
111 Sierra Leone −1.2% −3.3% −2.8% −2.7% −3.9%
112 Singapore 1.4% 3.2% 4.1% 5.9% 9.4%
113 Slovakia 0.3% 1.1% 1.5% 2.1% 3.6%
114 Slovenia 0.5% 1.3% 1.9% 2.4% 3.9%
115 South Africa −0.1% −0.9% −1.2% −0.6% −0.4%
116 Spain 1.7% 3.5% 4.8% 5.9% 9.2%
117 Sri Lanka 1.4% 3.7% 3.9% 3.3% 8.2%
118 Sudan (former) 0.1% 0.4% 0.6% −1.4% −2.1%
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119 Swaziland 1.4% 3.5% 5.2% 7.0% 11.5%
120 Sweden 0.7% 1.9% 2.8% 3.5% 5.4%
121 Switzerland 0.3% 0.9% 1.1% 1.5% 2.2%
122 Syrian Arab Republic 0.5% 1.3% 1.9% 2.6% 1.9%
123 Tajikistan 1.0% 2.1% 2.6% 3.0% 4.5%
124 Thailand 1.0% 2.6% 3.9% 5.2% 8.5%
125 Togo −0.1% 0.7% 0.8% 1.3% 2.5%
126 Trinidad and Tobago 0.7% 1.8% 2.3% 3.0% 4.5%
127 Tunisia 1.4% 3.5% 5.2% 7.7% 13.0%
128 Turkey 0.9% 2.1% 3.2% 4.1% 6.7%
129 Uganda 0.1% 0.0% 1.0% 1.5% 2.6%
130 Ukraine −0.2% −0.6% −0.9% −0.4% −0.5%
131 United Arab Emirates 0.8% 1.3% −1.7% −9.4% −11.3%
132 United Kingdom 0.5% 1.5% 2.1% 2.8% 4.7%
133 United Republic of Tanzania −0.1% −0.2% 0.2% 0.7% 1.1%
134 United States of America 0.3% 0.9% 1.1% 1.5% 2.2%
135 Uruguay 0.3% 0.9% 1.4% 1.7% 2.6%
136 Venezuela (Bolivarian  
Republic of)
0.9% 1.9% 3.0% 3.9% 6.4%
137 Viet Nam 0.9% 1.7% 2.4% 3.2% 5.3%
138 Yemen −0.5% −0.4% 0.0% 0.4% 1.1%
139 Zambia 0.0% −0.1% 0.7% 2.2% 3.4%
140 Zimbabwe −1.4% −3.7% −5.3% −5.1% −2.8%
Table A3.9 Produced capital (Produced capital in billions of constant 2005 US$)
Country/year 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
1 Afghanistan 25 25 24 24 28 31
2 Albania 25 23 24 31 41 47
3 Algeria 280 293 309 346 421 512
4 Argentina 488 533 608 634 770 915
5 Armenia 15 15 14 16 23 25
6 Australia 1,333 1,557 1,900 2,397 3,105 3,755
7 Austria 805 937 1,077 1,210 1,330 1,418
8 Bahrain 25 30 34 42 65 74
9 Bangladesh 53 66 91 130 190 259
10 Barbados 10 10 11 12 13 13
11 Belgium 875 1,004 1,148 1,300 1,478 1,605
12 Belize 1 2 2 3 3 4
13 Benin 9 11 12 15 18 21
14 Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of)
13 15 19 21 25 32
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15 Botswana 8 13 18 25 35 47
16 Brazil 1,899 2,068 2,316 2,506 2,904 3,435
17 Bulgaria 48 46 49 66 99 114
18 Burundi 2 2 2 3 3 5
19 Cambodia 4 4 6 9 15 21
20 Cameroon 32 34 36 42 51 61
21 Canada 2,010 2,295 2,686 3,227 3,899 4,468
22 Central African 
Republic
4 4 4 4 4 4
23 Chile 91 129 186 248 352 465
24 China 1,537 2,365 3,831 6,445 11,534 18,000
25 Colombia 276 338 382 420 530 669
26 Congo 16 19 20 22 30 45
27 Costa Rica 23 29 37 46 60 75
28 Côte d’Ivoire 147 146 160 138 121 102
29 Croatia 94 95 110 135 170 183
30 Cuba 111 106 101 97 106 113
31 Cyprus 40 48 54 61 73 74
32 Czech Republic 383 418 483 558 659 719
33 Democratic Republic 
of the Congo
50 47 43 40 45 53
34 Denmark 519 583 693 809 933 997
35 Dominican Republic 47 58 84 107 140 164
36 Ecuador 88 99 106 121 145 180
37 Egypt 95 117 150 188 260 307
38 El Salvador 24 28 33 39 45 49
39 Estonia 31 31 35 46 59 68
40 Fiji 6 6 7 8 9 10
41 Finland 539 570 639 727 818 868
42 France 5,152 5,829 6,548 7,452 8,404 9,019
43 Gabon 42 42 45 47 50 55
44 Gambia 1 1 1 2 2 3
45 Germany 7,209 8,321 9,384 10,196 11,045 11,749
46 Ghana 30 32 36 43 59 84
47 Greece 579 616 693 812 940 906
48 Guatemala 42 48 59 70 82 90
49 Guyana 3 4 5 5 6 7
50 Haiti 8 9 11 15 17 20
51 Honduras 16 20 26 31 39 43
52 Hungary 288 301 332 385 437 462
53 Iceland 31 34 40 49 58 59
54 India 867 1,141 1,557 2,241 3,618 5,049
55 Indonesia 310 485 660 811 1,056 1,343
56 Iran (Islamic 
Republic of )
558 599 652 793 989 1,096
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57 Iraq 60 54 48 56 77 112
58 Ireland 285 320 419 580 736 799
59 Israel 203 270 349 404 475 557
60 Italy 4,493 5,021 5,594 6,326 6,941 7,072
61 Jamaica 34 40 44 49 53 54
62 Japan 13,360 16,115 18,265 19,606 20,452 20,939
63 Jordan 26 32 37 43 55 65
64 Kazakhstan 259 284 260 265 327 386
65 Kenya 34 38 44 51 69 90
66 Kuwait 86 95 107 127 192 248
67 Kyrgyzstan 9 9 9 9 11 13
68 Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic
2 3 5 7 13 20
69 Latvia 33 32 35 47 64 73
70 Lesotho 4 5 7 7 8 9
71 Liberia 3 3 3 2 3 4
72 Lithuania 67 67 70 79 97 108
73 Luxembourg 49 60 76 96 118 136
74 Malawi 7 7 7 8 10 11
75 Malaysia 134 234 337 413 512 638
76 Maldives 1 1 1 2 4 5
77 Mali 6 7 9 11 14 16
78 Malta 7 9 12 15 19 21
79 Mauritania 5 5 5 7 10 17
80 Mauritius 7 10 14 17 22 26
81 Mexico 1,463 1,724 2,065 2,465 2,973 3,385
82 Mongolia 13 15 16 18 19 27
83 Morocco 115 135 163 204 275 335
84 Mozambique 5 6 8 11 16 33
85 Myanmar 3 3 5 9 23 51
86 Namibia 12 13 15 18 25 35
87 Nepal 9 12 16 20 26 31
88 Netherlands 1,413 1,616 1,915 2,200 2,501 2,651
89 New Zealand 213 235 275 338 401 458
90 Nicaragua 19 19 21 23 26 31
91 Niger 12 11 11 11 15 19
92 Nigeria 185 177 171 168 216 265
93 Norway 688 730 830 928 1,091 1,224
94 Pakistan 157 196 231 265 315 339
95 Panama 18 22 29 34 49 74
96 Papua New Guinea 7 8 9 11 14 22
97 Paraguay 18 23 26 27 31 36
98 Peru 153 166 192 208 272 363
99 Philippines 181 212 256 298 353 419
100 Poland 426 469 615 740 962 1,152
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101 Portugal 402 477 595 703 781 784
102 Qatar 28 31 41 75 206 359
103 Republic of Korea 875 1,562 2,297 3,081 3,906 4,548
104 Republic of Moldova 36 37 32 29 28 24
105 Romania 278 278 293 330 444 495
106 Russian Federation 3,185 3,466 3,189 3,127 3,439 3,774
107 Rwanda 3 3 4 4 7 11
108 Saudi Arabia 411 462 521 639 965 1,328
109 Senegal 13 15 19 24 31 38
110 Serbia 63 62 64 71 90 101
111 Sierra Leone 2 3 2 3 4 6
112 Singapore 137 198 299 374 491 613
113 Slovakia 148 160 183 203 234 255
114 Slovenia 77 83 101 124 151 157
115 South Africa 477 497 543 613 766 895
116 Spain 2,368 2,763 3,287 4,103 4,939 5,167
117 Sri Lanka 35 42 52 64 86 113
118 Sudan (former) 6 7 14 34 61 80
119 Swaziland 11 14 16 16 16 16
120 Sweden 954 1,039 1,158 1,313 1,515 1,669
121 Switzerland 935 1,340 1,606 1,714 1,916 2,054
122 Syrian Arab Republic 43 50 57 71 89 94
123 Tajikistan 13 13 12 11 10 10
124 Thailand 310 522 635 710 829 939
125 Togo 8 7 7 7 8 10
126 Trinidad and Tobago 50 47 48 53 54 52
127 Tunisia 66 76 89 104 123 136
128 Turkey 499 664 871 1,053 1,368 1,683
129 Uganda 11 14 18 26 41 56
130 Ukraine 555 599 538 512 519 496
131 United Arab Emirates 282 318 363 427 591 743
132 United Kingdom 3,826 4,439 5,347 6,279 7,115 7,667
133 United Republic of 
Tanzania
12 21 28 40 66 95
134 United States of 
America
20,669 24,439 30,540 37,543 43,404 47,411
135 Uruguay 34 39 46 49 58 72
136 Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of)
496 520 539 546 651 739
137 Viet Nam 24 41 76 131 227 307
138 Yemen 16 19 25 33 48 58
139 Zambia 29 25 25 29 37 50
140 Zimbabwe 3 4 4 5 5 5
Annex 3: data 279
Table A3.10  Produced capital per capita (Produced capital per capita in thousands of 
constant 2005 US$)
Country/year 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
1 Afghanistan 2.1 1.5 1.2 1.0 1.0 1.0
2 Albania 7.8 7.3 7.9 10.4 14.1 16.2
3 Algeria 10.8 10.1 9.9 10.4 11.7 13.1
4 Argentina 14.9 15.2 16.4 16.2 18.7 21.3
5 Armenia 4.3 4.5 4.5 5.3 7.7 8.4
6 Australia 78.1 86.1 99.2 117.5 140.9 160.0
7 Austria 104.8 117.8 134.5 147.1 159.1 166.0
8 Bahrain 49.9 53.8 51.7 49.0 51.7 54.2
9 Bangladesh 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.3 1.6
10 Barbados 38.3 38.0 41.1 44.4 46.7 46.5
11 Belgium 87.8 99.1 111.9 124.1 135.7 142.9
12 Belize 7.9 9.6 10.0 10.6 10.8 10.7
13 Benin 1.9 1.8 1.8 1.8 1.8 2.0
14 Bolivia (Plurinational State 
of)
1.9 1.9 2.2 2.3 2.5 3.0
15 Botswana 6.0 8.0 10.4 13.6 17.3 21.4
16 Brazil 12.6 12.7 13.2 13.3 14.6 16.7
17 Bulgaria 5.5 5.4 6.0 8.6 13.3 15.7
18 Burundi 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
19 Cambodia 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.7 1.0 1.4
20 Cameroon 2.7 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.5 2.7
21 Canada 72.3 78.2 87.3 99.9 114.7 125.7
22 Central African Republic 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.8
23 Chile 6.9 9.1 12.3 15.4 20.7 26.2
24 China 1.4 2.0 3.0 4.9 8.6 13.2
25 Colombia 8.1 9.0 9.5 9.7 11.5 14.0
26 Congo 6.5 6.9 6.5 6.2 7.3 10.0
27 Costa Rica 7.3 8.1 9.3 10.8 13.2 15.8
28 Côte d’Ivoire 12.1 10.2 9.7 7.6 6.0 4.6
29 Croatia 19.8 20.3 24.8 30.4 38.4 43.1
30 Cuba 10.5 9.7 9.1 8.7 9.3 9.9
31 Cyprus 51.7 56.4 56.8 58.8 66.3 64.4
32 Czech Republic 37.0 40.4 47.1 54.6 62.9 68.3
33 Democratic Republic of 
the Congo
1.4 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.7 0.7
34 Denmark 100.9 111.4 129.8 149.3 168.3 176.7
35 Dominican Republic 6.5 7.4 9.8 11.6 14.1 15.7
36 Ecuador 8.6 8.7 8.4 8.8 9.7 11.3
37 Egypt 1.7 1.9 2.2 2.5 3.2 3.4
38 El Salvador 4.6 5.0 5.8 6.6 7.4 8.0
39 Estonia 19.6 21.9 25.2 33.7 44.5 51.9
40 Fiji 7.7 8.0 8.6 9.8 10.3 10.7
41 Finland 108.1 111.5 123.5 138.5 152.6 158.8
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42 France 88.0 97.9 107.5 117.9 129.2 135.6
43 Gabon 43.8 38.9 36.8 33.8 32.1 32.5
44 Gambia 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.3 1.4 1.4
45 Germany 90.8 101.9 114.1 123.6 135.1 145.1
46 Ghana 2.0 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.4 3.1
47 Greece 56.8 58.3 64.1 73.9 84.5 83.2
48 Guatemala 4.6 4.6 5.0 5.3 5.6 5.6
49 Guyana 4.7 5.7 6.5 7.1 8.1 8.9
50 Haiti 1.2 1.2 1.3 1.6 1.8 1.9
51 Honduras 3.2 3.5 4.1 4.5 5.1 5.4
52 Hungary 27.7 29.1 32.5 38.1 43.7 46.8
53 Iceland 123.0 126.5 142.4 164.7 182.6 179.6
54 India 1.0 1.2 1.5 2.0 2.9 3.9
55 Indonesia 1.7 2.5 3.1 3.6 4.4 5.3
56 Iran (Islamic Republic of) 9.9 9.9 9.9 11.3 13.3 14.0
57 Iraq 3.4 2.7 2.0 2.1 2.5 3.2
58 Ireland 81.0 88.7 110.1 139.3 161.3 173.1
59 Israel 43.6 48.7 55.5 58.3 62.3 67.7
60 Italy 79.2 88.3 98.2 109.1 117.1 116.3
61 Jamaica 14.4 16.1 16.9 18.5 19.5 19.8
62 Japan 108.2 128.5 144.0 153.4 159.7 164.7
63 Jordan 7.8 7.5 7.8 8.0 8.4 8.7
64 Kazakhstan 15.9 18.0 17.5 17.5 20.0 22.3
65 Kenya 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.5 1.7 2.0
66 Kuwait 41.6 58.2 55.2 56.0 62.7 66.2
67 Kyrgyzstan 2.0 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.9 2.2
68 Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic
0.5 0.7 0.9 1.3 2.1 2.9
69 Latvia 12.4 13.0 15.0 21.0 30.7 36.5
70 Lesotho 2.3 3.1 3.7 3.8 4.0 4.4
71 Liberia 1.4 1.2 0.9 0.7 0.8 0.9
72 Lithuania 18.2 18.4 19.9 23.9 31.4 36.7
73 Luxembourg 128.6 147.2 174.4 206.1 232.0 245.0
74 Malawi 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.6
75 Malaysia 7.4 11.3 14.4 16.0 18.2 21.4
76 Maldives 2.9 3.8 5.2 7.4 11.1 13.5
77 Mali 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.9 0.9
78 Malta 18.4 24.3 32.3 38.3 46.4 50.0
79 Mauritania 2.4 2.1 1.8 2.2 2.8 4.2
80 Mauritius 7.1 9.2 11.5 14.1 17.9 20.7
81 Mexico 17.1 18.3 20.1 22.5 25.1 27.0
82 Mongolia 6.1 6.5 6.9 7.3 7.0 9.2
83 Morocco 4.6 5.0 5.6 6.7 8.6 9.9
84 Mozambique 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.7 1.2
(Continued )
Annex 3: data 281
Country/year 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
85 Myanmar 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 1.0
86 Namibia 8.7 7.9 7.9 9.0 11.6 14.6
87 Nepal 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.1
88 Netherlands 94.5 104.5 120.3 134.8 150.5 157.2
89 New Zealand 63.9 64.0 71.3 81.7 92.2 101.5
90 Nicaragua 4.6 4.1 4.2 4.3 4.6 5.1
91 Niger 1.5 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.9 1.0
92 Nigeria 1.9 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.4 1.5
93 Norway 162.1 167.4 184.7 200.8 223.1 238.2
94 Pakistan 1.5 1.6 1.7 1.7 1.9 1.8
95 Panama 7.3 8.1 9.7 10.3 13.5 19.1
96 Papua New Guinea 1.8 1.7 1.7 1.8 2.1 2.9
97 Paraguay 4.3 4.8 4.8 4.7 4.9 5.5
98 Peru 7.0 6.9 7.4 7.5 9.3 11.7
99 Philippines 2.9 3.0 3.3 3.5 3.8 4.2
100 Poland 11.2 12.1 16.1 19.4 25.3 30.3
101 Portugal 40.2 47.6 57.8 67.0 73.9 75.4
102 Qatar 58.6 61.4 69.1 89.5 116.4 165.2
103 Republic of Korea 20.4 34.6 48.9 64.0 79.1 90.2
104 Republic of Moldova 9.7 10.0 8.8 8.1 7.9 6.7
105 Romania 12.0 12.3 13.0 15.5 21.9 24.9
106 Russian Federation 21.5 23.4 21.8 21.8 24.1 26.2
107 Rwanda 0.4 0.5 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.9
108 Saudi Arabia 25.1 24.5 24.4 25.8 34.4 43.0
109 Senegal 1.7 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.4 2.6
110 Serbia 8.2 8.2 8.5 9.6 12.4 14.2
111 Sierra Leone 0.6 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.6 0.9
112 Singapore 44.8 56.2 74.1 87.8 96.8 112.1
113 Slovakia 27.9 29.8 33.9 37.8 43.4 47.0
114 Slovenia 38.6 41.9 50.8 61.9 73.5 76.3
115 South Africa 13.6 12.7 12.3 13.0 15.1 16.6
116 Spain 61.0 70.1 81.6 94.0 106.0 111.2
117 Sri Lanka 2.1 2.3 2.8 3.3 4.3 5.4
118 Sudan (former) 0.3 0.3 0.5 1.1 1.7 2.0
119 Swaziland 12.2 14.7 14.9 14.9 13.6 12.5
120 Sweden 111.4 117.7 130.5 145.4 161.5 172.2
121 Switzerland 139.2 190.3 223.5 230.4 244.8 250.8
122 Syrian Arab Republic 3.4 3.5 3.5 3.9 4.3 5.0
123 Tajikistan 2.4 2.3 2.0 1.6 1.4 1.2
124 Thailand 5.5 8.8 10.1 10.8 12.4 13.9
125 Togo 2.0 1.6 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.4
126 Trinidad and Tobago 40.8 37.3 37.5 41.1 40.6 38.1
127 Tunisia 8.1 8.5 9.3 10.3 11.7 12.4
128 Turkey 9.2 11.4 13.8 15.5 18.9 21.7
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129 Uganda 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.2 1.5
130 Ukraine 10.7 11.6 10.9 10.9 11.3 10.9
131 United Arab Emirates 155.7 135.2 119.0 95.2 70.9 81.7
132 United Kingdom 66.8 76.5 90.8 104.0 113.4 118.7
133 United Republic of 
Tanzania
0.5 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.4 1.8
134 United States of America 82.8 91.8 108.2 127.0 140.3 148.7
135 Uruguay 10.9 12.1 13.9 14.7 17.3 20.9
136 Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of)
24.9 23.4 22.0 20.4 22.4 24.1
137 Viet Nam 0.4 0.6 1.0 1.6 2.6 3.4
138 Yemen 1.4 1.2 1.4 1.6 2.0 2.2
139 Zambia 3.5 2.7 2.3 2.4 2.7 3.2
140 Zimbabwe 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.3 0.3
Table A3.11  Produced capital growth (Produced capital change (%) with respect to base 
year 1990)
Country/year 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
1 Afghanistan −0.5% −1.7% −0.8% 2.6% 6.8%
2 Albania −1.9% −1.2% 5.3% 12.6% 22.5%
3 Algeria 0.8% 2.5% 5.4% 10.7% 22.2%
4 Argentina 1.8% 5.6% 6.7% 12.0% 23.3%
5 Armenia −0.8% −2.0% 1.3% 10.8% 18.6%
6 Australia 3.2% 9.3% 15.8% 23.5% 41.2%
7 Austria 3.1% 7.6% 10.7% 13.4% 20.8%
8 Bahrain 4.1% 8.7% 14.5% 27.4% 43.9%
9 Bangladesh 4.5% 14.4% 24.9% 37.2% 69.3%
10 Barbados 0.2% 2.7% 5.1% 7.0% 9.7%
11 Belgium 2.8% 7.0% 10.4% 14.0% 22.4%
12 Belize 6.2% 13.9% 19.6% 24.0% 36.6%
13 Benin 2.2% 6.9% 11.6% 16.6% 31.3%
14 Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of)
2.8% 10.2% 13.1% 18.3% 35.3%
15 Botswana 8.7% 21.5% 32.1% 43.6% 78.6%
16 Brazil 1.7% 5.1% 7.2% 11.2% 21.8%
17 Bulgaria −0.8% 0.8% 8.6% 20.0% 33.7%
18 Burundi −0.6% −0.3% 3.1% 8.7% 23.6%
19 Cambodia 2.4% 10.6% 23.2% 39.7% 76.0%
20 Cameroon 0.8% 2.8% 7.0% 11.7% 23.3%
21 Canada 2.7% 7.5% 12.6% 18.0% 30.5%
22 Central African 
Republic
1.7% 1.6% 0.9% 0.9% 0.1%
23 Chile 7.2% 19.5% 28.4% 40.1% 72.1%
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24 China 9.0% 25.6% 43.1% 65.5% 127.1%
25 Colombia 4.1% 8.4% 11.0% 17.7% 34.2%
26 Congo 3.9% 6.8% 8.5% 17.4% 42.5%
27 Costa Rica 4.7% 12.6% 19.3% 27.5% 48.9%
28 Côte d’Ivoire −0.1% 2.1% −1.6% −4.9% −11.4%
29 Croatia 0.0% 3.8% 9.4% 15.8% 24.6%
30 Cuba −1.0% −2.4% −3.2% −1.2% 0.7%
31 Cyprus 4.0% 7.8% 11.2% 16.6% 23.3%
32 Czech Republic 1.8% 6.0% 9.9% 14.6% 23.4%
33 Democratic Republic 
of the Congo
−1.2% −4.2% −5.5% −2.9% 1.4%
34 Denmark 2.4% 7.5% 11.8% 15.8% 24.3%
35 Dominican Republic 4.3% 15.5% 22.8% 31.3% 51.6%
36 Ecuador 2.4% 4.9% 8.3% 13.4% 27.0%
37 Egypt 4.2% 12.2% 18.6% 28.6% 47.8%
38 El Salvador 3.2% 8.8% 13.2% 17.0% 26.9%
39 Estonia 0.4% 3.4% 10.3% 17.8% 30.4%
40 Fiji 2.1% 5.5% 9.4% 12.0% 19.3%
41 Finland 1.1% 4.3% 7.7% 11.0% 17.2%
42 France 2.5% 6.2% 9.7% 13.0% 20.5%
43 Gabon 0.3% 2.1% 2.8% 4.4% 9.6%
44 Gambia 8.3% 17.4% 32.7% 41.0% 65.7%
45 Germany 2.9% 6.8% 9.1% 11.3% 17.7%
46 Ghana 1.6% 4.8% 9.6% 18.4% 41.4%
47 Greece 1.2% 4.6% 8.8% 12.9% 16.1%
48 Guatemala 2.6% 8.7% 13.7% 18.3% 29.1%
49 Guyana 3.8% 9.1% 11.5% 15.4% 25.7%
50 Haiti 2.0% 8.5% 15.1% 20.5% 34.5%
51 Honduras 4.9% 13.1% 18.6% 25.4% 40.7%
52 Hungary 0.9% 3.7% 7.5% 11.0% 17.1%
53 Iceland 1.5% 6.3% 11.7% 16.7% 23.3%
54 India 5.7% 15.8% 26.8% 42.9% 79.9%
55 Indonesia 9.4% 20.8% 27.2% 35.9% 63.1%
56 Iran (Islamic 
Republic of)
1.4% 4.0% 9.2% 15.4% 25.2%
57 Iraq −2.2% −5.7% −2.0% 6.3% 23.0%
58 Ireland 2.4% 10.2% 19.5% 26.8% 41.1%
59 Israel 5.9% 14.5% 18.8% 23.7% 39.9%
60 Italy 2.2% 5.6% 8.9% 11.5% 16.3%
61 Jamaica 3.0% 6.3% 9.3% 11.2% 16.1%
62 Japan 3.8% 8.1% 10.1% 11.2% 16.2%
63 Jordan 4.3% 9.1% 13.0% 20.2% 35.2%
64 Kazakhstan 1.8% 0.1% 0.6% 5.9% 14.2%
65 Kenya 2.1% 6.4% 10.8% 19.0% 38.0%
66 Kuwait 2.1% 5.6% 10.3% 22.3% 42.6%
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67 Kyrgyzstan 0.8% 0.3% 0.5% 4.9% 13.1%
68 Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic
10.7% 25.9% 38.9% 59.7% 113.7%
69 Latvia −0.6% 1.7% 9.1% 18.0% 30.0%
70 Lesotho 8.2% 17.5% 19.3% 21.7% 36.5%
71 Liberia −3.3% −2.3% −4.9% 0.7% 9.1%
72 Lithuania −0.2% 0.8% 4.2% 9.6% 16.9%
73 Luxembourg 4.2% 11.6% 18.2% 24.4% 40.5%
74 Malawi 0.5% 0.5% 1.4% 8.9% 13.5%
75 Malaysia 11.8% 26.0% 32.5% 39.8% 68.3%
76 Maldives 9.2% 24.3% 39.5% 59.4% 105.2%
77 Mali 4.5% 10.4% 15.6% 22.8% 38.4%
78 Malta 6.6% 17.2% 24.1% 31.0% 48.5%
79 Mauritania 0.3% 0.6% 9.8% 20.6% 51.4%
80 Mauritius 6.6% 16.2% 23.5% 31.7% 51.7%
81 Mexico 3.3% 9.0% 13.9% 19.4% 32.3%
82 Mongolia 2.2% 5.3% 8.2% 9.3% 25.8%
83 Morocco 3.2% 9.1% 15.4% 24.2% 42.6%
84 Mozambique 3.7% 13.2% 22.8% 36.5% 91.4%
85 Myanmar 4.9% 18.6% 36.1% 71.2% 168.8%
86 Namibia 1.1% 5.2% 10.3% 19.9% 41.5%
87 Nepal 6.1% 15.3% 22.4% 29.9% 50.9%
88 Netherlands 2.7% 7.9% 11.7% 15.4% 23.3%
89 New Zealand 2.0% 6.6% 12.2% 17.2% 29.1%
90 Nicaragua −0.1% 2.7% 5.2% 8.3% 17.2%
91 Niger −1.1% −1.9% −0.4% 6.1% 17.7%
92 Nigeria −0.9% −2.0% −2.5% 3.9% 12.7%
93 Norway 1.2% 4.8% 7.8% 12.2% 21.2%
94 Pakistan 4.6% 10.2% 14.0% 19.1% 29.3%
95 Panama 4.4% 13.1% 17.4% 28.4% 60.1%
96 Papua New Guinea 1.9% 5.8% 11.2% 18.5% 44.3%
97 Paraguay 4.5% 8.8% 10.3% 13.9% 25.1%
98 Peru 1.7% 5.8% 8.1% 15.5% 33.5%
99 Philippines 3.3% 9.1% 13.3% 18.2% 32.4%
100 Poland 1.9% 9.7% 14.8% 22.6% 39.4%
101 Portugal 3.5% 10.3% 15.0% 18.1% 25.0%
102 Qatar 2.0% 10.1% 28.0% 64.7% 134.2%
103 Republic of Korea 12.3% 27.3% 37.0% 45.3% 73.2%
104 Republic of Moldova 0.4% −2.8% −5.3% −6.0% −12.8%
105 Romania 0.0% 1.3% 4.4% 12.4% 21.2%
106 Russian Federation 1.7% 0.0% −0.5% 1.9% 5.8%
107 Rwanda 1.2% 4.2% 10.1% 23.5% 51.9%
108 Saudi Arabia 2.4% 6.1% 11.7% 23.8% 47.8%
109 Senegal 2.9% 9.3% 15.9% 24.0% 43.3%
110 Serbia 0.0% 0.4% 3.3% 9.6% 17.4%
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111 Sierra Leone 1.3% −0.1% 1.7% 8.9% 31.3%
112 Singapore 7.7% 21.6% 28.7% 37.7% 64.9%
113 Slovakia 1.6% 5.5% 8.3% 12.2% 19.9%
114 Slovenia 1.5% 6.9% 12.5% 18.2% 26.8%
115 South Africa 0.8% 3.3% 6.5% 12.6% 23.3%
116 Spain 3.1% 8.5% 14.7% 20.2% 29.7%
117 Sri Lanka 3.6% 10.1% 15.8% 24.8% 47.4%
118 Sudan (former) 3.2% 24.9% 55.5% 79.3% 138.8%
119 Swaziland 6.1% 10.9% 11.9% 11.4% 14.8%
120 Sweden 1.7% 5.0% 8.3% 12.3% 20.5%
121 Switzerland 7.5% 14.5% 16.4% 19.6% 30.0%
122 Syrian Arab Republic 3.2% 7.8% 13.7% 20.3% 30.3%
123 Tajikistan 0.6% −1.6% −4.2% −5.5% −8.4%
124 Thailand 11.0% 19.7% 23.0% 27.9% 44.7%
125 Togo −1.5% −2.5% −1.7% 0.5% 8.7%
126 Trinidad and Tobago −1.2% −1.2% 1.7% 2.0% 1.1%
127 Tunisia 2.9% 7.5% 11.8% 16.9% 27.2%
128 Turkey 5.9% 14.9% 20.5% 28.6% 49.9%
129 Uganda 4.4% 13.7% 23.9% 38.6% 72.4%
130 Ukraine 1.5% −0.8% −2.0% −1.6% −3.7%
131 United Arab Emirates 2.4% 6.5% 10.9% 20.3% 38.1%
132 United Kingdom 3.0% 8.7% 13.2% 16.8% 26.1%
133 United Republic of 
Tanzania
12.5% 24.3% 36.0% 53.5% 100.3%
134 United States of 
America
3.4% 10.3% 16.1% 20.4% 31.9%
135 Uruguay 2.8% 8.0% 9.5% 14.4% 28.2%
136 Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of)
1.0% 2.1% 2.5% 7.1% 14.2%
137 Viet Nam 11.6% 33.9% 53.5% 76.0% 135.1%
138 Yemen 2.7% 11.1% 18.8% 31.0% 52.2%
139 Zambia −2.4% −3.6% 0.7% 6.9% 20.3%
140 Zimbabwe 3.3% 6.6% 9.8% 8.9% 14.0%
Table A3.12  Produced capital per capita growth (Produced capital per capita change (%) 
with respect to base year 1990)
Country/year 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
1 Afghanistan −6.8% −13.0% −16.8% −16.8% −22.5%
2 Albania −1.3% 0.3% 7.6% 16.1% 27.9%
3 Algeria −1.3% −2.2% −1.0% 2.0% 6.7%
4 Argentina 0.4% 2.4% 2.1% 5.8% 12.6%
5 Armenia 1.1% 1.5% 5.5% 15.9% 25.2%
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6 Australia 2.0% 6.2% 10.8% 15.9% 27.0%
7 Austria 2.4% 6.4% 8.8% 11.0% 16.6%
8 Bahrain 1.5% 0.9% −0.5% 0.9% 2.8%
9 Bangladesh 2.2% 8.4% 15.9% 25.5% 47.8%
10 Barbados −0.2% 1.8% 3.8% 5.1% 6.7%
11 Belgium 2.4% 6.3% 9.0% 11.5% 17.6%
12 Belize 4.1% 6.3% 7.9% 8.3% 10.7%
13 Benin −1.4% −1.5% −1.3% −0.7% 2.2%
14 Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of)
0.8% 4.9% 5.3% 7.9% 17.2%
15 Botswana 5.9% 14.7% 22.6% 30.1% 52.4%
16 Brazil 0.1% 1.1% 1.3% 3.7% 9.7%
17 Bulgaria −0.1% 2.4% 11.9% 25.0% 42.3%
18 Burundi −2.7% −4.8% −5.4% −4.6% −0.7%
19 Cambodia −1.1% 2.5% 11.7% 24.3% 47.4%
20 Cameroon −2.0% −4.1% −3.4% −2.2% −0.2%
21 Canada 1.6% 4.8% 8.4% 12.2% 20.2%
22 Central African 
Republic
−0.9% −4.3% −7.0% −9.0% −15.0%
23 Chile 5.5% 15.3% 22.0% 31.4% 55.6%
24 China 7.7% 22.3% 38.2% 58.8% 113.6%
25 Colombia 2.3% 4.1% 4.7% 9.4% 20.2%
26 Congo 1.2% −0.1% −1.4% 2.8% 15.3%
27 Costa Rica 2.1% 6.1% 10.2% 15.9% 29.0%
28 Côte d’Ivoire −3.5% −5.4% −11.0% −16.1% −27.5%
29 Croatia 0.5% 5.8% 11.4% 18.1% 29.7%
30 Cuba −1.6% −3.6% −4.7% −2.8% −1.7%
31 Cyprus 1.8% 2.4% 3.3% 6.4% 7.6%
32 Czech Republic 1.8% 6.2% 10.2% 14.2% 22.7%
33 Democratic Republic 
of the Congo
−4.9% −11.5% −16.0% −17.1% −21.3%
34 Denmark 2.0% 6.5% 10.3% 13.6% 20.5%
35 Dominican Republic 2.4% 10.6% 15.3% 21.2% 33.9%
36 Ecuador 0.1% −0.5% 0.6% 3.1% 9.6%
37 Egypt 2.1% 6.9% 10.4% 17.1% 26.7%
38 El Salvador 1.9% 6.0% 9.8% 13.0% 20.7%
39 Estonia 2.2% 6.4% 14.5% 22.7% 38.3%
40 Fiji 0.9% 2.7% 6.1% 7.5% 11.7%
41 Finland 0.6% 3.4% 6.4% 9.0% 13.7%
42 France 2.1% 5.1% 7.6% 10.1% 15.5%
43 Gabon −2.3% −4.3% −6.2% −7.4% −9.5%
44 Gambia 5.1% 9.1% 18.5% 21.0% 29.4%
45 Germany 2.3% 5.9% 8.0% 10.5% 16.9%
46 Ghana −1.1% −1.6% −0.4% 4.3% 15.5%
47 Greece 0.5% 3.1% 6.8% 10.4% 13.6%
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48 Guatemala 0.1% 2.3% 3.8% 5.0% 7.1%
49 Guyana 3.6% 8.3% 10.7% 14.1% 23.3%
50 Haiti 0.0% 3.5% 7.7% 10.6% 17.8%
51 Honduras 2.2% 6.5% 9.0% 12.7% 19.7%
52 Hungary 1.0% 4.1% 8.3% 12.0% 19.1%
53 Iceland 0.6% 3.7% 7.6% 10.4% 13.4%
54 India 3.6% 10.4% 18.4% 31.1% 57.6%
55 Indonesia 7.6% 16.2% 20.3% 26.5% 45.7%
56 Iran (Islamic 
Republic of)
0.0% −0.1% 3.3% 7.6% 12.2%
57 Iraq −5.0% −12.5% −12.1% −7.8% −2.7%
58 Ireland 1.8% 8.0% 14.5% 18.8% 28.8%
59 Israel 2.3% 6.2% 7.6% 9.3% 15.8%
60 Italy 2.2% 5.5% 8.3% 10.3% 13.7%
61 Jamaica 2.3% 4.1% 6.6% 8.0% 11.2%
62 Japan 3.5% 7.4% 9.1% 10.2% 15.1%
63 Jordan −0.8% −0.1% 0.7% 1.8% 3.8%
64 Kazakhstan 2.5% 2.5% 2.5% 6.0% 12.1%
65 Kenya −1.1% −0.8% 0.0% 3.9% 11.2%
66 Kuwait 6.9% 7.3% 7.7% 10.7% 16.7%
67 Kyrgyzstan 0.0% −2.4% −3.5% −0.6% 2.8%
68 Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic
7.7% 18.8% 28.8% 45.0% 83.6%
69 Latvia 0.8% 4.7% 14.0% 25.3% 43.2%
70 Lesotho 6.2% 13.2% 13.9% 14.9% 24.4%
71 Liberia −3.1% −9.8% −14.8% −14.0% −14.7%
72 Lithuania 0.2% 2.2% 7.0% 14.5% 26.3%
73 Luxembourg 2.8% 7.9% 12.5% 15.9% 24.0%
74 Malawi −0.3% −3.8% −6.0% −2.7% −6.2%
75 Malaysia 9.0% 18.3% 21.5% 25.4% 42.7%
76 Maldives 5.8% 16.1% 26.6% 40.0% 67.4%
77 Mali 1.8% 3.3% 4.2% 6.2% 9.6%
78 Malta 5.7% 15.0% 20.1% 25.9% 39.5%
79 Mauritania −2.5% −6.5% −1.8% 4.5% 20.9%
80 Mauritius 5.4% 12.9% 19.0% 26.3% 43.1%
81 Mexico 1.3% 4.1% 7.1% 10.1% 16.5%
82 Mongolia 1.1% 2.9% 4.3% 3.5% 14.3%
83 Morocco 1.5% 5.1% 9.8% 16.6% 28.8%
84 Mozambique 0.1% 4.7% 9.5% 17.5% 51.0%
85 Myanmar 3.6% 14.9% 30.3% 62.5% 148.1%
86 Namibia −2.0% −2.3% 0.9% 7.4% 18.7%
87 Nepal 3.3% 8.7% 13.4% 18.7% 31.7%
88 Netherlands 2.0% 6.2% 9.3% 12.4% 18.5%
89 New Zealand 0.0% 2.8% 6.3% 9.6% 16.7%
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90 Nicaragua −2.2% −2.1% −1.4% −0.1% 3.5%
91 Niger −4.4% −10.1% −12.8% −11.5% −12.3%
92 Nigeria −3.3% −8.0% −11.3% −8.6% −8.3%
93 Norway 0.6% 3.3% 5.5% 8.3% 13.7%
94 Pakistan 1.9% 3.5% 4.3% 6.2% 7.9%
95 Panama 2.2% 7.4% 9.1% 16.7% 37.9%
96 Papua New Guinea −0.7% −0.7% 1.1% 4.6% 18.7%
97 Paraguay 2.0% 2.7% 1.9% 3.4% 8.0%
98 Peru −0.3% 1.4% 1.9% 7.2% 18.8%
99 Philippines 0.8% 3.0% 4.4% 6.8% 13.2%
100 Poland 1.7% 9.5% 14.8% 22.7% 39.5%
101 Portugal 3.4% 9.5% 13.6% 16.4% 23.3%
102 Qatar 0.9% 4.2% 11.2% 18.7% 41.3%
103 Republic of Korea 11.1% 24.4% 33.1% 40.3% 64.1%
104 Republic of Moldova 0.5% −2.4% −4.6% −5.1% −11.6%
105 Romania 0.5% 2.2% 6.6% 16.3% 27.6%
106 Russian Federation 1.7% 0.3% 0.4% 2.9% 6.9%
107 Rwanda 5.5% 1.7% 4.3% 13.2% 30.9%
108 Saudi Arabia −0.5% −0.8% 0.7% 8.1% 19.6%
109 Senegal −0.1% 2.1% 4.8% 8.2% 14.7%
110 Serbia −0.1% 0.6% 3.8% 10.7% 19.8%
111 Sierra Leone 1.8% −0.9% −4.6% −1.0% 12.1%
112 Singapore 4.6% 13.4% 18.3% 21.2% 35.7%
113 Slovakia 1.4% 5.0% 8.0% 11.7% 19.0%
114 Slovenia 1.6% 7.1% 12.5% 17.4% 25.4%
115 South Africa −1.3% −2.3% −1.1% 2.7% 6.9%
116 Spain 2.8% 7.6% 11.4% 14.8% 22.2%
117 Sri Lanka 2.4% 7.6% 12.2% 19.8% 38.1%
118 Sudan (former) −1.1% 14.8% 38.3% 54.7% 90.6%
119 Swaziland 3.8% 5.2% 5.2% 2.7% 0.9%
120 Sweden 1.1% 4.0% 6.9% 9.7% 15.6%
121 Switzerland 6.5% 12.6% 13.4% 15.2% 21.7%
122 Syrian Arab Republic 0.3% 0.7% 3.5% 6.0% 13.7%
123 Tajikistan −1.1% −5.4% −10.0% −13.6% −21.1%
124 Thailand 10.0% 16.6% 18.5% 22.7% 36.3%
125 Togo −3.9% −8.4% −10.8% −11.8% −11.9%
126 Trinidad and Tobago −1.8% −2.1% 0.2% −0.1% −2.3%
127 Tunisia 1.0% 3.4% 6.2% 9.6% 15.2%
128 Turkey 4.2% 10.5% 13.8% 19.6% 32.9%
129 Uganda 1.1% 5.2% 9.9% 18.0% 33.1%
130 Ukraine 1.7% 0.6% 0.4% 1.4% 0.7%
131 United Arab Emirates −2.8% −6.5% −11.6% −17.8% −19.3%
132 United Kingdom 2.7% 8.0% 11.7% 14.1% 21.1%
133 United Republic of 
Tanzania
8.9% 15.6% 22.2% 32.6% 58.1%
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134 United States of 
America
2.1% 6.9% 11.3% 14.1% 21.5%
135 Uruguay 2.1% 6.3% 7.7% 12.1% 24.2%
136 Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of)
−1.2% −3.1% −4.9% −2.6% −1.2%
137 Viet Nam 9.7% 28.6% 45.2% 64.3% 111.4%
138 Yemen −2.2% 0.6% 3.9% 10.5% 17.2%
139 Zambia −4.9% −9.7% −8.7% −6.5% −3.4%
140 Zimbabwe 1.1% 2.1% 4.1% 1.4% 0.6%
Table A3.13 Natural capital (Natural capital in billions of constant 2005 US$)
Country/year 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
1 Afghanistan 12 12 12 12 12 12
2 Albania 20 19 19 19 19 19
3 Algeria 619 577 530 475 413 366
4 Argentina 867 848 825 819 820 799
5 Armenia 3 3 2 2 5 5
6 Australia 3,341 3,302 3,247 3,175 3,034 2,907
7 Austria 58 59 61 61 60 57
8 Bahrain 8 6 5 4 3 2
9 Bangladesh 62 58 56 54 54 51
10 Barbados 1 1 1 1 1 0
11 Belgium 4 5 6 6 7 6
12 Belize 14 14 13 13 13 13
13 Benin 38 36 33 32 30 30
14 Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of)
737 724 710 694 676 659
15 Botswana 67 64 61 59 56 54
16 Brazil 7,543 7,382 7,198 7,037 6,840 6,786
17 Bulgaria 82 80 78 78 79 56
18 Burundi 5 5 4 4 4 4
19 Cambodia 248 233 217 201 189 180
20 Cameroon 246 233 220 208 200 53
21 Canada 5,516 5,436 5,348 5,247 5,143 4,103
22 Central African Republic 211 209 208 207 205 205
23 Chile 351 338 327 323 310 305
24 China 9,552 9,417 9,094 8,640 8,247 7,882
25 Colombia 997 970 946 909 878 308
26 Congo 301 297 291 285 282 277
27 Costa Rica 52 48 45 46 47 62
28 Côte d’Ivoire 62 73 84 84 84 83
29 Croatia 23 25 25 26 26 25
30 Cuba 31 33 35 36 35 33
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31 Cyprus 1 1 1 1 1 1
32 Czech Republic 81 77 71 66 61 57
33 Democratic Republic of 
the Congo
1,320 1,307 1,294 1,281 1,268 1,258
34 Denmark 77 69 60 49 41 34
35 Dominican Republic 37 37 36 35 35 34
36 Ecuador 335 319 301 283 264 263
37 Egypt 219 199 176 156 135 117
38 El Salvador 9 9 9 9 9 9
39 Estonia 20 15 10 22 21 21
40 Fiji 8 8 8 8 8 8
41 Finland 166 169 171 166 161 155
42 France 276 276 277 279 278 275
43 Gabon 1,123 1,117 1,109 1,103 1,098 1,098
44 Gambia 5 5 5 4 4 4
45 Germany 1,633 1,574 1,528 1,485 1,442 1,413
46 Ghana 78 74 71 66 62 79
47 Greece 249 243 228 219 212 204
48 Guatemala 109 103 95 89 81 86
49 Guyana 203 203 202 202 202 233
50 Haiti 8 7 7 6 5 5
51 Honduras 107 97 85 78 71 65
52 Hungary 69 66 63 61 58 57
53 Iceland 106 104 102 100 99 98
54 India 3,605 3,552 3,489 3,426 3,344 3,242
55 Indonesia 2,974 2,811 2,684 2,587 2,446 2,302
56 Iran (Islamic Republic of) 4,768 4,682 4,577 4,437 4,314 4,116
57 Iraq 1,541 1,528 1,504 1,470 1,434 1,397
58 Ireland 43 35 33 32 32 30
59 Israel 15 14 14 14 13 13
60 Italy 355 345 356 355 362 335
61 Jamaica 32 33 32 32 30 30
62 Japan 567 548 531 509 501 458
63 Jordan 8 8 7 7 7 7
64 Kazakhstan 930 1,015 998 973 937 904
65 Kenya 46 46 44 44 43 47
66 Kuwait 1,606 1,575 1,524 1,472 1,409 1,358
67 Kyrgyzstan 16 16 16 17 18 18
68 Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic
150 147 145 142 140 152
69 Latvia 21 22 23 24 27 25
70 Lesotho 0 0 0 0 0 0
71 Liberia 37 36 35 34 33 32
72 Lithuania 17 17 18 18 18 17
73 Luxembourg 1 1 1 1 1 1
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74 Malawi 25 24 23 23 22 22
75 Malaysia 628 597 558 513 471 461
76 Maldives 3 3 3 3 2 2
77 Mali 75 75 74 72 69 46
78 Malta 0 0 0 0 0 0
79 Mauritania 20 18 17 15 15 13
80 Mauritius 2 2 2 2 2 2
81 Mexico 1,151 1,106 1,055 1,002 952 948
82 Mongolia 221 213 218 202 198 201
83 Morocco 84 82 79 77 75 75
84 Mozambique 272 267 262 258 371 367
85 Myanmar 253 237 220 203 188 175
86 Namibia 54 56 58 60 66 64
87 Nepal 222 202 182 170 170 170
88 Netherlands 157 138 120 105 89 75
89 New Zealand 1,609 1,595 1,592 1,520 1,889 1,713
90 Nicaragua 42 41 39 37 34 36
91 Niger 15 13 12 12 11 11
92 Nigeria 953 917 868 811 742 697
93 Norway 584 533 452 369 298 250
94 Pakistan 1,448 1,302 1,156 1,006 859 747
95 Panama 46 44 42 41 40 47
96 Papua New Guinea 327 318 309 300 292 398
97 Paraguay 115 110 112 108 106 100
98 Peru 1,332 1,305 1,287 1,263 1,234 1,294
99 Philippines 142 141 142 143 149 140
100 Poland 545 524 504 480 461 447
101 Portugal 62 63 65 63 62 58
102 Qatar 452 443 430 411 383 351
103 Republic of Korea 418 418 426 437 440 394
104 Republic of Moldova 6 6 7 7 7 1
105 Romania 218 209 201 191 188 184
106 Russian Federation 10,921 12,965 12,694 12,390 12,079 11,754
107 Rwanda 3 2 3 3 4 4
108 Saudi Arabia 5,882 6,299 6,090 5,872 5,621 5,547
109 Senegal 82 78 75 73 71 71
110 Serbia 25 26 27 30 42 36
111 Sierra Leone 20 19 19 18 16 16
112 Singapore 0 0 0 0 0 0
113 Slovakia 15 16 15 15 15 14
114 Slovenia 24 25 25 26 27 25
115 South Africa 481 461 437 410 384 363
116 Spain 295 300 309 310 310 308
117 Sri Lanka 79 73 68 62 59 63
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118 Sudan (former) 413 398 381 374 363 203
119 Swaziland 2 3 3 3 3 3
120 Sweden 209 204 199 202 197 154
121 Switzerland 86 85 85 85 84 84
122 Syrian Arab Republic 81 72 60 50 42 36
123 Tajikistan 6 7 6 6 6 6
124 Thailand 345 330 309 290 274 272
125 Togo 6 5 5 4 4 4
126 Trinidad and Tobago 72 67 62 53 41 28
127 Tunisia 28 26 23 21 19 17
128 Turkey 650 640 636 622 587 583
129 Uganda 48 46 45 43 41 38
130 Ukraine 672 725 717 706 694 680
131 United Arab Emirates 1,346 1,298 1,249 1,196 1,137 1,086
132 United Kingdom 490 417 327 251 202 166
133 United Republic of 
Tanzania
290 278 265 253 242 380
134 United States of America 10,980 10,671 10,372 10,189 10,018 9,490
135 Uruguay 38 38 38 37 36 36
136 Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of)
4,788 4,715 4,626 4,542 4,467 4,423
137 Viet Nam 359 358 358 350 337 328
138 Yemen 89 85 78 70 86 81
139 Zambia 349 344 339 334 329 328
140 Zimbabwe 102 95 88 81 74 68
Table A3.14  Natural capital per capita (Natural capital per capita in thousands of con-
stant 2005 US$)
Country/year 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
1 Afghanistan 1.0 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4
2 Albania 6.0 6.1 6.2 6.3 6.5 6.4
3 Algeria 23.9 20.0 17.0 14.3 11.4 9.4
4 Argentina 26.5 24.2 22.3 20.9 19.9 18.6
5 Armenia 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 1.6 1.7
6 Australia 195.8 182.7 169.5 155.7 137.7 123.9
7 Austria 7.6 7.5 7.6 7.4 7.1 6.6
8 Bahrain 15.4 11.5 7.9 4.7 2.3 1.4
9 Bangladesh 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3
10 Barbados 2.7 2.5 2.3 2.0 1.8 1.7
11 Belgium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
12 Belize 75.6 67.0 54.4 46.1 39.6 35.6
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13 Benin 7.7 6.0 4.8 3.9 3.1 2.8
14 Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of)
107.5 95.7 85.1 76.1 68.2 62.4
15 Botswana 48.4 40.7 35.4 31.5 27.3 24.3
16 Brazil 50.2 45.3 40.9 37.3 34.4 32.9
17 Bulgaria 9.4 9.5 9.6 10.1 10.7 7.7
18 Burundi 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4
19 Cambodia 27.5 21.8 17.8 15.1 13.2 11.8
20 Cameroon 20.4 16.7 13.8 11.5 9.7 2.3
21 Canada 198.5 185.2 173.8 162.4 151.2 115.4
22 Central African Republic 71.7 62.8 55.8 50.9 46.2 42.6
23 Chile 26.7 23.8 21.6 20.1 18.2 17.2
24 China 8.4 7.8 7.2 6.6 6.2 5.8
25 Colombia 29.1 25.9 23.4 21.0 19.1 6.4
26 Congo 126.0 109.0 93.6 81.4 69.3 61.5
27 Costa Rica 16.9 13.8 11.5 10.7 10.3 13.1
28 Côte d’Ivoire 5.1 5.1 5.1 4.6 4.2 3.7
29 Croatia 4.8 5.3 5.7 5.8 6.0 5.8
30 Cuba 2.9 3.0 3.1 3.2 3.1 2.9
31 Cyprus 1.7 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.1
32 Czech Republic 7.8 7.5 7.0 6.5 5.8 5.5
33 Democratic Republic of 
the Congo
37.7 31.0 26.9 22.8 19.2 16.8
34 Denmark 15.0 13.2 11.2 9.0 7.3 6.1
35 Dominican Republic 5.1 4.7 4.2 3.8 3.5 3.3
36 Ecuador 32.8 27.9 23.9 20.6 17.7 16.6
37 Egypt 3.9 3.2 2.6 2.1 1.6 1.3
38 El Salvador 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
39 Estonia 12.8 10.4 6.9 15.9 16.0 15.8
40 Fiji 11.0 10.5 10.0 9.9 9.5 9.3
41 Finland 33.4 33.0 33.1 31.6 30.1 28.4
42 France 4.7 4.6 4.5 4.4 4.3 4.1
43 Gabon 1,179.2 1,027.8 900.6 800.9 712.4 650.4
44 Gambia 6.0 4.3 3.7 3.0 2.5 2.1
45 Germany 20.6 19.3 18.6 18.0 17.6 17.4
46 Ghana 5.3 4.4 3.7 3.1 2.5 2.9
47 Greece 24.4 23.0 21.1 20.0 19.0 18.7
48 Guatemala 11.9 9.9 8.2 6.7 5.5 5.4
49 Guyana 281.9 279.3 272.7 271.8 267.7 305.3
50 Haiti 1.1 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.5
51 Honduras 21.7 17.3 13.6 11.3 9.5 8.2
52 Hungary 6.6 6.4 6.1 6.1 5.8 5.8
53 Iceland 415.4 388.3 361.9 335.5 309.9 298.5
54 India 4.1 3.7 3.3 3.0 2.7 2.5
55 Indonesia 16.4 14.3 12.7 11.4 10.1 9.0
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56 Iran (Islamic Republic of) 84.9 77.6 69.5 63.3 58.1 52.7
57 Iraq 88.2 75.6 63.8 54.4 46.4 39.6
58 Ireland 12.2 9.7 8.8 7.6 6.9 6.4
59 Israel 3.1 2.6 2.3 2.0 1.8 1.5
60 Italy 6.3 6.1 6.2 6.1 6.1 5.5
61 Jamaica 13.5 13.4 12.5 12.0 11.3 11.1
62 Japan 4.6 4.4 4.2 4.0 3.9 3.6
63 Jordan 2.3 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.1 0.9
64 Kazakhstan 56.9 64.2 67.1 64.2 57.4 52.3
65 Kenya 2.0 1.7 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.1
66 Kuwait 780.1 962.1 790.0 650.1 460.5 361.8
67 Kyrgyzstan 3.6 3.6 3.3 3.2 3.4 3.1
68 Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic
35.4 30.3 27.1 24.7 22.4 22.7
69 Latvia 7.9 8.9 9.9 10.9 12.7 12.7
70 Lesotho 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
71 Liberia 17.8 17.4 12.1 10.3 8.2 7.2
72 Lithuania 4.6 4.8 5.0 5.4 5.8 5.9
73 Luxembourg 3.0 3.2 3.3 3.1 2.8 2.5
74 Malawi 2.6 2.4 2.1 1.8 1.5 1.3
75 Malaysia 34.5 28.8 23.8 19.9 16.8 15.4
76 Maldives 14.2 11.6 11.0 8.9 5.3 4.8
77 Mali 8.9 7.7 6.7 5.6 4.6 2.7
78 Malta 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4
79 Mauritania 9.9 7.8 6.3 4.9 4.0 3.3
80 Mauritius 2.2 1.9 1.7 1.4 1.3 1.3
81 Mexico 13.4 11.7 10.3 9.1 8.0 7.6
82 Mongolia 101.2 92.5 90.9 80.1 73.2 69.2
83 Morocco 3.4 3.0 2.7 2.5 2.3 2.2
84 Mozambique 20.4 16.8 14.4 12.2 15.3 13.5
85 Myanmar 6.0 5.3 4.6 4.1 3.6 3.3
86 Namibia 38.3 34.0 30.7 29.7 30.0 26.7
87 Nepal 11.8 9.4 7.7 6.7 6.3 6.0
88 Netherlands 10.5 8.9 7.6 6.4 5.3 4.4
89 New Zealand 483.1 434.2 412.7 367.8 434.3 379.8
90 Nicaragua 10.2 8.8 7.8 6.9 5.9 6.0
91 Niger 1.9 1.4 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.6
92 Nigeria 10.0 8.5 7.1 5.8 4.7 3.9
93 Norway 137.7 122.2 100.7 79.8 60.9 48.7
94 Pakistan 13.5 10.6 8.4 6.6 5.1 4.0
95 Panama 18.7 16.1 13.9 12.4 11.1 12.2
96 Papua New Guinea 78.7 67.4 57.4 49.4 42.6 53.3
97 Paraguay 27.2 23.1 21.1 18.6 17.1 15.2
98 Peru 61.0 54.3 49.7 45.7 42.0 41.8
99 Philippines 2.3 2.0 1.8 1.7 1.6 1.4
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100 Poland 14.3 13.6 13.2 12.6 12.1 11.8
101 Portugal 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.0 5.9 5.6
102 Qatar 948.7 884.2 724.9 491.3 217.1 161.7
103 Republic of Korea 9.8 9.3 9.1 9.1 8.9 7.8
104 Republic of Moldova 1.6 1.7 1.8 2.0 2.1 0.4
105 Romania 9.4 9.2 9.0 9.0 9.3 9.2
106 Russian Federation 73.6 87.4 86.6 86.3 84.6 81.7
107 Rwanda 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4
108 Saudi Arabia 359.5 334.1 284.7 237.3 200.1 179.6
109 Senegal 10.9 9.0 7.6 6.4 5.5 4.8
110 Serbia 3.3 3.4 3.5 4.0 5.8 5.1
111 Sierra Leone 5.1 5.0 4.6 3.5 2.9 2.6
112 Singapore 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
113 Slovakia 2.8 2.9 2.9 2.8 2.8 2.6
114 Slovenia 12.0 12.4 12.7 13.2 13.4 12.2
115 South Africa 13.7 11.8 9.9 8.7 7.6 6.7
116 Spain 7.6 7.6 7.7 7.1 6.7 6.6
117 Sri Lanka 4.6 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.9 3.1
118 Sudan (former) 20.7 16.1 13.6 11.7 10.1 5.2
119 Swaziland 2.9 2.7 2.5 2.5 2.4 2.4
120 Sweden 24.5 23.2 22.5 22.3 21.0 15.9
121 Switzerland 12.8 12.1 11.9 11.4 10.8 10.2
122 Syrian Arab Republic 6.5 5.0 3.7 2.8 2.0 1.9
123 Tajikistan 1.2 1.1 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.8
124 Thailand 6.1 5.6 4.9 4.4 4.1 4.0
125 Togo 1.5 1.2 1.0 0.7 0.6 0.5
126 Trinidad and Tobago 58.7 53.5 48.7 41.1 30.8 20.6
127 Tunisia 3.5 2.9 2.5 2.1 1.8 1.5
128 Turkey 12.0 10.9 10.1 9.2 8.1 7.5
129 Uganda 2.8 2.3 1.9 1.5 1.2 1.0
130 Ukraine 12.9 14.1 14.6 15.0 15.1 15.0
131 United Arab Emirates 743.0 552.3 409.3 266.9 136.6 119.5
132 United Kingdom 8.6 7.2 5.5 4.2 3.2 2.6
133 United Republic of 
Tanzania
11.4 9.3 7.8 6.5 5.3 7.3
134 United States of America 44.0 40.1 36.8 34.5 32.4 29.8
135 Uruguay 12.3 11.8 11.3 11.2 10.7 10.5
136 Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of)
241.1 212.5 189.0 169.7 154.1 144.1
137 Viet Nam 5.4 5.0 4.6 4.3 3.9 3.6
138 Yemen 7.4 5.6 4.4 3.4 3.6 3.1
139 Zambia 42.8 37.1 32.0 27.7 23.6 20.9
140 Zimbabwe 9.8 8.1 7.0 6.2 5.3 4.5
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Table A3.15  Natural capital growth (Natural capital change (%) with respect to base 
year 1990)
Country/year 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
1 Afghanistan −0.1% −0.2% −0.2% −0.3% −0.8%
2 Albania −0.4% −0.9% −1.1% −1.2% −2.1%
3 Algeria −1.4% −3.8% −6.4% −9.7% −16.1%
4 Argentina −0.4% −1.2% −1.4% −1.4% −2.7%
5 Armenia −1.2% −3.0% −4.7% 13.4% 21.7%
6 Australia −0.2% −0.7% −1.3% −2.4% −4.5%
7 Austria 0.4% 1.0% 1.2% 0.5% −0.9%
8 Bahrain −3.3% −8.9% −14.4% −21.1% −36.3%
9 Bangladesh −1.3% −2.3% −3.2% −3.4% −5.9%
10 Barbados −1.2% −3.2% −6.1% −7.5% −12.3%
11 Belgium 2.9% 7.0% 9.5% 10.9% 13.2%
12 Belize −0.5% −1.3% −2.0% −2.6% −4.1%
13 Benin −1.4% −3.4% −4.8% −6.2% −8.1%
14 Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of)
−0.4% −0.9% −1.5% −2.1% −3.6%
15 Botswana −0.8% −2.1% −3.2% −4.3% −6.9%
16 Brazil −0.4% −1.2% −1.7% −2.4% −3.5%
17 Bulgaria −0.3% −1.0% −1.0% −0.8% −12.0%
18 Burundi −1.9% −5.8% −6.5% −6.5% −7.1%
19 Cambodia −1.2% −3.3% −5.1% −6.5% −10.1%
20 Cameroon −1.1% −2.7% −4.1% −5.1% −39.9%
21 Canada −0.3% −0.8% −1.2% −1.7% −9.4%
22 Central African 
Republic
−0.1% −0.3% −0.5% −0.7% −0.9%
23 Chile −0.7% −1.7% −2.0% −3.1% −4.6%
24 China −0.3% −1.2% −2.5% −3.6% −6.2%
25 Colombia −0.5% −1.3% −2.3% −3.1% −32.4%
26 Congo −0.3% −0.8% −1.3% −1.6% −2.7%
27 Costa Rica −1.5% −3.5% −3.3% −2.7% 5.9%
28 Côte d’Ivoire 3.5% 7.9% 7.9% 8.1% 10.3%
29 Croatia 1.6% 2.4% 2.9% 3.4% 2.2%
30 Cuba 1.4% 2.9% 3.8% 3.3% 1.9%
31 Cyprus −0.2% 0.2% 1.5% −0.3% −0.4%
32 Czech Republic −0.9% −3.0% −4.9% −6.8% −10.7%
33 Democratic Republic 
of the Congo
−0.2% −0.5% −0.7% −1.0% −1.6%
34 Denmark −2.2% −6.2% −10.9% −14.8% −23.8%
35 Dominican Republic −0.1% −0.5% −1.1% −1.4% −2.6%
36 Ecuador −1.0% −2.6% −4.1% −5.8% −7.7%
37 Egypt −1.9% −5.3% −8.1% −11.4% −18.8%
38 El Salvador 0.3% 0.5% 1.5% 1.5% 2.2%
39 Estonia −5.9% −16.9% 1.7% 1.5% 1.1%
40 Fiji 0.4% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 1.1%
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41 Finland 0.2% 0.7% −0.1% −0.8% −2.3%
42 France 0.0% 0.1% 0.3% 0.2% −0.1%
43 Gabon −0.1% −0.3% −0.4% −0.5% −0.8%
44 Gambia −3.5% −4.5% −5.4% −5.8% −9.3%
45 Germany −0.7% −1.6% −2.4% −3.1% −4.7%
46 Ghana −1.1% −2.5% −4.0% −5.7% 0.2%
47 Greece −0.5% −2.2% −3.1% −4.0% −6.4%
48 Guatemala −1.3% −3.3% −5.0% −7.1% −7.7%
49 Guyana 0.0% −0.1% −0.2% −0.2% 4.7%
50 Haiti −1.4% −3.6% −5.8% −8.4% −13.2%
51 Honduras −1.9% −5.6% −7.5% −9.6% −15.1%
52 Hungary −0.9% −2.4% −3.0% −4.3% −6.3%
53 Iceland −0.4% −1.0% −1.5% −1.8% −2.6%
54 India −0.3% −0.8% −1.3% −1.9% −3.5%
55 Indonesia −1.1% −2.5% −3.4% −4.8% −8.2%
56 Iran (Islamic 
Republic of)
−0.4% −1.0% −1.8% −2.5% −4.8%
57 Iraq −0.2% −0.6% −1.2% −1.8% −3.2%
58 Ireland −3.8% −6.0% −7.3% −7.2% −11.6%
59 Israel −0.2% −0.5% −1.4% −2.1% −4.8%
60 Italy −0.5% 0.1% 0.0% 0.5% −1.9%
61 Jamaica 0.6% −0.1% −0.6% −1.5% −2.1%
62 Japan −0.7% −1.6% −2.7% −3.0% −6.9%
63 Jordan 0.1% −0.7% −1.7% −2.3% −3.6%
64 Kazakhstan 1.8% 1.8% 1.1% 0.2% −1.0%
65 Kenya −0.2% −1.0% −1.4% −1.6% 0.7%
66 Kuwait −0.4% −1.3% −2.2% −3.2% −5.4%
67 Kyrgyzstan 0.4% 0.9% 1.2% 3.9% 4.2%
68 Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic
−0.4% −1.0% −1.4% −1.8% 0.3%
69 Latvia 1.2% 2.7% 3.8% 6.2% 6.4%
70 Lesotho −0.1% −0.1% −0.2% −0.3% −1.8%
71 Liberia −0.7% −1.7% −2.5% −3.4% −5.5%
72 Lithuania 0.4% 0.9% 1.5% 1.5% 0.4%
73 Luxembourg 2.2% 5.2% 5.2% 5.2% 5.8%
74 Malawi −0.7% −1.3% −2.0% −2.6% −4.0%
75 Malaysia −1.0% −2.9% −5.0% −6.9% −9.8%
76 Maldives −0.8% 0.4% −2.0% −11.0% −14.5%
77 Mali −0.2% −0.5% −1.1% −2.1% −15.5%
78 Malta −1.7% −4.7% −3.6% −1.9% −5.5%
79 Mauritania −2.0% −4.1% −6.2% −7.7% −13.4%
80 Mauritius −1.3% −3.3% −6.3% −7.6% −11.5%
81 Mexico −0.8% −2.1% −3.4% −4.6% −6.3%
82 Mongolia −0.8% −0.4% −2.2% −2.7% −3.1%
83 Morocco −0.5% −1.3% −2.1% −2.6% −3.7%
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84 Mozambique −0.4% −0.9% −1.3% 8.1% 10.4%
85 Myanmar −1.3% −3.4% −5.3% −7.1% −11.5%
86 Namibia 0.7% 1.8% 2.7% 5.0% 5.7%
87 Nepal −1.9% −4.9% −6.5% −6.5% −8.6%
88 Netherlands −2.6% −6.5% −9.7% −13.4% −21.9%
89 New Zealand −0.2% −0.3% −1.4% 4.1% 2.1%
90 Nicaragua −0.7% −1.7% −3.2% −5.3% −5.2%
91 Niger −2.3% −5.7% −5.5% −6.6% −9.0%
92 Nigeria −0.8% −2.3% −3.9% −6.1% −9.9%
93 Norway −1.8% −6.2% −10.9% −15.5% −24.6%
94 Pakistan −2.1% −5.5% −8.7% −12.2% −19.8%
95 Panama −0.9% −2.2% −2.9% −3.3% 0.9%
96 Papua New Guinea −0.6% −1.5% −2.1% −2.8% 6.7%
97 Paraguay −0.9% −0.6% −1.6% −2.0% −4.6%
98 Peru −0.4% −0.8% −1.3% −1.9% −0.9%
99 Philippines −0.1% 0.0% 0.1% 1.1% −0.6%
100 Poland −0.8% −1.9% −3.1% −4.1% −6.3%
101 Portugal 0.3% 1.4% 0.6% 0.2% −2.1%
102 Qatar −0.4% −1.2% −2.3% −4.0% −8.1%
103 Republic of Korea 0.0% 0.5% 1.1% 1.3% −2.0%
104 Republic of Moldova 1.3% 3.2% 4.9% 6.3% −36.6%
105 Romania −0.8% −1.9% −3.1% −3.6% −5.5%
106 Russian Federation 3.5% 3.8% 3.2% 2.6% 2.5%
107 Rwanda −3.7% −3.1% −1.6% 10.8% 14.0%
108 Saudi Arabia 1.4% 0.9% 0.0% −1.1% −1.9%
109 Senegal −0.9% −2.1% −3.0% −3.4% −4.9%
110 Serbia 0.6% 1.6% 4.6% 14.1% 13.0%
111 Sierra Leone −0.9% −2.2% −3.5% −5.0% −7.2%
112 Singapore −4.7% −7.4% −8.6% −10.3% −5.7%
113 Slovakia 1.2% 1.3% 1.1% 0.8% −1.0%
114 Slovenia 0.6% 1.4% 2.3% 3.4% 1.7%
115 South Africa −0.8% −2.3% −3.9% −5.5% −9.0%
116 Spain 0.3% 1.2% 1.3% 1.3% 1.4%
117 Sri Lanka −1.3% −3.6% −5.6% −7.0% −6.9%
118 Sudan (former) −0.8% −2.0% −2.5% −3.2% −21.1%
119 Swaziland 0.9% 2.1% 3.0% 3.9% 6.5%
120 Sweden −0.5% −1.2% −0.9% −1.5% −9.8%
121 Switzerland −0.1% −0.2% −0.3% −0.4% −1.0%
122 Syrian Arab Republic −2.5% −7.3% −11.4% −15.2% −23.5%
123 Tajikistan 0.5% 0.6% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5%
124 Thailand −0.9% −2.7% −4.3% −5.6% −7.6%
125 Togo −1.8% −4.0% −7.2% −8.5% −13.8%
126 Trinidad and Tobago −1.3% −3.7% −7.2% −13.1% −27.0%
127 Tunisia −1.8% −4.7% −7.3% −10.0% −15.8%
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128 Turkey −0.3% −0.6% −1.1% −2.5% −3.6%
129 Uganda −0.8% −2.0% −3.0% −3.9% −7.8%
130 Ukraine 1.5% 1.6% 1.2% 0.8% 0.4%
131 United Arab 
Emirates
−0.7% −1.9% −2.9% −4.1% −6.9%
132 United Kingdom −3.2% −9.7% −15.4% −19.8% −30.3%
133 United Republic of 
Tanzania
−0.9% −2.2% −3.3% −4.4% 9.5%
134 United States of 
America
−0.6% −1.4% −1.9% −2.3% −4.7%
135 Uruguay −0.2% −0.5% −0.8% −1.6% −2.1%
136 Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of)
−0.3% −0.9% −1.3% −1.7% −2.6%
137 Viet Nam 0.0% 0.0% −0.6% −1.5% −2.9%
138 Yemen −0.9% −3.1% −5.9% −0.8% −2.9%
139 Zambia −0.3% −0.7% −1.1% −1.4% −2.0%
140 Zimbabwe −1.5% −3.8% −5.8% −7.9% −12.6%
Table A3.16  Natural capital per capita growth (Natural capital per capita change (%) with 
respect to base year 1990)
Country/year 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
1 Afghanistan −6.5% −11.7% −16.3% −19.2% −28.1%
2 Albania 0.2% 0.7% 1.1% 1.8% 2.1%
3 Algeria −3.5% −8.2% −12.1% −16.8% −26.7%
4 Argentina −1.8% −4.2% −5.7% −6.9% −11.1%
5 Armenia 0.7% 0.5% −0.8% 18.6% 28.6%
6 Australia −1.4% −3.5% −5.6% −8.4% −14.1%
7 Austria −0.3% −0.1% −0.5% −1.6% −4.4%
8 Bahrain −5.7% −15.4% −25.6% −37.5% −54.5%
9 Bangladesh −3.5% −7.4% −10.2% −11.7% −17.8%
10 Barbados −1.5% −4.1% −7.3% −9.2% −14.8%
11 Belgium 2.5% 6.2% 8.1% 8.4% 8.8%
12 Belize −2.4% −7.9% −11.6% −14.9% −22.2%
13 Benin −4.8% −11.0% −15.8% −20.1% −28.4%
14 Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of)
−2.3% −5.7% −8.3% −10.8% −16.6%
15 Botswana −3.4% −7.5% −10.2% −13.3% −20.5%
16 Brazil −2.0% −4.9% −7.1% −9.0% −13.1%
17 Bulgaria 0.4% 0.6% 2.0% 3.3% −6.3%
18 Burundi −3.9% −10.1% −14.3% −17.9% −25.4%
19 Cambodia −4.6% −10.3% −13.9% −16.8% −24.7%
20 Cameroon −3.9% −9.3% −13.3% −16.9% −51.3%
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21 Canada −1.4% −3.3% −4.9% −6.6% −16.5%
22 Central African 
Republic
−2.6% −6.1% −8.2% −10.4% −15.9%
23 Chile −2.3% −5.2% −6.9% −9.2% −13.7%
24 China −1.5% −3.8% −5.8% −7.5% −11.8%
25 Colombia −2.3% −5.3% −7.8% −10.0% −39.5%
26 Congo −2.9% −7.2% −10.4% −13.9% −21.3%
27 Costa Rica −3.9% −9.1% −10.7% −11.6% −8.2%
28 Côte d’Ivoire 0.0% 0.0% −2.3% −4.7% −9.7%
29 Croatia 2.1% 4.4% 4.8% 5.5% 6.3%
30 Cuba 0.7% 1.6% 2.2% 1.6% −0.6%
31 Cyprus −2.3% −4.9% −5.8% −9.0% −13.1%
32 Czech Republic −0.9% −2.9% −4.6% −7.1% −11.3%
33 Democratic Republic 
of the Congo
−3.9% −8.1% −11.8% −15.5% −23.6%
34 Denmark −2.5% −7.1% −12.1% −16.4% −26.1%
35 Dominican Republic −2.0% −4.8% −7.2% −9.0% −13.9%
36 Ecuador −3.2% −7.6% −11.0% −14.3% −20.3%
37 Egypt −3.9% −9.8% −14.4% −19.4% −30.4%
38 El Salvador −0.9% −2.0% −1.6% −2.0% −2.8%
39 Estonia −4.2% −14.5% 5.5% 5.7% 7.2%
40 Fiji −0.8% −2.2% −2.5% −3.6% −5.3%
41 Finland −0.2% −0.2% −1.4% −2.6% −5.3%
42 France −0.4% −0.9% −1.6% −2.4% −4.3%
43 Gabon −2.7% −6.5% −9.2% −11.8% −18.0%
44 Gambia −6.3% −11.2% −15.5% −19.2% −29.2%
45 Germany −1.3% −2.5% −3.3% −3.8% −5.3%
46 Ghana −3.7% −8.4% −12.7% −17.0% −18.1%
47 Greece −1.2% −3.6% −4.9% −6.0% −8.5%
48 Guatemala −3.7% −9.1% −13.3% −17.6% −23.4%
49 Guyana −0.2% −0.8% −0.9% −1.3% 2.7%
50 Haiti −3.3% −8.0% −11.8% −15.9% −24.0%
51 Honduras −4.5% −11.1% −15.0% −18.7% −27.8%
52 Hungary −0.8% −2.0% −2.3% −3.4% −4.7%
53 Iceland −1.3% −3.4% −5.2% −7.1% −10.4%
54 India −2.2% −5.4% −7.8% −10.0% −15.4%
55 Indonesia −2.7% −6.2% −8.6% −11.3% −18.0%
56 Iran (Islamic 
Republic of )
−1.8% −4.9% −7.1% −9.0% −14.7%
57 Iraq −3.0% −7.8% −11.4% −14.8% −23.4%
58 Ireland −4.4% −7.9% −11.1% −13.1% −19.3%
59 Israel −3.6% −7.7% −10.7% −13.4% −21.2%
60 Italy −0.6% 0.0% −0.5% −0.6% −4.1%
61 Jamaica −0.2% −2.0% −3.0% −4.4% −6.3%
62 Japan −1.0% −2.3% −3.5% −3.9% −7.8%
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63 Jordan −4.8% −9.0% −12.4% −17.2% −26.0%
64 Kazakhstan 2.4% 4.2% 3.1% 0.2% −2.8%
65 Kenya −3.3% −7.7% −11.0% −14.1% −18.9%
66 Kuwait 4.3% 0.3% −4.5% −12.3% −22.6%
67 Kyrgyzstan −0.3% −1.8% −2.8% −1.6% −5.2%
68 Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic
−3.1% −6.5% −8.6% −10.8% −13.8%
69 Latvia 2.6% 5.8% 8.4% 12.7% 17.1%
70 Lesotho −1.9% −3.8% −4.8% −5.9% −10.4%
71 Liberia −0.5% −9.2% −12.7% −17.5% −26.1%
72 Lithuania 0.8% 2.3% 4.3% 6.1% 8.5%
73 Luxembourg 0.8% 1.8% 0.2% −2.0% −6.7%
74 Malawi −1.6% −5.5% −9.2% −12.9% −20.7%
75 Malaysia −3.5% −8.8% −12.9% −16.5% −23.6%
76 Maldives −3.9% −6.2% −11.1% −21.9% −30.2%
77 Mali −2.7% −6.8% −10.9% −15.4% −33.1%
78 Malta −2.6% −6.4% −6.7% −5.7% −11.3%
79 Mauritania −4.7% −10.8% −16.0% −20.0% −30.8%
80 Mauritius −2.5% −6.1% −9.7% −11.3% −16.5%
81 Mexico −2.7% −6.5% −9.2% −12.1% −17.5%
82 Mongolia −1.8% −2.7% −5.7% −7.8% −11.9%
83 Morocco −2.2% −4.9% −6.8% −8.5% −13.0%
84 Mozambique −3.8% −8.4% −12.0% −7.0% −12.8%
85 Myanmar −2.5% −6.4% −9.3% −11.8% −18.3%
86 Namibia −2.4% −5.4% −6.1% −5.9% −11.4%
87 Nepal −4.4% −10.3% −13.4% −14.6% −20.2%
88 Netherlands −3.3% −7.9% −11.7% −15.6% −25.0%
89 New Zealand −2.1% −3.9% −6.6% −2.6% −7.7%
90 Nicaragua −2.8% −6.3% −9.3% −12.7% −16.3%
91 Niger −5.5% −13.6% −17.3% −22.0% −32.2%
92 Nigeria −3.2% −8.2% −12.6% −17.3% −26.7%
93 Norway −2.4% −7.5% −12.8% −18.4% −29.3%
94 Pakistan −4.6% −11.2% −16.4% −21.7% −33.1%
95 Panama −2.9% −7.0% −9.8% −12.1% −13.1%
96 Papua New Guinea −3.1% −7.6% −11.0% −14.2% −12.2%
97 Paraguay −3.3% −6.1% −9.1% −11.0% −17.7%
98 Peru −2.3% −5.0% −7.0% −8.9% −11.9%
99 Philippines −2.4% −5.6% −7.8% −8.7% −15.0%
100 Poland −1.0% −2.0% −3.1% −4.0% −6.3%
101 Portugal 0.2% 0.6% −0.6% −1.3% −3.4%
102 Qatar −1.4% −6.5% −15.2% −30.8% −44.6%
Table A3.16 (Continued)
Annex 3: data 303
Country/year 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
103 Republic of Korea −1.0% −1.8% −1.8% −2.3% −7.2%
104 Republic of Moldova 1.4% 3.6% 5.7% 7.2% −35.8%
105 Romania −0.4% −1.1% −1.1% −0.3% −0.6%
106 Russian Federation 3.5% 4.1% 4.1% 3.5% 3.5%
107 Rwanda 0.3% −5.4% −6.8% 1.5% −1.8%
108 Saudi Arabia −1.5% −5.7% −9.9% −13.6% −20.7%
109 Senegal −3.8% −8.5% −12.3% −15.7% −23.9%
110 Serbia 0.5% 1.8% 5.1% 15.2% 15.4%
111 Sierra Leone −0.4% −2.9% −9.5% −13.7% −20.7%
112 Singapore −7.4% −13.6% −16.0% −21.0% −22.4%
113 Slovakia 1.0% 0.9% 0.7% 0.3% −1.7%
114 Slovenia 0.7% 1.5% 2.3% 2.8% 0.6%
115 South Africa −2.9% −7.6% −10.7% −13.8% −21.1%
116 Spain 0.0% 0.3% −1.7% −3.2% −4.4%
117 Sri Lanka −2.5% −5.7% −8.5% −10.7% −12.8%
118 Sudan (former) −4.9% −10.0% −13.3% −16.5% −37.1%
119 Swaziland −1.3% −3.1% −3.2% −4.2% −6.4%
120 Sweden −1.1% −2.1% −2.2% −3.7% −13.5%
121 Switzerland −1.1% −1.9% −2.8% −4.2% −7.3%
122 Syrian Arab Republic −5.2% −13.4% −19.4% −25.4% −33.3%
123 Tajikistan −1.2% −3.2% −5.6% −8.2% −13.5%
124 Thailand −1.8% −5.2% −7.8% −9.4% −13.0%
125 Togo −4.2% −9.9% −15.8% −19.7% −30.1%
126 Trinidad and Tobago −1.9% −4.6% −8.6% −14.9% −29.5%
127 Tunisia −3.6% −8.4% −11.9% −15.6% −23.8%
128 Turkey −1.9% −4.4% −6.6% −9.4% −14.5%
129 Uganda −3.9% −9.4% −14.0% −18.2% −28.8%
130 Ukraine 1.7% 3.0% 3.7% 4.0% 5.0%
131 United Arab 
Emirates
−5.8% −13.8% −22.6% −34.5% −45.6%
132 United Kingdom −3.4% −10.3% −16.5% −21.7% −33.0%
133 United Republic of 
Tanzania
−4.0% −9.0% −13.1% −17.4% −13.6%
134 United States of 
America
−1.8% −4.4% −5.9% −7.4% −12.2%
135 Uruguay −0.9% −2.1% −2.4% −3.5% −5.2%
136 Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of)
−2.5% −5.9% −8.4% −10.6% −15.8%
137 Viet Nam −1.7% −4.0% −6.0% −8.1% −12.7%
138 Yemen −5.6% −12.2% −17.7% −16.3% −25.2%
139 Zambia −2.8% −7.0% −10.3% −13.8% −21.3%
140 Zimbabwe −3.6% −7.9% −10.7% −14.3% −22.9%
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Table A3.17  Renewable resources (Renewable resources in billions of constant 2005 US$)
Country/year 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
1 Afghanistan 9 9 9 9 9 9
2 Albania 7 7 6 6 6 6
3 Algeria 16 15 14 13 11 12
4 Argentina 807 792 777 779 790 774
5 Armenia 3 3 2 2 2 2
6 Australia 1,299 1,296 1,284 1,263 1,177 1,099
7 Austria 54 56 58 59 58 56
8 Bahrain 1 1 1 1 1 1
9 Bangladesh 57 54 53 51 50 49
10 Barbados 1 1 1 0 0 0
11 Belgium 4 5 6 6 7 6
12 Belize 14 14 13 13 13 13
13 Benin 38 36 33 32 30 30
14 Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of)
725 712 698 684 668 653
15 Botswana 65 62 60 57 55 53
16 Brazil 6,988 6,848 6,691 6,568 6,421 6,416
17 Bulgaria 22 24 25 28 31 10
18 Burundi 5 5 4 4 4 4
19 Cambodia 248 233 217 201 189 180
20 Cameroon 234 223 213 203 193 48
21 Canada 2,884 2,885 2,895 2,902 2,908 1,958
22 Central African 
Republic
211 209 208 207 205 205
23 Chile 240 231 226 230 224 225
24 China 5,369 5,407 5,283 5,085 5,081 5,120
25 Colombia 771 757 752 733 724 178
26 Congo 259 258 258 257 257 257
27 Costa Rica 52 48 45 46 47 62
28 Côte d’Ivoire 58 70 81 81 81 80
29 Croatia 20 21 22 24 25 23
30 Cuba 16 18 21 24 25 23
31 Cyprus 1 1 1 1 1 1
32 Czech Republic 0 0 0 0 0 0
33 Democratic Republic 
of the Congo
1,320 1,307 1,294 1,281 1,268 1,258
34 Denmark 32 28 25 24 25 23
35 Dominican Republic 35 36 35 34 34 33
36 Ecuador 183 175 166 158 150 159
37 Egypt 11 13 13 13 14 14
38 El Salvador 9 9 9 9 9 9
39 Estonia 20 15 10 22 21 21
40 Fiji 8 8 8 8 8 8
41 Finland 166 168 171 165 161 155
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42 France 272 273 275 278 277 274
43 Gabon 1,072 1,072 1,071 1,071 1,071 1,075
44 Gambia 5 5 5 4 4 4
45 Germany 148 150 154 157 156 160
46 Ghana 74 70 67 64 60 77
47 Greece 169 168 159 157 155 151
48 Guatemala 107 100 94 87 80 85
49 Guyana 201 201 201 200 200 232
50 Haiti 8 7 7 6 5 5
51 Honduras 107 97 85 78 71 65
52 Hungary 26 25 24 24 23 23
53 Iceland 106 104 102 100 99 98
54 India 1,256 1,248 1,241 1,242 1,243 1,216
55 Indonesia 1,902 1,795 1,730 1,695 1,628 1,557
56 Iran (Islamic 
Republic of)
566 569 565 535 540 446
57 Iraq 8 8 8 8 8 8
58 Ireland 41 34 32 31 31 29
59 Israel 5 5 5 4 4 4
60 Italy 329 323 338 341 351 327
61 Jamaica 28 29 28 27 26 26
62 Japan 530 518 508 491 489 450
63 Jordan 2 3 3 2 2 2
64 Kazakhstan 12 12 12 12 12 12
65 Kenya 46 46 44 44 43 47
66 Kuwait 1 0 0 0 0 0
67 Kyrgyzstan 5 6 6 6 8 8
68 Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic
149 146 143 141 139 151
69 Latvia 21 22 23 24 27 25
70 Lesotho 0 0 0 0 0 0
71 Liberia 37 36 35 34 33 32
72 Lithuania 17 17 17 18 18 17
73 Luxembourg 1 1 1 1 1 1
74 Malawi 25 24 23 23 22 22
75 Malaysia 322 312 299 284 274 289
76 Maldives 3 3 3 3 2 2
77 Mali 75 75 74 72 69 46
78 Malta 0 0 0 0 0 0
79 Mauritania 15 13 12 11 10 8
80 Mauritius 2 2 2 2 2 2
81 Mexico 854 843 830 819 812 839
82 Mongolia 175 167 173 158 155 160
83 Morocco 84 81 79 77 75 74
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84 Mozambique 242 237 232 228 224 221
85 Myanmar 231 216 200 186 174 161
86 Namibia 54 56 58 60 63 61
87 Nepal 222 202 182 170 170 170
88 Netherlands 35 33 33 32 32 32
89 New Zealand 1,464 1,452 1,452 1,383 1,754 1,579
90 Nicaragua 42 41 39 37 34 36
91 Niger 12 10 9 9 8 8
92 Nigeria 241 248 246 240 224 224
93 Norway 100 102 99 102 106 108
94 Pakistan 1,313 1,173 1,034 891 755 651
95 Panama 46 44 42 41 40 47
96 Papua New Guinea 311 303 296 290 282 388
97 Paraguay 115 110 112 108 106 100
98 Peru 1,240 1,218 1,205 1,186 1,165 1,234
99 Philippines 131 130 131 132 134 128
100 Poland 49 49 48 43 40 39
101 Portugal 62 63 65 63 62 58
102 Qatar 1 1 1 1 1 1
103 Republic of Korea 397 399 410 423 428 384
104 Republic of Moldova 6 6 7 7 7 1
105 Romania 170 170 171 167 170 170
106 Russian Federation 6,598 6,581 6,563 6,554 6,586 6,553
107 Rwanda 3 2 3 3 3 3
108 Saudi Arabia 1,505 2,114 2,114 2,113 2,109 2,241
109 Senegal 82 78 75 72 71 70
110 Serbia 25 26 27 30 37 33
111 Sierra Leone 20 19 19 18 16 16
112 Singapore 0 0 0 0 0 0
113 Slovakia 10 10 11 11 11 11
114 Slovenia 14 15 17 18 20 18
115 South Africa 180 183 184 183 183 184
116 Spain 254 263 275 279 281 280
117 Sri Lanka 79 73 68 62 59 63
118 Sudan (former) 352 336 320 317 313 157
119 Swaziland 1 2 2 2 2 2
120 Sweden 196 192 187 190 185 142
121 Switzerland 86 85 85 85 84 84
122 Syrian Arab Republic 11 10 9 9 9 8
123 Tajikistan 1 1 1 1 1 1
124 Thailand 251 241 228 220 220 234
125 Togo 5 5 5 4 4 3
126 Trinidad and Tobago 7 7 7 7 7 3
127 Tunisia 9 9 9 9 9 9
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128 Turkey 381 378 381 373 347 349
129 Uganda 21 19 17 15 13 10
130 Ukraine 44 49 53 55 57 53
131 United Arab 
Emirates
2 2 2 1 1 1
132 United Kingdom 153 143 135 132 132 121
133 United Republic of 
Tanzania
288 275 263 251 240 378
134 United States of 
America
5,051 5,090 5,140 5,294 5,459 5,246
135 Uruguay 38 38 38 37 36 36
136 Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of )
471 461 452 444 436 444
137 Viet Nam 194 196 201 201 196 196
138 Yemen 37 37 36 35 34 34
139 Zambia 340 336 332 327 322 322
140 Zimbabwe 93 86 79 72 65 60
Table A3.18  Renewable resources per capita (Renewable resources per capita in thousands 
of constant 2005 US$)
Country/year 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
1 Afghanistan 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3
2 Albania 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2
3 Algeria 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3
4 Argentina 24.6 22.6 21.0 19.9 19.2 18.0
5 Armenia 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7 0.8
6 Australia 76.1 71.7 67.0 61.9 53.4 46.8
7 Austria 7.0 7.0 7.2 7.2 7.0 6.6
8 Bahrain 2.1 1.8 1.4 1.0 0.6 0.5
9 Bangladesh 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3
10 Barbados 2.1 2.1 2.0 1.8 1.8 1.7
11 Belgium 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6
12 Belize 75.6 67.0 54.4 46.1 39.5 35.6
13 Benin 7.7 6.0 4.8 3.9 3.1 2.8
14 Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of )
105.7 94.1 83.8 74.9 67.3 61.8
15 Botswana 46.9 39.4 34.4 30.6 26.7 23.8
16 Brazil 46.5 42.1 38.1 34.8 32.3 31.1
17 Bulgaria 2.6 2.8 3.0 3.6 4.1 1.4
18 Burundi 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4
19 Cambodia 27.5 21.8 17.8 15.1 13.2 11.8
20 Cameroon 19.4 16.0 13.4 11.2 9.4 2.1
21 Canada 103.8 98.3 94.1 89.8 85.5 55.1
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22 Central African 
Republic
71.7 62.8 55.8 50.9 46.2 42.6
23 Chile 18.3 16.3 14.9 14.3 13.1 12.7
24 China 4.7 4.5 4.2 3.9 3.8 3.8
25 Colombia 22.5 20.2 18.6 16.9 15.8 3.7
26 Congo 108.6 95.0 82.9 73.4 63.1 57.0
27 Costa Rica 16.9 13.8 11.5 10.7 10.3 13.1
28 Côte d’Ivoire 4.8 4.9 4.9 4.5 4.0 3.6
29 Croatia 4.3 4.6 5.1 5.3 5.6 5.5
30 Cuba 1.5 1.7 1.9 2.1 2.2 2.1
31 Cyprus 1.7 1.5 1.4 1.4 1.2 1.1
32 Czech Republic 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
33 Democratic Republic 
of the Congo
37.7 31.0 26.9 22.8 19.2 16.8
34 Denmark 6.2 5.4 4.7 4.4 4.4 4.0
35 Dominican Republic 4.9 4.5 4.1 3.7 3.4 3.2
36 Ecuador 18.0 15.3 13.2 11.5 10.1 10.0
37 Egypt 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
38 El Salvador 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.5 1.5 1.5
39 Estonia 12.8 10.4 6.9 15.9 15.9 15.8
40 Fiji 11.0 10.5 10.0 9.9 9.5 9.3
41 Finland 33.3 32.9 33.1 31.5 30.1 28.4
42 France 4.7 4.6 4.5 4.4 4.3 4.1
43 Gabon 1,125.5 986.4 870.0 777.5 694.8 636.7
44 Gambia 6.0 4.3 3.7 3.0 2.5 2.1
45 Germany 1.9 1.8 1.9 1.9 1.9 2.0
46 Ghana 5.1 4.2 3.6 3.0 2.5 2.9
47 Greece 16.6 15.9 14.7 14.3 13.9 13.9
48 Guatemala 11.7 9.7 8.0 6.6 5.4 5.3
49 Guyana 279.5 276.9 270.3 269.5 265.5 303.1
50 Haiti 1.1 0.9 0.8 0.6 0.5 0.5
51 Honduras 21.7 17.3 13.6 11.3 9.5 8.2
52 Hungary 2.5 2.4 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.3
53 Iceland 415.4 388.3 361.9 335.5 309.9 298.5
54 India 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1 1.0 0.9
55 Indonesia 10.5 9.1 8.2 7.5 6.7 6.1
56 Iran (Islamic 
Republic of)
10.1 9.4 8.6 7.6 7.3 5.7
57 Iraq 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2
58 Ireland 11.6 9.3 8.4 7.4 6.8 6.3
59 Israel 1.0 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.5
60 Italy 5.8 5.7 5.9 5.9 5.9 5.4
61 Jamaica 11.6 11.6 10.8 10.4 9.8 9.7
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62 Japan 4.3 4.1 4.0 3.8 3.8 3.5
63 Jordan 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.3
64 Kazakhstan 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.8 0.7
65 Kenya 2.0 1.7 1.4 1.2 1.1 1.1
66 Kuwait 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1
67 Kyrgyzstan 1.2 1.3 1.2 1.2 1.5 1.3
68 Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic
35.1 30.0 26.8 24.5 22.2 22.5
69 Latvia 7.9 8.9 9.9 10.9 12.7 12.7
70 Lesotho 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
71 Liberia 17.8 17.4 12.1 10.3 8.2 7.2
72 Lithuania 4.5 4.7 5.0 5.4 5.8 5.9
73 Luxembourg 3.0 3.2 3.3 3.1 2.8 2.5
74 Malawi 2.6 2.4 2.1 1.8 1.5 1.3
75 Malaysia 17.7 15.0 12.8 11.0 9.8 9.7
76 Maldives 14.2 11.6 11.0 8.9 5.3 4.8
77 Mali 8.9 7.7 6.7 5.6 4.6 2.7
78 Malta 0.6 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4
79 Mauritania 7.4 5.7 4.6 3.5 2.7 2.1
80 Mauritius 2.2 1.9 1.7 1.4 1.3 1.3
81 Mexico 10.0 8.9 8.1 7.5 6.8 6.7
82 Mongolia 80.2 72.7 72.1 62.4 57.1 54.9
83 Morocco 3.3 3.0 2.7 2.5 2.3 2.2
84 Mozambique 18.1 14.9 12.7 10.8 9.2 8.1
85 Myanmar 5.5 4.8 4.2 3.7 3.4 3.0
86 Namibia 38.3 34.0 30.7 29.7 28.7 25.5
87 Nepal 11.8 9.4 7.7 6.7 6.3 6.0
88 Netherlands 2.4 2.1 2.0 2.0 1.9 1.9
89 New Zealand 439.5 395.4 376.4 334.5 403.2 350.2
90 Nicaragua 10.2 8.8 7.8 6.9 5.9 6.0
91 Niger 1.5 1.1 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.4
92 Nigeria 2.5 2.3 2.0 1.7 1.4 1.3
93 Norway 23.6 23.4 22.1 22.0 21.7 21.1
94 Pakistan 12.2 9.6 7.5 5.8 4.4 3.5
95 Panama 18.7 16.1 13.9 12.4 11.1 12.2
96 Papua New Guinea 74.9 64.4 55.1 47.6 41.2 52.1
97 Paraguay 27.2 23.1 21.1 18.6 17.0 15.2
98 Peru 56.8 50.7 46.5 43.0 39.7 39.8
99 Philippines 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.5 1.4 1.3
100 Poland 1.3 1.3 1.3 1.1 1.0 1.0
101 Portugal 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.0 5.8 5.5
102 Qatar 1.6 1.5 1.3 0.8 0.4 0.3
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103 Republic of Korea 9.3 8.9 8.7 8.8 8.7 7.6
104 Republic of Moldova 1.6 1.7 1.8 2.0 2.1 0.4
105 Romania 7.3 7.5 7.6 7.9 8.4 8.5
106 Russian Federation 44.5 44.3 44.8 45.7 46.1 45.6
107 Rwanda 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2
108 Saudi Arabia 92.0 112.1 98.8 85.4 75.1 72.6
109 Senegal 10.9 9.0 7.6 6.4 5.5 4.8
110 Serbia 3.3 3.4 3.5 4.0 5.0 4.7
111 Sierra Leone 5.1 5.0 4.6 3.5 2.9 2.6
112 Singapore 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0
113 Slovakia 1.8 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.1 2.0
114 Slovenia 7.2 7.8 8.3 9.0 9.6 8.6
115 South Africa 5.1 4.7 4.2 3.9 3.6 3.4
116 Spain 6.5 6.7 6.8 6.4 6.0 6.0
117 Sri Lanka 4.6 4.1 3.6 3.2 2.9 3.1
118 Sudan (former) 17.6 13.6 11.4 9.9 8.7 4.0
119 Swaziland 1.7 1.7 1.6 1.7 1.6 1.6
120 Sweden 22.9 21.7 21.0 21.0 19.8 14.7
121 Switzerland 12.8 12.1 11.9 11.4 10.8 10.2
122 Syrian Arab Republic 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4
123 Tajikistan 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.2
124 Thailand 4.4 4.1 3.6 3.3 3.3 3.5
125 Togo 1.4 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.5
126 Trinidad and Tobago 6.1 5.8 5.6 5.2 5.0 2.6
127 Tunisia 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.8
128 Turkey 7.1 6.5 6.0 5.5 4.8 4.5
129 Uganda 1.2 0.9 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.3
130 Ukraine 0.9 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.2
131 United Arab 
Emirates
1.2 0.8 0.5 0.3 0.1 0.1
132 United Kingdom 2.7 2.5 2.3 2.2 2.1 1.9
133 United Republic of 
Tanzania
11.3 9.2 7.7 6.4 5.2 7.3
134 United States of 
America
20.2 19.1 18.2 17.9 17.6 16.4
135 Uruguay 12.3 11.8 11.3 11.2 10.7 10.5
136 Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of )
23.7 20.8 18.5 16.6 15.0 14.5
137 Viet Nam 2.9 2.7 2.6 2.4 2.3 2.2
138 Yemen 3.1 2.4 2.1 1.7 1.4 1.3
139 Zambia 41.8 36.3 31.3 27.1 23.2 20.5
140 Zimbabwe 8.8 7.3 6.3 5.6 4.7 4.0
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Table A3.19  Renewable resources growth (Renewable resources change (%) with respect 
to base year 1990)
Country/year 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
1 Afghanistan 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% −0.1%
2 Albania −0.1% −0.4% −0.6% −0.5% −0.7%
3 Algeria −1.1% −2.6% −4.7% −7.4% −8.3%
4 Argentina −0.4% −0.9% −0.9% −0.5% −1.3%
5 Armenia −1.2% −3.0% −4.7% −7.5% −4.0%
6 Australia 0.0% −0.3% −0.7% −2.4% −5.4%
7 Austria 0.7% 1.7% 2.3% 1.9% 1.4%
8 Bahrain −1.0% −3.6% −5.2% −7.4% −12.3%
9 Bangladesh −1.3% −2.2% −3.0% −3.3% −5.4%
10 Barbados −0.3% −0.9% −2.7% −3.1% −5.4%
11 Belgium 2.9% 7.0% 9.5% 10.5% 13.2%
12 Belize −0.5% −1.3% −2.0% −2.7% −4.1%
13 Benin −1.4% −3.4% −4.8% −6.2% −8.1%
14 Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of )
−0.4% −0.9% −1.4% −2.0% −3.4%
15 Botswana −0.8% −2.0% −3.1% −4.1% −6.5%
16 Brazil −0.4% −1.1% −1.5% −2.1% −2.8%
17 Bulgaria 1.4% 2.7% 5.5% 8.1% −23.9%
18 Burundi −1.9% −5.8% −6.5% −6.5% −7.1%
19 Cambodia −1.2% −3.3% −5.1% −6.5% −10.1%
20 Cameroon −0.9% −2.3% −3.5% −4.6% −40.8%
21 Canada 0.0% 0.1% 0.2% 0.2% −12.1%
22 Central African 
Republic
−0.1% −0.3% −0.5% −0.7% −0.9%
23 Chile −0.8% −1.5% −1.1% −1.8% −2.1%
24 China 0.1% −0.4% −1.4% −1.4% −1.6%
25 Colombia −0.4% −0.6% −1.2% −1.6% −38.7%
26 Congo −0.1% −0.1% −0.2% −0.2% −0.3%
27 Costa Rica −1.5% −3.5% −3.3% −2.7% 5.9%
28 Côte d’Ivoire 3.7% 8.4% 8.5% 8.5% 11.3%
29 Croatia 0.9% 2.4% 3.7% 4.9% 4.4%
30 Cuba 3.2% 7.6% 10.9% 11.8% 14.2%
31 Cyprus −0.2% 0.2% 1.5% −0.3% −0.4%
32 Czech Republic 1.0% 2.5% 2.5% 3.7% −13.3%
33 Democratic Republic 
of the Congo
−0.2% −0.5% −0.7% −1.0% −1.6%
34 Denmark −2.4% −5.7% −6.9% −6.1% −10.3%
35 Dominican Republic 0.0% −0.3% −0.8% −1.0% −2.1%
36 Ecuador −0.9% −2.4% −3.7% −4.9% −4.6%
37 Egypt 2.9% 3.0% 4.3% 4.5% 6.9%
38 El Salvador 0.3% 0.5% 1.5% 1.5% 2.2%
39 Estonia −5.9% −16.9% 1.7% 1.3% 1.1%
40 Fiji 0.4% 0.5% 0.5% 0.5% 1.1%
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41 Finland 0.2% 0.7% −0.1% −0.8% −2.3%
42 France 0.0% 0.2% 0.5% 0.4% 0.2%
43 Gabon 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1%
44 Gambia −3.5% −4.5% −5.4% −5.8% −9.3%
45 Germany 0.3% 1.0% 1.4% 1.4% 2.6%
46 Ghana −1.0% −2.4% −3.7% −5.3% 1.2%
47 Greece −0.1% −1.5% −1.9% −2.1% −3.6%
48 Guatemala −1.3% −3.3% −4.9% −7.0% −7.4%
49 Guyana 0.0% −0.1% −0.1% −0.2% 4.8%
50 Haiti −1.4% −3.6% −5.8% −8.4% −13.2%
51 Honduras −1.9% −5.6% −7.5% −9.6% −15.1%
52 Hungary −0.6% −1.7% −1.5% −3.4% −4.5%
53 Iceland −0.4% −1.0% −1.5% −1.8% −2.6%
54 India −0.1% −0.3% −0.3% −0.3% −1.1%
55 Indonesia −1.1% −2.3% −2.8% −3.8% −6.4%
56 Iran (Islamic 
Republic of)
0.1% 0.0% −1.4% −1.1% −7.6%
57 Iraq 0.0% −1.4% 0.2% −1.7% −2.0%
58 Ireland −3.8% −5.7% −6.8% −6.6% −10.6%
59 Israel −0.2% −0.7% −2.8% −3.3% −4.2%
60 Italy −0.3% 0.7% 0.9% 1.7% −0.1%
61 Jamaica 0.7% 0.1% −0.3% −1.4% −1.8%
62 Japan −0.5% −1.1% −1.9% −2.0% −5.3%
63 Jordan 1.2% 0.6% −0.6% −0.8% −1.1%
64 Kazakhstan −0.3% −0.8% 0.5% 0.3% 0.4%
65 Kenya −0.2% −1.0% −1.4% −1.6% 0.7%
66 Kuwait −1.9% −3.6% −3.6% −4.7% −8.7%
67 Kyrgyzstan 0.9% 2.3% 3.4% 10.4% 12.0%
68 Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic
−0.4% −1.0% −1.4% −1.8% 0.4%
69 Latvia 1.2% 2.7% 3.8% 6.2% 6.4%
70 Lesotho −0.1% −0.1% −0.2% −0.3% −1.8%
71 Liberia −0.7% −1.7% −2.5% −3.4% −5.5%
72 Lithuania 0.4% 1.0% 1.8% 1.8% 1.0%
73 Luxembourg 2.2% 5.2% 5.2% 5.2% 5.8%
74 Malawi −0.7% −1.3% −2.0% −2.6% −4.0%
75 Malaysia −0.7% −1.8% −3.1% −3.9% −3.6%
76 Maldives −0.8% 0.4% −2.0% −11.0% −14.5%
77 Mali −0.2% −0.5% −1.1% −2.1% −15.5%
78 Malta −1.7% −4.7% −3.6% −1.9% −5.5%
79 Mauritania −2.4% −4.7% −7.3% −10.5% −17.6%
80 Mauritius −1.3% −3.3% −6.3% −7.6% −11.5%
81 Mexico −0.2% −0.7% −1.0% −1.3% −0.6%
82 Mongolia −0.9% −0.3% −2.6% −3.0% −3.0%
83 Morocco −0.5% −1.3% −2.1% −2.6% −3.7%
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84 Mozambique −0.4% −1.0% −1.5% −1.9% −3.0%
85 Myanmar −1.3% −3.6% −5.4% −6.9% −11.5%
86 Namibia 0.7% 1.8% 2.7% 3.9% 4.2%
87 Nepal −1.9% −4.9% −6.5% −6.5% −8.6%
88 Netherlands −1.2% −2.0% −2.2% −2.2% −3.7%
89 New Zealand −0.2% −0.2% −1.4% 4.6% 2.6%
90 Nicaragua −0.7% −1.7% −3.2% −5.3% −5.2%
91 Niger −2.8% −7.2% −6.9% −8.2% −10.6%
92 Nigeria 0.6% 0.6% −0.1% −1.8% −2.3%
93 Norway 0.4% −0.2% 0.5% 1.5% 2.7%
94 Pakistan −2.2% −5.8% −9.2% −12.9% −20.8%
95 Panama −0.9% −2.2% −2.9% −3.3% 0.9%
96 Papua New Guinea −0.5% −1.2% −1.8% −2.4% 7.6%
97 Paraguay −0.9% −0.6% −1.6% −2.0% −4.6%
98 Peru −0.4% −0.7% −1.1% −1.5% −0.2%
99 Philippines −0.1% 0.0% 0.2% 0.7% −0.8%
100 Poland 0.0% −0.3% −3.2% −4.9% −7.2%
101 Portugal 0.3% 1.4% 0.7% 0.0% −2.3%
102 Qatar −0.3% 0.1% −1.5% −3.6% −3.8%
103 Republic of Korea 0.1% 0.8% 1.6% 1.9% −1.1%
104 Republic of Moldova 1.3% 3.2% 4.9% 6.3% −36.6%
105 Romania 0.0% 0.1% −0.4% 0.0% 0.0%
106 Russian Federation −0.1% −0.1% −0.2% 0.0% −0.2%
107 Rwanda −3.7% −3.1% −1.6% −1.5% −2.9%
108 Saudi Arabia 7.0% 8.9% 8.9% 8.8% 14.2%
109 Senegal −0.9% −2.1% −3.0% −3.3% −4.8%
110 Serbia 0.6% 1.6% 4.6% 10.1% 10.1%
111 Sierra Leone −0.9% −2.2% −3.5% −5.0% −7.2%
112 Singapore −4.7% −7.4% −8.6% −11.0% −5.7%
113 Slovakia 0.9% 2.2% 3.3% 4.1% 4.0%
114 Slovenia 1.5% 3.7% 5.9% 8.1% 7.3%
115 South Africa 0.3% 0.6% 0.5% 0.4% 0.7%
116 Spain 0.7% 2.1% 2.5% 2.6% 3.3%
117 Sri Lanka −1.3% −3.6% −5.6% −7.0% −6.9%
118 Sudan (former) −0.9% −2.3% −2.6% −2.9% −23.6%
119 Swaziland 1.5% 3.6% 5.2% 6.7% 11.1%
120 Sweden −0.5% −1.2% −0.9% −1.4% −10.1%
121 Switzerland −0.1% −0.2% −0.3% −0.4% −1.0%
122 Syrian Arab Republic −1.8% −4.1% −4.9% −3.9% −9.6%
123 Tajikistan −0.1% −0.2% −0.3% −0.3% −0.4%
124 Thailand −0.8% −2.4% −3.2% −3.2% −2.3%
125 Togo −1.7% −3.7% −6.9% −8.1% −13.3%
126 Trinidad and Tobago −0.5% −1.3% −2.2% −2.8% −22.5%
127 Tunisia 0.1% −0.2% −0.4% −0.4% −0.8%
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128 Turkey −0.2% 0.0% −0.5% −2.3% −2.9%
129 Uganda −1.9% −4.9% −7.7% −10.0% −21.0%
130 Ukraine 1.8% 4.3% 5.3% 6.2% 6.0%
131 United Arab 
Emirates
−2.6% −7.1% −12.3% −15.0% −20.6%
132 United Kingdom −1.3% −3.2% −3.8% −3.8% −7.7%
133 United Republic of 
Tanzania
−0.9% −2.2% −3.3% −4.5% 9.6%
134 United States of 
America
0.2% 0.4% 1.2% 2.0% 1.3%
135 Uruguay −0.2% −0.5% −0.8% −1.6% −2.1%
136 Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of)
−0.5% −1.0% −1.5% −1.9% −2.0%
137 Viet Nam 0.2% 0.9% 0.9% 0.2% 0.3%
138 Yemen 0.0% −0.5% −1.7% −2.2% −3.3%
139 Zambia −0.3% −0.6% −1.0% −1.3% −1.7%
140 Zimbabwe −1.5% −3.9% −6.1% −8.4% −13.4%
Table A3.20  Renewable resources per capita growth (Renewable resources per capita 
change (%) with respect to base year 1990)
Country/year 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
1 Afghanistan −6.4% −11.5% −16.1% −18.9% −27.5%
2 Albania 0.5% 1.2% 1.6% 2.6% 3.7%
3 Algeria −3.2% −7.0% −10.5% −14.7% −20.0%
4 Argentina −1.7% −4.0% −5.2% −6.1% −9.9%
5 Armenia 0.7% 0.5% −0.8% −3.2% 1.4%
6 Australia −1.2% −3.1% −5.0% −8.5% −15.0%
7 Austria 0.0% 0.7% 0.6% −0.2% −2.2%
8 Bahrain −3.5% −10.5% −17.6% −26.7% −37.3%
9 Bangladesh −3.5% −7.3% −9.9% −11.5% −17.4%
10 Barbados −0.7% −1.8% −4.0% −4.8% −8.0%
11 Belgium 2.5% 6.2% 8.1% 8.1% 8.8%
12 Belize −2.4% −7.9% −11.6% −15.0% −22.2%
13 Benin −4.8% −11.0% −15.8% −20.1% −28.4%
14 Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of)
−2.3% −5.7% −8.2% −10.7% −16.4%
15 Botswana −3.4% −7.5% −10.1% −13.1% −20.2%
16 Brazil −2.0% −4.9% −6.9% −8.7% −12.5%
17 Bulgaria 2.1% 4.4% 8.7% 12.7% −19.0%
18 Burundi −3.9% −10.1% −14.3% −17.9% −25.4%
19 Cambodia −4.6% −10.3% −13.9% −16.8% −24.7%
20 Cameroon −3.7% −8.8% −12.8% −16.5% −52.1%
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21 Canada −1.1% −2.4% −3.6% −4.7% −19.0%
22 Central African 
Republic
−2.6% −6.1% −8.2% −10.4% −15.9%
23 Chile −2.3% −5.0% −6.0% −7.9% −11.5%
24 China −1.1% −3.0% −4.7% −5.3% −7.4%
25 Colombia −2.1% −4.6% −6.8% −8.5% −45.1%
26 Congo −2.6% −6.5% −9.3% −12.7% −19.3%
27 Costa Rica −3.9% −9.1% −10.7% −11.6% −8.2%
28 Côte d’Ivoire 0.2% 0.4% −1.8% −4.3% −8.8%
29 Croatia 1.4% 4.4% 5.6% 6.9% 8.6%
30 Cuba 2.6% 6.2% 9.2% 10.0% 11.4%
31 Cyprus −2.3% −4.9% −5.8% −9.0% −13.1%
32 Czech Republic 1.0% 2.7% 2.8% 3.4% −13.8%
33 Democratic Republic 
of the Congo
−3.9% −8.1% −11.8% −15.5% −23.6%
34 Denmark −2.8% −6.6% −8.1% −7.9% −13.1%
35 Dominican Republic −1.8% −4.5% −6.8% −8.7% −13.5%
36 Ecuador −3.1% −7.4% −10.6% −13.5% −17.7%
37 Egypt 0.9% −1.8% −2.9% −4.8% −8.4%
38 El Salvador −0.9% −2.0% −1.6% −2.0% −2.8%
39 Estonia −4.2% −14.5% 5.5% 5.6% 7.2%
40 Fiji −0.8% −2.2% −2.5% −3.6% −5.3%
41 Finland −0.2% −0.2% −1.4% −2.6% −5.2%
42 France −0.3% −0.8% −1.4% −2.2% −4.0%
43 Gabon −2.6% −6.2% −8.8% −11.4% −17.3%
44 Gambia −6.3% −11.2% −15.5% −19.2% −29.2%
45 Germany −0.3% 0.1% 0.5% 0.6% 1.9%
46 Ghana −3.7% −8.3% −12.5% −16.6% −17.3%
47 Greece −0.8% −3.0% −3.7% −4.2% −5.7%
48 Guatemala −3.7% −9.0% −13.2% −17.4% −23.2%
49 Guyana −0.2% −0.8% −0.9% −1.3% 2.7%
50 Haiti −3.3% −8.0% −11.8% −15.9% −24.0%
51 Honduras −4.5% −11.1% −15.0% −18.7% −27.8%
52 Hungary −0.6% −1.3% −0.8% −2.5% −2.9%
53 Iceland −1.3% −3.4% −5.2% −7.1% −10.4%
54 India −2.1% −4.9% −6.9% −8.5% −13.3%
55 Indonesia −2.8% −6.0% −8.1% −10.5% −16.4%
56 Iran (Islamic 
Republic of)
−1.3% −3.9% −6.7% −7.8% −17.2%
57 Iraq −2.9% −8.5% −10.1% −14.7% −22.4%
58 Ireland −4.3% −7.6% −10.7% −12.5% −18.4%
59 Israel −3.7% −7.9% −12.0% −14.5% −20.7%
60 Italy −0.4% 0.6% 0.4% 0.5% −2.4%
61 Jamaica 0.0% −1.8% −2.8% −4.3% −5.9%
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62 Japan −0.8% −1.7% −2.7% −2.9% −6.2%
63 Jordan −3.8% −7.9% −11.4% −16.0% −24.1%
64 Kazakhstan 0.3% 1.6% 2.4% 0.4% −1.4%
65 Kenya −3.3% −7.7% −11.0% −14.1% −18.9%
66 Kuwait 2.7% −2.0% −5.9% −13.7% −25.3%
67 Kyrgyzstan 0.2% −0.5% −0.7% 4.6% 1.9%
68 Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic
−3.1% −6.5% −8.6% −10.8% −13.7%
69 Latvia 2.6% 5.8% 8.4% 12.7% 17.1%
70 Lesotho −1.9% −3.8% −4.8% −5.9% −10.4%
71 Liberia −0.5% −9.2% −12.7% −17.5% −26.1%
72 Lithuania 0.8% 2.4% 4.6% 6.4% 9.2%
73 Luxembourg 0.8% 1.8% 0.2% −2.0% −6.7%
74 Malawi −1.6% −5.5% −9.2% −13.0% −20.7%
75 Malaysia −3.2% −7.8% −11.2% −13.8% −18.3%
76 Maldives −3.9% −6.2% −11.1% −21.9% −30.2%
77 Mali −2.7% −6.8% −10.9% −15.4% −33.1%
78 Malta −2.6% −6.4% −6.7% −5.7% −11.3%
79 Mauritania −5.1% −11.4% −17.0% −22.5% −34.2%
80 Mauritius −2.5% −6.1% −9.7% −11.3% −16.5%
81 Mexico −2.2% −5.1% −7.0% −9.0% −12.5%
82 Mongolia −1.9% −2.6% −6.1% −8.1% −11.9%
83 Morocco −2.2% −4.9% −6.8% −8.6% −13.1%
84 Mozambique −3.8% −8.5% −12.1% −15.5% −23.4%
85 Myanmar −2.6% −6.6% −9.4% −11.7% −18.3%
86 Namibia −2.4% −5.4% −6.1% −6.9% −12.6%
87 Nepal −4.4% −10.3% −13.4% −14.6% −20.2%
88 Netherlands −1.9% −3.6% −4.3% −4.7% −7.5%
89 New Zealand −2.1% −3.8% −6.6% −2.1% −7.3%
90 Nicaragua −2.8% −6.3% −9.3% −12.7% −16.3%
91 Niger −6.0% −14.9% −18.5% −23.4% −33.4%
92 Nigeria −1.9% −5.5% −9.1% −13.6% −20.5%
93 Norway −0.1% −1.6% −1.7% −2.1% −3.6%
94 Pakistan −4.7% −11.5% −16.9% −22.3% −33.9%
95 Panama −2.9% −7.0% −9.8% −12.1% −13.1%
96 Papua New Guinea −3.0% −7.4% −10.7% −13.9% −11.4%
97 Paraguay −3.3% −6.1% −9.1% −11.0% −17.7%
98 Peru −2.3% −4.9% −6.8% −8.6% −11.2%
99 Philippines −2.4% −5.5% −7.7% −9.1% −15.2%
100 Poland −0.3% −0.4% −3.2% −4.9% −7.1%
101 Portugal 0.2% 0.6% −0.6% −1.4% −3.6%
102 Qatar −1.3% −5.3% −14.4% −30.5% −42.0%
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103 Republic of Korea −0.9% −1.5% −1.3% −1.6% −6.3%
104 Republic of Moldova 1.4% 3.6% 5.7% 7.2% −35.8%
105 Romania 0.5% 0.9% 1.7% 3.4% 5.2%
106 Russian Federation −0.1% 0.2% 0.7% 0.9% 0.8%
107 Rwanda 0.3% −5.4% −6.8% −9.7% −16.3%
108 Saudi Arabia 4.0% 1.8% −1.8% −4.9% −7.6%
109 Senegal −3.8% −8.5% −12.3% −15.6% −23.9%
110 Serbia 0.5% 1.8% 5.1% 11.1% 12.4%
111 Sierra Leone −0.4% −2.9% −9.5% −13.7% −20.7%
112 Singapore −7.4% −13.6% −16.0% −21.6% −22.4%
113 Slovakia 0.7% 1.8% 2.9% 3.7% 3.2%
114 Slovenia 1.6% 3.8% 5.9% 7.5% 6.1%
115 South Africa −1.8% −4.9% −6.7% −8.3% −12.7%
116 Spain 0.4% 1.2% −0.5% −1.9% −2.7%
117 Sri Lanka −2.5% −5.7% −8.5% −10.7% −12.8%
118 Sudan (former) −5.0% −10.3% −13.4% −16.2% −39.0%
119 Swaziland −0.7% −1.7% −1.1% −1.6% −2.3%
120 Sweden −1.1% −2.1% −2.2% −3.6% −13.8%
121 Switzerland −1.1% −1.9% −2.8% −4.2% −7.3%
122 Syrian Arab Republic −4.5% −10.4% −13.4% −15.4% −21.2%
123 Tajikistan −1.8% −4.0% −6.4% −8.8% −14.2%
124 Thailand −1.7% −4.8% −6.8% −7.1% −8.0%
125 Togo −4.1% −9.6% −15.5% −19.3% −29.7%
126 Trinidad and Tobago −1.1% −2.2% −3.7% −4.8% −25.2%
127 Tunisia −1.7% −4.1% −5.4% −6.6% −10.2%
128 Turkey −1.7% −3.9% −6.0% −9.2% −13.9%
129 Uganda −5.0% −12.0% −18.1% −23.4% −39.0%
130 Ukraine 1.9% 5.8% 7.9% 9.5% 10.8%
131 United Arab 
Emirates
−7.5% −18.4% −30.0% −41.9% −53.6%
132 United Kingdom −1.6% −3.9% −5.1% −6.0% −11.3%
133 United Republic of 
Tanzania
−4.0% −9.0% −13.2% −17.4% −13.6%
134 United States of 
America
−1.1% −2.6% −3.0% −3.4% −6.7%
135 Uruguay −0.9% −2.1% −2.4% −3.5% −5.2%
136 Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of)
−2.6% −6.1% −8.6% −10.8% −15.2%
137 Viet Nam −1.5% −3.1% −4.5% −6.4% −9.8%
138 Yemen −4.8% −9.9% −14.1% −17.5% −25.6%
139 Zambia −2.8% −6.9% −10.2% −13.7% −21.1%
140 Zimbabwe −3.6% −8.0% −11.0% −14.7% −23.5%
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Table A3.21  Non-renewable resources (Non-renewable resources in billions of constant 
2005 US$)
Country/year 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
1 Afghanistan 4  4  3  3  3  3
2 Albania 13  13  13  13  12  12
3 Algeria 604  563  516  462  401  354
4 Argentina 60  56  49  40  31  24
5 Armenia  –  –  –  –  3  3
6 Australia 2,041  2,006  1,963  1,912  1,857  1,808
7 Austria 4  4  3  2  1  0
8 Bahrain 7  5  4  3  2  1
9 Bangladesh 4  4  4  3  3  3
10 Barbados 0  0  0  0  0  –
11 Belgium  –  –  –  –  0  –
12 Belize  –  –  –  –  0  –
13 Benin  –  –  –  –  –  –
14 Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of)
12  12  11  10  9  7
15 Botswana 2  2  2  2  1  1
16 Brazil 554  534  507  469  419  371
17 Bulgaria 59  56  53  51  48  46
18 Burundi  –  –  –  –  –  –
19 Cambodia  –  –  –  –  –  –
20 Cameroon 12  9  7  5  6  5
21 Canada 2,632  2,550  2,453  2,346  2,235  2,145
22 Central African 
Republic
 –  –  –  –  0  0
23 Chile 111  107  101  94  86  79
24 China 4,183  4,009  3,812  3,555  3,166  2,762
25 Colombia 226  214  195  176  154  130
26 Congo 42  38  33  28  25  20
27 Costa Rica  –  –  –  –  0  –
28 Côte d’Ivoire 3  3  3  3  3  2
29 Croatia 3  4  3  2  2  1
30 Cuba 15  14  13  12  10  9
31 Cyprus  –  –  –  –  0  –
32 Czech Republic 81  77  71  66  61  57
33 Democratic Republic 
of the Congo
 –  –  –  –  –  –
34 Denmark 45  41  35  25  16  11
35 Dominican Republic 1  1  1  1  1  1
36 Ecuador 151  144  135  125  114  104
37 Egypt 208  186  164  143  121  103
38 El Salvador  –  –  –  –  –  –
39 Estonia  –  –  –  –  0  –
40 Fiji  –  –  –  –  –  –
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41 Finland 0  0  0  0  0  –
42 France 4  3  2  1  1  1
43 Gabon 51  45  38  32  27  23
44 Gambia  –  –  –  –  –  –
45 Germany 1,485  1,424  1,375  1,328  1,285  1,253
46 Ghana 4  4  3  3  2  2
47 Greece 80  74  69  62  57  52
48 Guatemala 2  2  2  2  1  1
49 Guyana 2  2  2  2  2  2
50 Haiti  –  –  –  –  –  –
51 Honduras  –  –  –  –  –  –
52 Hungary 43  41  38  37  35  34
53 Iceland  –  –  –  –  –  –
54 India 2,348  2,304  2,248  2,184  2,101  2,025
55 Indonesia 1,072  1,016  953  892  818  745
56 Iran (Islamic 
Republic of)
4,202  4,113  4,012  3,902  3,773  3,671
57 Iraq 1,533  1,520  1,496  1,462  1,426  1,390
58 Ireland 2  2  1  1  1  0
59 Israel 10  10  10  10  9  8
60 Italy 26  22  18  14  11  8
61 Jamaica 4  4  4  4  4  4
62 Japan 37  30  24  18  12  8
63 Jordan 5  5  5  5  5  5
64 Kazakhstan 918  1,003  987  961  925  891
65 Kenya  –  –  –  –  –  –
66 Kuwait 1,606  1,574  1,524  1,471  1,408  1,357
67 Kyrgyzstan 10  10  10  10  10  10
68 Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic
1  1  1  1  1  1
69 Latvia  –  –  –  –  0  –
70 Lesotho  –  –  –  –  –  –
71 Liberia  –  –  –  –  –  –
72 Lithuania 0  0  0  0  0  –
73 Luxembourg  –  –  –  –  –  –
74 Malawi  –  –  –  –  0  0
75 Malaysia 306  286  259  229  197  172
76 Maldives  –  –  –  –  –  –
77 Mali  –  –  –  –  –  –
78 Malta  –  –  –  –  –  –
79 Mauritania 5  5  5  4  5  5
80 Mauritius  –  –  –  –  –  –
81 Mexico 297  263  225  183  141  109
82 Mongolia 46  46  45  45  44  42
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83 Morocco 0  0  0  0  0  0
84 Mozambique 30  30  30  30  147  146
85 Myanmar 21  21  20  18  15  14
86 Namibia  –  –  –  –  3  3
87 Nepal 0  0  0  0  0  0
88 Netherlands 122  105  88  72  56  43
89 New Zealand 145  143  140  138  135  133
90 Nicaragua  –  –  –  –  0  –
91 Niger 3  3  3  3  3  3
92 Nigeria 712  669  622  571  518  473
93 Norway 484  431  353  267  192  142
94 Pakistan 135  129  123  115  104  96
95 Panama  –  –  –  –  –  –
96 Papua New Guinea 16  14  12  11  10  9
97 Paraguay  –  –  –  –  0  –
98 Peru 91  87  82  76  69  60
99 Philippines 11  11  11  11  14  12
100 Poland 496  475  455  438  421  409
101 Portugal 0  0  0  0  1  0
102 Qatar 451  442  429  410  383  351
103 Republic of Korea 21  18  16  14  12  10
104 Republic of Moldova  –  –  –  –  –  –
105 Romania 47  38  31  24  18  13
106 Russian Federation 4,322  6,384  6,131  5,835  5,493  5,201
107 Rwanda  –  –  –  –  2  2
108 Saudi Arabia 4,378  4,185  3,977  3,759  3,512  3,305
109 Senegal 0  0  0  0  0  0
110 Serbia  –  –  –  –  6  3
111 Sierra Leone  –  –  –  –  –  –
112 Singapore  –  –  –  –  0  –
113 Slovakia 5  5  5  4  4  3
114 Slovenia 10  9  9  8  8  8
115 South Africa 301  278  253  227  200  179
116 Spain 42  37  34  31  29  28
117 Sri Lanka  –  –  –  –  –  –
118 Sudan (former) 61  61  61  57  50  45
119 Swaziland 1  1  1  1  1  1
120 Sweden 13  13  13  12  12  11
121 Switzerland 0  0  0  0  0  –
122 Syrian Arab Republic 71  62  51  41  33  28
123 Tajikistan 5  5  5  5  5  5
124 Thailand 94  89  81  69  54  38
125 Togo 0  0  0  0  0  0
126 Trinidad and Tobago 64  60  55  46  34  24
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127 Tunisia 19  17  14  12  10  8
128 Turkey 269  262  255  249  241  234
129 Uganda 28  28  28  28  28  28
130 Ukraine 627  676  664  651  638  627
131 United Arab 
Emirates
1,344  1,296  1,247  1,195  1,136  1,085
132 United Kingdom 337  274  192  120  71  45
133 United Republic of 
Tanzania
2  2  2  2  2  2
134 United States of 
America
5,929  5,581  5,232  4,895  4,559  4,244
135 Uruguay 0  –  –  –  0  –
136 Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of)
4,317  4,254  4,174  4,099  4,031  3,979
137 Viet Nam 165  162  157  149  142  133
138 Yemen 52  48  42  35  52  48
139 Zambia 9  8  8  7  6  6
140 Zimbabwe 10  9  9  9  8  8
Table A3.22  Non-renewable resources per capita (Non-renewable resources per capita in 
thousands of constant 2005 US$)
Country/year 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
1 Afghanistan 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
2 Albania 4.0 4.0 4.1 4.2 4.2 4.2
3 Algeria 23.3 19.5 16.5 13.9 11.1 9.1
4 Argentina 1.8 1.6 1.3 1.0 0.7 0.6
5 Armenia – – – – 0.9 0.9
6 Australia 119.6 111.0 102.5 93.8 84.3 77.1
7 Austria 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1
8 Bahrain 13.2 9.7 6.5 3.7 1.7 0.9
9 Bangladesh 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
10 Barbados 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 –
11 Belgium – – – – – –
12 Belize – – – – 0.2 –
13 Benin – – – – – –
14 Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of)
1.8 1.6 1.4 1.1 0.9 0.6
15 Botswana 1.5 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.6 0.5
16 Brazil 3.7 3.3 2.9 2.5 2.1 1.8
17 Bulgaria 6.8 6.7 6.5 6.6 6.5 6.3
18 Burundi – – – – – –
19 Cambodia – – – – – –
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20 Cameroon 1.0 0.7 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2
21 Canada 94.7 86.9 79.7 72.6 65.7 60.4
22 Central African 
Republic
– – – – – –
23 Chile 8.4 7.5 6.7 5.8 5.1 4.5
24 China 3.7 3.3 3.0 2.7 2.4 2.0
25 Colombia 6.6 5.7 4.8 4.1 3.4 2.7
26 Congo 17.4 14.0 10.7 7.9 6.2 4.5
27 Costa Rica – – – – – –
28 Côte d’Ivoire 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.1
29 Croatia 0.6 0.8 0.7 0.5 0.4 0.3
30 Cuba 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.1 0.9 0.8
31 Cyprus – – – – – –
32 Czech Republic 7.8 7.4 6.9 6.4 5.8 5.4
33 Democratic Republic 
of the Congo
– – – – – –
34 Denmark 8.8 7.9 6.5 4.6 2.9 2.0
35 Dominican Republic 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
36 Ecuador 14.8 12.6 10.7 9.1 7.6 6.6
37 Egypt 3.7 3.0 2.4 1.9 1.5 1.2
38 El Salvador – – – – – –
39 Estonia – – – – – –
40 Fiji – – – – – –
41 Finland 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 –
42 France 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
43 Gabon 53.7 41.4 30.5 23.4 17.6 13.7
44 Gambia – – – – – –
45 Germany 18.7 17.4 16.7 16.1 15.7 15.5
46 Ghana 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
47 Greece 7.8 7.0 6.4 5.7 5.1 4.8
48 Guatemala 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
49 Guyana 2.4 2.4 2.3 2.3 2.2 2.2
50 Haiti – – – – – –
51 Honduras – – – – – –
52 Hungary 4.1 3.9 3.8 3.6 3.5 3.5
53 Iceland – – – – – –
54 India 2.7 2.4 2.1 1.9 1.7 1.6
55 Indonesia 5.9 5.2 4.5 3.9 3.4 2.9
56 Iran (Islamic 
Republic of)
74.8 68.2 60.9 55.6 50.8 47.0
57 Iraq 87.7 75.2 63.5 54.1 46.2 39.4
58 Ireland 0.6 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.1
59 Israel 2.1 1.8 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.0
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60 Italy 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1
61 Jamaica 1.9 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.5 1.4
62 Japan 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.1
63 Jordan 1.6 1.2 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.6
64 Kazakhstan 56.2 63.4 66.3 63.4 56.7 51.6
65 Kenya – – – – – –
66 Kuwait 779.9 961.8 789.8 649.9 460.4 361.7
67 Kyrgyzstan 2.4 2.3 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.8
68 Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic
0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2
69 Latvia – – – – – –
70 Lesotho – – – – – –
71 Liberia – – – – – –
72 Lithuania 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 –
73 Luxembourg – – – – – –
74 Malawi – – – – – –
75 Malaysia 16.8 13.8 11.1 8.9 7.0 5.8
76 Maldives – – – – – –
77 Mali – – – – – –
78 Malta – – – – – –
79 Mauritania 2.5 2.1 1.7 1.4 1.4 1.2
80 Mauritius – – – – – –
81 Mexico 3.5 2.8 2.2 1.7 1.2 0.9
82 Mongolia 21.1 19.8 18.8 17.7 16.1 14.3
83 Morocco 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
84 Mozambique 2.3 1.9 1.7 1.4 6.0 5.4
85 Myanmar 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.3
86 Namibia – – – – 1.2 1.1
87 Nepal 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
88 Netherlands 8.2 6.8 5.5 4.4 3.4 2.6
89 New Zealand 43.6 38.8 36.3 33.3 31.1 29.6
90 Nicaragua – – – – – –
91 Niger 0.4 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1
92 Nigeria 7.4 6.2 5.1 4.1 3.2 2.7
93 Norway 114.2 98.8 78.6 57.7 39.3 27.6
94 Pakistan 1.3 1.1 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.5
95 Panama – – – – – –
96 Papua New Guinea 3.8 3.1 2.3 1.8 1.4 1.2
97 Paraguay – – – – 0.0 –
98 Peru 4.2 3.6 3.2 2.8 2.3 1.9
99 Philippines 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.1
100 Poland 13.0 12.3 11.9 11.5 11.1 10.7
101 Portugal 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
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102 Qatar 947.2 882.7 723.7 490.5 216.7 161.4
103 Republic of Korea 0.5 0.4 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.2
104 Republic of Moldova – – – – – –
105 Romania 2.0 1.7 1.4 1.1 0.9 0.7
106 Russian Federation 29.1 43.0 41.8 40.7 38.5 36.2
107 Rwanda – – – – 0.2 0.1
108 Saudi Arabia 267.6 222.0 185.9 151.9 125.0 107.0
109 Senegal 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
110 Serbia – – – – 0.8 0.4
111 Sierra Leone – – – – – –
112 Singapore – – – – – –
113 Slovakia 0.9 1.0 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6
114 Slovenia 4.8 4.6 4.4 4.1 3.8 3.6
115 South Africa 8.5 7.1 5.7 4.8 3.9 3.3
116 Spain 1.1 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.6 0.6
117 Sri Lanka – – – – – –
118 Sudan (former) 3.1 2.5 2.2 1.8 1.4 1.2
119 Swaziland 1.1 1.0 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.7
120 Sweden 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.3 1.2
121 Switzerland 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0 –
122 Syrian Arab Republic 5.7 4.3 3.1 2.3 1.6 1.5
123 Tajikistan 0.9 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6
124 Thailand 1.7 1.5 1.3 1.1 0.8 0.6
125 Togo 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.0 0.0 0.0
126 Trinidad and Tobago 52.6 47.7 43.1 35.8 25.7 18.1
127 Tunisia 2.4 1.9 1.5 1.2 0.9 0.7
128 Turkey 5.0 4.5 4.0 3.7 3.3 3.0
129 Uganda 1.6 1.4 1.2 1.0 0.8 0.7
130 Ukraine 12.1 13.1 13.5 13.8 13.9 13.8
131 United Arab 
Emirates
741.8 551.4 408.8 266.6 136.4 119.4
132 United Kingdom 5.9 4.7 3.3 2.0 1.1 0.7
133 United Republic of 
Tanzania
0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.0
134 United States of 
America
23.8 21.0 18.5 16.6 14.7 13.3
135 Uruguay – – – – – –
136 Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of)
217.4 191.7 170.5 153.1 139.0 129.6
137 Viet Nam 2.5 2.3 2.0 1.8 1.6 1.5
138 Yemen 4.3 3.1 2.4 1.7 2.2 1.8
139 Zambia 1.0 0.9 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.4
140 Zimbabwe 0.9 0.8 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.5
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Table A3.23  Non-renewable resources growth (Non-renewable resources change (%) with 
respect to base year 1990)
Country/year 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
1 Afghanistan −0.3% −0.8% −0.8% −1.2% −2.7%
2 Albania −0.6% −1.1% −1.4% −1.6% −2.9%
3 Algeria −1.4% −3.8% −6.5% −9.7% −16.3%
4 Argentina −1.6% −5.1% −9.7% −15.5% −26.1%
5 Armenia – – – – –
6 Australia −0.4% −1.0% −1.6% −2.3% −4.0%
7 Austria −3.7% −10.2% −17.9% −26.6% −51.7%
8 Bahrain −3.6% −9.9% −16.2% −24.1% −42.3%
9 Bangladesh −1.1% −3.4% −6.6% −5.4% −13.6%
10 Barbados −4.9% −14.3% −24.4% −38.8% −100.0%
11 Belgium – – – – –
12 Belize – – – – –
13 Benin – – – – –
14 Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of)
−0.8% −2.0% −4.1% −8.3% −17.8%
15 Botswana −1.7% −4.5% −7.5% −10.8% −18.6%
16 Brazil −0.7% −2.2% −4.1% −6.8% −12.5%
17 Bulgaria −1.0% −2.5% −3.8% −4.9% −8.2%
18 Burundi – – – – –
19 Cambodia – – – – –
20 Cameroon −5.4% −13.6% −19.1% −15.5% −25.2%
21 Canada −0.6% −1.8% −2.8% −4.0% −6.6%
22 Central African 
Republic
– – – – –
23 Chile −0.7% −2.2% −4.0% −6.1% −10.5%
24 China −0.8% −2.3% −4.0% −6.7% −12.9%
25 Colombia −1.1% −3.7% −6.1% −9.1% −16.9%
26 Congo −1.7% −5.5% −9.6% −11.8% −21.4%
27 Costa Rica – – – – –
28 Côte d’Ivoire −0.3% −2.7% −5.3% −1.3% −12.1%
29 Croatia 6.3% 2.1% −3.7% −9.9% −19.2%
30 Cuba −0.7% −2.8% −5.6% −8.8% −15.4%
31 Cyprus – – – – –
32 Czech Republic −0.9% −3.0% −4.9% −6.8% −10.7%
33 Democratic Republic 
of the Congo
– – – – –
34 Denmark −2.0% −6.6% −14.1% −23.0% −37.0%
35 Dominican Republic −2.9% −7.4% −10.9% −12.6% −18.7%
36 Ecuador −1.0% −2.8% −4.7% −6.9% −11.7%
37 Egypt −2.2% −5.8% −9.0% −12.6% −20.8%
38 El Salvador – – – – –
39 Estonia – – – – –
40 Fiji – – – – –
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41 Finland −3.7% −11.8% −21.5% −25.0% −100.0%
42 France −6.1% −14.4% −21.2% −25.9% −40.7%
43 Gabon −2.5% −7.4% −10.9% −14.6% −23.2%
44 Gambia – – – – –
45 Germany −0.8% −1.9% −2.8% −3.6% −5.5%
46 Ghana −1.4% −4.9% −8.6% −13.9% −23.4%
47 Greece −1.4% −3.6% −5.9% −8.2% −13.0%
48 Guatemala −0.9% −4.8% −9.8% −15.1% −24.7%
49 Guyana −0.2% −0.6% −0.9% −1.1% −1.8%
50 Haiti – – – – –
51 Honduras – – – – –
52 Hungary −1.1% −2.8% −3.9% −4.9% −7.3%
53 Iceland – – – – –
54 India −0.4% −1.1% −1.8% −2.7% −4.8%
55 Indonesia −1.1% −2.9% −4.5% −6.5% −11.4%
56 Iran (Islamic 
Republic of)
−0.4% −1.1% −1.8% −2.7% −4.4%
57 Iraq −0.2% −0.6% −1.2% −1.8% −3.2%
58 Ireland −5.0% −12.3% −18.5% −25.1% −39.3%
59 Israel −0.1% −0.4% −0.7% −1.6% −5.1%
60 Italy −3.3% −9.0% −14.0% −20.0% −32.2%
61 Jamaica −0.5% −1.3% −2.1% −2.5% −4.3%
62 Japan −4.1% −10.5% −16.6% −24.2% −40.2%
63 Jordan −0.5% −1.4% −2.2% −3.0% −4.8%
64 Kazakhstan 1.8% 1.8% 1.1% 0.2% −1.0%
65 Kenya – – – – –
66 Kuwait −0.4% −1.3% −2.2% −3.2% −5.4%
67 Kyrgyzstan 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% −0.1% −0.4%
68 Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic
0.0% 0.0% −0.1% −0.2% −0.5%
69 Latvia – – – – –
70 Lesotho – – – – –
71 Liberia – – – – –
72 Lithuania −0.9% −6.7% −21.7% −36.7% −100.0%
73 Luxembourg – – – – –
74 Malawi – – – – –
75 Malaysia −1.4% −4.1% −7.0% −10.5% −17.5%
76 Maldives – – – – –
77 Mali – – – – –
78 Malta – – – – –
79 Mauritania −0.8% −2.1% −3.2% −0.5% −2.6%
80 Mauritius – – – – –
81 Mexico −2.4% −6.7% −11.4% −17.0% −28.3%
82 Mongolia −0.2% −0.5% −0.8% −1.3% −3.3%
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83 Morocco −0.7% −2.3% −4.1% 21.8% 27.8%
84 Mozambique 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 48.4% 68.9%
85 Myanmar −0.3% −1.0% −4.2% −8.9% −11.8%
86 Namibia – – – – –
87 Nepal −0.2% −1.5% −2.6% −4.2% −7.0%
88 Netherlands −3.1% −7.9% −12.3% −17.6% −29.1%
89 New Zealand −0.4% −0.9% −1.3% −1.7% −2.8%
90 Nicaragua – – – – –
91 Niger −0.1% −0.1% −0.2% −0.3% −2.6%
92 Nigeria −1.2% −3.3% −5.4% −7.7% −12.8%
93 Norway −2.3% −7.6% −13.8% −20.6% −33.6%
94 Pakistan −0.8% −2.3% −3.9% −6.1% −10.8%
95 Panama – – – – –
96 Papua New Guinea −1.9% −6.1% −9.0% −11.5% −17.1%
97 Paraguay – – – – –
98 Peru −1.0% −2.6% −4.4% −6.9% −12.9%
99 Philippines −0.3% −0.8% −1.4% 6.2% 1.7%
100 Poland −0.9% −2.1% −3.1% −4.0% −6.3%
101 Portugal −4.1% −9.4% −10.1% 61.1% 86.5%
102 Qatar −0.4% −1.2% −2.3% −4.0% −8.1%
103 Republic of Korea −3.1% −7.2% −10.3% −13.8% −23.1%
104 Republic of Moldova – – – – –
105 Romania −4.2% −10.2% −15.6% −21.7% −34.4%
106 Russian Federation 8.1% 9.1% 7.8% 6.2% 6.4%
107 Rwanda – – – – –
108 Saudi Arabia −0.9% −2.4% −3.7% −5.4% −8.9%
109 Senegal −2.2% −5.6% −8.6% −9.6% −15.4%
110 Serbia – – – – –
111 Sierra Leone – – – – –
112 Singapore – – – – –
113 Slovakia 1.9% −0.6% −3.8% −7.1% −12.7%
114 Slovenia −0.9% −2.4% −3.7% −5.1% −8.0%
115 South Africa −1.5% −4.2% −6.8% −9.6% −15.9%
116 Spain −2.2% −5.1% −7.2% −8.5% −11.9%
117 Sri Lanka – – – – –
118 Sudan (former) 0.0% −0.1% −1.9% −5.1% −9.5%
119 Swaziland −0.1% −0.4% −0.7% −0.9% −1.4%
120 Sweden −0.5% −1.4% −2.1% −2.6% −4.9%
121 Switzerland 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 16.7% −100.0%
122 Syrian Arab Republic −2.6% −7.7% −12.6% −17.4% −26.1%
123 Tajikistan 0.7% 0.8% 0.8% 0.7% 0.7%
124 Thailand −1.1% −3.8% −7.3% −13.1% −26.2%
125 Togo −3.8% −9.7% −13.0% −15.4% −23.2%
126 Trinidad and Tobago −1.4% −4.0% −7.8% −14.6% −27.5%
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127 Tunisia −2.7% −7.0% −11.1% −15.8% −25.2%
128 Turkey −0.5% −1.3% −2.0% −2.8% −4.5%
129 Uganda 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
130 Ukraine 1.5% 1.4% 0.9% 0.4% 0.0%
131 United Arab 
Emirates
−0.7% −1.9% −2.9% −4.1% −6.9%
132 United Kingdom −4.1% −13.1% −22.8% −32.3% −48.7%
133 United Republic of 
Tanzania
0.0% 0.0% −0.1% −0.1% −0.1%
134 United States of 
America
−1.2% −3.1% −4.7% −6.4% −10.5%
135 Uruguay – – – – –
136 Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of)
−0.3% −0.8% −1.3% −1.7% −2.7%
137 Viet Nam −0.3% −1.1% −2.5% −3.7% −7.0%
138 Yemen −1.5% −5.1% −9.3% 0.2% −2.5%
139 Zambia −1.3% −2.8% −4.3% −6.9% −12.7%
140 Zimbabwe −1.0% −2.3% −3.2% −3.7% −6.0%
Table A3.24  Non-renewable resources per capita growth (Non-renewable resources per 
capita change (%) with respect to base year 1990)
Country/year 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
1 Afghanistan −6.7% −12.2% −16.8% −19.9% −29.5%
2 Albania 0.0% 0.5% 0.8% 1.4% 1.4%
3 Algeria −3.5% −8.2% −12.1% −16.9% −26.9%
4 Argentina −2.9% −8.0% −13.7% −20.2% −32.5%
5 Armenia – – – – –
6 Australia −1.5% −3.8% −5.9% −8.4% −13.6%
7 Austria −4.4% −11.2% −19.3% −28.2% −53.4%
8 Bahrain −6.1% −16.3% −27.1% −39.9% −58.8%
9 Bangladesh −3.3% −8.4% −13.4% −13.5% −24.6%
10 Barbados −5.2% −15.1% −25.4% −39.8% −100.0%
11 Belgium – – – – –
12 Belize – – – – –
13 Benin – – – – –
14 Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of)
−2.7% −6.6% −10.7% −16.4% −28.8%
15 Botswana −4.3% −9.9% −14.2% −19.2% −30.5%
16 Brazil −2.3% −6.0% −9.3% −13.0% −21.3%
17 Bulgaria −0.3% −1.0% −0.9% −0.9% −2.3%
18 Burundi – – – – –
19 Cambodia – – – – –
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20 Cameroon −8.1% −19.4% −26.9% −26.1% −39.5%
21 Canada −1.7% −4.2% −6.4% −8.7% −13.9%
22 Central African 
Republic
– – – – –
23 Chile −2.2% −5.7% −8.8% −12.0% −19.0%
24 China −2.0% −4.9% −7.3% −10.5% −18.1%
25 Colombia −2.9% −7.6% −11.5% −15.5% −25.6%
26 Congo −4.3% −11.6% −17.9% −22.8% −36.4%
27 Costa Rica – – – – –
28 Côte d’Ivoire −3.6% −9.9% −14.3% −13.0% −28.0%
29 Croatia 6.8% 4.1% −1.9% −8.1% −15.9%
30 Cuba −1.3% −4.0% −7.0% −10.3% −17.4%
31 Cyprus – – – – –
32 Czech Republic −0.9% −2.9% −4.6% −7.1% −11.3%
33 Democratic Republic 
of the Congo
– – – – –
34 Denmark −2.3% −7.5% −15.2% −24.4% −38.9%
35 Dominican Republic −4.7% −11.3% −16.3% −19.3% −28.2%
36 Ecuador −3.2% −7.9% −11.5% −15.4% −23.8%
37 Egypt −4.2% −10.3% −15.2% −20.4% −32.1%
38 El Salvador – – – – –
39 Estonia – – – – –
40 Fiji – – – – –
41 Finland −4.2% −12.6% −22.4% −26.4% −100.0%
42 France −6.5% −15.2% −22.7% −27.8% −43.2%
43 Gabon −5.1% −13.1% −18.8% −24.3% −36.6%
44 Gambia – – – – –
45 Germany −1.4% −2.8% −3.7% −4.2% −6.1%
46 Ghana −4.0% −10.8% −16.9% −24.2% −37.4%
47 Greece −2.1% −5.0% −7.7% −10.2% −14.9%
48 Guatemala −3.3% −10.4% −17.6% −24.6% −37.5%
49 Guyana −0.4% −1.4% −1.6% −2.2% −3.7%
50 Haiti – – – – –
51 Honduras – – – – –
52 Hungary −1.0% −2.4% −3.2% −4.0% −5.8%
53 Iceland – – – – –
54 India −2.3% −5.7% −8.3% −10.8% −16.6%
55 Indonesia −2.7% −6.5% −9.6% −13.0% −20.9%
56 Iran (Islamic 
Republic of)
−1.8% −5.0% −7.1% −9.2% −14.4%
57 Iraq −3.0% −7.8% −11.4% −14.8% −23.4%
58 Ireland −5.5% −14.0% −21.8% −29.8% −44.6%
59 Israel −3.5% −7.6% −10.1% −13.0% −21.5%
60 Italy −3.3% −9.1% −14.4% −20.9% −33.7%
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61 Jamaica −1.2% −3.3% −4.5% −5.3% −8.3%
62 Japan −4.4% −11.1% −17.3% −24.9% −40.8%
63 Jordan −5.4% −9.6% −12.9% −17.8% −26.9%
64 Kazakhstan 2.5% 4.2% 3.1% 0.2% −2.8%
65 Kenya – – – – –
66 Kuwait 4.3% 0.3% −4.5% −12.3% −22.6%
67 Kyrgyzstan −0.6% −2.6% −4.0% −5.4% −9.4%
68 Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic
−2.6% −5.6% −7.3% −9.4% −14.5%
69 Latvia – – – – –
70 Lesotho – – – – –
71 Liberia – – – – –
72 Lithuania −0.5% −5.4% −19.6% −33.8% −100.0%
73 Luxembourg – – – – –
74 Malawi – – – – –
75 Malaysia −3.9% −10.0% −14.8% −19.7% −30.1%
76 Maldives – – – – –
77 Mali – – – – –
78 Malta – – – – –
79 Mauritania −3.6% −9.1% −13.4% −13.8% −22.2%
80 Mauritius – – – – –
81 Mexico −4.3% −10.9% −16.7% −23.5% −36.9%
82 Mongolia −1.2% −2.8% −4.3% −6.5% −12.1%
83 Morocco −2.4% −5.9% −8.7% 14.3% 15.3%
84 Mozambique −3.4% −7.5% −10.8% 27.8% 33.3%
85 Myanmar −1.5% −4.1% −8.3% −13.5% −18.6%
86 Namibia – – – – –
87 Nepal −2.8% −7.2% −9.8% −12.4% −18.8%
88 Netherlands −3.7% −9.3% −14.2% −19.7% −31.9%
89 New Zealand −2.3% −4.5% −6.5% −8.1% −12.1%
90 Nicaragua – – – – –
91 Niger −3.4% −8.5% −12.7% −16.8% −27.4%
92 Nigeria −3.7% −9.2% −13.9% −18.7% −29.0%
93 Norway −2.8% −8.9% −15.7% −23.4% −37.7%
94 Pakistan −3.4% −8.2% −12.0% −16.3% −25.5%
95 Panama – – – – –
96 Papua New Guinea −4.3% −11.9% −17.3% −21.9% −31.8%
97 Paraguay – – – – –
98 Peru −2.9% −6.7% −9.8% −13.5% −22.5%
99 Philippines −2.7% −6.3% −9.2% −4.1% −13.0%
100 Poland −1.1% −2.2% −3.1% −4.0% −6.2%
101 Portugal −4.2% −10.1% −11.2% 58.8% 84.0%
102 Qatar −1.4% −6.5% −15.2% −30.8% −44.6%
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103 Republic of Korea −4.1% −9.3% −12.9% −16.8% −27.2%
104 Republic of Moldova – – – – –
105 Romania −3.8% −9.5% −13.8% −19.0% −31.0%
106 Russian Federation 8.1% 9.4% 8.7% 7.2% 7.5%
107 Rwanda – – – – –
108 Saudi Arabia −3.7% −8.7% −13.2% −17.3% −26.3%
109 Senegal −5.1% −11.8% −17.4% −21.1% −32.3%
110 Serbia – – – – –
111 Sierra Leone – – – – –
112 Singapore – – – – –
113 Slovakia 1.7% −1.0% −4.2% −7.5% −13.4%
114 Slovenia −0.8% −2.3% −3.7% −5.6% −8.9%
115 South Africa −3.6% −9.4% −13.4% −17.6% −27.1%
116 Spain −2.5% −5.9% −9.8% −12.6% −17.1%
117 Sri Lanka – – – – –
118 Sudan (former) −4.1% −8.2% −12.7% −18.1% −27.8%
119 Swaziland −2.3% −5.5% −6.7% −8.6% −13.3%
120 Sweden −1.1% −2.3% −3.4% −4.8% −8.8%
121 Switzerland −0.9% −1.7% −2.5% 12.3% −100.0%
122 Syrian Arab Republic −5.3% −13.8% −20.4% −27.3% −35.6%
123 Tajikistan −1.0% −3.0% −5.4% −8.0% −13.3%
124 Thailand −2.0% −6.2% −10.8% −16.6% −30.5%
125 Togo −6.1% −15.2% −21.0% −25.8% −37.8%
126 Trinidad and Tobago −1.9% −4.9% −9.2% −16.4% −30.0%
127 Tunisia −4.5% −10.6% −15.6% −21.1% −32.3%
128 Turkey −2.1% −5.2% −7.4% −9.6% −15.3%
129 Uganda −3.2% −7.5% −11.3% −14.9% −22.8%
130 Ukraine 1.7% 2.8% 3.4% 3.5% 4.6%
131 United Arab 
Emirates
−5.8% −13.8% −22.6% −34.5% −45.6%
132 United Kingdom −4.3% −13.7% −23.8% −33.8% −50.7%
133 United Republic of 
Tanzania
−3.2% −7.0% −10.2% −13.6% −21.2%
134 United States of 
America
−2.5% −6.0% −8.6% −11.2% −17.6%
135 Uruguay – – – – –
136 Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of)
−2.5% −5.9% −8.4% −10.6% −15.8%
137 Viet Nam −2.0% −5.0% −7.7% −10.1% −16.3%
138 Yemen −6.2% −14.0% −20.8% −15.4% −24.9%
139 Zambia −3.7% −9.0% −13.3% −18.6% −29.9%
140 Zimbabwe −3.1% −6.5% −8.2% −10.4% −17.1%
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Table A3.25 Agriculture land (Agriculture land in billions of constant 2005 US$)
Country/year 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
 1 Afghanistan  –  –  –  –  –  –
 2 Albania  –  –  –  –  –  –
 3 Algeria  –  –  –  –  –  –
 4 Argentina  206  206  207  222  238  239
 5 Armenia  –  –  –  –  –  –
 6 Australia  644  642  632  617  553  558
 7 Austria  22  21  21  20  20  19
 8 Bahrain  –  –  –  –  –  –
 9 Bangladesh  27  25  25  25  24  24
10 Barbados  0  0  0  0  0  0
11 Belgium  –  –  –  –  –  –
12 Belize  1  1  1  1  1  1
13 Benin  –  –  –  –  –  –
14 Bolivia (Plurinational State of )  55  57  58  57  58  58
15 Botswana  5  5  5  4  4  4
16 Brazil  307  328  332  346  347  358
17 Bulgaria  6  6  5  5  5  5
18 Burundi  4  4  4  3  4  3
19 Cambodia  23  24  25  28  29  30
20 Cameroon  11  11  11  11  12  12
21 Canada  63  63  63  62  58  59
22 Central African Republic  –  –  –  –  –  –
23 Chile  122  117  116  122  121  121
24 China  3,961  4,095  4,088  4,053  4,030  4,039
25 Colombia  65  58  59  47  44  40
26 Congo  34  34  34  34  34  34
27 Costa Rica  28  25  23  22  22  21
28 Côte d’Ivoire  14  14  14  15  15  15
29 Croatia  –  –  –  –  –  –
30 Cuba  –  –  –  –  –  –
31 Cyprus  0  0  0  0  0  0
32 Czech Republic  –  –  –  –  –  –
33 Democratic Republic of the Congo  –  –  –  –  –  –
34 Denmark  6  6  5  6  5  5
35 Dominican Republic  16  16  15  15  15  14
36 Ecuador  15  16  16  15  15  14
37 Egypt  8  10  10  11  12  12
38 El Salvador  5  5  5  6  5  6
39 Estonia  –  –  –  –  –  –
40 Fiji  2  2  2  2  2  2
41 Finland  15  14  14  14  14  14
42 France  154  152  150  149  145  144
43 Gabon  –  –  –  –  –  –
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44 Gambia  0  0  0  0  0  0
45 Germany  68  66  65  65  63  63
46 Ghana  21  22  24  25  26  27
47 Greece  138  137  128  125  123  119
48 Guatemala  –  –  –  –  –  –
49 Guyana  20  20  19  19  19  19
50 Haiti  –  –  –  –  –  –
51 Honduras  10  10  9  9  10  9
52 Hungary  23  22  21  21  19  19
53 Iceland  87  87  86  86  86  86
54 India  698  697  697  693  691  691
55 Indonesia  329  313  344  378  405  424
56 Iran (Islamic Republic of)  89  93  91  69  67  65
57 Iraq  5  5  4  5  4  4
58 Ireland  29  22  22  22  23  22
59 Israel  4  4  4  4  4  4
60 Italy  181  164  168  158  154  146
61 Jamaica  24  25  24  24  22  22
62 Japan  239  229  221  197  193  180
63 Jordan  2  2  2  2  2  2
64 Kazakhstan  –  –  –  –  –  –
65 Kenya  22  23  22  23  23  23
66 Kuwait  –  –  –  –  –  –
67 Kyrgyzstan  –  –  –  –  –  –
68 Lao People’s Democratic Republic  11  11  12  13  15  15
69 Latvia  –  –  –  –  –  –
70 Lesotho  –  –  –  –  –  –
71 Liberia  –  –  –  –  –  –
72 Lithuania  –  –  –  –  –  –
73 Luxembourg  –  –  –  –  –  –
74 Malawi  6  6  6  7  8  8
75 Malaysia  34  35  34  35  37  37
76 Maldives  0  0  0  0  0  0
77 Mali  12  13  14  15  15  16
78 Malta  0  0  0  0  0  0
79 Mauritania  –  –  –  –  –  –
80 Mauritius  1  1  1  1  1  1
81 Mexico  473  478  478  479  480  481
82 Mongolia  90  85  94  81  81  81
83 Morocco  31  31  31  30  30  30
84 Mozambique  45  45  45  46  47  47
85 Myanmar  –  –  –  –  –  –
86 Namibia  0  0  0  0  0  0
87 Nepal  10  10  10  10  10  10
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88 Netherlands  23  22  22  22  21  21
89 New Zealand  101  93  96  73  71  63
90 Nicaragua  9  10  11  11  11  12
91 Niger  2  2  3  3  3  3
92 Nigeria  151  168  175  178  172  181
93 Norway  11  13  12  12  11  12
94 Pakistan  98  100  102  100  98  100
95 Panama  9  9  9  9  9  9
96 Papua New Guinea  –  –  –  –  –  –
97 Paraguay  26  25  31  31  33  34
98 Peru  111  112  118  118  122  125
99 Philippines  49  48  49  50  53  54
100 Poland  42  42  41  36  33  32
101 Portugal  37  37  38  36  33  34
102 Qatar  0  0  0  0  0  0
103 Republic of Korea  242  228  219  209  197  190
104 Republic of Moldova  –  –  –  –  –  –
105 Romania  77  78  78  74  74  72
106 Russian Federation  –  –  –  –  –  –
107 Rwanda  2  2  2  2  2  2
108 Saudi Arabia  1,497  2,106  2,106  2,105  2,102  2,234
109 Senegal  3  3  3  3  3  3
110 Serbia  –  –  –  –  –  –
111 Sierra Leone  –  –  –  –  –  –
112 Singapore  0  0  0  0  0  0
113 Slovakia  –  –  –  –  –  –
114 Slovenia  –  –  –  –  –  –
115 South Africa  126  128  129  128  128  128
116 Spain  136  133  133  130  123  121
117 Sri Lanka  11  11  11  12  13  13
118 Sudan (former)  –  –  –  –  –  –
119 Swaziland  –  –  –  –  –  –
120 Sweden  10  10  10  10  9  9
121 Switzerland  68  67  67  66  65  65
122 Syrian Arab Republic  –  –  –  –  –  –
123 Tajikistan  –  –  –  –  –  –
124 Thailand  76  75  71  70  75  73
125 Togo  1  1  2  1  2  2
126 Trinidad and Tobago  1  1  1  1  1  1
127 Tunisia  5  6  6  6  6  6
128 Turkey  177  176  180  183  174  175
129 Uganda  –  –  –  –  –  –
130 Ukraine  –  –  –  –  –  –
131 United Arab Emirates  –  –  –  –  –  –
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132 United Kingdom  96  92  90  89  91  90
133 United Republic of Tanzania  24  25  26  27  28  29
134 United States of America  1,385  1,363  1,344  1,336  1,325  1,312
135 Uruguay  32  32  32  32  31  31
136 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)  218  216  216  215  215  215
137 Viet Nam  36  38  47  53  57  61
138 Yemen  29  29  29  29  29  29
139 Zambia  21  21  23  23  23  24
140 Zimbabwe  –  –  –  –  –  –
Table A3.26  Agriculture land per capita (Agriculture land per capita in thousands of 
constant 2005 US$)
Country/year 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
1 Afghanistan  –  –  –  –  –  –
2 Albania  –  –  –  –  –  –
3 Algeria  –  –  –  –  –  –
4 Argentina  6.3  5.9  5.6  5.7  5.8  5.6
5 Armenia  –  –  –  –  –  –
6 Australia  37.7  35.5  33.0  30.3  25.1  23.8
7 Austria  2.8  2.7  2.6  2.5  2.4  2.3
8 Bahrain  –  –  –  –  –  –
9 Bangladesh  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.1
10 Barbados  1.3  1.3  1.2  1.1  1.0  0.9
11 Belgium  –  –  –  –  –  –
12 Belize  3.1  3.3  2.8  2.5  2.3  2.1
13 Benin  –  –  –  –  –  –
14 Bolivia (Plurinational State of )  8.0  7.5  6.9  6.3  5.8  5.5
15 Botswana  3.3  2.9  2.6  2.4  2.2  2.0
16 Brazil  2.0  2.0  1.9  1.8  1.7  1.7
17 Bulgaria  0.7  0.7  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6
18 Burundi  0.7  0.6  0.5  0.4  0.4  0.3
19 Cambodia  2.5  2.2  2.0  2.1  2.0  2.0
20 Cameroon  0.9  0.8  0.7  0.6  0.6  0.5
21 Canada  2.3  2.1  2.0  1.9  1.7  1.7
22 Central African Republic  –  –  –  –  –  –
23 Chile  9.3  8.3  7.6  7.6  7.1  6.8
24 China  3.5  3.4  3.2  3.1  3.0  3.0
25 Colombia  1.9  1.5  1.5  1.1  1.0  0.8
26 Congo  14.3  12.5  11.0  9.8  8.4  7.6
27 Costa Rica  9.1  7.1  5.7  5.2  4.9  4.3
28 Côte d’Ivoire  1.1  1.0  0.9  0.8  0.7  0.7
29 Croatia  –  –  –  –  –  –
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30 Cuba  –  –  –  –  –  –
31 Cyprus  0.5  0.4  0.3  0.4  0.2  0.2
32 Czech Republic  –  –  –  –  –  –
33 Democratic Republic of the Congo  –  –  –  –  –  –
34 Denmark  1.1  1.1  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0
35 Dominican Republic  2.2  2.0  1.8  1.6  1.5  1.4
36 Ecuador  1.5  1.4  1.3  1.1  1.0  0.9
37 Egypt  0.1  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1
38 El Salvador  1.0  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.9
39 Estonia  –  –  –  –  –  –
40 Fiji  3.0  3.0  2.8  2.8  2.6  2.5
41 Finland  3.0  2.8  2.7  2.7  2.7  2.6
42 France  2.6  2.5  2.5  2.4  2.2  2.2
43 Gabon  –  –  –  –  –  –
44 Gambia  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.1
45 Germany  0.9  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.8
46 Ghana  1.4  1.3  1.3  1.2  1.1  1.0
47 Greece  13.6  13.0  11.8  11.4  11.0  10.9
48 Guatemala  –  –  –  –  –  –
49 Guyana  27.1  26.9  25.9  25.5  25.1  24.6
50 Haiti  –  –  –  –  –  –
51 Honduras  2.0  1.9  1.4  1.4  1.3  1.2
52 Hungary  2.2  2.1  2.1  2.1  1.9  1.9
53 Iceland  341.4  324.9  307.4  290.2  269.7  261.2
54 India  0.8  0.7  0.7  0.6  0.6  0.5
55 Indonesia  1.8  1.6  1.6  1.7  1.7  1.7
56 Iran (Islamic Republic of )  1.6  1.5  1.4  1.0  0.9  0.8
57 Iraq  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1
58 Ireland  8.1  6.2  5.9  5.2  5.1  4.7
59 Israel  0.9  0.7  0.6  0.5  0.5  0.4
60 Italy  3.2  2.9  2.9  2.7  2.6  2.4
61 Jamaica  10.1  10.1  9.4  8.9  8.3  8.3
62 Japan  1.9  1.8  1.7  1.5  1.5  1.4
63 Jordan  0.6  0.5  0.5  0.4  0.3  0.3
64 Kazakhstan  –  –  –  –  –  –
65 Kenya  1.0  0.8  0.7  0.6  0.6  0.5
66 Kuwait  –  –  –  –  –  –
67 Kyrgyzstan  –  –  –  –  –  –
68 Lao People’s Democratic Republic  2.6  2.3  2.2  2.3  2.3  2.3
69 Latvia  –  –  –  –  –  –
70 Lesotho  –  –  –  –  –  –
71 Liberia  –  –  –  –  –  –
72 Lithuania  –  –  –  –  –  –
73 Luxembourg  –  –  –  –  –  –
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74 Malawi  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.5  0.5
75 Malaysia  1.8  1.7  1.5  1.4  1.3  1.2
76 Maldives  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1
77 Mali  1.4  1.3  1.3  1.1  1.0  0.9
78 Malta  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.2
79 Mauritania  –  –  –  –  –  –
80 Mauritius  1.1  1.0  0.9  0.8  0.8  0.7
81 Mexico  5.5  5.1  4.7  4.4  4.0  3.8
82 Mongolia  41.2  37.0  39.0  32.2  30.0  27.7
83 Morocco  1.2  1.1  1.1  1.0  0.9  0.9
84 Mozambique  3.4  2.8  2.5  2.2  1.9  1.7
85 Myanmar  –  –  –  –  –  –
86 Namibia  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1
87 Nepal  0.5  0.5  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4
88 Netherlands  1.5  1.4  1.4  1.3  1.3  1.2
89 New Zealand  30.2  25.4  24.9  17.6  16.3  14.0
90 Nicaragua  2.1  2.1  2.2  2.1  1.9  1.9
91 Niger  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2
92 Nigeria  1.6  1.5  1.4  1.3  1.1  1.0
93 Norway  2.6  2.9  2.6  2.5  2.3  2.2
94 Pakistan  0.9  0.8  0.7  0.7  0.6  0.5
95 Panama  3.5  3.2  3.0  2.7  2.5  2.4
96 Papua New Guinea  –  –  –  –  –  –
97 Paraguay  6.2  5.3  5.9  5.3  5.2  5.2
98 Peru  5.1  4.6  4.6  4.3  4.2  4.0
99 Philippines  0.8  0.7  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.5
100 Poland  1.1  1.1  1.1  0.9  0.9  0.8
101 Portugal  3.7  3.7  3.7  3.4  3.1  3.2
102 Qatar  0.8  0.8  0.7  0.5  0.2  0.2
103 Republic of Korea  5.6  5.0  4.7  4.3  4.0  3.8
104 Republic of Moldova  –  –  –  –  –  –
105 Romania  3.3  3.4  3.5  3.5  3.7  3.6
106 Russian Federation  –  –  –  –  –  –
107 Rwanda  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2
108 Saudi Arabia  91.5  111.7  98.5  85.1  74.8  72.3
109 Senegal  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.2
110 Serbia  –  –  –  –  –  –
111 Sierra Leone  –  –  –  –  –  –
112 Singapore  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
113 Slovakia  –  –  –  –  –  –
114 Slovenia  –  –  –  –  –  –
115 South Africa  3.6  3.3  2.9  2.7  2.5  2.4
116 Spain  3.5  3.4  3.3  3.0  2.6  2.6
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117 Sri Lanka  0.7  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6
118 Sudan (former)  –  –  –  –  –  –
119 Swaziland  –  –  –  –  –  –
120 Sweden  1.2  1.1  1.1  1.1  1.0  0.9
121 Switzerland  10.2  9.6  9.3  8.9  8.4  7.9
122 Syrian Arab Republic  –  –  –  –  –  –
123 Tajikistan  –  –  –  –  –  –
124 Thailand  1.3  1.3  1.1  1.1  1.1  1.1
125 Togo  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.2
126 Trinidad and Tobago  0.8  0.8  0.7  0.5  0.5  0.4
127 Tunisia  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6
128 Turkey  3.3  3.0  2.8  2.7  2.4  2.3
129 Uganda  –  –  –  –  –  –
130 Ukraine  –  –  –  –  –  –
131 United Arab Emirates  –  –  –  –  –  –
132 United Kingdom  1.7  1.6  1.5  1.5  1.4  1.4
133 United Republic of Tanzania  0.9  0.8  0.8  0.7  0.6  0.6
134 United States of America  5.5  5.1  4.8  4.5  4.3  4.1
135 Uruguay  10.4  10.0  9.8  9.7  9.3  9.2
136 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of )  11.0  9.7  8.8  8.0  7.4  7.0
137 Viet Nam  0.5  0.5  0.6  0.6  0.7  0.7
138 Yemen  2.4  1.9  1.6  1.4  1.2  1.1
139 Zambia  2.6  2.3  2.1  1.9  1.7  1.5
140 Zimbabwe  –  –  –  –  –  –
Table A3.27  Agriculture land growth (Agriculture land change (%) with respect to base 
year 1990)
Country/year 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
1 Afghanistan – – – – –
2 Albania – – – – –
3 Algeria – – – – –
4 Argentina 0.1% 0.2% 1.9% 3.7% 5.2%
5 Armenia – – – – –
6 Australia 0.0% −0.5% −1.1% −3.8% −4.7%
7 Austria −0.4% −0.9% −1.8% −2.3% −3.7%
8 Bahrain – – – – –
9 Bangladesh −2.0% −2.5% −2.7% −2.9% −4.6%
10 Barbados 0.0% −1.3% −4.2% −5.7% −9.4%
11 Belgium – – – – –
12 Belize 3.0% 4.3% 4.8% 5.7% 8.7%
13 Benin – – – – –
14 Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 0.6% 1.2% 1.0% 1.2% 2.1%
15 Botswana −0.1% −0.1% −0.2% −0.2% −0.2%
Table A3.26 (Continued)
Annex 3: data 339
Country/year 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
16 Brazil 1.4% 2.0% 3.0% 3.1% 5.3%
17 Bulgaria 0.0% −2.4% −3.8% −4.8% −8.1%
18 Burundi −0.7% −3.0% −3.6% −3.5% −5.6%
19 Cambodia 0.5% 1.7% 4.7% 6.1% 9.6%
20 Cameroon 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 1.4% 1.4%
21 Canada 0.1% −0.1% −0.1% −1.7% −1.7%
22 Central African Republic – – – – –
23 Chile −0.7% −1.3% 0.0% −0.2% −0.3%
24 China 0.7% 0.8% 0.6% 0.4% 0.7%
25 Colombia −2.4% −2.4% −7.8% −9.5% −15.0%
26 Congo 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.1% 0.2%
27 Costa Rica −2.3% −5.5% −5.9% −5.7% −9.9%
28 Côte d’Ivoire 0.9% 0.9% 1.6% 2.1% 3.2%
29 Croatia – – – – –
30 Cuba – – – – –
31 Cyprus −2.3% −3.1% 1.0% −8.2% −9.0%
32 Czech Republic – – – – –
33 Democratic Republic of the Congo – – – – –
34 Denmark −0.4% −1.3% −0.7% −1.5% −2.1%
35 Dominican Republic 0.2% −0.3% −1.3% −1.5% −2.6%
36 Ecuador 0.7% 0.7% −1.1% −1.1% −2.3%
37 Egypt 4.4% 5.6% 7.4% 8.5% 13.1%
38 El Salvador 0.6% 1.6% 2.6% 2.1% 4.1%
39 Estonia – – – – –
40 Fiji 1.4% 1.1% 1.1% 0.9% 1.3%
41 Finland −1.3% −1.9% −1.3% −1.1% −2.2%
42 France −0.3% −0.6% −0.9% −1.4% −2.1%
43 Gabon – – – – –
44 Gambia −0.2% 10.4% 14.5% 24.1% 33.7%
45 Germany −0.8% −1.4% −1.4% −1.9% −2.6%
46 Ghana 0.8% 3.4% 4.6% 5.5% 9.1%
47 Greece −0.1% −1.9% −2.4% −2.9% −5.0%
48 Guatemala – – – – –
49 Guyana 0.0% −0.3% −0.8% −0.8% −1.3%
50 Haiti – – – – –
51 Honduras 0.9% −3.0% −1.3% −0.7% −2.2%
52 Hungary −0.9% −2.5% −2.4% −4.7% −6.0%
53 Iceland 0.0% −0.2% −0.3% −0.4% −0.6%
54 India −0.1% −0.1% −0.2% −0.3% −0.4%
55 Indonesia −1.0% 1.1% 3.6% 5.4% 8.9%
56 Iran (Islamic Republic of ) 0.9% 0.6% −6.2% −6.8% −9.8%
57 Iraq −0.3% −2.6% 0.4% −2.9% −3.2%
58 Ireland −4.9% −6.0% −6.6% −5.2% −8.8%
59 Israel −0.2% −0.6% −2.9% −3.4% −4.6%
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60 Italy −1.9% −1.8% −3.3% −4.0% −6.8%
61 Jamaica 0.9% 0.2% −0.5% −1.7% −2.3%
62 Japan −0.9% −2.0% −4.7% −5.2% −9.0%
63 Jordan 1.4% 0.7% −0.7% −0.9% −1.3%
64 Kazakhstan – – – – –
65 Kenya 0.3% −0.1% 0.2% 0.5% 0.8%
66 Kuwait – – – – –
67 Kyrgyzstan – – – – –
68 Lao People’s Democratic Republic 0.5% 2.1% 4.6% 7.5% 11.5%
69 Latvia – – – – –
70 Lesotho – – – – –
71 Liberia – – – – –
72 Lithuania – – – – –
73 Luxembourg – – – – –
74 Malawi 0.3% 2.9% 5.3% 7.7% 11.3%
75 Malaysia 0.6% 0.6% 1.1% 2.2% 3.3%
76 Maldives 0.0% 3.0% 3.0% −0.3% 2.6%
77 Mali 2.0% 4.7% 5.9% 6.3% 10.6%
78 Malta −3.3% −8.8% −8.0% −5.6% −12.1%
79 Mauritania – – – – –
80 Mauritius −1.3% −2.3% −3.6% −4.8% −8.1%
81 Mexico 0.2% 0.3% 0.3% 0.4% 0.6%
82 Mongolia −1.2% 0.9% −2.5% −2.5% −3.6%
83 Morocco 0.3% 0.3% −0.3% −0.3% −0.3%
84 Mozambique 0.1% 0.2% 0.8% 1.2% 1.7%
85 Myanmar – – – – –
86 Namibia 4.4% 5.5% 5.5% 5.1% 8.8%
87 Nepal 0.2% 0.6% 0.3% −0.1% 0.1%
88 Netherlands −0.4% −0.6% −0.9% −1.7% −2.4%
89 New Zealand −1.5% −1.2% −7.8% −8.4% −14.3%
90 Nicaragua 2.5% 6.3% 7.2% 5.7% 10.9%
91 Niger 0.0% 1.1% 6.9% 6.9% 10.9%
92 Nigeria 2.1% 3.7% 4.2% 3.3% 6.3%
93 Norway 2.9% 1.6% 1.5% 0.8% 1.3%
94 Pakistan 0.5% 1.0% 0.5% 0.0% 0.9%
95 Panama 0.1% 1.2% 1.2% 1.6% 2.4%
96 Papua New Guinea – – – – –
97 Paraguay −0.8% 4.3% 3.8% 5.5% 8.8%
98 Peru 0.0% 1.4% 1.6% 2.4% 3.8%
99 Philippines −0.2% 0.2% 0.5% 2.1% 3.2%
100 Poland −0.2% −0.5% −4.1% −6.4% −8.9%
101 Portugal 0.2% 1.0% −0.8% −2.7% −2.8%
102 Qatar 1.3% 2.0% 1.3% 2.2% 3.2%
103 Republic of Korea −1.2% −2.5% −3.6% −5.0% −7.7%
104 Republic of Moldova – – – – –
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105 Romania 0.0% 0.1% −1.0% −1.1% −2.4%
106 Russian Federation – – – – –
107 Rwanda −4.6% −2.9% −1.3% −1.0% −1.0%
108 Saudi Arabia 7.1% 8.9% 8.9% 8.9% 14.3%
109 Senegal −0.2% −0.4% −0.6% −0.6% −1.0%
110 Serbia – – – – –
111 Sierra Leone – – – – –
112 Singapore −9.7% −12.0% −21.5% −22.0% −34.7%
113 Slovakia – – – – –
114 Slovenia – – – – –
115 South Africa 0.4% 0.7% 0.5% 0.3% 0.6%
116 Spain −0.5% −0.6% −1.1% −2.5% −3.8%
117 Sri Lanka −0.1% 0.1% 1.8% 2.9% 4.1%
118 Sudan (former) – – – – –
119 Swaziland – – – – –
120 Sweden −0.9% −2.0% −1.5% −2.5% −4.0%
121 Switzerland −0.3% −0.6% −0.9% −1.1% −1.8%
122 Syrian Arab Republic – – – – –
123 Tajikistan – – – – –
124 Thailand −0.2% −1.9% −2.1% −0.4% −1.5%
125 Togo 0.7% 3.3% 0.5% 3.5% 5.3%
126 Trinidad and Tobago −0.3% −3.4% −8.5% −8.5% −15.6%
127 Tunisia 1.6% 2.5% 3.3% 3.8% 5.4%
128 Turkey −0.1% 0.5% 1.0% −0.4% −0.4%
129 Uganda – – – – –
130 Ukraine – – – – –
131 United Arab Emirates – – – – –
132 United Kingdom −0.9% −1.7% −1.8% −1.4% −2.1%
133 United Republic of Tanzania 0.7% 1.5% 2.5% 4.0% 6.5%
134 United States of America −0.3% −0.7% −0.9% −1.1% −1.8%
135 Uruguay 0.0% 0.1% −0.1% −0.8% −1.0%
136 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of ) −0.2% −0.3% −0.3% −0.3% −0.5%
137 Viet Nam 1.0% 6.9% 10.6% 12.5% 19.7%
138 Yemen 0.1% 0.0% −0.1% 0.0% −0.2%
139 Zambia 0.6% 2.0% 2.3% 3.0% 5.0%
140 Zimbabwe – – – – –
Table A3.28  Agriculture land per capita growth (Agriculture land per capita change (%) 
with respect to base year 1990)
Country/year 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
1 Afghanistan – – – – –
2 Albania – – – – –
3 Algeria – – – – –
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4 Argentina −1.3% −2.9% −2.5% −2.1% −3.9%
5 Armenia – – – – –
6 Australia −1.2% −3.3% −5.4% −9.7% −14.3%
7 Austria −1.1% −2.0% −3.5% −4.4% −7.1%
8 Bahrain – – – – –
9 Bangladesh −4.2% −7.5% −9.7% −11.2% −16.7%
10 Barbados −0.3% −2.2% −5.4% −7.4% −12.0%
11 Belgium – – – – –
12 Belize 1.0% −2.7% −5.5% −7.7% −11.8%
13 Benin – – – – –
14 Bolivia (Plurinational State of ) −1.3% −3.7% −5.9% −7.7% −11.6%
15 Botswana −2.7% −5.7% −7.4% −9.5% −14.9%
16 Brazil −0.2% −1.9% −2.6% −3.8% −5.2%
17 Bulgaria 0.7% −0.8% −0.9% −0.8% −2.1%
18 Burundi −2.8% −7.4% −11.6% −15.3% −24.1%
19 Cambodia −2.9% −5.7% −5.0% −5.5% −8.2%
20 Cameroon −2.8% −6.7% −9.6% −11.3% −18.0%
21 Canada −1.0% −2.6% −3.8% −6.5% −9.5%
22 Central African Republic – – – – –
23 Chile −2.2% −4.7% −5.0% −6.5% −9.8%
24 China −0.5% −1.9% −2.9% −3.6% −5.3%
25 Colombia −4.1% −6.3% −13.0% −15.9% −23.9%
26 Congo −2.6% −6.4% −9.1% −12.4% −18.9%
27 Costa Rica −4.8% −10.9% −13.1% −14.4% −21.9%
28 Côte d’Ivoire −2.4% −6.6% −8.0% −9.9% −15.5%
29 Croatia – – – – –
30 Cuba – – – – –
31 Cyprus −4.4% −8.0% −6.3% −16.2% −20.6%
32 Czech Republic – – – – –
33 Democratic Republic of the Congo – – – – –
34 Denmark −0.8% −2.2% −2.0% −3.3% −5.1%
35 Dominican Republic −1.6% −4.6% −7.3% −9.1% −13.9%
36 Ecuador −1.6% −4.5% −8.2% −10.1% −15.7%
37 Egypt 2.3% 0.6% 0.0% −1.2% −3.1%
38 El Salvador −0.6% −1.0% −0.5% −1.4% −1.0%
39 Estonia – – – – –
40 Fiji 0.2% −1.6% −1.9% −3.2% −5.1%
41 Finland −1.8% −2.8% −2.5% −2.9% −5.1%
42 France −0.6% −1.6% −2.7% −4.0% −6.2%
43 Gabon – – – – –
44 Gambia −3.2% 2.6% 2.3% 6.4% 4.3%
45 Germany −1.3% −2.2% −2.3% −2.6% −3.2%
46 Ghana −1.9% −2.9% −4.9% −7.1% −10.8%
47 Greece −0.8% −3.3% −4.2% −5.0% −7.0%
48 Guatemala – – – – –
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49 Guyana −0.2% −1.1% −1.5% −1.9% −3.2%
50 Haiti – – – – –
51 Honduras −1.7% −8.7% −9.3% −10.7% −16.8%
52 Hungary −0.8% −2.1% −1.8% −3.8% −4.4%
53 Iceland −1.0% −2.6% −4.0% −5.7% −8.5%
54 India −2.0% −4.7% −6.8% −8.5% −12.7%
55 Indonesia −2.6% −2.7% −2.0% −1.9% −2.7%
56 Iran (Islamic Republic of) −0.6% −3.4% −11.3% −13.1% −19.2%
57 Iraq −3.1% −9.6% −9.9% −15.7% −23.4%
58 Ireland −5.4% −7.8% −10.4% −11.2% −16.8%
59 Israel −3.6% −7.7% −12.1% −14.6% −21.0%
60 Italy −1.9% −1.9% −3.8% −5.0% −9.0%
61 Jamaica 0.1% −1.8% −3.0% −4.6% −6.4%
62 Japan −1.2% −2.6% −5.5% −6.1% −9.8%
63 Jordan −3.6% −7.8% −11.5% −16.1% −24.2%
64 Kazakhstan – – – – –
65 Kenya −2.7% −6.9% −9.6% −12.2% −18.8%
66 Kuwait – – – – –
67 Kyrgyzstan – – – – –
68 Lao People’s Democratic Republic −2.2% −3.6% −3.0% −2.4% −4.2%
69 Latvia – – – – –
70 Lesotho – – – – –
71 Liberia – – – – –
72 Lithuania – – – – –
73 Luxembourg – – – – –
74 Malawi −0.6% −1.5% −2.4% −3.7% −8.1%
75 Malaysia −2.0% −5.5% −7.4% −8.3% −12.4%
76 Maldives −3.1% −3.8% −6.5% −12.5% −16.3%
77 Mali −0.6% −2.0% −4.6% −8.1% −12.4%
78 Malta −4.2% −10.5% −11.0% −9.2% −17.5%
79 Mauritania – – – – –
80 Mauritius −2.4% −5.1% −7.1% −8.7% −13.3%
81 Mexico −1.7% −4.2% −5.7% −7.5% −11.5%
82 Mongolia −2.2% −1.4% −6.0% −7.6% −12.4%
83 Morocco −1.4% −3.4% −5.1% −6.4% −10.0%
84 Mozambique −3.3% −7.3% −10.1% −12.9% −19.7%
85 Myanmar – – – – –
86 Namibia 1.2% −2.0% −3.6% −5.8% −8.8%
87 Nepal −2.4% −5.1% −7.1% −8.7% −12.6%
88 Netherlands −1.1% −2.2% −3.0% −4.3% −6.3%
89 New Zealand −3.5% −4.8% −12.6% −14.3% −22.6%
90 Nicaragua 0.3% 1.3% 0.4% −2.5% −2.1%
91 Niger −3.3% −7.3% −6.4% −10.7% −17.3%
92 Nigeria −0.4% −2.6% −5.2% −9.1% −13.5%
93 Norway 2.4% 0.2% −0.7% −2.8% −5.0%
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94 Pakistan −2.1% −5.1% −8.0% −10.8% −15.8%
95 Panama −2.0% −3.8% −6.0% −7.6% −11.8%
96 Papua New Guinea – – – – –
97 Paraguay −3.2% −1.5% −4.1% −4.3% −6.1%
98 Peru −1.9% −2.8% −4.2% −4.9% −7.6%
99 Philippines −2.6% −5.4% −7.5% −7.8% −11.8%
100 Poland −0.4% −0.6% −4.1% −6.3% −8.8%
101 Portugal 0.1% 0.3% −2.0% −4.1% −4.1%
102 Qatar 0.3% −3.5% −12.0% −26.4% −37.7%
103 Republic of Korea −2.2% −4.7% −6.4% −8.3% −12.6%
104 Republic of Moldova – – – – –
105 Romania 0.5% 1.0% 1.1% 2.4% 2.7%
106 Russian Federation – – – – –
107 Rwanda −0.6% −5.3% −6.5% −9.3% −14.6%
108 Saudi Arabia 4.1% 1.9% −1.8% −4.9% −7.5%
109 Senegal −3.1% −7.0% −10.2% −13.3% −20.8%
110 Serbia – – – – –
111 Sierra Leone – – – – –
112 Singapore −12.3% −17.9% −27.8% −31.4% −46.3%
113 Slovakia – – – – –
114 Slovenia – – – – –
115 South Africa −1.7% −4.8% −6.7% −8.4% −12.8%
116 Spain −0.8% −1.5% −3.9% −6.8% −9.4%
117 Sri Lanka −1.2% −2.1% −1.4% −1.3% −2.5%
118 Sudan (former) – – – – –
119 Swaziland – – – – –
120 Sweden −1.5% −2.8% −2.8% −4.7% −7.9%
121 Switzerland −1.2% −2.3% −3.4% −4.8% −8.1%
122 Syrian Arab Republic – – – – –
123 Tajikistan – – – – –
124 Thailand −1.1% −4.3% −5.8% −4.4% −7.3%
125 Togo −1.8% −3.0% −8.8% −9.2% −14.7%
126 Trinidad and Tobago −0.8% −4.3% −9.8% −10.4% −18.4%
127 Tunisia −0.3% −1.5% −2.0% −2.7% −4.6%
128 Turkey −1.7% −3.4% −4.6% −7.4% −11.7%
129 Uganda – – – – –
130 Ukraine – – – – –
131 United Arab Emirates – – – – –
132 United Kingdom −1.2% −2.4% −3.1% −3.6% −6.0%
133 United Republic of Tanzania −2.5% −5.6% −7.9% −10.1% −15.9%
134 United States of America −1.6% −3.7% −5.0% −6.3% −9.5%
135 Uruguay −0.7% −1.6% −1.8% −2.8% −4.1%
136 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of ) −2.4% −5.3% −7.5% −9.3% −13.9%
137 Viet Nam −0.7% 2.6% 4.6% 5.0% 7.6%
138 Yemen −4.7% −9.4% −12.7% −15.7% −23.1%
139 Zambia −1.9% −4.5% −7.3% −9.9% −15.7%
140 Zimbabwe – – – – –
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Table A3.29 Forest resources (Forest resources in billions of constant 2005 US$)
Country/year 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
1 Afghanistan  9  9  9  9  9  9
2 Albania  6  6  6  6  6  6
3 Algeria  10  9  9  8  8  9
4 Argentina  560  552  544  536  537  524
5 Armenia  3  3  2  2  2  2
6 Australia  642  642  643  637  616  534
7 Austria  32  35  37  39  39  37
8 Bahrain  0  0  –  0  0  0
9 Bangladesh  16  15  15  15  15  15
10 Barbados  0  0  0  0  0  0
11 Belgium  4  4  5  5  6  5
12 Belize  13  13  13  12  12  12
13 Benin  37  35  32  31  29  29
14 Bolivia (Plurinational State of )  670  655  641  626  610  594
15 Botswana  60  58  55  53  50  48
16 Brazil  6,662  6,501  6,341  6,205  6,057  6,042
17 Bulgaria  16  18  19  22  26  5
18 Burundi  1  1  1  1  1  1
19 Cambodia  196  185  173  160  150  142
20 Cameroon  221  211  201  191  181  36
21 Canada  2,662  2,643  2,624  2,606  2,593  1,627
22 Central African Republic  211  209  208  207  205  205
23 Chile  85  86  86  87  86  88
24 China  1,159  1,089  1,019  887  923  966
25 Colombia  703  697  691  684  677  135
26 Congo  224  223  222  221  220  220
27 Costa Rica  22  21  21  22  23  40
28 Côte d’Ivoire  42  53  64  64  64  64
29 Croatia  19  20  21  22  23  22
30 Cuba  14  17  20  22  23  22
31 Cyprus  1  1  1  1  1  1
32 Czech Republic  0  0  0  0  0  0
33 Democratic Republic of the Congo  1,320  1,307  1,294  1,281  1,268  1,258
34 Denmark  1  1  1  2  2  1
35 Dominican Republic  18  18  18  18  18  18
36 Ecuador  163  155  147  139  131  141
37 Egypt  –  –  –  –  –  –
38 El Salvador  2  2  1  1  1  1
39 Estonia  19  14  9  21  21  20
40 Fiji  4  4  4  4  4  4
41 Finland  150  153  156  150  146  140
42 France  106  109  113  119  122  121
43 Gabon  1,070  1,070  1,070  1,070  1,070  1,073
44 Gambia  2  2  2  2  2  2
(Continued )
346 Annex 3: data
Table A3.29 (Continued)
Country/year 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
45 Germany  74  78  83  85  86  89
46 Ghana  45  41  37  33  29  46
47 Greece  23  24  25  26  27  28
48 Guatemala  106  99  93  87  79  84
49 Guyana  180  180  180  180  180  212
50 Haiti  7  6  6  5  5  4
51 Honduras  96  86  75  68  61  56
52 Hungary  3  3  3  3  3  3
53 Iceland  0  0  0  0  0  0
54 India  456  460  465  477  488  468
55 Indonesia  1,435  1,357  1,279  1,227  1,147  1,067
56 Iran (Islamic Republic of )  465  466  467  460  467  375
57 Iraq  3  3  3  3  3  3
58 Ireland  1  1  1  1  1  1
59 Israel  0  0  0  0  0  0
60 Italy  119  131  144  157  169  154
61 Jamaica  2  2  2  2  2  2
62 Japan  130  138  145  155  155  137
63 Jordan  0  0  0  0  0  0
64 Kazakhstan  12  12  12  12  12  12
65 Kenya  24  23  22  21  20  24
66 Kuwait  –  –  –  –  –  –
67 Kyrgyzstan  5  6  6  6  8  8
68 Lao People’s Democratic Republic  138  135  131  128  124  135
69 Latvia  20  21  22  23  26  24
70 Lesotho  0  0  0  0  0  0
71 Liberia  36  35  34  33  32  31
72 Lithuania  16  17  17  18  18  17
73 Luxembourg  1  1  1  1  1  1
74 Malawi  19  18  17  16  14  14
75 Malaysia  216  211  207  198  191  209
76 Maldives  0  0  0  0  0  0
77 Mali  64  62  60  57  54  30
78 Malta  0  0  0  0  0  0
79 Mauritania  2  2  1  1  1  1
80 Mauritius  0  0  0  0  0  0
81 Mexico  330  319  309  297  290  319
82 Mongolia  85  82  79  76  73  79
83 Morocco  23  23  23  24  24  25
84 Mozambique  193  189  184  179  174  171
85 Myanmar  192  180  169  160  152  141
86 Namibia  38  36  34  33  31  30
87 Nepal  212  192  171  159  159  159
88 Netherlands  –  –  –  –  –  –
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89 New Zealand  1,339  1,339  1,339  1,295  1,669  1,505
90 Nicaragua  32  30  27  25  22  23
91 Niger  9  8  6  6  5  5
92 Nigeria  81  72  64  56  48  39
93 Norway  53  54  55  58  62  65
94 Pakistan  1,197  1,057  917  779  646  541
95 Panama  35  33  31  30  29  36
96 Papua New Guinea  306  299  292  285  278  385
97 Paraguay  88  85  81  77  73  66
98 Peru  1,054  1,044  1,034  1,026  1,011  1,081
99 Philippines  58  60  61  64  65  60
100 Poland  4  5  5  5  6  6
101 Portugal  15  15  16  15  15  11
102 Qatar  –  –  –  –  –  –
103 Republic of Korea  90  113  136  162  182  148
104 Republic of Moldova  6  6  7  7  7  1
105 Romania  93  93  93  93  96  98
106 Russian Federation  6,485  6,479  6,473  6,466  6,498  6,478
107 Rwanda  1  1  1  1  1  1
108 Saudi Arabia  6  6  6  6  6  6
109 Senegal  59  57  55  53  51  51
110 Serbia  25  26  27  30  37  33
111 Sierra Leone  18  17  16  15  15  14
112 Singapore  0  0  0  0  0  0
113 Slovakia  10  10  11  11  11  11
114 Slovenia  14  15  17  18  20  18
115 South Africa  38  38  37  37  37  37
116 Spain  64  73  82  84  88  86
117 Sri Lanka  56  52  47  43  40  45
118 Sudan (former)  352  336  320  317  313  157
119 Swaziland  1  2  2  2  2  2
120 Sweden  181  178  174  176  172  130
121 Switzerland  18  18  19  19  19  19
122 Syrian Arab Republic  1  1  1  1  1  0
123 Tajikistan  1  1  1  1  1  1
124 Thailand  122  119  116  112  109  129
125 Togo  3  2  2  1  1  1
126 Trinidad and Tobago  6  6  5  5  5  2
127 Tunisia  2  1  1  1  1  1
128 Turkey  188  188  188  178  163  164
129 Uganda  21  19  17  15  13  10
130 Ukraine  43  47  51  53  55  51
131 United Arab Emirates  –  –  –  –  –  –
132 United Kingdom  7  8  8  8  9  2
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133 United Republic of Tanzania  261  248  235  222  209  347
134 United States of America  3,463  3,529  3,596  3,759  3,934  3,734
135 Uruguay  3  3  3  3  3  3
136 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of )  244  237  230  224  217  226
137 Viet Nam  80  85  90  93  91  92
138 Yemen  2  2  2  2  2  2
139 Zambia  319  314  309  304  299  298
140 Zimbabwe  93  86  79  72  65  60
Table A3.30  Forest resources per capita (Forest resources per capita in thousands of 
constant 2005 US$)
Country/year 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
1 Afghanistan  0.7  0.5  0.4  0.4  0.3  0.3
2 Albania  1.9  2.0  2.0  2.1  2.2  2.2
3 Algeria  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.2
4 Argentina  17.1  15.8  14.7  13.7  13.0  12.2
5 Armenia  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.7  0.8
6 Australia  37.6  35.5  33.6  31.2  28.0  22.8
7 Austria  4.2  4.4  4.6  4.7  4.6  4.3
8 Bahrain  0.0  0.0  –  0.0  0.0  0.0
9 Bangladesh  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1
10 Barbados  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1
11 Belgium  0.4  0.4  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5
12 Belize  71.0  62.4  50.6  42.7  36.3  32.7
13 Benin  7.4  5.8  4.7  3.8  3.1  2.8
14 Bolivia (Plurinational State of)  97.7  86.6  76.9  68.7  61.5  56.3
15 Botswana  43.6  36.6  31.8  28.2  24.5  21.8
16 Brazil  44.3  39.9  36.1  32.9  30.5  29.3
17 Bulgaria  1.9  2.1  2.4  2.9  3.5  0.7
18 Burundi  0.3  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1
19 Cambodia  21.8  17.3  14.2  12.0  10.5  9.3
20 Cameroon  18.3  15.2  12.6  10.5  8.8  1.6
21 Canada  95.8  90.0  85.3  80.6  76.2  45.8
22 Central African Republic  71.7  62.8  55.8  50.9  46.2  42.6
23 Chile  6.4  6.0  5.7  5.4  5.0  4.9
24 China  1.0  0.9  0.8  0.7  0.7  0.7
25 Colombia  20.5  18.6  17.1  15.8  14.8  2.8
26 Congo  93.7  81.8  71.4  63.1  54.2  48.9
27 Costa Rica  7.0  6.1  5.3  5.1  5.0  8.4
28 Côte d’Ivoire  3.5  3.7  3.9  3.5  3.2  2.9
29 Croatia  4.0  4.3  4.8  5.0  5.3  5.2
30 Cuba  1.3  1.5  1.8  2.0  2.0  1.9
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31 Cyprus  1.3  1.2  1.1  1.0  1.0  0.9
32 Czech Republic  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
33 Democratic Republic of the Congo  37.7  31.0  26.9  22.8  19.2  16.8
34 Denmark  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.3
35 Dominican Republic  2.6  2.3  2.1  2.0  1.8  1.7
36 Ecuador  16.0  13.5  11.6  10.1  8.8  8.9
37 Egypt  –  –  –  –  –  –
38 El Salvador  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.2
39 Estonia  12.4  9.9  6.4  15.4  15.5  15.4
40 Fiji  4.9  4.6  4.4  4.3  4.1  4.0
41 Finland  30.1  30.0  30.2  28.7  27.2  25.7
42 France  1.8  1.8  1.9  1.9  1.9  1.8
43 Gabon  1,123.1  984.4  868.4  776.3  693.6  635.8
44 Gambia  2.4  2.1  1.9  1.6  1.4  1.2
45 Germany  0.9  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.1  1.1
46 Ghana  3.1  2.4  2.0  1.5  1.2  1.7
47 Greece  2.2  2.3  2.3  2.4  2.4  2.6
48 Guatemala  11.6  9.6  7.9  6.6  5.4  5.3
49 Guyana  250.3  248.1  242.9  242.8  239.3  277.6
50 Haiti  0.9  0.8  0.7  0.6  0.5  0.4
51 Honduras  19.6  15.3  12.1  9.9  8.2  7.0
52 Hungary  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3
53 Iceland  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1
54 India  0.5  0.5  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4
55 Indonesia  7.9  6.9  6.0  5.4  4.7  4.2
56 Iran (Islamic Republic of )  8.3  7.7  7.1  6.6  6.3  4.8
57 Iraq  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1
58 Ireland  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1
59 Israel  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
60 Italy  2.1  2.3  2.5  2.7  2.9  2.5
61 Jamaica  0.9  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.7  0.7
62 Japan  1.1  1.1  1.1  1.2  1.2  1.1
63 Jordan  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0
64 Kazakhstan  0.7  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.7
65 Kenya  1.0  0.8  0.7  0.6  0.5  0.5
66 Kuwait  –  –  –  –  –  –
67 Kyrgyzstan  1.2  1.3  1.2  1.2  1.5  1.3
68 Lao People’s Democratic Republic  32.5  27.7  24.6  22.2  19.8  20.2
69 Latvia  7.4  8.5  9.4  10.4  12.2  12.1
70 Lesotho  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1
71 Liberia  17.2  16.8  11.7  10.0  8.0  7.0
72 Lithuania  4.4  4.6  4.9  5.3  5.7  5.8
73 Luxembourg  3.0  3.2  3.3  3.1  2.8  2.5
74 Malawi  2.0  1.8  1.5  1.2  1.0  0.8
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75 Malaysia  11.9  10.2  8.8  7.7  6.8  7.0
76 Maldives  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
77 Mali  7.5  6.4  5.4  4.5  3.6  1.7
78 Malta  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
79 Mauritania  0.9  0.7  0.5  0.4  0.3  0.2
80 Mauritius  0.4  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3
81 Mexico  3.9  3.4  3.0  2.7  2.4  2.5
82 Mongolia  38.9  35.7  33.0  30.2  27.0  27.2
83 Morocco  0.9  0.9  0.8  0.8  0.7  0.7
84 Mozambique  14.5  11.8  10.1  8.5  7.2  6.3
85 Myanmar  4.6  4.0  3.5  3.2  2.9  2.6
86 Namibia  26.6  21.8  18.2  16.2  14.3  12.5
87 Nepal  11.3  9.0  7.2  6.3  5.9  5.7
88 Netherlands  –  –  –  –  –  –
89 New Zealand  402.1  364.5  347.0  313.2  383.6  333.6
90 Nicaragua  7.8  6.5  5.4  4.6  3.9  3.9
91 Niger  1.2  0.8  0.6  0.4  0.3  0.3
92 Nigeria  0.8  0.7  0.5  0.4  0.3  0.2
93 Norway  12.4  12.3  12.2  12.6  12.6  12.7
94 Pakistan  11.1  8.6  6.6  5.1  3.8  2.9
95 Panama  14.1  11.9  10.1  9.0  8.1  9.4
96 Papua New Guinea  73.5  63.3  54.3  46.8  40.6  51.6
97 Paraguay  21.0  17.8  15.2  13.3  11.8  10.0
98 Peru  48.3  43.4  39.9  37.2  34.4  34.9
99 Philippines  0.9  0.9  0.8  0.7  0.7  0.6
100 Poland  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.2  0.2
101 Portugal  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.4  1.0
102 Qatar  –  –  –  –  –  –
103 Republic of Korea  2.1  2.5  2.9  3.4  3.7  2.9
104 Republic of Moldova  1.6  1.7  1.8  2.0  2.1  0.4
105 Romania  4.0  4.1  4.1  4.4  4.7  4.9
106 Russian Federation  43.7  43.7  44.2  45.1  45.5  45.0
107 Rwanda  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1
108 Saudi Arabia  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.2
109 Senegal  7.8  6.5  5.6  4.7  4.0  3.5
110 Serbia  3.3  3.4  3.5  4.0  5.0  4.7
111 Sierra Leone  4.5  4.4  4.0  3.0  2.5  2.3
112 Singapore  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
113 Slovakia  1.8  1.9  2.0  2.1  2.1  2.0
114 Slovenia  7.2  7.8  8.3  9.0  9.6  8.6
115 South Africa  1.1  1.0  0.8  0.8  0.7  0.7
116 Spain  1.7  1.9  2.0  1.9  1.9  1.8
117 Sri Lanka  3.3  2.9  2.5  2.2  2.0  2.2
118 Sudan (former)  17.6  13.6  11.4  9.9  8.7  4.0
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119 Swaziland  1.7  1.7  1.6  1.7  1.6  1.6
120 Sweden  21.2  20.1  19.6  19.5  18.4  13.4
121 Switzerland  2.6  2.6  2.6  2.5  2.4  2.3
122 Syrian Arab Republic  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0
123 Tajikistan  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2
124 Thailand  2.2  2.0  1.9  1.7  1.6  1.9
125 Togo  0.7  0.5  0.4  0.3  0.2  0.1
126 Trinidad and Tobago  4.6  4.4  4.3  4.1  3.9  1.6
127 Tunisia  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1
128 Turkey  3.5  3.2  3.0  2.6  2.3  2.1
129 Uganda  1.2  0.9  0.7  0.5  0.4  0.3
130 Ukraine  0.8  0.9  1.0  1.1  1.2  1.1
131 United Arab Emirates  –  –  –  –  –  –
132 United Kingdom  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0
133 United Republic of Tanzania  10.2  8.3  6.9  5.7  4.6  6.7
134 United States of America  13.9  13.3  12.7  12.7  12.7  11.7
135 Uruguay  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0
136 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)  12.3  10.7  9.4  8.4  7.5  7.4
137 Viet Nam  1.2  1.2  1.2  1.1  1.0  1.0
138 Yemen  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1
139 Zambia  39.2  33.9  29.2  25.2  21.5  19.0
140 Zimbabwe  8.8  7.3  6.3  5.6  4.7  4.0
Table A3.31 Forest growth (Forest change (%) with respect to base year 1990)
Country/year 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
1 Afghanistan 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% −0.1%
2 Albania 0.0% 0.0% −0.1% 0.1% 0.2%
3 Algeria −0.7% −1.9% −3.3% −4.8% −2.2%
4 Argentina −0.3% −0.7% −1.1% −1.1% −2.2%
5 Armenia −1.2% −3.0% −4.7% −7.5% −4.0%
6 Australia 0.0% 0.0% −0.2% −1.0% −6.0%
7 Austria 1.4% 3.4% 4.8% 4.5% 4.5%
8 Bahrain −12.9% – −15.6% 0.3% −41.3%
9 Bangladesh −0.4% −0.9% −1.5% −0.8% −1.9%
10 Barbados 0.0% 0.0% −0.1% −0.1% −7.0%
11 Belgium 3.1% 7.4% 9.9% 10.7% 13.1%
12 Belize −0.6% −1.5% −2.4% −3.2% −4.7%
13 Benin −1.3% −3.2% −4.4% −5.7% −7.6%
14 Bolivia (Plurinational State of ) −0.4% −1.1% −1.7% −2.3% −3.9%
15 Botswana −0.8% −2.2% −3.3% −4.5% −7.0%
16 Brazil −0.5% −1.2% −1.8% −2.4% −3.2%
17 Bulgaria 1.8% 4.4% 8.3% 11.8% −32.1%
18 Burundi −5.4% −15.4% −16.5% −17.2% −11.9%
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Country/year 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
19 Cambodia −1.2% −3.0% −4.9% −6.4% −10.2%
20 Cameroon −0.9% −2.3% −3.6% −4.9% −45.3%
21 Canada −0.1% −0.4% −0.5% −0.7% −15.1%
22 Central African Republic −0.1% −0.3% −0.5% −0.7% −0.9%
23 Chile 0.2% 0.5% 0.6% 0.3% 1.2%
24 China −1.2% −3.2% −6.5% −5.5% −5.9%
25 Colombia −0.2% −0.5% −0.7% −0.9% −42.2%
26 Congo −0.1% −0.2% −0.3% −0.4% −0.5%
27 Costa Rica −0.4% −1.0% 0.1% 1.2% 22.5%
28 Côte d’Ivoire 4.8% 11.2% 11.2% 11.1% 14.7%
29 Croatia 1.1% 2.7% 4.0% 5.3% 5.0%
30 Cuba 3.8% 9.0% 12.7% 13.7% 16.7%
31 Cyprus 0.5% 1.4% 1.7% 2.2% 2.5%
32 Czech Republic 1.0% 2.5% 2.5% 3.7% −13.3%
33 Democratic Republic of the Congo −0.2% −0.5% −0.7% −1.0% −1.6%
34 Denmark 1.2% 2.9% 9.6% 8.8% 10.4%
35 Dominican Republic 0.0% 0.0% −0.1% −0.4% −1.2%
36 Ecuador −1.0% −2.6% −3.9% −5.2% −4.7%
37 Egypt – – – – –
38 El Salvador −1.3% −3.4% −5.3% −7.2% −11.6%
39 Estonia −6.1% −17.6% 1.8% 1.5% 1.3%
40 Fiji −0.1% −0.3% −0.5% −0.7% −0.1%
41 Finland 0.4% 1.0% 0.0% −0.7% −2.2%
42 France 0.7% 1.8% 3.0% 3.7% 4.6%
43 Gabon 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.1%
44 Gambia 0.4% 1.1% 1.6% 2.1% 3.2%
45 Germany 1.2% 2.8% 3.7% 3.9% 6.6%
46 Ghana −1.9% −4.8% −7.5% −10.4% 0.5%
47 Greece 0.9% 2.2% 3.2% 4.3% 7.0%
48 Guatemala −1.3% −3.3% −4.9% −7.0% −7.3%
49 Guyana 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 5.6%
50 Haiti −1.5% −3.8% −5.9% −8.4% −13.2%
51 Honduras −2.2% −5.8% −8.1% −10.6% −16.7%
52 Hungary 1.6% 4.0% 5.4% 5.6% 6.2%
53 Iceland −0.8% −2.0% −2.1% −1.7% 31.7%
54 India 0.2% 0.5% 1.2% 1.7% 0.9%
55 Indonesia −1.1% −2.8% −3.9% −5.5% −9.4%
56 Iran (Islamic Republic of) 0.0% 0.1% −0.3% 0.1% −6.9%
57 Iraq 0.2% 0.4% 0.7% 0.7% 0.9%
58 Ireland −1.0% −2.6% −3.4% −5.2% −9.9%
59 Israel −0.2% −0.5% 0.3% −0.1% 3.7%
60 Italy 2.1% 5.0% 7.2% 9.3% 9.2%
61 Jamaica −0.2% −0.5% −0.6% −1.1% −1.1%
62 Japan 1.2% 2.8% 4.5% 4.6% 1.7%
63 Jordan 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% −0.1%
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64 Kazakhstan −0.3% −0.8% 0.5% 0.3% 0.4%
65 Kenya −0.8% −1.9% −3.0% −3.9% 0.6%
66 Kuwait – – – – –
67 Kyrgyzstan 0.9% 2.3% 3.4% 10.4% 12.0%
68 Lao People’s Democratic Republic −0.5% −1.2% −1.9% −2.6% −0.6%
69 Latvia 1.2% 3.0% 4.1% 6.6% 6.9%
70 Lesotho −0.1% −0.1% −0.2% −0.3% −1.8%
71 Liberia −0.6% −1.6% −2.4% −3.2% −5.1%
72 Lithuania 0.5% 1.1% 2.0% 2.0% 1.4%
73 Luxembourg 2.2% 5.2% 5.2% 5.2% 5.8%
74 Malawi −1.1% −2.7% −4.6% −6.5% −9.9%
75 Malaysia −0.4% −1.1% −2.1% −3.1% −1.1%
76 Maldives 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% −41.5%
77 Mali −0.6% −1.5% −2.6% −4.0% −22.5%
78 Malta 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% −41.5%
79 Mauritania −2.7% −7.2% −11.6% −14.3% −21.0%
80 Mauritius −0.1% −0.4% −2.6% −2.8% −3.7%
81 Mexico −0.6% −1.6% −2.5% −3.1% −1.1%
82 Mongolia −0.7% −1.7% −2.7% −3.6% −2.4%
83 Morocco 0.0% 0.1% 0.6% 0.4% 2.1%
84 Mozambique −0.5% −1.3% −2.0% −2.6% −4.1%
85 Myanmar −1.2% −3.1% −4.4% −5.6% −9.6%
86 Namibia −0.8% −2.2% −3.3% −4.5% −7.2%
87 Nepal −2.0% −5.2% −6.8% −6.8% −9.0%
88 Netherlands – – – – –
89 New Zealand 0.0% 0.0% −0.8% 5.7% 4.0%
90 Nicaragua −1.6% −4.1% −6.4% −9.0% −10.3%
91 Niger −3.6% −9.7% −11.7% −13.7% −18.3%
92 Nigeria −2.1% −5.4% −8.6% −12.1% −21.2%
93 Norway 0.4% 1.0% 2.6% 4.1% 7.5%
94 Pakistan −2.5% −6.4% −10.2% −14.3% −23.2%
95 Panama −1.2% −3.1% −3.7% −4.2% 1.5%
96 Papua New Guinea −0.5% −1.1% −1.7% −2.3% 8.0%
97 Paraguay −0.9% −2.2% −3.4% −4.6% −9.5%
98 Peru −0.2% −0.5% −0.7% −1.0% 0.9%
99 Philippines 0.5% 1.4% 2.4% 3.0% 1.2%
100 Poland 2.1% 5.1% 7.7% 9.8% 12.2%
101 Portugal 0.9% 2.1% 1.4% 1.3% −9.7%
102 Qatar – – – – –
103 Republic of Korea 4.6% 10.8% 15.8% 19.2% 17.9%
104 Republic of Moldova 1.3% 3.2% 4.9% 6.3% −36.6%
105 Romania 0.0% 0.0% 0.1% 0.8% 1.9%
106 Russian Federation 0.0% 0.0% −0.1% 0.1% 0.0%
107 Rwanda −1.4% −3.5% −2.5% −2.8% −8.7%
108 Saudi Arabia 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
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109 Senegal −0.6% −1.5% −2.5% −3.2% −4.6%
110 Serbia 0.6% 1.6% 4.6% 10.1% 10.1%
111 Sierra Leone −0.9% −2.4% −3.5% −4.7% −6.7%
112 Singapore 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 80.6%
113 Slovakia 0.9% 2.2% 3.3% 4.1% 4.0%
114 Slovenia 1.5% 3.7% 5.9% 8.2% 7.3%
115 South Africa −0.1% −0.3% −0.4% −0.5% −0.6%
116 Spain 2.7% 6.4% 6.8% 8.1% 10.0%
117 Sri Lanka −1.6% −4.2% −6.5% −8.3% −7.1%
118 Sudan (former) −0.9% −2.3% −2.6% −2.9% −23.6%
119 Swaziland 1.5% 3.6% 5.2% 6.7% 11.1%
120 Sweden −0.4% −1.1% −0.7% −1.3% −10.5%
121 Switzerland 0.5% 1.4% 1.7% 2.1% 2.3%
122 Syrian Arab Republic 0.0% 0.1% 0.0% 0.0% −41.5%
123 Tajikistan −0.1% −0.2% −0.3% −0.3% −0.4%
124 Thailand −0.4% −1.1% −2.0% −2.8% 1.9%
125 Togo −3.4% −9.1% −14.8% −22.0% −37.3%
126 Trinidad and Tobago −0.3% −0.9% −1.4% −2.2% −28.1%
127 Tunisia −0.9% −2.4% −2.4% −2.5% −3.5%
128 Turkey 0.0% −0.1% −1.4% −3.6% −4.4%
129 Uganda −1.9% −4.9% −7.7% −10.0% −21.0%
130 Ukraine 1.9% 4.5% 5.6% 6.5% 6.3%
131 United Arab Emirates – – – – –
132 United Kingdom 0.2% 0.5% 2.1% 4.0% −38.4%
133 United Republic of Tanzania −1.0% −2.6% −3.9% −5.3% 10.0%
134 United States of America 0.4% 0.9% 2.1% 3.2% 2.5%
135 Uruguay 0.4% 0.9% 1.3% 1.8% 2.4%
136 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) −0.6% −1.4% −2.1% −2.9% −2.5%
137 Viet Nam 1.2% 3.0% 3.8% 3.2% 4.8%
138 Yemen 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
139 Zambia −0.3% −0.8% −1.2% −1.6% −2.2%
140 Zimbabwe −1.5% −3.9% −6.1% −8.4% −13.4%
Table A3.32  Forest per capita growth (Forest per capita change (%) with respect to base 
year 1990)
Country/year 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
1 Afghanistan −6.4% −11.5% −16.1% −18.9% −27.5%
2 Albania 0.6% 1.5% 2.1% 3.1% 4.5%
3 Algeria −2.9% −6.3% −9.2% −12.3% −14.6%
4 Argentina −1.6% −3.8% −5.4% −6.6% −10.7%
5 Armenia 0.7% 0.5% −0.8% −3.2% 1.4%
6 Australia −1.1% −2.8% −4.5% −7.1% −15.4%
7 Austria 0.7% 2.3% 3.0% 2.3% 0.8%
Table A3.31 (Continued)
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8 Bahrain −15.1% – −26.6% −20.6% −58.1%
9 Bangladesh −2.6% −6.1% −8.6% −9.3% −14.3%
10 Barbados −0.3% −0.9% −1.3% −1.9% −9.6%
11 Belgium 2.7% 6.6% 8.5% 8.3% 8.7%
12 Belize −2.6% −8.1% −11.9% −15.4% −22.7%
13 Benin −4.7% −10.9% −15.5% −19.7% −28.0%
14 Bolivia (Plurinational State of) −2.4% −5.8% −8.4% −10.9% −16.8%
15 Botswana −3.5% −7.6% −10.3% −13.4% −20.7%
16 Brazil −2.1% −5.0% −7.2% −8.9% −12.9%
17 Bulgaria 2.6% 6.1% 11.6% 16.5% −27.7%
18 Burundi −7.4% −19.2% −23.4% −27.3% −29.2%
19 Cambodia −4.5% −10.1% −13.8% −16.7% −24.7%
20 Cameroon −3.7% −8.9% −12.9% −16.8% −55.7%
21 Canada −1.2% −2.9% −4.2% −5.5% −21.8%
22 Central African Republic −2.6% −6.1% −8.2% −10.4% −15.9%
23 Chile −1.3% −3.0% −4.4% −6.0% −8.5%
24 China −2.4% −5.7% −9.7% −9.3% −11.5%
25 Colombia −1.9% −4.5% −6.3% −7.9% −48.3%
26 Congo −2.7% −6.6% −9.4% −12.8% −19.5%
27 Costa Rica −2.9% −6.7% −7.5% −8.1% 6.1%
28 Côte d’Ivoire 1.3% 3.0% 0.6% −2.1% −6.1%
29 Croatia 1.6% 4.7% 5.9% 7.4% 9.3%
30 Cuba 3.2% 7.7% 11.0% 11.8% 13.9%
31 Cyprus −1.6% −3.8% −5.6% −6.7% −10.6%
32 Czech Republic 1.0% 2.7% 2.8% 3.4% −13.8%
33 Democratic Republic of the Congo −3.9% −8.1% −11.8% −15.5% −23.6%
34 Denmark 0.8% 2.0% 8.2% 6.8% 7.0%
35 Dominican Republic −1.9% −4.3% −6.2% −8.0% −12.7%
36 Ecuador −3.2% −7.6% −10.7% −13.8% −17.7%
37 Egypt – – – – –
38 El Salvador −2.6% −5.8% −8.2% −10.4% −16.0%
39 Estonia −4.4% −15.2% 5.6% 5.7% 7.5%
40 Fiji −1.4% −3.0% −3.4% −4.7% −6.4%
41 Finland −0.1% 0.1% −1.2% −2.5% −5.2%
42 France 0.4% 0.8% 1.0% 1.0% 0.2%
43 Gabon −2.6% −6.2% −8.8% −11.4% −17.3%
44 Gambia −2.5% −6.1% −9.2% −12.4% −19.4%
45 Germany 0.6% 2.0% 2.7% 3.1% 5.9%
46 Ghana −4.5% −10.6% −15.9% −21.1% −17.8%
47 Greece 0.2% 0.7% 1.3% 2.1% 4.6%
48 Guatemala −3.7% −9.0% −13.2% −17.4% −23.1%
49 Guyana −0.2% −0.7% −0.8% −1.1% 3.5%
50 Haiti −3.4% −8.1% −11.9% −15.9% −24.0%
51 Honduras −4.8% −11.4% −15.6% −19.6% −29.1%
52 Hungary 1.7% 4.4% 6.1% 6.6% 8.0%
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53 Iceland −1.7% −4.3% −5.8% −7.0% 21.2%
54 India −1.8% −4.2% −5.5% −6.7% −11.6%
55 Indonesia −2.7% −6.5% −9.0% −12.0% −19.1%
56 Iran (Islamic Republic of) −1.4% −3.8% −5.7% −6.6% −16.6%
57 Iraq −2.7% −6.8% −9.7% −12.7% −20.2%
58 Ireland −1.6% −4.6% −7.4% −11.2% −17.8%
59 Israel −3.6% −7.7% −9.2% −11.7% −14.2%
60 Italy 2.0% 4.9% 6.6% 8.1% 6.7%
61 Jamaica −0.9% −2.4% −3.0% −4.0% −5.3%
62 Japan 0.9% 2.2% 3.6% 3.6% 0.7%
63 Jordan −4.9% −8.4% −11.0% −15.3% −23.3%
64 Kazakhstan 0.3% 1.6% 2.4% 0.4% −1.4%
65 Kenya −3.8% −8.6% −12.5% −16.1% −18.9%
66 Kuwait – – – – –
67 Kyrgyzstan 0.2% −0.5% −0.7% 4.6% 1.9%
68 Lao People’s Democratic Republic −3.1% −6.7% −9.1% −11.6% −14.6%
69 Latvia 2.6% 6.1% 8.7% 13.1% 17.7%
70 Lesotho −1.9% −3.8% −4.8% −5.9% −10.4%
71 Liberia −0.4% −9.1% −12.6% −17.4% −25.8%
72 Lithuania 0.8% 2.5% 4.8% 6.7% 9.5%
73 Luxembourg 0.8% 1.8% 0.2% −2.0% −6.7%
74 Malawi −1.9% −6.9% −11.6% −16.5% −25.5%
75 Malaysia −3.0% −7.1% −10.3% −13.1% −16.2%
76 Maldives −3.1% −6.6% −9.2% −12.2% −52.3%
77 Mali −3.1% −7.8% −12.2% −17.0% −38.6%
78 Malta −0.9% −1.8% −3.2% −3.9% −45.1%
79 Mauritania −5.5% −13.8% −20.9% −25.8% −36.9%
80 Mauritius −1.3% −3.2% −6.2% −6.7% −9.1%
81 Mexico −2.6% −6.0% −8.4% −10.7% −12.9%
82 Mongolia −1.7% −4.0% −6.2% −8.7% −11.3%
83 Morocco −1.6% −3.5% −4.3% −5.8% −7.8%
84 Mozambique −3.9% −8.7% −12.6% −16.1% −24.3%
85 Myanmar −2.5% −6.2% −8.4% −10.4% −16.6%
86 Namibia −3.9% −9.1% −11.6% −14.4% −22.2%
87 Nepal −4.5% −10.6% −13.8% −14.9% −20.6%
88 Netherlands – – – – –
89 New Zealand −1.9% −3.6% −6.1% −1.2% −6.0%
90 Nicaragua −3.7% −8.6% −12.3% −16.1% −20.8%
91 Niger −6.8% −17.3% −22.7% −28.0% −39.1%
92 Nigeria −4.5% −11.2% −16.8% −22.6% −35.9%
93 Norway −0.1% −0.4% 0.4% 0.5% 0.9%
94 Pakistan −5.0% −12.1% −17.8% −23.5% −35.9%
95 Panama −3.2% −7.9% −10.5% −12.9% −12.6%
96 Papua New Guinea −2.9% −7.3% −10.7% −13.8% −11.1%
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97 Paraguay −3.3% −7.7% −10.8% −13.4% −21.8%
98 Peru −2.1% −4.7% −6.3% −8.1% −10.2%
99 Philippines −1.8% −4.3% −5.7% −6.9% −13.5%
100 Poland 1.9% 5.0% 7.6% 9.9% 12.3%
101 Portugal 0.8% 1.4% 0.1% −0.2% −10.9%
102 Qatar – – – – –
103 Republic of Korea 3.6% 8.3% 12.5% 15.1% 11.6%
104 Republic of Moldova 1.4% 3.6% 5.7% 7.2% −35.8%
105 Romania 0.4% 0.8% 2.2% 4.3% 7.3%
106 Russian Federation 0.0% 0.2% 0.8% 1.0% 1.0%
107 Rwanda 2.8% −5.8% −7.7% −10.9% −21.3%
108 Saudi Arabia −2.8% −6.5% −9.8% −12.6% −19.1%
109 Senegal −3.5% −8.0% −11.9% −15.6% −23.7%
110 Serbia 0.5% 1.8% 5.1% 11.1% 12.4%
111 Sierra Leone −0.5% −3.2% −9.5% −13.4% −20.3%
112 Singapore −2.9% −6.7% −8.1% −12.0% 48.6%
113 Slovakia 0.7% 1.8% 2.9% 3.7% 3.2%
114 Slovenia 1.6% 3.8% 5.9% 7.5% 6.2%
115 South Africa −2.2% −5.7% −7.5% −9.2% −13.8%
116 Spain 2.4% 5.4% 3.7% 3.3% 3.6%
117 Sri Lanka −2.7% −6.3% −9.4% −12.0% −13.0%
118 Sudan (former) −5.0% −10.3% −13.4% −16.2% −39.0%
119 Swaziland −0.7% −1.7% −1.1% −1.6% −2.3%
120 Sweden −1.0% −2.0% −2.0% −3.5% −14.2%
121 Switzerland −0.4% −0.3% −0.8% −1.7% −4.3%
122 Syrian Arab Republic −2.7% −6.5% −9.0% −12.0% −49.0%
123 Tajikistan −1.8% −4.0% −6.4% −8.8% −14.2%
124 Thailand −1.4% −3.6% −5.6% −6.7% −4.0%
125 Togo −5.7% −14.6% −22.7% −31.5% −49.2%
126 Trinidad and Tobago −0.9% −1.8% −2.9% −4.2% −30.5%
127 Tunisia −2.8% −6.2% −7.3% −8.6% −12.7%
128 Turkey −1.6% −4.0% −6.8% −10.4% −15.3%
129 Uganda −5.0% −12.0% −18.1% −23.4% −39.0%
130 Ukraine 2.0% 5.9% 8.2% 9.8% 11.2%
131 United Arab Emirates – – – – –
132 United Kingdom −0.1% −0.2% 0.7% 1.6% −40.9%
133 United Republic of Tanzania −4.1% −9.4% −13.7% −18.2% −13.2%
134 United States of America −0.9% −2.1% −2.1% −2.1% −5.5%
135 Uruguay −0.4% −0.7% −0.4% −0.2% −0.8%
136 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) −2.7% −6.4% −9.2% −11.7% −15.6%
137 Viet Nam −0.5% −1.1% −1.8% −3.6% −5.7%
138 Yemen −4.8% −9.5% −12.6% −15.6% −23.0%
139 Zambia −2.8% −7.1% −10.4% −14.0% −21.5%
140 Zimbabwe −3.6% −8.0% −11.0% −14.7% −23.5%
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Table A3.33 Fishery (Fishery in billions of constant 2005 US$)
Country/year 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
1 Afghanistan  –  –  –  –  –  –
2 Albania  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1
3 Algeria  6.0  5.5  5.1  4.4  3.6  3.0
4 Argentina  40.7  34.0  25.5  20.9  15.1  11.4
5 Armenia  –  –  –  –  –  –
6 Australia  13.5  11.4  9.7  8.5  7.9  7.0
7 Austria  –  –  –  –  –  –
8 Bahrain  1.1  1.0  0.9  0.9  0.8  0.7
9 Bangladesh  14.4  13.6  12.6  11.6  10.8  10.1
10 Barbados  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2
11 Belgium  0.7  0.8  0.9  1.0  1.0  1.1
12 Belize  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3
13 Benin  1.5  1.2  1.0  0.8  0.7  0.7
14 Bolivia (Plurinational State of )  –  –  –  –  –  –
15 Botswana  –  –  –  –  –  –
16 Brazil  19.5  18.7  18.6  17.7  16.8  15.6
17 Bulgaria  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2
18 Burundi  –  –  –  –  –  –
19 Cambodia  28.8  24.8  19.2  13.4  9.7  7.8
20 Cameroon  1.5  1.2  1.0  0.7  0.7  0.6
21 Canada  159.5  179.5  208.4  233.6  256.9  271.7
22 Central African Republic  –  –  –  –  –  –
23 Chile  34.0  28.4  24.1  21.1  17.3  17.0
24 China  249.3  223.2  175.1  145.3  127.5  114.5
25 Colombia  2.4  1.9  1.9  2.1  2.3  2.2
26 Congo  1.4  1.5  1.8  2.0  2.1  2.1
27 Costa Rica  2.3  2.1  1.9  1.7  1.7  1.5
28 Côte d’Ivoire  2.6  2.3  2.2  2.1  2.0  1.9
29 Croatia  1.3  1.1  1.1  1.2  1.1  1.1
30 Cuba  1.9  1.7  1.5  1.4  1.5  1.4
31 Cyprus  –  –  –  –  –  –
32 Czech Republic  –  –  –  –  –  –
33 Democratic Republic of the Congo  –  –  –  –  –  –
34 Denmark  24.9  21.3  18.4  16.6  17.7  16.0
35 Dominican Republic  1.6  1.4  1.4  1.3  1.3  1.3
36 Ecuador  4.9  4.4  3.9  3.9  4.1  3.6
37 Egypt  2.9  2.7  2.3  2.2  1.9  1.7
38 El Salvador  1.9  2.0  1.9  2.2  2.4  2.3
39 Estonia  0.7  0.7  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6
40 Fiji  2.2  2.2  2.3  2.3  2.4  2.4
41 Finland  0.9  0.8  0.7  0.7  0.6  0.6
42 France  12.9  11.9  11.3  10.6  9.9  9.1
43 Gabon  2.3  2.2  1.9  1.7  1.8  1.5
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44 Gambia  3.3  2.3  2.2  2.0  1.8  1.6
45 Germany  5.9  6.3  6.6  6.8  7.0  7.2
46 Ghana  8.3  7.7  6.6  5.7  4.6  4.0
47 Greece  8.0  7.0  6.1  5.7  5.3  4.8
48 Guatemala  1.2  1.1  0.9  0.8  0.8  0.7
49 Guyana  1.5  1.4  1.1  0.9  0.8  0.7
50 Haiti  0.8  0.8  0.7  0.7  0.6  0.5
51 Honduras  0.7  0.6  0.5  0.4  0.4  0.3
52 Hungary  –  –  –  –  –  –
53 Iceland  18.8  16.9  15.3  13.4  12.8  12.2
54 India  101.9  91.0  79.2  71.5  63.9  57.6
55 Indonesia  137.8  124.7  107.4  90.4  76.6  65.6
56 Iran (Islamic Republic of)  11.5  9.8  7.3  6.4  6.2  5.2
57 Iraq  0.2  0.3  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1
58 Ireland  11.3  10.5  9.0  8.2  7.2  6.8
59 Israel  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2
60 Italy  29.5  27.6  26.2  26.3  28.0  26.9
61 Jamaica  1.7  1.7  1.8  1.9  1.9  1.9
62 Japan  161.3  152.0  141.6  139.7  141.0  133.1
63 Jordan  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
64 Kazakhstan  –  –  –  –  –  –
65 Kenya  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4
66 Kuwait  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.4  0.4
67 Kyrgyzstan  –  –  –  –  –  –
68 Lao People’s Democratic Republic  –  –  –  –  –  –
69 Latvia  1.2  1.1  1.0  1.1  1.1  1.1
70 Lesotho  –  –  –  –  –  –
71 Liberia  1.3  1.1  1.0  1.0  0.9  0.8
72 Lithuania  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.2
73 Luxembourg  –  –  –  –  –  –
74 Malawi  –  –  –  –  –  –
75 Malaysia  72.3  65.6  58.1  50.6  47.0  42.8
76 Maldives  3.1  2.9  3.1  2.8  1.9  1.9
77 Mali  –  –  –  –  –  –
78 Malta  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1
79 Mauritania  13.1  11.7  11.0  10.0  8.6  7.5
80 Mauritius  0.7  0.6  0.5  0.4  0.3  0.3
81 Mexico  50.9  46.5  43.1  42.0  41.3  38.4
82 Mongolia  –  –  –  –  –  –
83 Morocco  29.7  27.0  25.0  22.6  21.2  19.4
84 Mozambique  3.7  3.3  3.1  3.0  3.1  3.0
85 Myanmar  39.8  36.2  31.0  25.3  21.6  19.3
86 Namibia  16.4  20.0  23.7  27.2  31.6  31.1
87 Nepal  –  –  –  –  –  –
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88 Netherlands  12.7  11.0  10.4  10.5  11.2  10.5
89 New Zealand  24.1  20.5  17.5  15.2  14.2  11.7
90 Nicaragua  1.3  1.3  1.1  1.0  1.0  0.9
91 Niger  –  –  –  –  –  –
92 Nigeria  9.1  8.1  7.0  5.6  4.4  3.6
93 Norway  36.2  35.5  32.4  31.8  32.7  31.4
94 Pakistan  18.7  16.4  14.4  12.3  10.9  9.8
95 Panama  2.7  2.7  2.5  2.0  1.9  1.8
96 Papua New Guinea  5.9  4.8  4.5  4.7  4.3  3.5
97 Paraguay  –  –  –  –  –  –
98 Peru  74.8  62.5  53.4  42.0  31.9  27.8
99 Philippines  23.7  22.3  20.3  18.1  15.6  13.8
100 Poland  2.3  2.3  1.7  1.5  1.3  1.2
101 Portugal  10.6  10.6  11.3  12.5  13.6  13.2
102 Qatar  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.2
103 Republic of Korea  64.6  58.5  55.0  52.0  49.0  46.2
104 Republic of Moldova  –  –  –  –  –  –
105 Romania  –  –  –  –  –  –
106 Russian Federation  113.4  101.8  89.5  87.8  87.6  75.2
107 Rwanda  –  –  –  –  –  –
108 Saudi Arabia  2.2  1.8  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.3
109 Senegal  20.0  18.3  17.1  16.4  17.0  16.6
110 Serbia  –  –  –  –  –  –
111 Sierra Leone  2.5  2.4  2.4  2.1  1.8  1.7
112 Singapore  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2
113 Slovakia  –  –  –  –  –  –
114 Slovenia  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
115 South Africa  16.2  16.9  17.7  17.9  18.4  18.3
116 Spain  53.3  56.9  60.1  65.6  70.6  73.0
117 Sri Lanka  11.0  10.4  9.3  7.3  6.5  5.7
118 Sudan (former)  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1
119 Swaziland  –  –  –  –  –  –
120 Sweden  4.4  4.1  3.5  3.4  3.5  3.3
121 Switzerland  –  –  –  –  –  –
122 Syrian Arab Republic  9.8  8.9  8.2  7.9  8.2  7.7
123 Tajikistan  –  –  –  –  –  –
124 Thailand  53.2  46.6  41.2  38.3  36.4  32.6
125 Togo  1.1  1.0  1.0  1.1  1.1  1.1
126 Trinidad and Tobago  0.8  0.7  0.8  0.8  0.8  0.8
127 Tunisia  2.3  2.0  1.8  1.6  1.4  1.3
128 Turkey  15.8  14.1  12.7  11.6  10.5  9.5
129 Uganda  –  –  –  –  –  –
130 Ukraine  1.8  1.8  1.8  1.8  1.7  1.6
131 United Arab Emirates  2.2  1.9  1.6  1.3  1.1  1.1
132 United Kingdom  49.9  44.2  37.6  34.0  31.9  28.9
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133 United Republic of Tanzania  2.5  2.3  2.1  1.9  1.8  1.6
134 United States of America  202.6  197.6  199.4  198.7  199.9  199.6
135 Uruguay  2.9  2.4  2.0  1.7  1.4  1.2
136 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)  9.2  7.8  6.2  4.6  3.6  3.1
137 Viet Nam  78.5  73.8  64.7  55.4  48.2  42.5
138 Yemen  6.3  6.0  5.5  4.0  3.1  2.8
139 Zambia  –  –  –  –  –  –
140 Zimbabwe  –  –  –  –  –  –
Table A3.34 Fishery per capita (Fishery per capita in thousands of constant 2005 US$)
Country/year 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
1 Afghanistan  –  –  –  –  –  –
2 Albania  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0
3 Algeria  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1
4 Argentina  1.2  1.0  0.7  0.5  0.4  0.3
5 Armenia  –  –  –  –  –  –
6 Australia  0.8  0.6  0.5  0.4  0.4  0.3
7 Austria  –  –  –  –  –  –
8 Bahrain  2.1  1.8  1.4  1.0  0.6  0.5
9 Bangladesh  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1
10 Barbados  0.7  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.7  0.7
11 Belgium  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1
12 Belize  1.5  1.3  1.1  1.0  0.9  0.7
13 Benin  0.3  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1
14 Bolivia (Plurinational State of )  –  –  –  –  –  –
15 Botswana  –  –  –  –  –  –
16 Brazil  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1
17 Bulgaria  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
18 Burundi  –  –  –  –  –  –
19 Cambodia  3.2  2.3  1.6  1.0  0.7  0.5
20 Cameroon  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0
21 Canada  5.7  6.1  6.8  7.2  7.6  7.6
22 Central African Republic  –  –  –  –  –  –
23 Chile  2.6  2.0  1.6  1.3  1.0  1.0
24 China  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1
25 Colombia  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.1  0.0
26 Congo  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.5  0.5
27 Costa Rica  0.7  0.6  0.5  0.4  0.4  0.3
28 Côte d’Ivoire  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1
29 Croatia  0.3  0.2  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.2
30 Cuba  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1
31 Cyprus  –  –  –  –  –  –
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32 Czech Republic  –  –  –  –  –  –
33 Democratic Republic of the Congo  –  –  –  –  –  –
34 Denmark  4.8  4.1  3.4  3.1  3.2  2.8
35 Dominican Republic  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1
36 Ecuador  0.5  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.2
37 Egypt  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
38 El Salvador  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.4  0.4  0.4
39 Estonia  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5
40 Fiji  3.0  2.9  2.9  2.9  2.8  2.7
41 Finland  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1
42 France  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.1
43 Gabon  2.4  2.0  1.6  1.2  1.1  0.9
44 Gambia  3.5  2.2  1.8  1.4  1.1  0.8
45 Germany  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1
46 Ghana  0.6  0.5  0.4  0.3  0.2  0.1
47 Greece  0.8  0.7  0.6  0.5  0.5  0.4
48 Guatemala  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0
49 Guyana  2.0  1.9  1.5  1.2  1.0  0.9
50 Haiti  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0
51 Honduras  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0
52 Hungary  –  –  –  –  –  –
53 Iceland  73.9  63.3  54.4  45.1  40.2  37.1
54 India  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0
55 Indonesia  0.8  0.6  0.5  0.4  0.3  0.3
56 Iran (Islamic Republic of )  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1
57 Iraq  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
58 Ireland  3.2  2.9  2.4  2.0  1.6  1.5
59 Israel  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
60 Italy  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.4
61 Jamaica  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.7
62 Japan  1.3  1.2  1.1  1.1  1.1  1.0
63 Jordan  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
64 Kazakhstan  –  –  –  –  –  –
65 Kenya  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
66 Kuwait  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1
67 Kyrgyzstan  –  –  –  –  –  –
68 Lao People’s Democratic Republic  –  –  –  –  –  –
69 Latvia  0.4  0.5  0.4  0.5  0.5  0.5
70 Lesotho  –  –  –  –  –  –
71 Liberia  0.6  0.5  0.4  0.3  0.2  0.2
72 Lithuania  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1
73 Luxembourg  –  –  –  –  –  –
74 Malawi  –  –  –  –  –  –
75 Malaysia  4.0  3.2  2.5  2.0  1.7  1.4
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76 Maldives  14.1  11.5  10.9  8.8  5.2  4.8
77 Mali  –  –  –  –  –  –
78 Malta  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2
79 Mauritania  6.5  5.0  4.1  3.2  2.4  1.9
80 Mauritius  0.7  0.6  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.2
81 Mexico  0.6  0.5  0.4  0.4  0.3  0.3
82 Mongolia  –  –  –  –  –  –
83 Morocco  1.2  1.0  0.9  0.7  0.7  0.6
84 Mozambique  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1
85 Myanmar  0.9  0.8  0.7  0.5  0.4  0.4
86 Namibia  11.6  12.1  12.5  13.4  14.4  13.0
87 Nepal  –  –  –  –  –  –
88 Netherlands  0.8  0.7  0.7  0.6  0.7  0.6
89 New Zealand  7.2  5.6  4.5  3.7  3.3  2.6
90 Nicaragua  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2
91 Niger  –  –  –  –  –  –
92 Nigeria  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0
93 Norway  8.5  8.1  7.2  6.9  6.7  6.1
94 Pakistan  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1
95 Panama  1.1  1.0  0.8  0.6  0.5  0.5
96 Papua New Guinea  1.4  1.0  0.8  0.8  0.6  0.5
97 Paraguay  –  –  –  –  –  –
98 Peru  3.4  2.6  2.1  1.5  1.1  0.9
99 Philippines  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.1
100 Poland  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
101 Portugal  1.1  1.1  1.1  1.2  1.3  1.3
102 Qatar  0.7  0.6  0.5  0.3  0.1  0.1
103 Republic of Korea  1.5  1.3  1.2  1.1  1.0  0.9
104 Republic of Moldova  –  –  –  –  –  –
105 Romania  –  –  –  –  –  –
106 Russian Federation  0.8  0.7  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.5
107 Rwanda  –  –  –  –  –  –
108 Saudi Arabia  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0
109 Senegal  2.7  2.1  1.7  1.5  1.3  1.1
110 Serbia  –  –  –  –  –  –
111 Sierra Leone  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.4  0.3  0.3
112 Singapore  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
113 Slovakia  –  –  –  –  –  –
114 Slovenia  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
115 South Africa  0.5  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.3
116 Spain  1.4  1.4  1.5  1.5  1.5  1.6
117 Sri Lanka  0.6  0.6  0.5  0.4  0.3  0.3
118 Sudan (former)  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
119 Swaziland  –  –  –  –  –  –
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120 Sweden  0.5  0.5  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.3
121 Switzerland  –  –  –  –  –  –
122 Syrian Arab Republic  0.8  0.6  0.5  0.4  0.4  0.4
123 Tajikistan  –  –  –  –  –  –
124 Thailand  0.9  0.8  0.7  0.6  0.5  0.5
125 Togo  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2
126 Trinidad and Tobago  0.7  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.6
127 Tunisia  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1
128 Turkey  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1
129 Uganda  –  –  –  –  –  –
130 Ukraine  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
131 United Arab Emirates  1.2  0.8  0.5  0.3  0.1  0.1
132 United Kingdom  0.9  0.8  0.6  0.6  0.5  0.4
133 United Republic of Tanzania  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0
134 United States of America  0.8  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.6  0.6
135 Uruguay  0.9  0.8  0.6  0.5  0.4  0.3
136 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)  0.5  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.1  0.1
137 Viet Nam  1.2  1.0  0.8  0.7  0.6  0.5
138 Yemen  0.5  0.4  0.3  0.2  0.1  0.1
139 Zambia  –  –  –  –  –  –
140 Zimbabwe  –  –  –  –  –  –
Table A3.35 Fishery growth (Fishery change (%) with respect to base year 1990)
Country/year 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
1 Afghanistan – – – – –
2 Albania −2.7% −10.4% −14.9% −15.4% −24.4%
3 Algeria −1.7% −3.8% −7.1% −12.1% −20.3%
4 Argentina −3.5% −11.0% −15.3% −21.9% −34.6%
5 Armenia – – – – –
6 Australia −3.5% −7.9% −11.0% −12.5% −19.7%
7 Austria – – – – –
8 Bahrain −1.0% −3.6% −5.2% −7.4% −12.3%
9 Bangladesh −1.1% −3.1% −5.1% −6.9% −11.1%
10 Barbados −1.0% −0.4% −0.6% 1.0% 1.9%
11 Belgium 1.7% 4.8% 7.3% 9.5% 13.6%
12 Belize −1.0% −1.8% −1.6% −1.3% −3.5%
13 Benin −4.3% −9.2% −15.2% −18.8% −23.6%
14 Bolivia (Plurinational State of ) – – – – –
15 Botswana – – – – –
16 Brazil −0.8% −1.2% −2.3% −3.6% −7.1%
17 Bulgaria 3.0% 3.8% 4.1% 4.3% 5.2%
18 Burundi – – – – –
19 Cambodia −3.0% −9.6% −17.4% −23.8% −35.2%
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20 Cameroon −4.0% −9.8% −17.5% −18.2% −26.9%
21 Canada 2.4% 6.9% 10.0% 12.7% 19.4%
22 Central African Republic – – – – –
23 Chile −3.5% −8.2% −11.2% −15.5% −20.6%
24 China −2.2% −8.4% −12.6% −15.4% −22.8%
25 Colombia −4.8% −5.7% −3.6% −0.7% −2.2%
26 Congo 2.3% 6.6% 9.5% 11.5% 14.8%
27 Costa Rica −1.9% −4.7% −7.0% −6.9% −12.9%
28 Côte d’Ivoire −1.8% −4.2% −5.3% −5.6% −10.0%
29 Croatia −2.4% −2.9% −1.6% −2.5% −5.7%
30 Cuba −1.9% −5.8% −6.8% −5.2% −8.9%
31 Cyprus – – – – –
32 Czech Republic – – – – –
33 Democratic Republic of the Congo – – – – –
34 Denmark −3.1% −7.2% −9.5% −8.2% −13.7%
35 Dominican Republic −2.2% −3.4% −4.4% −4.6% −7.1%
36 Ecuador −2.3% −6.0% −5.8% −4.4% −10.1%
37 Egypt −1.9% −5.7% −6.8% −10.5% −17.0%
38 El Salvador 1.0% 1.2% 3.9% 6.3% 7.9%
39 Estonia −0.7% −3.2% −3.2% −3.1% −5.5%
40 Fiji 0.3% 1.2% 1.4% 2.0% 2.9%
41 Finland −1.8% −6.3% −6.9% −8.1% −12.7%
42 France −1.7% −3.3% −4.9% −6.5% −10.9%
43 Gabon −0.9% −3.7% −6.7% −6.2% −12.2%
44 Gambia −6.5% −9.2% −11.6% −13.2% −21.3%
45 Germany 1.3% 2.7% 3.6% 4.5% 6.8%
46 Ghana −1.5% −5.6% −8.9% −13.5% −21.8%
47 Greece −2.7% −6.5% −8.1% −10.0% −15.5%
48 Guatemala −1.9% −7.0% −10.0% −10.7% −17.8%
49 Guyana −1.1% −7.1% −11.6% −14.5% −22.1%
50 Haiti −0.8% −2.2% −4.8% −8.6% −13.1%
51 Honduras −3.1% −9.4% −13.6% −15.5% −23.9%
52 Hungary – – – – –
53 Iceland −2.1% −5.1% −8.2% −9.2% −13.6%
54 India −2.2% −6.1% −8.5% −11.0% −17.3%
55 Indonesia −2.0% −6.1% −10.0% −13.7% −21.9%
56 Iran (Islamic Republic of) −3.2% −10.7% −13.7% −14.3% −23.1%
57 Iraq 2.2% −4.4% −11.2% −17.0% −24.2%
58 Ireland −1.3% −5.3% −7.7% −10.6% −15.6%
59 Israel −1.1% −3.8% −6.3% −6.2% −8.7%
60 Italy −1.4% −3.0% −2.9% −1.3% −3.0%
61 Jamaica 0.1% 0.7% 1.8% 2.8% 4.0%
62 Japan −1.2% −3.2% −3.5% −3.3% −6.2%
63 Jordan 0.1% −0.1% −0.4% −1.1% −2.0%
64 Kazakhstan – – – – –
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65 Kenya −0.6% 0.2% 1.4% 1.6% −0.2%
66 Kuwait −1.9% −3.6% −3.6% −4.7% −8.7%
67 Kyrgyzstan – – – – –
68 Lao People’s Democratic Republic – – – – –
69 Latvia −0.3% −2.5% −2.1% −1.0% −3.2%
70 Lesotho – – – – –
71 Liberia −2.6% −5.8% −7.3% −9.8% −16.2%
72 Lithuania −0.6% −5.6% −7.8% −9.5% −17.0%
73 Luxembourg – – – – –
74 Malawi – – – – –
75 Malaysia −1.9% −5.3% −8.5% −10.2% −16.1%
76 Maldives −0.8% 0.3% −2.1% −11.2% −14.6%
77 Mali – – – – –
78 Malta 2.0% 4.1% 5.7% 6.2% 8.3%
79 Mauritania −2.3% −4.4% −6.7% −10.0% −17.1%
80 Mauritius −2.1% −7.2% −14.3% −16.8% −24.4%
81 Mexico −1.8% −4.1% −4.7% −5.1% −8.9%
82 Mongolia – – – – –
83 Morocco −1.8% −4.1% −6.6% −8.1% −13.2%
84 Mozambique −2.1% −4.4% −5.1% −3.9% −6.5%
85 Myanmar −1.9% −6.1% −10.7% −14.2% −21.5%
86 Namibia 4.0% 9.5% 13.4% 17.7% 23.7%
87 Nepal – – – – –
88 Netherlands −2.8% −4.7% −4.7% −3.1% −6.2%
89 New Zealand −3.2% −7.7% −10.9% −12.4% −21.5%
90 Nicaragua 0.0% −3.7% −6.6% −7.0% −11.0%
91 Niger – – – – –
92 Nigeria −2.2% −6.4% −11.4% −16.8% −26.8%
93 Norway −0.4% −2.8% −3.2% −2.5% −4.7%
94 Pakistan −2.5% −6.2% −9.8% −12.6% −19.4%
95 Panama −0.5% −2.0% −7.4% −8.6% −12.5%
96 Papua New Guinea −4.0% −6.8% −5.7% −7.8% −16.1%
97 Paraguay – – – – –
98 Peru −3.5% −8.1% −13.5% −19.2% −28.1%
99 Philippines −1.3% −3.8% −6.5% −9.9% −16.4%
100 Poland −0.6% −7.0% −10.7% −13.1% −20.3%
101 Portugal 0.0% 1.7% 4.3% 6.5% 7.7%
102 Qatar −2.2% −2.3% −4.9% −11.9% −13.3%
103 Republic of Korea −2.0% −3.9% −5.3% −6.7% −10.6%
104 Republic of Moldova – – – – –
105 Romania – – – – –
106 Russian Federation −2.1% −5.7% −6.2% −6.2% −12.8%
107 Rwanda – – – – –
108 Saudi Arabia −3.3% −8.4% −8.4% −9.2% −16.2%
109 Senegal −1.8% −3.9% −4.8% −4.0% −6.0%
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110 Serbia – – – – –
111 Sierra Leone −0.6% −0.6% −3.4% −7.3% −10.9%
112 Singapore −3.8% −6.7% −6.6% −9.4% −11.2%
113 Slovakia – – – – –
114 Slovenia −3.4% −9.1% −14.1% −17.3% −24.9%
115 South Africa 0.9% 2.3% 2.5% 3.3% 4.2%
116 Spain 1.3% 3.0% 5.3% 7.3% 11.0%
117 Sri Lanka −1.1% −4.1% −9.8% −12.5% −19.8%
118 Sudan (former) −0.3% −1.5% −3.8% −6.2% −6.5%
119 Swaziland – – – – –
120 Sweden −1.4% −5.6% −6.3% −5.5% −9.4%
121 Switzerland – – – – –
122 Syrian Arab Republic −2.0% −4.5% −5.3% −4.3% −7.8%
123 Tajikistan – – – – –
124 Thailand −2.6% −6.2% −7.9% −9.1% −15.1%
125 Togo −0.9% −1.1% −0.5% 0.7% 0.6%
126 Trinidad and Tobago −2.3% −1.7% −1.3% −0.5% −2.3%
127 Tunisia −2.7% −6.0% −9.0% −10.8% −16.7%
128 Turkey −2.3% −5.3% −7.4% −9.7% −15.7%
129 Uganda – – – – –
130 Ukraine 0.0% 0.3% −0.7% −1.3% −3.8%
131 United Arab Emirates −2.6% −7.1% −12.3% −15.0% −20.6%
132 United Kingdom −2.4% −6.8% −9.2% −10.6% −16.7%
133 United Republic of Tanzania −1.5% −3.8% −6.0% −8.2% −13.5%
134 United States of America −0.5% −0.4% −0.5% −0.3% −0.5%
135 Uruguay −3.5% −9.4% −12.0% −17.0% −25.6%
136 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of ) −3.4% −9.4% −16.0% −20.8% −30.7%
137 Viet Nam −1.2% −4.7% −8.3% −11.5% −18.5%
138 Yemen −0.7% −3.4% −10.8% −15.8% −23.7%
139 Zambia – – – – –
140 Zimbabwe – – – – –
Table A3.36  Fishery per capita growth (Fishery per capita change (%) with respect to 
base year 1990)
Country/year 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
1 Afghanistan – – – – –
2 Albania −2.1% −9.0% −13.0% −12.8% −21.2%
3 Algeria −3.8% −8.2% −12.7% −19.0% −30.4%
4 Argentina −4.8% −13.7% −19.0% −26.3% −40.3%
5 Armenia – – – – –
6 Australia −4.6% −10.5% −14.8% −17.9% −27.8%
7 Austria – – – – –
8 Bahrain −3.5% −10.5% −17.6% −26.7% −37.3%
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9 Bangladesh −3.3% −8.2% −11.9% −14.9% −22.4%
10 Barbados −1.4% −1.3% −1.9% −0.8% −0.9%
11 Belgium 1.4% 4.1% 6.0% 7.0% 9.2%
12 Belize −2.9% −8.3% −11.3% −13.8% −21.8%
13 Benin −7.6% −16.3% −25.0% −30.9% −40.5%
14 Bolivia (Plurinational State of ) – – – – –
15 Botswana – – – – –
16 Brazil −2.4% −5.0% −7.7% −10.1% −16.4%
17 Bulgaria 3.7% 5.5% 7.3% 8.7% 12.0%
18 Burundi – – – – –
19 Cambodia −6.2% −16.2% −25.1% −32.2% −45.7%
20 Cameroon −6.7% −15.9% −25.5% −28.5% −40.8%
21 Canada 1.3% 4.2% 5.9% 7.1% 10.0%
22 Central African Republic – – – – –
23 Chile −5.0% −11.5% −15.6% −20.8% −28.2%
24 China −3.3% −10.9% −15.6% −18.8% −27.4%
25 Colombia −6.4% −9.5% −9.1% −7.7% −12.4%
26 Congo −0.3% −0.2% −0.5% −2.4% −7.1%
27 Costa Rica −4.3% −10.2% −14.1% −15.4% −24.5%
28 Côte d’Ivoire −5.1% −11.2% −14.3% −16.8% −26.3%
29 Croatia −1.9% −1.0% 0.2% −0.5% −1.9%
30 Cuba −2.5% −6.9% −8.2% −6.8% −11.1%
31 Cyprus – – – – –
32 Czech Republic – – – – –
33 Democratic Republic of the Congo – – – – –
34 Denmark −3.4% −8.1% −10.7% −9.9% −16.3%
35 Dominican Republic −4.0% −7.6% −10.2% −11.9% −17.9%
36 Ecuador −4.5% −10.9% −12.5% −13.1% −22.4%
37 Egypt −3.8% −10.1% −13.2% −18.5% −28.9%
38 El Salvador −0.3% −1.4% 0.7% 2.6% 2.6%
39 Estonia 1.1% −0.4% 0.4% 0.9% 0.2%
40 Fiji −1.0% −1.5% −1.6% −2.1% −3.6%
41 Finland −2.3% −7.2% −8.1% −9.7% −15.3%
42 France −2.1% −4.2% −6.7% −9.0% −14.6%
43 Gabon −3.5% −9.7% −15.0% −16.8% −27.5%
44 Gambia −9.3% −15.6% −21.1% −25.5% −38.5%
45 Germany 0.7% 1.8% 2.7% 3.7% 6.1%
46 Ghana −4.1% −11.3% −17.1% −23.8% −36.1%
47 Greece −3.4% −7.9% −9.8% −11.9% −17.3%
48 Guatemala −4.3% −12.5% −17.9% −20.7% −31.8%
49 Guyana −1.3% −7.8% −12.3% −15.5% −23.6%
50 Haiti −2.7% −6.6% −11.0% −16.1% −23.9%
51 Honduras −5.6% −14.7% −20.6% −24.0% −35.2%
52 Hungary – – – – –
53 Iceland −3.1% −7.4% −11.6% −14.1% −20.5%
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54 India −4.1% −10.5% −14.5% −18.4% −27.6%
55 Indonesia −3.6% −9.6% −14.9% −19.6% −30.2%
56 Iran (Islamic Republic of) −4.6% −14.1% −18.4% −20.1% −31.1%
57 Iraq −0.7% −11.3% −20.4% −28.0% −40.0%
58 Ireland −1.8% −7.2% −11.5% −16.3% −23.0%
59 Israel −4.5% −10.8% −15.1% −17.0% −24.4%
60 Italy −1.4% −3.1% −3.4% −2.4% −5.2%
61 Jamaica −0.6% −1.3% −0.7% −0.2% −0.4%
62 Japan −1.5% −3.8% −4.4% −4.2% −7.1%
63 Jordan −4.8% −8.5% −11.3% −16.2% −24.7%
64 Kazakhstan – – – – –
65 Kenya −3.7% −6.6% −8.5% −11.3% −19.6%
66 Kuwait 2.7% −2.0% −5.9% −13.7% −25.3%
67 Kyrgyzstan – – – – –
68 Lao People’s Democratic Republic – – – – –
69 Latvia 1.1% 0.4% 2.2% 5.1% 6.7%
70 Lesotho – – – – –
71 Liberia −2.4% −13.0% −17.0% −23.0% −34.4%
72 Lithuania −0.2% −4.3% −5.3% −5.4% −10.3%
73 Luxembourg – – – – –
74 Malawi – – – – –
75 Malaysia −4.4% −11.1% −16.2% −19.4% −28.9%
76 Maldives −3.9% −6.3% −11.1% −22.0% −30.3%
77 Mali – – – – –
78 Malta 1.1% 2.2% 2.3% 2.1% 1.7%
79 Mauritania −5.1% −11.1% −16.5% −22.0% −33.8%
80 Mauritius −3.2% −9.8% −17.4% −20.2% −28.6%
81 Mexico −3.7% −8.4% −10.4% −12.5% −19.8%
82 Mongolia – – – – –
83 Morocco −3.5% −7.6% −11.1% −13.7% −21.6%
84 Mozambique −5.4% −11.5% −15.4% −17.3% −26.2%
85 Myanmar −3.1% −9.0% −14.5% −18.5% −27.5%
86 Namibia 0.8% 1.8% 3.6% 5.5% 3.7%
87 Nepal – – – – –
88 Netherlands −3.4% −6.2% −6.8% −5.6% −9.9%
89 New Zealand −5.1% −11.1% −15.6% −18.0% −29.1%
90 Nicaragua −2.1% −8.2% −12.5% −14.3% −21.4%
91 Niger – – – – –
92 Nigeria −4.7% −12.1% −19.4% −26.8% −40.4%
93 Norway −0.9% −4.1% −5.3% −5.9% −10.6%
94 Pakistan −5.0% −11.9% −17.5% −22.0% −32.7%
95 Panama −2.5% −6.9% −13.9% −16.9% −24.6%
96 Papua New Guinea −6.4% −12.6% −14.2% −18.6% −31.0%
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97 Paraguay – – – – –
98 Peru −5.4% −12.0% −18.4% −25.0% −36.0%
99 Philippines −3.6% −9.2% −13.9% −18.6% −28.5%
100 Poland −0.9% −7.1% −10.7% −13.1% −20.2%
101 Portugal −0.1% 0.9% 3.0% 4.9% 6.2%
102 Qatar −3.2% −7.5% −17.4% −36.5% −47.7%
103 Republic of Korea −3.0% −6.1% −8.0% −10.0% −15.3%
104 Republic of Moldova – – – – –
105 Romania – – – – –
106 Russian Federation −2.1% −5.5% −5.4% −5.4% −11.9%
107 Rwanda – – – – –
108 Saudi Arabia −6.0% −14.3% −17.4% −20.7% −32.2%
109 Senegal −4.7% −10.2% −14.0% −16.2% −24.8%
110 Serbia – – – – –
111 Sierra Leone −0.1% −1.4% −9.4% −15.8% −23.9%
112 Singapore −6.6% −13.0% −14.1% −20.3% −26.9%
113 Slovakia – – – – –
114 Slovenia −3.4% −9.0% −14.1% −17.8% −25.7%
115 South Africa −1.2% −3.2% −4.8% −5.7% −9.7%
116 Spain 1.0% 2.1% 2.3% 2.5% 4.6%
117 Sri Lanka −2.3% −6.2% −12.6% −16.0% −24.9%
118 Sudan (former) −4.4% −9.5% −14.5% −19.1% −25.4%
119 Swaziland – – – – –
120 Sweden −2.0% −6.5% −7.6% −7.6% −13.1%
121 Switzerland – – – – –
122 Syrian Arab Republic −4.7% −10.8% −13.8% −15.7% −19.6%
123 Tajikistan – – – – –
124 Thailand −3.5% −8.6% −11.4% −12.8% −20.0%
125 Togo −3.4% −7.2% −9.7% −11.7% −18.5%
126 Trinidad and Tobago −2.8% −2.6% −2.8% −2.5% −5.6%
127 Tunisia −4.5% −9.6% −13.6% −16.4% −24.6%
128 Turkey −3.8% −8.9% −12.6% −16.1% −25.3%
129 Uganda – – – – –
130 Ukraine 0.2% 1.6% 1.7% 1.8% 0.6%
131 United Arab Emirates −7.5% −18.4% −30.0% −41.9% −53.6%
132 United Kingdom −2.7% −7.5% −10.4% −12.6% −20.0%
133 United Republic of Tanzania −4.6% −10.5% −15.5% −20.7% −31.8%
134 United States of America −1.8% −3.4% −4.6% −5.5% −8.3%
135 Uruguay −4.2% −10.9% −13.5% −18.7% −27.9%
136 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) −5.5% −14.0% −22.1% −28.0% −40.1%
137 Viet Nam −2.9% −8.5% −13.3% −17.4% −26.7%
138 Yemen −5.4% −12.5% −22.0% −28.9% −41.2%
139 Zambia – – – – –
140 Zimbabwe – – – – –
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Table A3.37 Fossil fuels (Fossil fuels in billions of constant 2005 US$)
Country/year 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
1 Afghanistan  3.6  3.5  3.5  3.5  3.4  3.3
2 Albania  13.2  12.8  12.7  12.5  12.4  12.1
3 Algeria  594.3  553.3  506.6  452.5  391.8  344.8
4 Argentina  60.2  55.5  48.8  40.0  30.7  24.3
5 Armenia  –  –  –  –  2.6  2.6
6 Australia  1,780.8  1,749.7  1,713.3  1,670.6  1,625.0  1,583.7
7 Austria  4.3  3.6  2.8  2.0  1.2  0.5
8 Bahrain  6.6  5.5  4.3  3.2  2.2  1.3
9 Bangladesh  4.2  4.0  3.7  3.2  3.4  2.7
10 Barbados  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  –
11 Belgium  –  –  –  –  0.1  –
12 Belize  –  –  –  –  0.1  –
13 Benin  –  –  –  –  –  –
14 Bolivia (Plurinational State of )  9.6  9.3  9.0  8.2  6.9  5.4
15 Botswana  1.2  1.1  1.1  1.0  0.9  0.8
16 Brazil  426.7  410.2  387.2  354.8  311.6  270.1
17 Bulgaria  59.2  56.3  53.4  50.8  48.4  45.8
18 Burundi  –  –  –  –  –  –
19 Cambodia  –  –  –  –  –  –
20 Cameroon  12.2  9.2  6.8  5.2  6.2  5.1
21 Canada  2,587.9  2,509.8  2,415.9  2,312.3  2,204.9  2,115.9
22 Central African Republic  –  –  –  –  –  –
23 Chile  20.6  20.0  19.6  19.3  18.9  18.6
24 China  3,988.3  3,821.9  3,632.2  3,385.5  3,019.4  2,644.2
25 Colombia  224.1  211.6  192.8  174.2  153.2  129.0
26 Congo  41.6  38.1  33.1  27.7  25.1  20.2
27 Costa Rica  –  –  –  –  –  –
28 Côte d’Ivoire  3.2  3.2  2.9  2.6  3.0  2.2
29 Croatia  2.7  3.6  2.9  2.3  1.8  1.4
30 Cuba  9.0  8.6  7.8  6.6  5.4  4.3
31 Cyprus  –  –  –  –  –  –
32 Czech Republic  80.6  76.9  71.2  65.8  60.8  57.3
33 Democratic Republic of the 
Congo
 –  –  –  –  –  –
34 Denmark  45.5  41.2  34.6  24.7  16.0  11.4
35 Dominican Republic  –  –  –  –  –  –
36 Ecuador  151.5  143.9  135.0  125.0  113.6  104.2
37 Egypt  202.7  180.5  158.1  137.6  116.2  98.3
38 El Salvador  –  –  –  –  –  –
39 Estonia  –  –  –  –  0.1  –
40 Fiji  –  –  –  –  –  –
41 Finland  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1  –
42 France  3.5  2.6  1.9  1.4  1.1  0.7
43 Gabon  51.1  44.9  37.6  32.2  27.1  23.1
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44 Gambia  –  –  –  –  –  –
45 Germany  1,485.4  1,424.0  1,374.6  1,327.8  1,285.4  1,253.1
46 Ghana  –  –  –  –  –  0.1
47 Greece  79.2  73.9  68.2  61.9  56.1  52.0
48 Guatemala  2.3  2.2  1.9  1.5  1.2  1.0
49 Guyana  –  –  –  –  –  –
50 Haiti  –  –  –  –  –  –
51 Honduras  –  –  –  –  –  –
52 Hungary  43.0  40.6  38.4  36.6  35.2  34.2
53 Iceland  –  –  –  –  –  –
54 India  2,197.5  2,154.0  2,100.5  2,038.2  1,960.1  1,887.8
55 Indonesia  1,043.6  989.1  928.5  869.9  799.3  728.9
56 Iran (Islamic Republic of )  4,190.3  4,101.4  4,001.1  3,891.1  3,762.7  3,660.5
57 Iraq  1,532.8  1,519.5  1,495.8  1,461.5  1,426.0  1,389.6
58 Ireland  1.1  0.8  0.5  0.4  0.4  0.3
59 Israel  9.0  9.0  9.0  8.9  8.7  7.9
60 Italy  26.1  22.1  17.9  14.3  10.7  8.1
61 Jamaica  –  –  –  –  0.0  –
62 Japan  36.3  29.4  23.2  17.5  11.9  7.7
63 Jordan  0.5  0.5  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.2
64 Kazakhstan  901.2  986.3  970.9  945.9  911.4  878.8
65 Kenya  –  –  –  –  –  –
66 Kuwait  1,605.6  1,574.5  1,523.9  1,471.1  1,408.4  1,357.4
67 Kyrgyzstan  10.4  10.5  10.4  10.4  10.3  10.3
68 Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic
 1.5  1.5  1.5  1.4  1.4  1.4
69 Latvia  –  –  –  –  –  –
70 Lesotho  –  –  –  –  –  –
71 Liberia  –  –  –  –  –  –
72 Lithuania  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.1  0.0  –
73 Luxembourg  –  –  –  –  –  –
74 Malawi  –  –  –  –  –  –
75 Malaysia  306.1  285.5  258.8  228.6  196.7  171.9
76 Maldives  –  –  –  –  –  –
77 Mali  –  –  –  –  –  –
78 Malta  –  –  –  –  –  –
79 Mauritania  –  –  –  –  0.7  0.6
80 Mauritius  –  –  –  –  –  –
81 Mexico  270.7  237.9  201.2  161.1  120.2  90.8
82 Mongolia  46.0  45.5  45.1  44.7  43.7  41.7
83 Morocco  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.4  0.4
84 Mozambique  30.3  30.3  30.3  30.3  146.9  145.9
85 Myanmar  21.1  20.8  20.2  17.7  14.5  14.5
86 Namibia  –  –  –  –  2.7  2.7
87 Nepal  –  –  –  –  –  –
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88 Netherlands  122.0  104.5  87.9  72.3  56.4  43.5
89 New Zealand  145.1  142.5  139.9  137.6  135.3  133.4
90 Nicaragua  –  –  –  –  –  –
91 Niger  2.8  2.8  2.8  2.8  2.8  2.6
92 Nigeria  712.0  668.9  621.9  571.3  517.7  472.6
93 Norway  484.3  430.8  353.1  266.9  192.0  142.0
94 Pakistan  134.6  129.1  122.6  114.9  104.4  95.6
95 Panama  –  –  –  –  –  –
96 Papua New Guinea  12.8  11.7  10.0  8.9  8.1  7.7
97 Paraguay  –  –  –  –  –  –
98 Peru  47.5  44.6  41.8  39.5  35.9  30.6
99 Philippines  6.3  6.1  6.0  5.9  10.0  9.0
100 Poland  485.3  464.7  446.0  428.8  413.3  401.0
101 Portugal  –  –  –  –  0.5  0.4
102 Qatar  451.3  442.3  429.5  410.5  382.7  350.6
103 Republic of Korea  21.5  18.4  15.9  13.9  11.9  9.7
104 Republic of Moldova  –  –  –  –  –  –
105 Romania  47.4  38.2  30.8  24.1  17.8  13.4
106 Russian Federation  4,182.8  6,248.4  6,000.0  5,709.2  5,372.1  5,084.0
107 Rwanda  –  –  –  –  1.6  1.6
108 Saudi Arabia  4,377.7  4,184.8  3,976.8  3,759.5  3,511.8  3,305.3
109 Senegal  –  –  –  –  –  –
110 Serbia  –  –  –  –  5.6  2.7
111 Sierra Leone  –  –  –  –  –  –
112 Singapore  –  –  –  –  –  –
113 Slovakia  4.9  5.4  4.8  4.2  3.6  3.2
114 Slovenia  9.7  9.2  8.8  8.3  7.8  7.5
115 South Africa  261.9  244.1  222.5  199.6  175.8  156.6
116 Spain  41.7  37.2  33.9  31.0  29.1  28.4
117 Sri Lanka  –  –  –  –  –  –
118 Sudan (former)  61.4  61.4  61.1  57.0  49.8  45.5
119 Swaziland  1.0  1.0  1.0  1.0  0.9  0.9
120 Sweden  –  –  –  –  0.1  0.0
121 Switzerland  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  –
122 Syrian Arab Republic  64.6  55.8  45.2  35.3  27.0  22.6
123 Tajikistan  4.9  5.1  5.0  5.0  5.0  5.0
124 Thailand  93.9  88.8  80.5  69.1  53.5  37.7
125 Togo  –  –  –  –  –  –
126 Trinidad and Tobago  64.3  59.9  54.7  46.5  34.2  24.5
127 Tunisia  18.2  15.9  13.7  11.4  9.2  7.7
128 Turkey  269.1  262.5  255.0  248.7  240.6  234.4
129 Uganda  27.8  27.8  27.8  27.8  27.8  27.8
130 Ukraine  604.8  654.8  643.2  631.0  618.6  609.1
131 United Arab Emirates  1,343.8  1,296.0  1,246.9  1,195.0  1,136.3  1,084.5
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132 United Kingdom  336.7  273.6  191.8  119.8  70.9  45.4
133 United Republic of Tanzania  2.3  2.3  2.3  2.3  2.3  2.3
134 United States of America  5,843.9  5,502.4  5,160.5  4,829.0  4,497.7  4,187.2
135 Uruguay  –  –  –  –  –  –
136 Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of)
 4,300.1  4,237.3  4,157.6  4,082.7  4,015.7  3,963.6
137 Viet Nam  164.6  162.3  157.4  148.8  137.8  128.8
138 Yemen  51.6  47.9  41.9  34.9  52.0  47.8
139 Zambia  0.8  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.7  0.7
140 Zimbabwe  9.7  9.3  8.9  8.6  8.4  8.1
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Table A3.38 Fossil fuel per capita (Fossil fuel per capita in thousands of constant 2005 US$)
Country/year 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
1 Afghanistan  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1
2 Albania  4.0  4.0  4.1  4.2  4.2  4.2
3 Algeria  22.9  19.1  16.2  13.6  10.9  8.9
4 Argentina  1.8  1.6  1.3  1.0  0.7  0.6
5 Armenia  –  –  –  –  0.9  0.9
6 Australia  104.4  96.8  89.5  81.9  73.8  67.5
7 Austria  0.6  0.4  0.3  0.2  0.1  0.1
8 Bahrain  13.2  9.7  6.5  3.7  1.7  0.9
9 Bangladesh  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
10 Barbados  0.5  0.4  0.3  0.2  0.1  –
11 Belgium  –  –  –  –  0.0  –
12 Belize  –  –  –  –  0.2  –
13 Benin  –  –  –  –  –  –
14 Bolivia (Plurinational State of)  1.4  1.2  1.1  0.9  0.7  0.5
15 Botswana  0.9  0.7  0.6  0.5  0.4  0.3
16 Brazil  2.8  2.5  2.2  1.9  1.6  1.3
17 Bulgaria  6.8  6.7  6.5  6.6  6.5  6.3
18 Burundi  –  –  –  –  –  –
19 Cambodia  –  –  –  –  –  –
20 Cameroon  1.0  0.7  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.2
21 Canada  93.1  85.5  78.5  71.6  64.8  59.5
22 Central African Republic  –  –  –  –  0.0  0.0
23 Chile  1.6  1.4  1.3  1.2  1.1  1.0
24 China  3.5  3.2  2.9  2.6  2.3  1.9
25 Colombia  6.5  5.7  4.8  4.0  3.3  2.7
26 Congo  17.4  14.0  10.7  7.9  6.2  4.5
27 Costa Rica  –  –  –  –  0.0  –
28 Côte d’Ivoire  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.2  0.1
29 Croatia  0.6  0.8  0.7  0.5  0.4  0.3
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30 Cuba  0.9  0.8  0.7  0.6  0.5  0.4
31 Cyprus  –  –  –  –  0.0  –
32 Czech Republic  7.8  7.4  6.9  6.4  5.8  5.4
33 Democratic Republic of the Congo  –  –  –  –  –  –
34 Denmark  8.8  7.9  6.5  4.6  2.9  2.0
35 Dominican Republic  –  –  –  –  –  –
36 Ecuador  14.8  12.6  10.7  9.1  7.6  6.6
37 Egypt  3.6  2.9  2.3  1.8  1.4  1.1
38 El Salvador  –  –  –  –  –  –
39 Estonia  –  –  –  –  0.1  –
40 Fiji  –  –  –  –  –  –
41 Finland  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  –
42 France  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
43 Gabon  53.7  41.4  30.5  23.4  17.6  13.7
44 Gambia  –  –  –  –  –  –
45 Germany  18.7  17.4  16.7  16.1  15.7  15.5
46 Ghana  –  –  –  –  –  0.0
47 Greece  7.8  7.0  6.3  5.6  5.0  4.8
48 Guatemala  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1
49 Guyana  –  –  –  –  –  –
50 Haiti  –  –  –  –  –  –
51 Honduras  –  –  –  –  –  –
52 Hungary  4.1  3.9  3.8  3.6  3.5  3.5
53 Iceland  –  –  –  –  –  –
54 India  2.5  2.2  2.0  1.8  1.6  1.5
55 Indonesia  5.8  5.0  4.4  3.8  3.3  2.9
56 Iran (Islamic Republic of)  74.6  68.0  60.8  55.5  50.7  46.8
57 Iraq  87.7  75.2  63.5  54.1  46.2  39.4
58 Ireland  0.3  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1
59 Israel  1.9  1.6  1.4  1.3  1.1  1.0
60 Italy  0.5  0.4  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.1
61 Jamaica  –  –  –  –  0.0  –
62 Japan  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1
63 Jordan  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0
64 Kazakhstan  55.1  62.4  65.2  62.4  55.8  50.8
65 Kenya  –  –  –  –  –  –
66 Kuwait  779.9  961.8  789.8  649.9  460.4  361.7
67 Kyrgyzstan  2.4  2.3  2.1  2.0  1.9  1.8
68 Lao People’s Democratic Republic  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.2
69 Latvia  –  –  –  –  0.0  –
70 Lesotho  –  –  –  –  –  –
71 Liberia  –  –  –  –  –  –
72 Lithuania  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  –
73 Luxembourg  –  –  –  –  –  –
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74 Malawi  –  –  –  –  0.0  0.0
75 Malaysia  16.8  13.8  11.0  8.9  7.0  5.7
76 Maldives  –  –  –  –  –  –
77 Mali  –  –  –  –  –  –
78 Malta  –  –  –  –  –  –
79 Mauritania  –  –  –  –  0.2  0.2
80 Mauritius  –  –  –  –  –  –
81 Mexico  3.2  2.5  2.0  1.5  1.0  0.7
82 Mongolia  21.1  19.8  18.8  17.7  16.1  14.3
83 Morocco  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
84 Mozambique  2.3  1.9  1.7  1.4  6.0  5.4
85 Myanmar  0.5  0.5  0.4  0.4  0.3  0.3
86 Namibia  –  –  –  –  1.2  1.1
87 Nepal  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
88 Netherlands  8.2  6.8  5.5  4.4  3.4  2.6
89 New Zealand  43.6  38.8  36.3  33.3  31.1  29.6
90 Nicaragua  –  –  –  –  0.0  –
91 Niger  0.4  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.1
92 Nigeria  7.4  6.2  5.1  4.1  3.2  2.7
93 Norway  114.2  98.8  78.6  57.7  39.3  27.6
94 Pakistan  1.3  1.1  0.9  0.7  0.6  0.5
95 Panama  –  –  –  –  –  –
96 Papua New Guinea  3.1  2.5  1.9  1.5  1.2  1.0
97 Paraguay  –  –  –  –  0.0  –
98 Peru  2.2  1.9  1.6  1.4  1.2  1.0
99 Philippines  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1
100 Poland  12.7  12.0  11.7  11.2  10.9  10.5
101 Portugal  –  –  –  –  0.0  0.0
102 Qatar  947.2  882.7  723.7  490.5  216.7  161.4
103 Republic of Korea  0.5  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.2
104 Republic of Moldova  –  –  –  –  –  –
105 Romania  2.0  1.7  1.4  1.1  0.9  0.7
106 Russian Federation  28.2  42.1  40.9  39.8  37.6  35.4
107 Rwanda  –  –  –  –  0.2  0.1
108 Saudi Arabia  267.6  222.0  185.9  151.9  125.0  107.0
109 Senegal  –  –  –  –  0.0  –
110 Serbia  –  –  –  –  0.8  0.4
111 Sierra Leone  –  –  –  –  –  –
112 Singapore  –  –  –  –  0.0  –
113 Slovakia  0.9  1.0  0.9  0.8  0.7  0.6
114 Slovenia  4.8  4.6  4.4  4.1  3.8  3.6
115 South Africa  7.4  6.2  5.1  4.2  3.5  2.9
116 Spain  1.1  0.9  0.8  0.7  0.6  0.6
117 Sri Lanka  –  –  –  –  –  –
118 Sudan (former)  3.1  2.5  2.2  1.8  1.4  1.2
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119 Swaziland  1.1  1.0  0.9  0.9  0.8  0.7
120 Sweden  –  –  –  –  0.0  0.0
121 Switzerland  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  –
122 Syrian Arab Republic  5.2  3.9  2.8  1.9  1.3  1.2
123 Tajikistan  0.9  0.9  0.8  0.7  0.7  0.6
124 Thailand  1.7  1.5  1.3  1.0  0.8  0.6
125 Togo  –  –  –  –  –  –
126 Trinidad and Tobago  52.6  47.7  43.1  35.8  25.7  18.1
127 Tunisia  2.2  1.8  1.4  1.1  0.9  0.7
128 Turkey  5.0  4.5  4.0  3.7  3.3  3.0
129 Uganda  1.6  1.4  1.2  1.0  0.8  0.7
130 Ukraine  11.7  12.7  13.1  13.4  13.5  13.4
131 United Arab Emirates  741.8  551.4  408.8  266.6  136.4  119.4
132 United Kingdom  5.9  4.7  3.3  2.0  1.1  0.7
133 United Republic of Tanzania  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0
134 United States of America  23.4  20.7  18.3  16.3  14.5  13.1
135 Uruguay  –  –  –  –  –  –
136 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)  216.5  191.0  169.8  152.5  138.5  129.1
137 Viet Nam  2.5  2.3  2.0  1.8  1.6  1.4
138 Yemen  4.3  3.1  2.4  1.7  2.2  1.8
139 Zambia  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0
140 Zimbabwe  0.9  0.8  0.7  0.7  0.6  0.5
Table A3.39 Fossil fuel growth (Fossil fuel change (%) with respect to base year 1990)
Country/year 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
1 Afghanistan −0.3% −0.8% −0.8% −1.2% −2.7%
2 Albania −0.6% −1.1% −1.4% −1.6% −2.9%
3 Algeria −1.4% −3.9% −6.6% −9.9% −16.6%
4 Argentina −1.6% −5.1% −9.7% −15.5% −26.1%
5 Armenia – – – – –
6 Australia −0.4% −1.0% −1.6% −2.3% −3.8%
7 Austria −3.7% −10.2% −17.9% −26.6% −51.7%
8 Bahrain −3.6% −9.9% −16.2% −24.1% −42.3%
9 Bangladesh −1.1% −3.4% −6.6% −5.4% −13.6%
10 Barbados −4.9% −14.3% −24.4% −38.8% −100.0%
11 Belgium – – – – –
12 Belize – – – – –
13 Benin – – – – –
14 Bolivia (Plurinational State of) −0.6% −1.6% −3.8% −7.9% −17.3%
15 Botswana −1.4% −3.6% −5.7% −7.9% −14.0%
16 Brazil −0.8% −2.4% −4.5% −7.6% −14.1%
17 Bulgaria −1.0% −2.5% −3.8% −4.9% −8.2%
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18 Burundi – – – – –
19 Cambodia – – – – –
20 Cameroon −5.4% −13.6% −19.1% −15.5% −25.2%
21 Canada −0.6% −1.7% −2.8% −3.9% −6.5%
22 Central African Republic – – – – –
23 Chile −0.5% −1.2% −1.6% −2.1% −3.4%
24 China −0.8% −2.3% −4.0% −6.7% −12.8%
25 Colombia −1.1% −3.7% −6.1% −9.1% −16.8%
26 Congo −1.7% −5.5% −9.6% −11.8% −21.4%
27 Costa Rica – – – – –
28 Côte d’Ivoire −0.3% −2.7% −5.3% −1.3% −12.1%
29 Croatia 6.3% 2.1% −3.7% −9.9% −19.2%
30 Cuba −0.9% −3.5% −7.3% −12.1% −21.7%
31 Cyprus – – – – –
32 Czech Republic −0.9% −3.0% −4.9% −6.8% −10.7%
33 Democratic Republic of the Congo – – – – –
34 Denmark −2.0% −6.6% −14.1% −23.0% −37.0%
35 Dominican Republic – – – – –
36 Ecuador −1.0% −2.8% −4.7% −6.9% −11.7%
37 Egypt −2.3% −6.0% −9.2% −13.0% −21.4%
38 El Salvador – – – – –
39 Estonia – – – – –
40 Fiji – – – – –
41 Finland −3.7% −11.8% −21.5% −25.0% −100.0%
42 France −6.1% −14.4% −21.2% −25.9% −40.7%
43 Gabon −2.5% −7.4% −10.9% −14.6% −23.2%
44 Gambia – – – – –
45 Germany −0.8% −1.9% −2.8% −3.6% −5.5%
46 Ghana – – – – –
47 Greece −1.4% −3.7% −6.0% −8.3% −13.1%
48 Guatemala −0.9% −4.8% −9.8% −15.1% −24.7%
49 Guyana – – – – –
50 Haiti – – – – –
51 Honduras – – – – –
52 Hungary −1.1% −2.8% −3.9% −4.9% −7.3%
53 Iceland – – – – –
54 India −0.4% −1.1% −1.9% −2.8% −4.9%
55 Indonesia −1.1% −2.9% −4.4% −6.5% −11.3%
56 Iran (Islamic Republic of ) −0.4% −1.1% −1.8% −2.7% −4.4%
57 Iraq −0.2% −0.6% −1.2% −1.8% −3.2%
58 Ireland −7.3% −17.9% −22.4% −24.8% −34.7%
59 Israel 0.0% 0.0% −0.2% −0.9% −4.3%
60 Italy −3.3% −9.0% −14.0% −20.0% −32.2%
61 Jamaica – – – – –
62 Japan −4.2% −10.5% −16.6% −24.3% −40.4%
Table A3.39 (Continued)
Annex 3: data 379
Country/year 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
63 Jordan −2.0% −5.9% −10.0% −13.9% −21.3%
64 Kazakhstan 1.8% 1.9% 1.2% 0.3% −0.8%
65 Kenya – – – – –
66 Kuwait −0.4% −1.3% −2.2% −3.2% −5.4%
67 Kyrgyzstan 0.2% 0.1% 0.0% −0.1% −0.4%
68 Lao People’s Democratic Republic 0.0% 0.0% −0.1% −0.2% −0.5%
69 Latvia – – – – –
70 Lesotho – – – – –
71 Liberia – – – – –
72 Lithuania −0.9% −6.7% −21.7% −36.7% −100.0%
73 Luxembourg – – – – –
74 Malawi – – – – –
75 Malaysia −1.4% −4.1% −7.0% −10.5% −17.5%
76 Maldives – – – – –
77 Mali – – – – –
78 Malta – – – – –
79 Mauritania – – – – –
80 Mauritius – – – – –
81 Mexico −2.5% −7.2% −12.2% −18.4% −30.5%
82 Mongolia −0.2% −0.5% −0.8% −1.3% −3.3%
83 Morocco −0.7% −2.3% −4.1% 21.8% 27.8%
84 Mozambique 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 48.4% 68.9%
85 Myanmar −0.3% −1.0% −4.2% −8.9% −11.8%
86 Namibia – – – – –
87 Nepal −0.2% −1.5% −2.6% −4.2% −7.0%
88 Netherlands −3.1% −7.9% −12.3% −17.6% −29.1%
89 New Zealand −0.4% −0.9% −1.3% −1.7% −2.8%
90 Nicaragua – – – – –
91 Niger −0.1% −0.1% −0.2% −0.3% −2.6%
92 Nigeria −1.2% −3.3% −5.4% −7.7% −12.8%
93 Norway −2.3% −7.6% −13.8% −20.6% −33.6%
94 Pakistan −0.8% −2.3% −3.9% −6.1% −10.8%
95 Panama – – – – –
96 Papua New Guinea −1.8% −6.0% −8.8% −10.8% −15.7%
97 Paraguay – – – – –
98 Peru −1.3% −3.1% −4.5% −6.8% −13.6%
99 Philippines −0.4% −0.8% −1.6% 12.6% 12.9%
100 Poland −0.9% −2.1% −3.0% −3.9% −6.2%
101 Portugal – – – – –
102 Qatar −0.4% −1.2% −2.3% −4.0% −8.1%
103 Republic of Korea −3.1% −7.2% −10.3% −13.8% −23.1%
104 Republic of Moldova – – – – –
105 Romania −4.2% −10.2% −15.6% −21.7% −34.4%
106 Russian Federation 8.4% 9.4% 8.1% 6.5% 6.7%
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107 Rwanda – – – – –
108 Saudi Arabia −0.9% −2.4% −3.7% −5.4% −8.9%
109 Senegal – – – – –
110 Serbia – – – – –
111 Sierra Leone – – – – –
112 Singapore – – – – –
113 Slovakia 1.9% −0.6% −3.8% −7.1% −12.7%
114 Slovenia −0.9% −2.4% −3.7% −5.1% −8.0%
115 South Africa −1.4% −4.0% −6.6% −9.5% −15.8%
116 Spain −2.2% −5.1% −7.2% −8.5% −11.9%
117 Sri Lanka – – – – –
118 Sudan (former) 0.0% −0.1% −1.9% −5.1% −9.5%
119 Swaziland −0.1% −0.4% −0.7% −0.9% −1.4%
120 Sweden – – – – –
121 Switzerland 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 16.7% −100.0%
122 Syrian Arab Republic −2.9% −8.6% −14.0% −19.6% −29.6%
123 Tajikistan 0.7% 0.8% 0.8% 0.7% 0.7%
124 Thailand −1.1% −3.8% −7.4% −13.1% −26.2%
125 Togo – – – – –
126 Trinidad and Tobago −1.4% −4.0% −7.8% −14.6% −27.5%
127 Tunisia −2.7% −7.0% −11.0% −15.7% −25.0%
128 Turkey −0.5% −1.3% −2.0% −2.8% −4.5%
129 Uganda 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0% 0.0%
130 Ukraine 1.6% 1.5% 1.1% 0.6% 0.2%
131 United Arab Emirates −0.7% −1.9% −2.9% −4.1% −6.9%
132 United Kingdom −4.1% −13.1% −22.8% −32.3% −48.7%
133 United Republic of Tanzania 0.0% 0.0% −0.1% −0.1% −0.1%
134 United States of America −1.2% −3.1% −4.7% −6.3% −10.5%
135 Uruguay – – – – –
136 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) −0.3% −0.8% −1.3% −1.7% −2.7%
137 Viet Nam −0.3% −1.1% −2.5% −4.3% −7.8%
138 Yemen −1.5% −5.1% −9.3% 0.2% −2.5%
139 Zambia −0.6% −1.1% −1.4% −1.5% −2.3%
140 Zimbabwe −1.0% −2.3% −3.2% −3.7% −6.0%
Table A3.40  Fossil fuel per capita growth (Fossil fuel per capita change (%) with respect 
to base year 1990)
Country/year 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
1 Afghanistan −6.7% −12.2% −16.8% −19.9% −29.5%
2 Albania 0.0% 0.5% 0.8% 1.4% 1.4%
3 Algeria −3.6% −8.3% −12.2% −17.0% −27.2%
4 Argentina −2.9% −8.0% −13.7% −20.2% −32.5%
5 Armenia – – – – –
Table A3.39 (Continued)
Annex 3: data 381
Country/year 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
6 Australia −1.5% −3.8% −5.9% −8.3% −13.5%
7 Austria −4.4% −11.2% −19.3% −28.2% −53.4%
8 Bahrain −6.1% −16.3% −27.1% −39.9% −58.8%
9 Bangladesh −3.3% −8.4% −13.4% −13.5% −24.6%
10 Barbados −5.2% −15.1% −25.4% −39.8% −100.0%
11 Belgium – – – – –
12 Belize – – – – –
13 Benin – – – – –
14 Bolivia (Plurinational State of) −2.6% −6.3% −10.4% −16.0% −28.4%
15 Botswana −4.0% −9.0% −12.5% −16.5% −26.6%
16 Brazil −2.3% −6.1% −9.7% −13.8% −22.7%
17 Bulgaria −0.3% −1.0% −0.9% −0.9% −2.3%
18 Burundi – – – – –
19 Cambodia – – – – –
20 Cameroon −8.1% −19.4% −26.9% −26.1% −39.5%
21 Canada −1.7% −4.2% −6.4% −8.7% −13.9%
22 Central African Republic – – – – –
23 Chile −2.0% −4.7% −6.5% −8.2% −12.6%
24 China −2.0% −4.9% −7.3% −10.5% −18.0%
25 Colombia −2.9% −7.6% −11.4% −15.5% −25.6%
26 Congo −4.3% −11.6% −17.9% −22.8% −36.4%
27 Costa Rica – – – – –
28 Côte d’Ivoire −3.6% −9.9% −14.3% −13.0% −28.0%
29 Croatia 6.8% 4.1% −1.9% −8.1% −15.9%
30 Cuba −1.5% −4.7% −8.7% −13.5% −23.6%
31 Cyprus – – – – –
32 Czech Republic −0.9% −2.9% −4.6% −7.1% −11.3%
33 Democratic Republic of the Congo – – – – –
34 Denmark −2.3% −7.5% −15.2% −24.4% −38.9%
35 Dominican Republic – – – – –
36 Ecuador −3.2% −7.9% −11.5% −15.4% −23.8%
37 Egypt −4.3% −10.4% −15.4% −20.8% −32.7%
38 El Salvador – – – – –
39 Estonia – – – – –
40 Fiji – – – – –
41 Finland −4.2% −12.6% −22.4% −26.4% −100.0%
42 France −6.5% −15.2% −22.7% −27.8% −43.2%
43 Gabon −5.1% −13.1% −18.8% −24.3% −36.6%
44 Gambia – – – – –
45 Germany −1.4% −2.8% −3.7% −4.2% −6.1%
46 Ghana – – – – –
47 Greece −2.1% −5.0% −7.7% −10.2% −15.0%
48 Guatemala −3.3% −10.4% −17.6% −24.6% −37.5%
49 Guyana – – – – –
50 Haiti – – – – –
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51 Honduras – – – – –
52 Hungary −1.0% −2.4% −3.2% −4.0% −5.8%
53 Iceland – – – – –
54 India −2.3% −5.7% −8.3% −10.9% −16.7%
55 Indonesia −2.7% −6.5% −9.6% −12.9% −20.7%
56 Iran (Islamic Republic of) −1.8% −5.0% −7.1% −9.2% −14.4%
57 Iraq −3.0% −7.8% −11.4% −14.8% −23.4%
58 Ireland −7.8% −19.5% −25.6% −29.6% −40.4%
59 Israel −3.4% −7.3% −9.6% −12.4% −20.8%
60 Italy −3.3% −9.1% −14.4% −20.9% −33.7%
61 Jamaica – – – – –
62 Japan −4.4% −11.1% −17.3% −25.0% −40.9%
63 Jordan −6.8% −13.8% −19.9% −27.1% −39.5%
64 Kazakhstan 2.5% 4.3% 3.2% 0.3% −2.7%
65 Kenya – – – – –
66 Kuwait 4.3% 0.3% −4.5% −12.3% −22.6%
67 Kyrgyzstan −0.6% −2.6% −4.0% −5.4% −9.4%
68 Lao People’s Democratic Republic −2.6% −5.6% −7.3% −9.4% −14.5%
69 Latvia – – – – –
70 Lesotho – – – – –
71 Liberia – – – – –
72 Lithuania −0.5% −5.4% −19.6% −33.8% −100.0%
73 Luxembourg – – – – –
74 Malawi – – – – –
75 Malaysia −3.9% −10.0% −14.8% −19.7% −30.1%
76 Maldives – – – – –
77 Mali – – – – –
78 Malta – – – – –
79 Mauritania – – – – –
80 Mauritius – – – – –
81 Mexico −4.4% −11.3% −17.5% −24.8% −38.8%
82 Mongolia −1.2% −2.8% −4.3% −6.5% −12.1%
83 Morocco −2.4% −5.9% −8.7% 14.3% 15.3%
84 Mozambique −3.4% −7.5% −10.8% 27.8% 33.3%
85 Myanmar −1.5% −4.1% −8.3% −13.5% −18.6%
86 Namibia – – – – –
87 Nepal −2.8% −7.2% −9.8% −12.4% −18.8%
88 Netherlands −3.7% −9.3% −14.2% −19.7% −31.9%
89 New Zealand −2.3% −4.5% −6.5% −8.1% −12.1%
90 Nicaragua – – – – –
91 Niger −3.4% −8.5% −12.7% −16.8% −27.4%
92 Nigeria −3.7% −9.2% −13.9% −18.7% −29.0%
93 Norway −2.8% −8.9% −15.7% −23.4% −37.7%
94 Pakistan −3.4% −8.2% −12.0% −16.3% −25.5%
95 Panama – – – – –
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96 Papua New Guinea −4.2% −11.9% −17.1% −21.3% −30.7%
97 Paraguay – – – – –
98 Peru −3.2% −7.2% −10.0% −13.5% −23.1%
99 Philippines −2.7% −6.4% −9.3% 1.7% −3.5%
100 Poland −1.1% −2.2% −3.1% −3.9% −6.1%
101 Portugal – – – – –
102 Qatar −1.4% −6.5% −15.2% −30.8% −44.6%
103 Republic of Korea −4.1% −9.3% −12.9% −16.8% −27.2%
104 Republic of Moldova – – – – –
105 Romania −3.8% −9.5% −13.8% −19.0% −31.0%
106 Russian Federation 8.3% 9.8% 9.0% 7.5% 7.8%
107 Rwanda – – – – –
108 Saudi Arabia −3.7% −8.7% −13.2% −17.3% −26.3%
109 Senegal – – – – –
110 Serbia – – – – –
111 Sierra Leone – – – – –
112 Singapore – – – – –
113 Slovakia 1.7% −1.0% −4.2% −7.5% −13.4%
114 Slovenia −0.8% −2.3% −3.7% −5.6% −8.9%
115 South Africa −3.5% −9.2% −13.2% −17.4% −27.0%
116 Spain −2.5% −5.9% −9.8% −12.6% −17.1%
117 Sri Lanka – – – – –
118 Sudan (former) −4.1% −8.2% −12.7% −18.1% −27.8%
119 Swaziland −2.3% −5.5% −6.7% −8.6% −13.3%
120 Sweden – – – – –
121 Switzerland −0.9% −1.7% −2.5% 12.3% –
122 Syrian Arab Republic −5.6% −14.6% −21.7% −29.2% −38.6%
123 Tajikistan −1.0% −3.0% −5.4% −8.0% −13.3%
124 Thailand −2.0% −6.2% −10.8% −16.6% −30.5%
125 Togo – – – – –
126 Trinidad and Tobago −1.9% −4.9% −9.2% −16.4% −30.0%
127 Tunisia −4.5% −10.6% −15.5% −20.9% −32.1%
128 Turkey −2.1% −5.2% −7.4% −9.6% −15.3%
129 Uganda −3.2% −7.5% −11.3% −14.9% −22.8%
130 Ukraine 1.7% 2.9% 3.5% 3.7% 4.8%
131 United Arab Emirates −5.8% −13.8% −22.6% −34.5% −45.6%
132 United Kingdom −4.3% −13.7% −23.8% −33.8% −50.7%
133 United Republic of Tanzania −3.2% −7.0% −10.2% −13.6% −21.2%
134 United States of America −2.5% −6.0% −8.6% −11.2% −17.5%
135 Uruguay – – – – –
136 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) −2.5% −5.9% −8.4% −10.6% −15.8%
137 Viet Nam −2.0% −5.0% −7.7% −10.7% −17.1%
138 Yemen −6.2% −14.0% −20.8% −15.4% −24.9%
139 Zambia −3.1% −7.4% −10.6% −13.8% −21.5%
140 Zimbabwe −3.1% −6.5% −8.2% −10.4% −17.1%
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Table A3.41 Minerals (Minerals in billions of constant 2005 US$)
Country/year 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
1 Afghanistan  –  –  –  –  –  –
2 Albania  –  –  –  –  –  –
3 Algeria  9.4  9.4  9.4  9.4  9.3  9.3
4 Argentina  –  –  –  –  –  –
5 Armenia  –  –  –  –  –  –
6 Australia  260.7  255.8  249.5  241.6  232.1  224.7
7 Austria  –  –  –  –  –  –
8 Bahrain  –  –  –  –  –  –
9 Bangladesh  –  –  –  –  –  –
10 Barbados  –  –  –  –  –  –
11 Belgium  –  –  –  –  –  –
12 Belize  –  –  –  –  –  –
13 Benin  –  –  –  –  –  –
14 Bolivia (Plurinational State of)  2.6  2.5  2.3  2.1  1.7  1.4
15 Botswana  0.9  0.8  0.7  0.6  0.5  0.4
16 Brazil  127.7  123.8  119.6  114.4  107.0  100.8
17 Bulgaria  –  –  –  –  –  –
18 Burundi  –  –  –  –  –  –
19 Cambodia  –  –  –  –  –  –
20 Cameroon  –  –  –  –  –  –
21 Canada  44.4  40.5  36.6  33.2  30.1  29.3
22 Central African Republic  –  –  –  –  –  –
23 Chile  90.2  87.0  81.5  74.6  67.2  60.9
24 China  194.6  187.6  179.4  169.2  147.0  118.1
25 Colombia  2.2  2.1  1.9  1.6  1.3  1.0
26 Congo  –  –  –  –  –  –
27 Costa Rica  –  –  –  –  –  –
28 Côte d’Ivoire  –  –  –  –  –  –
29 Croatia  –  –  –  –  –  –
30 Cuba  6.0  5.9  5.6  5.3  5.0  4.8
31 Cyprus  –  –  –  –  –  –
32 Czech Republic  –  –  –  –  –  –
33 Democratic Republic of the Congo  –  –  –  –  –  –
34 Denmark  –  –  –  –  –  –
35 Dominican Republic  1.4  1.2  1.1  0.9  0.8  0.8
36 Ecuador  –  –  –  –  –  –
37 Egypt  5.4  5.4  5.4  5.3  5.3  5.2
38 El Salvador  –  –  –  –  –  –
39 Estonia  –  –  –  –  –  –
40 Fiji  –  –  –  –  –  –
41 Finland  –  –  –  –  –  –
42 France  –  –  –  –  –  –
43 Gabon  –  –  –  –  –  –
44 Gambia  –  –  –  –  –  –
45 Germany  –  –  –  –  –  –
46 Ghana  3.9  3.6  3.1  2.7  2.1  1.6
47 Greece  0.6  0.6  0.6  0.5  0.5  0.5
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48 Guatemala  –  –  –  –  –  –
49 Guyana  1.8  1.7  1.7  1.7  1.7  1.7
50 Haiti  –  –  –  –  –  –
51 Honduras  –  –  –  –  –  –
52 Hungary  –  –  –  –  –  –
53 Iceland  –  –  –  –  –  –
54 India  151.0  149.6  148.0  145.3  140.8  137.4
55 Indonesia  28.5  27.2  24.9  21.7  18.6  16.1
56 Iran (Islamic Republic of)  11.6  11.5  11.4  11.0  10.4  10.1
57 Iraq  –  –  –  –  –  –
58 Ireland  0.9  0.8  0.7  0.5  0.3  0.1
59 Israel  0.9  0.9  0.8  0.7  0.6  0.6
60 Italy  –  –  –  –  –  –
61 Jamaica  4.5  4.4  4.3  4.1  4.0  3.9
62 Japan  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.2
63 Jordan  4.7  4.7  4.6  4.5  4.4  4.3
64 Kazakhstan  17.1  16.5  15.8  14.7  13.5  12.5
65 Kenya  –  –  –  –  –  –
66 Kuwait  –  –  –  –  –  –
67 Kyrgyzstan  –  –  –  –  –  –
68 Lao People’s Democratic Republic  –  –  –  –  –  –
69 Latvia  –  –  –  –  –  –
70 Lesotho  –  –  –  –  –  –
71 Liberia  –  –  –  –  –  –
72 Lithuania  –  –  –  –  –  –
73 Luxembourg  –  –  –  –  –  –
74 Malawi  –  –  –  –  –  –
75 Malaysia  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2
76 Maldives  –  –  –  –  –  –
77 Mali  –  –  –  –  –  –
78 Malta  –  –  –  –  –  –
79 Mauritania  5.0  4.8  4.6  4.4  4.2  4.0
80 Mauritius  –  –  –  –  –  –
81 Mexico  26.2  25.1  23.7  22.3  20.5  18.5
82 Mongolia  –  –  –  –  –  –
83 Morocco  –  –  –  –  –  –
84 Mozambique  –  –  –  –  –  –
85 Myanmar  –  –  –  –  –  –
86 Namibia  –  –  –  –  –  –
87 Nepal  –  –  –  –  –  –
88 Netherlands  –  –  –  –  –  –
89 New Zealand  –  –  –  –  –  –
90 Nicaragua  –  –  –  –  –  –
91 Niger  –  –  –  –  –  –
92 Nigeria  –  –  –  –  –  –
93 Norway  –  –  –  –  –  –
94 Pakistan  –  –  –  –  –  –
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95 Panama  –  –  –  –  –  –
96 Papua New Guinea  3.1  2.7  2.4  2.0  1.6  1.4
97 Paraguay  –  –  –  –  –  –
98 Peru  43.7  42.3  40.2  36.8  32.8  29.7
99 Philippines  5.0  4.9  4.8  4.7  4.2  2.8
100 Poland  10.6  10.1  9.4  8.7  8.0  7.5
101 Portugal  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0
102 Qatar  –  –  –  –  –  –
103 Republic of Korea  –  –  –  –  –  –
104 Republic of Moldova  –  –  –  –  –  –
105 Romania  –  –  –  –  –  –
106 Russian Federation  139.4  135.3  131.2  126.3  121.2  116.9
107 Rwanda  –  –  –  –  –  –
108 Saudi Arabia  –  –  –  –  –  –
109 Senegal  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.2
110 Serbia  –  –  –  –  –  –
111 Sierra Leone  –  –  –  –  –  –
112 Singapore  –  –  –  –  –  –
113 Slovakia  –  –  –  –  –  –
114 Slovenia  –  –  –  –  –  –
115 South Africa  38.8  34.2  30.4  27.1  24.6  22.5
116 Spain  –  –  –  –  –  –
117 Sri Lanka  –  –  –  –  –  –
118 Sudan (former)  –  –  –  –  –  –
119 Swaziland  –  –  –  –  –  –
120 Sweden  13.3  12.9  12.5  12.2  11.8  11.4
121 Switzerland  –  –  –  –  –  –
122 Syrian Arab Republic  6.1  6.1  6.0  6.0  5.9  5.9
123 Tajikistan  –  –  –  –  –  –
124 Thailand  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1
125 Togo  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.1
126 Trinidad and Tobago  –  –  –  –  –  –
127 Tunisia  1.1  1.0  0.8  0.7  0.5  0.4
128 Turkey  –  –  –  –  –  –
129 Uganda  –  –  –  –  –  –
130 Ukraine  22.5  21.7  20.9  20.1  19.0  18.2
131 United Arab Emirates  –  –  –  –  –  –
132 United Kingdom  –  –  –  –  –  –
133 United Republic of Tanzania  –  –  –  –  –  –
134 United States of America  85.2  78.5  71.6  66.1  61.1  57.1
135 Uruguay  –  –  –  –  –  –
136 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)  17.0  16.6  16.3  15.9  15.5  15.3
137 Viet Nam  –  –  –  –  3.8  3.8
138 Yemen  –  –  –  –  –  –
139 Zambia  7.8  7.3  6.9  6.4  5.7  5.0
140 Zimbabwe  –  –  –  –  –  –
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Table A3.42 Minerals per capita (Minerals per capita in thousands of constant 2005 US$)
Country/year 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
1 Afghanistan  –  –  –  –  –  –
2 Albania  –  –  –  –  –  –
3 Algeria  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.2
4 Argentina  –  –  –  –  –  –
5 Armenia  –  –  –  –  –  –
6 Australia  15.3  14.2  13.0  11.8  10.5  9.6
7 Austria  –  –  –  –  –  –
8 Bahrain  –  –  –  –  –  –
9 Bangladesh  –  –  –  –  –  –
10 Barbados  –  –  –  –  –  –
11 Belgium  –  –  –  –  –  –
12 Belize  –  –  –  –  –  –
13 Benin  –  –  –  –  –  –
14 Bolivia (Plurinational State of)  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.1
15 Botswana  0.6  0.5  0.4  0.3  0.2  0.2
16 Brazil  0.8  0.8  0.7  0.6  0.5  0.5
17 Bulgaria  –  –  –  –  –  –
18 Burundi  –  –  –  –  –  –
19 Cambodia  –  –  –  –  –  –
20 Cameroon  –  –  –  –  –  –
21 Canada  1.6  1.4  1.2  1.0  0.9  0.8
22 Central African Republic  –  –  –  –  –  –
23 Chile  6.9  6.1  5.4  4.6  3.9  3.4
24 China  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1
25 Colombia  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
26 Congo  –  –  –  –  –  –
27 Costa Rica  –  –  –  –  –  –
28 Côte d’Ivoire  –  –  –  –  –  –
29 Croatia  –  –  –  –  –  –
30 Cuba  0.6  0.5  0.5  0.5  0.4  0.4
31 Cyprus  –  –  –  –  –  –
32 Czech Republic  –  –  –  –  –  –
33 Democratic Republic of the Congo  –  –  –  –  –  –
34 Denmark  –  –  –  –  –  –
35 Dominican Republic  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1
36 Ecuador  –  –  –  –  –  –
37 Egypt  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1
38 El Salvador  –  –  –  –  –  –
39 Estonia  –  –  –  –  –  –
40 Fiji  –  –  –  –  –  –
41 Finland  –  –  –  –  –  –
42 France  –  –  –  –  –  –
43 Gabon  –  –  –  –  –  –
44 Gambia  –  –  –  –  –  –
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Country/year 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
45 Germany  –  –  –  –  –  –
46 Ghana  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1
47 Greece  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0
48 Guatemala  –  –  –  –  –  –
49 Guyana  2.4  2.4  2.3  2.3  2.2  2.2
50 Haiti  –  –  –  –  –  –
51 Honduras  –  –  –  –  –  –
52 Hungary  –  –  –  –  –  –
53 Iceland  –  –  –  –  –  –
54 India  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1
55 Indonesia  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1
56 Iran (Islamic Republic of)  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1
57 Iraq  –  –  –  –  –  –
58 Ireland  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.0
59 Israel  0.2  0.2  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1
60 Italy  –  –  –  –  –  –
61 Jamaica  1.9  1.8  1.6  1.6  1.5  1.4
62 Japan  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
63 Jordan  1.4  1.1  1.0  0.8  0.7  0.6
64 Kazakhstan  1.0  1.0  1.1  1.0  0.8  0.7
65 Kenya  –  –  –  –  –  –
66 Kuwait  –  –  –  –  –  –
67 Kyrgyzstan  –  –  –  –  –  –
68 Lao People’s Democratic Republic  –  –  –  –  –  –
69 Latvia  –  –  –  –  –  –
70 Lesotho  –  –  –  –  –  –
71 Liberia  –  –  –  –  –  –
72 Lithuania  –  –  –  –  –  –
73 Luxembourg  –  –  –  –  –  –
74 Malawi  –  –  –  –  –  –
75 Malaysia  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
76 Maldives  –  –  –  –  –  –
77 Mali  –  –  –  –  –  –
78 Malta  –  –  –  –  –  –
79 Mauritania  2.5  2.1  1.7  1.4  1.2  1.0
80 Mauritius  –  –  –  –  –  –
81 Mexico  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.1
82 Mongolia  –  –  –  –  –  –
83 Morocco  –  –  –  –  –  –
84 Mozambique  –  –  –  –  –  –
85 Myanmar  –  –  –  –  –  –
86 Namibia  –  –  –  –  –  –
87 Nepal  –  –  –  –  –  –
88 Netherlands  –  –  –  –  –  –
89 New Zealand  –  –  –  –  –  –
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Country/year 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
90 Nicaragua  –  –  –  –  –  –
91 Niger  –  –  –  –  –  –
92 Nigeria  –  –  –  –  –  –
93 Norway  –  –  –  –  –  –
94 Pakistan  –  –  –  –  –  –
95 Panama  –  –  –  –  –  –
96 Papua New Guinea  0.7  0.6  0.4  0.3  0.2  0.2
97 Paraguay  –  –  –  –  –  –
98 Peru  2.0  1.8  1.6  1.3  1.1  1.0
99 Philippines  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0
100 Poland  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.2  0.2
101 Portugal  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
102 Qatar  –  –  –  –  –  –
103 Republic of Korea  –  –  –  –  –  –
104 Republic of Moldova  –  –  –  –  –  –
105 Romania  –  –  –  –  –  –
106 Russian Federation  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.9  0.8  0.8
107 Rwanda  –  –  –  –  –  –
108 Saudi Arabia  –  –  –  –  –  –
109 Senegal  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
110 Serbia  –  –  –  –  –  –
111 Sierra Leone  –  –  –  –  –  –
112 Singapore  –  –  –  –  –  –
113 Slovakia  –  –  –  –  –  –
114 Slovenia  –  –  –  –  –  –
115 South Africa  1.1  0.9  0.7  0.6  0.5  0.4
116 Spain  –  –  –  –  –  –
117 Sri Lanka  –  –  –  –  –  –
118 Sudan (former)  –  –  –  –  –  –
119 Swaziland  –  –  –  –  –  –
120 Sweden  1.5  1.5  1.4  1.3  1.3  1.2
121 Switzerland  –  –  –  –  –  –
122 Syrian Arab Republic  0.5  0.4  0.4  0.3  0.3  0.3
123 Tajikistan  –  –  –  –  –  –
124 Thailand  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
125 Togo  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0  0.0  0.0
126 Trinidad and Tobago  –  –  –  –  –  –
127 Tunisia  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.1  0.0  0.0
128 Turkey  –  –  –  –  –  –
129 Uganda  –  –  –  –  –  –
130 Ukraine  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4  0.4
131 United Arab Emirates  –  –  –  –  –  –
132 United Kingdom  –  –  –  –  –  –
133 United Republic of Tanzania  –  –  –  –  –  –
134 United States of America  0.3  0.3  0.3  0.2  0.2  0.2
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135 Uruguay  –  –  –  –  –  –
136 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of)  0.9  0.8  0.7  0.6  0.5  0.5
137 Viet Nam  –  –  –  –  0.0  0.0
138 Yemen  –  –  –  –  –  –
139 Zambia  1.0  0.8  0.7  0.5  0.4  0.3
140 Zimbabwe  –  –  –  –  –  –
Table A3.43 Minerals growth (Minerals change (%) with respect to base year 1990)
Country/year 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
1 Afghanistan – – – – –
2 Albania – – – – –
3 Algeria 0.0% −0.1% −0.2% −0.2% −0.4%
4 Argentina – – – – –
5 Armenia – – – – –
6 Australia −0.4% −1.1% −1.9% −2.9% −4.8%
7 Austria – – – – –
8 Bahrain – – – – –
9 Bangladesh – – – – –
10 Barbados – – – – –
11 Belgium – – – – –
12 Belize – – – – –
13 Benin – – – – –
14 Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of)
−1.3% −3.5% −5.5% −9.8% −19.6%
15 Botswana −2.1% −5.9% −10.1% −15.3% −26.0%
16 Brazil −0.6% −1.6% −2.7% −4.3% −7.6%
17 Bulgaria – – – – –
18 Burundi – – – – –
19 Cambodia – – – – –
20 Cameroon – – – – –
21 Canada −1.8% −4.7% −7.0% −9.3% −13.0%
22 Central African 
Republic
– – – – –
23 Chile −0.7% −2.5% −4.6% −7.1% −12.3%
24 China −0.7% −2.0% −3.4% −6.8% −15.3%
25 Colombia −1.1% −3.5% −7.9% −12.0% −22.4%
26 Congo – – – – –
27 Costa Rica – – – – –
28 Côte d’Ivoire – – – – –
29 Croatia – – – – –
30 Cuba −0.5% −1.7% −3.1% −4.5% −7.4%
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Country/year 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
31 Cyprus – – – – –
32 Czech Republic – – – – –
33 Democratic Republic 
of the Congo
– – – – –
34 Denmark – – – – –
35 Dominican Republic −2.9% −7.4% −10.9% −12.6% −18.7%
36 Ecuador – – – – –
37 Egypt 0.0% −0.1% −0.3% −0.6% −1.4%
38 El Salvador – – – – –
39 Estonia – – – – –
40 Fiji – – – – –
41 Finland – – – – –
42 France – – – – –
43 Gabon – – – – –
44 Gambia – – – – –
45 Germany – – – – –
46 Ghana −1.4% −4.9% −8.6% −13.9% −25.0%
47 Greece −0.8% −1.7% −2.8% −3.8% −5.9%
48 Guatemala – – – – –
49 Guyana −0.2% −0.6% −0.9% −1.1% −1.8%
50 Haiti – – – – –
51 Honduras – – – – –
52 Hungary – – – – –
53 Iceland – – – – –
54 India −0.2% −0.5% −1.0% −1.7% −3.1%
55 Indonesia −0.9% −3.3% −6.6% −10.1% −17.3%
56 Iran (Islamic 
Republic of)
−0.2% −0.6% −1.4% −2.8% −4.7%
57 Iraq – – – – –
58 Ireland −2.5% −6.7% −14.4% −25.4% −45.9%
59 Israel −1.3% −3.8% −6.3% −8.5% −13.9%
60 Italy – – – – –
61 Jamaica −0.5% −1.3% −2.1% −2.8% −4.3%
62 Japan −2.9% −7.6% −11.8% −16.6% −26.9%
63 Jordan −0.3% −0.9% −1.5% −2.0% −3.3%
64 Kazakhstan −0.8% −2.1% −3.7% −5.8% −9.9%
65 Kenya – – – – –
66 Kuwait – – – – –
67 Kyrgyzstan – – – – –
68 Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic
– – – – –
69 Latvia – – – – –
70 Lesotho – – – – –
71 Liberia – – – – –
72 Lithuania – – – – –
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Country/year 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
73 Luxembourg – – – – –
74 Malawi – – – – –
75 Malaysia −3.2% −6.3% −7.8% −8.8% −13.3%
76 Maldives – – – – –
77 Mali – – – – –
78 Malta – – – – –
79 Mauritania −0.8% −2.1% −3.2% −4.4% −7.2%
80 Mauritius – – – – –
81 Mexico −0.9% −2.5% −4.0% −5.9% −11.0%
82 Mongolia – – – – –
83 Morocco – – – – –
84 Mozambique – – – – –
85 Myanmar – – – – –
86 Namibia – – – – –
87 Nepal – – – – –
88 Netherlands – – – – –
89 New Zealand – – – – –
90 Nicaragua – – – – –
91 Niger – – – – –
92 Nigeria – – – – –
93 Norway – – – – –
94 Pakistan – – – – –
95 Panama – – – – –
96 Papua New Guinea −2.4% −6.2% −10.2% −14.6% −23.6%
97 Paraguay – – – – –
98 Peru −0.6% −2.1% −4.2% −6.9% −12.0%
99 Philippines −0.2% −0.7% −1.2% −4.0% −17.3%
100 Poland −1.0% −2.9% −4.9% −6.8% −10.9%
101 Portugal −4.1% −9.4% −10.1% −10.1% −13.4%
102 Qatar – – – – –
103 Republic of Korea – – – – –
104 Republic of Moldova – – – – –
105 Romania – – – – –
106 Russian Federation −0.6% −1.5% −2.4% −3.4% −5.7%
107 Rwanda – – – – –
108 Saudi Arabia – – – – –
109 Senegal −2.2% −5.6% −8.6% −10.2% −15.4%
110 Serbia – – – – –
111 Sierra Leone – – – – –
112 Singapore – – – – –
113 Slovakia – – – – –
114 Slovenia – – – – –
115 South Africa −2.5% −5.9% −8.5% −10.8% −16.6%
116 Spain – – – – –
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117 Sri Lanka – – – – –
118 Sudan (former) – – – – –
119 Swaziland – – – – –
120 Sweden −0.5% −1.4% −2.1% −2.9% −5.0%
121 Switzerland – – – – –
122 Syrian Arab Republic −0.1% −0.2% −0.4% −0.7% −1.0%
123 Tajikistan – – – – –
124 Thailand −2.8% −4.5% −5.3% −5.4% −7.3%
125 Togo −3.8% −9.7% −13.0% −15.4% −23.2%
126 Trinidad and Tobago – – – – –
127 Tunisia −2.4% −7.2% −12.3% −18.3% −27.8%
128 Turkey – – – – –
129 Uganda – – – – –
130 Ukraine −0.8% −1.8% −2.9% −4.1% −6.9%
131 United Arab 
Emirates
– – – – –
132 United Kingdom – – – – –
133 United Republic of 
Tanzania
– – – – –
134 United States of 
America
−1.6% −4.3% −6.1% −7.9% −12.5%
135 Uruguay – – – – –
136 Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of)
−0.5% −1.1% −1.7% −2.3% −3.5%
137 Viet Nam – – – – –
138 Yemen – – – – –
139 Zambia −1.3% −3.0% −4.7% −7.5% −13.8%
140 Zimbabwe – – – – –
Table A3.44  Minerals per capita growth (Minerals per capita change (%) with respect to base 
year 1990)
Country/year 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
1 Afghanistan – – – – –
2 Albania – – – – –
3 Algeria −2.2% −4.6% −6.2% −8.1% −13.1%
4 Argentina – – – – –
5 Armenia – – – – –
6 Australia −1.5% −3.9% −6.2% −8.9% −14.4%
7 Austria – – – – –
8 Bahrain – – – – –
9 Bangladesh – – – – –
10 Barbados – – – – –
11 Belgium – – – – –
12 Belize – – – – –
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13 Benin – – – – –
14 Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of)
−3.3% −8.1% −12.0% −17.7% −30.3%
15 Botswana −4.7% −11.2% −16.6% −23.3% −36.9%
16 Brazil −2.2% −5.4% −8.0% −10.7% −16.8%
17 Bulgaria – – – – –
18 Burundi – – – – –
19 Cambodia – – – – –
20 Cameroon – – – – –
21 Canada −2.9% −7.1% −10.4% −13.7% −19.8%
22 Central African 
Republic
– – – – –
23 Chile −2.2% −5.9% −9.3% −12.9% −20.6%
24 China −1.9% −4.6% −6.7% −10.5% −20.4%
25 Colombia −2.8% −7.4% −13.1% −18.2% −30.6%
26 Congo – – – – –
27 Costa Rica – – – – –
28 Côte d’Ivoire – – – – –
29 Croatia – – – – –
30 Cuba −1.1% −2.9% −4.6% −6.1% −9.6%
31 Cyprus – – – – –
32 Czech Republic – – – – –
33 Democratic Republic 
of the Congo
– – – – –
34 Denmark – – – – –
35 Dominican Republic −4.7% −11.3% −16.3% −19.3% −28.2%
36 Ecuador – – – – –
37 Egypt −2.0% −4.8% −7.2% −9.5% −15.5%
38 El Salvador – – – – –
39 Estonia – – – – –
40 Fiji – – – – –
41 Finland – – – – –
42 France – – – – –
43 Gabon – – – – –
44 Gambia – – – – –
45 Germany – – – – –
46 Ghana −4.0% −10.8% −16.9% −24.2% −38.7%
47 Greece −1.4% −3.2% −4.6% −5.8% −8.0%
48 Guatemala – – – – –
49 Guyana −0.4% −1.4% −1.6% −2.2% −3.7%
50 Haiti – – – – –
51 Honduras – – – – –
52 Hungary – – – – –
53 Iceland – – – – –
54 India −2.1% −5.1% −7.5% −9.9% −15.1%
Table A3.44 (Continued)
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55 Indonesia −2.5% −7.0% −11.6% −16.3% −26.1%
56 Iran (Islamic 
Republic of)
−1.6% −4.5% −6.7% −9.3% −14.7%
57 Iraq – – – – –
58 Ireland −3.0% −8.5% −17.9% −30.1% −50.6%
59 Israel −4.7% −10.7% −15.1% −19.1% −28.8%
60 Italy – – – – –
61 Jamaica −1.2% −3.3% −4.5% −5.6% −8.3%
62 Japan −3.2% −8.2% −12.6% −17.4% −27.6%
63 Jordan −5.2% −9.2% −12.2% −17.0% −25.8%
64 Kazakhstan −0.1% 0.3% −1.8% −5.8% −11.6%
65 Kenya – – – – –
66 Kuwait – – – – –
67 Kyrgyzstan – – – – –
68 Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic
– – – – –
69 Latvia – – – – –
70 Lesotho – – – – –
71 Liberia – – – – –
72 Lithuania – – – – –
73 Luxembourg – – – – –
74 Malawi – – – – –
75 Malaysia −5.7% −12.0% −15.5% −18.2% −26.5%
76 Maldives – – – – –
77 Mali – – – – –
78 Malta – – – – –
79 Mauritania −3.6% −9.1% −13.4% −17.2% −25.8%
80 Mauritius – – – – –
81 Mexico −2.8% −6.8% −9.7% −13.3% −21.6%
82 Mongolia – – – – –
83 Morocco – – – – –
84 Mozambique – – – – –
85 Myanmar – – – – –
86 Namibia – – – – –
87 Nepal – – – – –
88 Netherlands – – – – –
89 New Zealand – – – – –
90 Nicaragua – – – – –
91 Niger – – – – –
92 Nigeria – – – – –
93 Norway – – – – –
94 Pakistan – – – – –
95 Panama – – – – –
96 Papua New Guinea −4.8% −12.0% −18.4% −24.7% −37.1%
97 Paraguay – – – – –
98 Peru −2.5% −6.2% −9.6% −13.6% −21.7%
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99 Philippines −2.6% −6.2% −9.0% −13.2% −29.3%
100 Poland −1.3% −3.0% −4.9% −6.7% −10.8%
101 Portugal −4.2% −10.1% −11.2% −11.4% −14.6%
102 Qatar – – – – –
103 Republic of Korea – – – – –
104 Republic of Moldova – – – – –
105 Romania – – – – –
106 Russian Federation −0.6% −1.2% −1.6% −2.5% −4.7%
107 Rwanda – – – – –
108 Saudi Arabia – – – – –
109 Senegal −5.1% −11.8% −17.4% −21.6% −32.3%
110 Serbia – – – – –
111 Sierra Leone – – – – –
112 Singapore – – – – –
113 Slovakia – – – – –
114 Slovenia – – – – –
115 South Africa −4.5% −11.0% −15.0% −18.6% −27.7%
116 Spain – – – – –
117 Sri Lanka – – – – –
118 Sudan (former) – – – – –
119 Swaziland – – – – –
120 Sweden −1.1% −2.3% −3.4% −5.1% −8.8%
121 Switzerland – – – – –
122 Syrian Arab Republic −2.8% −6.8% −9.4% −12.5% −13.7%
123 Tajikistan – – – – –
124 Thailand −3.7% −6.9% −8.8% −9.2% −12.7%
125 Togo −6.1% −15.2% −21.0% −25.8% −37.8%
126 Trinidad and Tobago – – – – –
127 Tunisia −4.2% −10.8% −16.7% −23.4% −34.7%
128 Turkey – – – – –
129 Uganda – – – – –
130 Ukraine −0.7% −0.5% −0.5% −1.1% −2.6%
131 United Arab Emirates – – – – –
132 United Kingdom – – – – –
133 United Republic of 
Tanzania
– – – – –
134 United States of 
America
−2.9% −7.2% −10.0% −12.8% −19.3%
135 Uruguay – – – – –
136 Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of)
−2.6% −6.1% −8.8% −11.1% −16.5%
137 Viet Nam – – – – –
138 Yemen – – – – –
139 Zambia −3.8% −9.2% −13.5% −19.1% −30.8%






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Annex 3: data 427
Table A3.50 GDP (GDP billion of constant 2005 US$)
Country/year 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
1 Afghanistan 5.7 4.5 3.5 6.6 10.4 13.6
2 Albania 5.3 4.7 6.1 8.1 10.4 11.2
3 Algeria 66.8 67.6 80.1 103.2 117.0 132.8
4 Argentina 133.5 177.8 201.9 222.9 294.4 332.5
5 Armenia 4.0 2.1 2.7 4.9 5.9 7.1
6 Australia 453.9 532.8 642.9 762.1 870.4 975.0
7 Austria 223.1 249.0 288.9 314.6 335.5 349.9
8 Bahrain 7.8 9.9 12.4 16.0 20.9 24.4
9 Bangladesh 27.9 34.3 44.2 57.6 77.3 98.6
10 Barbados 3.3 3.2 3.7 3.9 4.1 4.1
11 Belgium 283.7 307.0 354.1 387.4 415.0 428.9
12 Belize 0.5 0.6 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.4
13 Benin 2.4 3.1 4.0 4.8 5.8 7.1
14 Bolivia (Plurinational 
State of)
5.7 6.9 8.2 9.5 12.0 14.9
15 Botswana 5.2 6.5 8.3 9.9 12.4 15.8
16 Brazil 606.1 704.4 778.1 892.1 1,108.5 1,206.1
17 Bulgaria 28.0 24.6 22.5 29.8 34.7 36.3
18 Burundi 1.2 1.1 1.0 1.1 2.1 3.0
19 Cambodia 2.1 2.9 4.0 6.3 8.7 11.5
20 Cameroon 11.7 11.0 13.8 16.6 19.1 23.3
21 Canada 774.6 842.8 1,026.9 1,164.2 1,240.1 1,359.8
22 Central African 
Republic
1.2 1.3 1.4 1.4 1.7 1.1
23 Chile 53.1 80.5 98.7 123.1 147.9 175.3
24 China 533.7 953.5 1,438.7 2,291.4 3,903.8 5,320.2
25 Colombia 94.5 117.2 122.7 146.6 183.0 222.6
26 Congo 4.3 4.4 5.0 6.1 7.9 9.3
27 Costa Rica 9.8 12.8 16.3 20.0 25.0 29.4
28 Côte d’Ivoire 13.4 14.5 17.1 17.1 19.6 24.6
29 Croatia 42.5 30.8 36.5 45.4 46.5 44.7
30 Cuba 38.5 26.7 33.4 42.6 55.4 61.1
31 Cyprus 10.1 13.0 15.8 18.8 21.3 19.1
32 Czech Republic 106.8 102.7 112.2 136.0 153.3 157.2
33 Democratic Republic 
of the Congo
17.7 12.1 9.9 12.0 15.7 21.3
34 Denmark 190.0 213.3 247.4 264.6 265.1 270.7
35 Dominican Republic 16.7 21.5 30.0 35.7 48.3 57.3
36 Ecuador 25.9 30.6 32.8 41.5 49.0 60.6
37 Egypt 48.6 61.0 78.7 94.5 127.5 138.5
38 El Salvador 9.7 13.1 15.2 17.1 18.3 19.8
39 Estonia 10.6 7.4 9.9 14.0 13.8 16.3
40 Fiji 2.2 2.5 2.8 3.1 3.2 3.7
41 Finland 143.6 140.4 179.9 204.4 212.9 212.0
(Continued )
428 Annex 3: data
Country/year 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
42 France 1,650.0 1,758.9 2,030.0 2,203.6 2,289.8 2,361.3
43 Gabon 7.9 9.2 9.1 9.6 10.1 12.7
44 Gambia 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8 0.8
45 Germany 2,286.9 2,529.4 2,781.3 2,861.3 3,042.4 3,226.7
46 Ghana 8.7 10.7 13.3 17.2 23.2 32.2
47 Greece 160.9 171.2 205.3 247.8 243.7 200.0
48 Guatemala 15.7 19.3 23.4 27.2 32.6 37.7
49 Guyana 0.8 1.1 1.3 1.3 1.6 1.9
50 Haiti 4.3 3.8 4.3 4.2 4.3 5.0
51 Honduras 5.6 6.7 7.8 9.8 11.6 13.3
52 Hungary 88.6 78.6 91.2 112.5 111.4 117.7
53 Iceland 10.5 10.7 13.6 16.7 17.8 19.5
54 India 344.2 442.4 586.3 821.0 1,223.9 1,573.0
55 Indonesia 159.8 233.0 241.6 304.4 402.4 502.2
56 Iran (Islamic 
Republic of)
122.6 141.6 168.2 219.8 279.1 276.7
57 Iraq 24.5 12.1 35.4 36.3 48.2 60.7
58 Ireland 81.0 101.2 163.5 211.4 219.8 241.0
59 Israel 71.2 98.7 128.4 142.8 176.6 202.1
60 Italy 1,501.7 1,602.2 1,768.8 1,853.5 1,825.0 1,745.0
61 Jamaica 9.0 10.4 10.4 11.2 11.0 11.2
62 Japan 3,851.3 4,132.2 4,308.1 4,571.9 4,651.1 4,780.9
63 Jordan 5.8 7.9 9.2 12.6 17.0 19.0
64 Kazakhstan 50.2 30.8 34.9 57.1 77.3 96.2
65 Kenya 14.9 16.1 17.9 21.5 27.4 33.9
66 Kuwait 30.6 48.6 54.7 80.8 85.6 99.6
67 Kyrgyzstan 3.1 1.6 2.0 2.5 3.1 3.7
68 Lao People’s 
Democratic Republic
1.1 1.5 2.0 2.7 4.0 5.4
69 Latvia 17.9 8.9 11.4 16.9 16.5 19.2
70 Lesotho 0.8 1.0 1.2 1.4 1.8 2.1
71 Liberia 0.4 0.1 0.5 0.6 1.1 1.5
72 Lithuania 24.9 14.4 18.1 26.1 27.7 32.6
73 Luxembourg 19.6 23.7 32.0 37.0 41.8 46.1
74 Malawi 2.5 2.6 3.1 3.7 5.2 5.9
75 Malaysia 57.3 90.1 113.9 143.5 178.7 220.5
76 Maldives 0.4 0.6 0.9 1.1 1.7 2.3
77 Mali 2.7 3.4 4.0 5.5 7.0 7.8
78 Malta 3.4 4.5 5.8 6.4 7.1 7.9
79 Mauritania 1.3 1.5 1.7 2.2 2.8 3.5
80 Mauritius 3.3 4.2 5.5 6.5 8.2 9.4
81 Mexico 560.2 604.4 788.2 864.8 952.0 1,067.0
82 Mongolia 2.1 1.9 2.1 2.9 4.0 6.3
83 Morocco 38.8 40.7 49.1 62.5 79.4 92.3
84 Mozambique 2.5 2.9 5.0 7.7 11.1 14.6
Table A3.50 (Continued)
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85 Myanmar 3.3 4.4 6.5 11.9 20.3 27.1
86 Namibia 3.9 5.0 5.9 7.3 9.0 10.9
87 Nepal 4.3 5.5 7.0 8.3 10.3 12.2
88 Netherlands 458.5 513.5 634.9 678.5 722.8 730.8
89 New Zealand 69.8 81.7 94.1 114.7 120.8 133.6
90 Nicaragua 3.9 4.2 5.4 6.3 7.2 8.7
91 Niger 2.1 2.3 2.7 3.4 4.3 5.5
92 Nigeria 87.8 94.2 109.8 180.5 249.7 306.0
93 Norway 193.0 231.8 276.9 308.7 323.3 346.2
94 Pakistan 62.7 78.6 92.3 117.7 139.2 163.0
95 Panama 7.6 10.0 12.5 15.5 22.0 30.3
96 Papua New Guinea 2.8 4.2 4.4 4.9 6.5 8.8
97 Paraguay 5.7 6.8 6.7 8.7 11.1 13.7
98 Peru 42.1 54.3 61.7 76.1 106.2 129.7
99 Philippines 62.1 69.1 82.4 103.1 131.1 165.1
100 Poland 181.6 202.2 261.3 304.4 383.3 427.7
101 Portugal 142.2 154.7 189.0 197.3 203.4 191.2
102 Qatar 15.8 17.7 30.1 44.5 101.9 137.9
103 Republic of Korea 364.3 545.7 712.8 898.1 1,098.7 1,238.7
104 Republic of Moldova 6.1 2.4 2.1 3.0 3.5 4.2
105 Romania 85.0 76.3 75.4 99.7 115.1 124.6
106 Russian Federation 844.2 524.1 567.4 764.0 909.3 999.6
107 Rwanda 1.6 1.1 1.7 2.6 3.8 5.1
108 Saudi Arabia 209.1 248.6 269.8 328.5 374.9 462.0
109 Senegal 5.1 5.5 6.9 8.7 10.4 11.9
110 Serbia 38.1 18.2 19.4 26.3 29.9 30.3
111 Sierra Leone 2.0 1.5 0.9 1.7 2.1 3.3
112 Singapore 50.4 76.3 100.4 127.4 176.5 208.3
113 Slovakia 35.2 32.2 38.3 48.8 61.6 66.9
114 Slovenia 25.5 24.7 30.5 36.3 39.6 39.5
115 South Africa 178.3 186.2 213.6 257.8 300.3 328.7
116 Spain 744.0 801.8 979.5 1,157.2 1,219.9 1,172.1
117 Sri Lanka 12.0 15.7 20.0 24.4 33.3 44.1
118 Sudan (former) 14.2 17.9 25.3 35.2 35.9 37.3
119 Swaziland 2.0 2.4 2.8 3.2 3.6 4.1
120 Sweden 276.7 286.7 341.7 389.0 420.9 446.4
121 Switzerland 335.8 338.0 378.4 407.5 454.9 485.6
122 Syrian Arab Republic 12.6 18.6 22.2 28.4 36.1 19.8
123 Tajikistan 3.8 1.5 1.5 2.3 3.2 4.0
124 Thailand 93.0 139.8 145.0 189.3 227.4 255.2
125 Togo 1.8 1.8 2.0 2.1 2.5 3.0
126 Trinidad and Tobago 7.0 7.5 10.8 16.0 18.7 19.7
127 Tunisia 16.4 19.9 26.0 32.3 40.2 42.9
128 Turkey 269.7 315.9 386.6 483.0 565.1 673.1
(Continued )
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Country/year 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
129 Uganda 3.9 5.6 7.6 11.0 16.3 19.6
130 Ukraine 142.8 68.2 61.7 89.2 93.8 92.4
131 United Arab Emirates 81.9 101.6 139.2 180.6 203.4 249.6
132 United Kingdom 1,656.0 1,797.8 2,105.5 2,418.9 2,466.8 2,676.5
133 United Republic of 
Tanzania
8.6 10.5 12.9 18.1 24.3 31.6
134 United States of 
America
8,228.6 9,359.5 11,553.3 13,093.7 13,599.3 14,682.7
135 Uruguay 12.7 15.5 17.2 17.4 23.2 27.4
136 Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of)
104.3 123.6 128.3 145.5 174.6 186.9
137 Viet Nam 19.5 29.0 40.6 57.6 78.3 97.8
138 Yemen 7.5 9.8 14.7 19.0 23.6 21.6
139 Zambia 5.3 5.2 6.2 8.3 12.6 16.2
140 Zimbabwe 7.4 7.8 7.7 6.2 9.6 12.8
Table A3.51 GDP per capita (GDP per capita in thousands of constant 2005 US$)
Country/year 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
1 Afghanistan 0.5 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4
2 Albania 1.6 1.5 2.0 2.7 3.6 3.9
3 Algeria 2.6 2.3 2.6 3.1 3.2 3.4
4 Argentina 4.1 5.1 5.4 5.7 7.1 7.7
5 Armenia 1.1 0.7 0.9 1.6 2.0 2.4
6 Australia 26.6 29.5 33.6 37.4 39.5 41.6
7 Austria 29.1 31.3 36.1 38.2 40.1 41.0
8 Bahrain 15.7 17.5 18.6 18.4 16.6 17.9
9 Bangladesh 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6
10 Barbados 12.8 12.0 13.7 14.2 14.5 14.5
11 Belgium 28.5 30.3 34.5 37.0 38.1 38.2
12 Belize 2.8 3.1 3.5 3.9 3.9 4.0
13 Benin 0.5 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7
14 Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 0.8 0.9 1.0 1.0 1.2 1.4
15 Botswana 3.7 4.1 4.8 5.3 6.1 7.1
16 Brazil 4.0 4.3 4.4 4.7 5.6 5.9
17 Bulgaria 3.2 2.9 2.8 3.9 4.7 5.0
18 Burundi 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.3
19 Cambodia 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.5 0.6 0.7
20 Cameroon 1.0 0.8 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.0
21 Canada 27.9 28.7 33.4 36.0 36.5 38.3
Table A3.50 (Continued)
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22 Central African Republic 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.3 0.4 0.2
23 Chile 4.0 5.7 6.5 7.6 8.7 9.9
24 China 0.5 0.8 1.1 1.8 2.9 3.9
25 Colombia 2.8 3.1 3.0 3.4 4.0 4.7
26 Congo 1.8 1.6 1.6 1.7 1.9 2.1
27 Costa Rica 3.2 3.7 4.2 4.7 5.5 6.2
28 Côte d’Ivoire 1.1 1.0 1.0 0.9 1.0 1.1
29 Croatia 8.9 6.6 8.2 10.2 10.5 10.5
30 Cuba 3.6 2.5 3.0 3.8 4.9 5.4
31 Cyprus 13.2 15.2 16.7 18.3 19.3 16.6
32 Czech Republic 10.3 9.9 10.9 13.3 14.6 14.9
33 Democratic Republic of the 
Congo
0.5 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3
34 Denmark 37.0 40.8 46.3 48.8 47.8 48.0
35 Dominican Republic 2.3 2.7 3.5 3.9 4.9 5.5
36 Ecuador 2.5 2.7 2.6 3.0 3.3 3.8
37 Egypt 0.9 1.0 1.2 1.3 1.6 1.5
38 El Salvador 1.8 2.3 2.6 2.9 3.0 3.2
39 Estonia 6.7 5.1 7.1 10.3 10.3 12.4
40 Fiji 3.1 3.2 3.4 3.8 3.8 4.1
41 Finland 28.8 27.5 34.8 39.0 39.7 38.8
42 France 28.2 29.5 33.3 34.9 35.2 35.5
43 Gabon 8.3 8.4 7.4 7.0 6.6 7.5
44 Gambia 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.4
45 Germany 28.8 31.0 33.8 34.7 37.2 39.8
46 Ghana 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 1.0 1.2
47 Greece 15.8 16.2 19.0 22.6 21.9 18.4
48 Guatemala 1.7 1.9 2.0 2.1 2.2 2.4
49 Guyana 1.1 1.5 1.7 1.8 2.1 2.5
50 Haiti 0.6 0.5 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.5
51 Honduras 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.4 1.6 1.7
52 Hungary 8.5 7.6 8.9 11.2 11.1 11.9
53 Iceland 41.4 39.9 48.5 56.4 56.0 59.4
54 India 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 1.0 1.2
55 Indonesia 0.9 1.2 1.1 1.3 1.7 2.0
56 Iran (Islamic Republic of) 2.2 2.3 2.6 3.1 3.8 3.5
57 Iraq 1.4 0.6 1.5 1.3 1.6 1.7
58 Ireland 23.0 28.1 43.0 50.8 48.2 52.2
59 Israel 15.3 17.8 20.4 20.6 23.2 24.6
60 Italy 26.5 28.2 31.1 32.0 30.8 28.7
61 Jamaica 3.8 4.2 4.0 4.3 4.1 4.1
62 Japan 31.2 33.0 34.0 35.8 36.3 37.6
(Continued )
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63 Jordan 1.7 1.8 1.9 2.4 2.6 2.6
64 Kazakhstan 3.1 1.9 2.3 3.8 4.7 5.6
65 Kenya 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8
66 Kuwait 14.9 29.7 28.4 35.7 28.0 26.5
67 Kyrgyzstan 0.7 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.6
68 Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic
0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.8
69 Latvia 6.7 3.6 4.8 7.5 7.9 9.7
70 Lesotho 0.5 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.0
71 Liberia 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3
72 Lithuania 6.7 4.0 5.2 7.9 8.9 11.1
73 Luxembourg 51.2 58.1 73.3 79.5 82.4 82.9
74 Malawi 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4
75 Malaysia 3.1 4.3 4.9 5.6 6.4 7.4
76 Maldives 1.9 2.3 3.0 3.5 4.6 5.8
77 Mali 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5
78 Malta 9.7 12.1 15.1 15.8 17.0 18.4
79 Mauritania 0.6 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9
80 Mauritius 3.1 3.7 4.6 5.3 6.5 7.4
81 Mexico 6.5 6.4 7.7 7.9 8.0 8.5
82 Mongolia 1.0 0.8 0.9 1.2 1.5 2.2
83 Morocco 1.6 1.5 1.7 2.1 2.5 2.7
84 Mozambique 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5
85 Myanmar 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.2 0.4 0.5
86 Namibia 2.8 3.0 3.1 3.6 4.1 4.5
87 Nepal 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.4
88 Netherlands 30.7 33.2 39.9 41.6 43.5 43.3
89 New Zealand 21.0 22.2 24.4 27.8 27.8 29.6
90 Nicaragua 0.9 0.9 1.1 1.2 1.2 1.5
91 Niger 0.3 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.3
92 Nigeria 0.9 0.9 0.9 1.3 1.6 1.7
93 Norway 45.5 53.2 61.7 66.8 66.1 67.4
94 Pakistan 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.9
95 Panama 3.1 3.6 4.1 4.7 6.1 7.8
96 Papua New Guinea 0.7 0.9 0.8 0.8 0.9 1.2
97 Paraguay 1.4 1.4 1.3 1.5 1.8 2.1
98 Peru 1.9 2.3 2.4 2.8 3.6 4.2
99 Philippines 1.0 1.0 1.1 1.2 1.4 1.7
100 Poland 4.8 5.2 6.8 8.0 10.1 11.3
101 Portugal 14.2 15.4 18.4 18.8 19.2 18.4
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102 Qatar 33.1 35.3 50.7 53.2 57.7 63.5
103 Republic of Korea 8.5 12.1 15.2 18.7 22.2 24.6
104 Republic of Moldova 1.7 0.7 0.6 0.8 1.0 1.2
105 Romania 3.7 3.4 3.4 4.7 5.7 6.3
106 Russian Federation 5.7 3.5 3.9 5.3 6.4 7.0
107 Rwanda 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.4
108 Saudi Arabia 12.8 13.2 12.6 13.3 13.3 15.0
109 Senegal 0.7 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.8 0.8
110 Serbia 5.0 2.4 2.6 3.5 4.1 4.2
111 Sierra Leone 0.5 0.4 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
112 Singapore 16.6 21.7 24.9 29.9 34.8 38.1
113 Slovakia 6.6 6.0 7.1 9.1 11.4 12.3
114 Slovenia 12.7 12.4 15.3 18.2 19.3 19.2
115 South Africa 5.1 4.8 4.9 5.5 5.9 6.1
116 Spain 19.2 20.4 24.3 26.5 26.2 25.2
117 Sri Lanka 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.3 1.7 2.1
118 Sudan (former) 0.7 0.7 0.9 1.1 1.0 0.9
119 Swaziland 2.4 2.5 2.6 2.9 3.0 3.2
120 Sweden 32.3 32.5 38.5 43.1 44.9 46.0
121 Switzerland 50.0 48.0 52.7 54.8 58.1 59.3
122 Syrian Arab Republic 1.0 1.3 1.4 1.6 1.7 1.1
123 Tajikistan 0.7 0.3 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5
124 Thailand 1.6 2.4 2.3 2.9 3.4 3.8
125 Togo 0.5 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4 0.4
126 Trinidad and Tobago 5.7 6.0 8.5 12.3 14.1 14.5
127 Tunisia 2.0 2.2 2.7 3.2 3.8 3.9
128 Turkey 5.0 5.4 6.1 7.1 7.8 8.7
129 Uganda 0.2 0.3 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.5
130 Ukraine 2.8 1.3 1.3 1.9 2.0 2.0
131 United Arab Emirates 45.2 43.2 45.6 40.3 24.4 27.5
132 United Kingdom 28.9 31.0 35.8 40.0 39.3 41.4
133 United Republic of Tanzania 0.3 0.4 0.4 0.5 0.5 0.6
134 United States of America 33.0 35.1 40.9 44.3 44.0 46.0
135 Uruguay 4.1 4.8 5.2 5.2 6.9 8.0
136 Venezuela (Bolivarian 
Republic of )
5.3 5.6 5.2 5.4 6.0 6.1
137 Viet Nam 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.7 0.9 1.1
138 Yemen 0.6 0.6 0.8 0.9 1.0 0.8
139 Zambia 0.7 0.6 0.6 0.7 0.9 1.0
140 Zimbabwe 0.7 0.7 0.6 0.5 0.7 0.8
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Table A3.52 GDP growth (GDP change (%) with respect to base year 1990)
Country/year 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
1 Afghanistan −4.6% −11.6% 3.7% 16.1% 33.5%
2 Albania −2.1% 3.6% 11.3% 18.5% 28.6%
3 Algeria 0.3% 4.7% 11.5% 15.0% 25.8%
4 Argentina 5.9% 10.9% 13.7% 21.9% 35.5%
5 Armenia −12.0% −9.3% 5.2% 10.3% 21.2%
6 Australia 3.3% 9.1% 13.8% 17.7% 29.0%
7 Austria 2.2% 6.7% 9.0% 10.7% 16.2%
8 Bahrain 4.9% 12.4% 19.7% 28.0% 46.3%
9 Bangladesh 4.2% 12.2% 19.9% 29.1% 52.4%
10 Barbados −0.9% 2.7% 4.0% 5.1% 7.2%
11 Belgium 1.6% 5.7% 8.1% 10.0% 14.8%
12 Belize 4.3% 13.4% 21.1% 24.9% 39.5%
13 Benin 5.0% 13.0% 18.6% 24.3% 43.1%
14 Bolivia (Plurinational State of ) 4.1% 9.7% 13.9% 20.5% 38.0%
15 Botswana 4.6% 12.7% 17.8% 24.5% 45.1%
16 Brazil 3.1% 6.4% 10.1% 16.3% 25.8%
17 Bulgaria −2.6% −5.4% 1.6% 5.5% 9.0%
18 Burundi −2.1% −4.1% −2.0% 15.0% 34.9%
19 Cambodia 6.5% 17.9% 31.8% 42.9% 76.6%
20 Cameroon −1.3% 4.3% 9.1% 13.1% 25.8%
21 Canada 1.7% 7.3% 10.7% 12.5% 20.6%
22 Central African Republic 1.9% 5.1% 4.5% 8.9% −1.6%
23 Chile 8.7% 16.8% 23.4% 29.2% 48.9%
24 China 12.3% 28.1% 43.9% 64.5% 115.2%
25 Colombia 4.4% 6.8% 11.6% 18.0% 33.1%
26 Congo 0.4% 3.6% 8.9% 16.1% 29.2%
27 Costa Rica 5.5% 13.5% 19.3% 26.3% 44.1%
28 Côte d’Ivoire 1.6% 6.2% 6.2% 10.0% 22.4%
29 Croatia −6.2% −3.8% 1.6% 2.2% 1.7%
30 Cuba −7.1% −3.5% 2.6% 9.5% 16.6%
31 Cyprus 5.2% 11.8% 16.9% 20.5% 23.7%
32 Czech Republic −0.8% 1.2% 6.2% 9.5% 13.8%
33 Democratic Republic of the Congo −7.3% −13.4% −9.3% −2.9% 6.4%
34 Denmark 2.3% 6.8% 8.6% 8.7% 12.5%
35 Dominican Republic 5.2% 15.8% 20.9% 30.5% 50.9%
36 Ecuador 3.4% 6.1% 12.5% 17.3% 32.8%
37 Egypt 4.7% 12.8% 18.1% 27.3% 41.8%
38 El Salvador 6.2% 11.9% 15.2% 17.3% 26.9%
39 Estonia −6.9% −1.6% 7.2% 6.7% 15.4%
40 Fiji 2.1% 5.3% 8.5% 9.5% 17.8%
41 Finland −0.4% 5.8% 9.2% 10.3% 13.9%
42 France 1.3% 5.3% 7.5% 8.5% 12.7%
43 Gabon 3.1% 3.8% 5.0% 6.5% 17.2%
44 Gambia 2.3% 8.4% 12.9% 19.5% 30.1%
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45 Germany 2.0% 5.0% 5.8% 7.4% 12.2%
46 Ghana 4.3% 11.2% 18.5% 27.7% 54.6%
47 Greece 1.2% 6.3% 11.4% 10.9% 7.5%
48 Guatemala 4.3% 10.6% 14.8% 20.1% 34.1%
49 Guyana 7.1% 12.7% 13.7% 19.4% 33.9%
50 Haiti −2.5% 0.0% −0.7% 0.2% 5.5%
51 Honduras 3.5% 8.4% 14.8% 20.0% 33.4%
52 Hungary −2.4% 0.7% 6.2% 5.9% 9.9%
53 Iceland 0.3% 6.7% 12.3% 14.0% 22.7%
54 India 5.1% 14.2% 24.3% 37.3% 66.0%
55 Indonesia 7.8% 10.9% 17.5% 26.0% 46.5%
56 Iran (Islamic Republic of) 2.9% 8.2% 15.7% 22.8% 31.2%
57 Iraq −13.2% 9.6% 10.3% 18.5% 35.4%
58 Ireland 4.6% 19.2% 27.1% 28.4% 43.8%
59 Israel 6.8% 15.9% 19.0% 25.5% 41.6%
60 Italy 1.3% 4.2% 5.4% 5.0% 5.1%
61 Jamaica 3.0% 3.6% 5.7% 5.0% 7.6%
62 Japan 1.4% 2.8% 4.4% 4.8% 7.5%
63 Jordan 6.2% 12.2% 21.2% 30.7% 48.3%
64 Kazakhstan −9.3% −8.7% 3.3% 11.4% 24.2%
65 Kenya 1.6% 4.6% 9.6% 16.4% 31.4%
66 Kuwait 9.7% 15.6% 27.5% 29.3% 48.2%
67 Kyrgyzstan −12.7% −9.7% −5.4% −0.1% 6.5%
68 Lao People’s Democratic Republic 6.2% 16.2% 25.4% 38.1% 70.1%
69 Latvia −13.1% −10.6% −1.4% −2.0% 2.5%
70 Lesotho 4.1% 10.3% 14.3% 21.8% 37.5%
71 Liberia −22.5% 6.7% 9.8% 27.4% 51.5%
72 Lithuania −10.3% −7.6% 1.3% 2.7% 9.4%
73 Luxembourg 4.0% 13.1% 17.3% 20.9% 33.1%
74 Malawi 1.2% 6.2% 10.3% 20.6% 33.5%
75 Malaysia 9.5% 18.7% 25.8% 32.9% 56.7%
76 Maldives 6.8% 19.9% 28.2% 42.4% 77.8%
77 Mali 4.5% 10.5% 19.4% 26.8% 42.6%
78 Malta 5.5% 13.8% 16.7% 19.7% 31.7%
79 Mauritania 3.2% 7.9% 14.1% 21.4% 39.3%
80 Mauritius 4.8% 13.4% 18.3% 25.2% 41.3%
81 Mexico 1.5% 8.9% 11.5% 14.2% 24.0%
82 Mongolia −2.8% −0.1% 8.1% 16.9% 43.5%
83 Morocco 0.9% 6.0% 12.7% 19.6% 33.5%
84 Mozambique 3.3% 19.3% 32.7% 45.1% 80.2%
85 Myanmar 5.8% 18.6% 38.0% 57.5% 101.9%
86 Namibia 5.0% 10.9% 16.7% 23.1% 40.7%
87 Nepal 5.2% 13.0% 17.9% 24.6% 42.1%
88 Netherlands 2.3% 8.5% 10.3% 12.1% 16.8%
89 New Zealand 3.2% 7.8% 13.2% 14.7% 24.1%
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90 Nicaragua 1.8% 8.7% 13.0% 16.5% 31.1%
91 Niger 1.5% 6.0% 12.0% 19.3% 37.3%
92 Nigeria 1.4% 5.8% 19.7% 29.9% 51.6%
93 Norway 3.7% 9.4% 12.5% 13.8% 21.5%
94 Pakistan 4.6% 10.1% 17.1% 22.1% 37.5%
95 Panama 5.5% 13.1% 19.3% 30.2% 58.3%
96 Papua New Guinea 8.6% 11.9% 14.9% 23.5% 46.9%
97 Paraguay 3.4% 4.0% 11.1% 18.1% 33.6%
98 Peru 5.2% 10.1% 16.0% 26.0% 45.5%
99 Philippines 2.2% 7.3% 13.5% 20.5% 38.5%
100 Poland 2.2% 9.5% 13.8% 20.5% 33.1%
101 Portugal 1.7% 7.4% 8.5% 9.4% 10.4%
102 Qatar 2.3% 17.5% 29.6% 59.4% 106.0%
103 Republic of Korea 8.4% 18.3% 25.3% 31.8% 50.4%
104 Republic of Moldova −17.0% −23.2% −16.3% −13.0% −11.4%
105 Romania −2.1% −3.0% 4.1% 7.9% 13.6%
106 Russian Federation −9.1% −9.5% −2.5% 1.9% 5.8%
107 Rwanda −8.5% 1.5% 11.9% 23.6% 45.3%
108 Saudi Arabia 3.5% 6.6% 11.9% 15.7% 30.2%
109 Senegal 1.4% 7.8% 14.2% 19.2% 32.4%
110 Serbia −13.7% −15.5% −8.9% −5.8% −7.4%
111 Sierra Leone −5.0% −17.9% −4.7% 1.6% 18.7%
112 Singapore 8.6% 18.8% 26.1% 36.8% 60.4%
113 Slovakia −1.8% 2.1% 8.5% 15.0% 23.8%
114 Slovenia −0.6% 4.6% 9.3% 11.7% 15.8%
115 South Africa 0.9% 4.6% 9.6% 13.9% 22.6%
116 Spain 1.5% 7.1% 11.7% 13.2% 16.4%
117 Sri Lanka 5.5% 13.6% 19.4% 29.0% 54.2%
118 Sudan (former) 4.8% 15.5% 25.5% 26.1% 38.0%
119 Swaziland 3.4% 8.5% 12.0% 15.6% 25.9%
120 Sweden 0.7% 5.4% 8.9% 11.1% 17.3%
121 Switzerland 0.1% 3.0% 5.0% 7.9% 13.1%
122 Syrian Arab Republic 8.1% 15.3% 22.6% 30.2% 16.4%
123 Tajikistan −17.6% −21.4% −11.8% −4.6% 1.5%
124 Thailand 8.5% 11.8% 19.5% 25.1% 40.0%
125 Togo −0.3% 2.3% 3.8% 7.9% 18.9%
126 Trinidad and Tobago 1.4% 11.4% 22.8% 27.8% 40.9%
127 Tunisia 3.9% 12.2% 18.4% 25.1% 37.7%
128 Turkey 3.2% 9.4% 15.7% 20.3% 35.6%
129 Uganda 7.5% 18.3% 29.6% 43.1% 71.2%
130 Ukraine −13.7% −18.9% −11.1% −10.0% −13.5%
131 United Arab Emirates 4.4% 14.2% 21.9% 25.5% 45.0%
132 United Kingdom 1.7% 6.2% 9.9% 10.5% 17.4%
133 United Republic of Tanzania 4.0% 10.6% 20.4% 29.6% 54.3%
134 United States of America 2.6% 8.9% 12.3% 13.4% 21.3%
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135 Uruguay 4.1% 8.0% 8.2% 16.4% 29.4%
136 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 3.4% 5.3% 8.7% 13.7% 21.4%
137 Viet Nam 8.2% 20.0% 31.0% 41.5% 71.1%
138 Yemen 5.5% 18.2% 26.1% 33.0% 42.1%
139 Zambia −0.7% 3.7% 11.8% 24.1% 44.7%
140 Zimbabwe 1.2% 1.3% −4.1% 6.7% 20.1%
Table A3.53  GDP per capita growth (GDP per capita change (%) with respect to base 
year 1990)
Country/year 1995 2000 2005 2010 2014
1 Afghanistan −10.6% −21.8% −13.0% −5.9% −3.2%
2 Albania −1.5% 5.2% 13.7% 22.1% 34.2%
3 Algeria −1.9% −0.1% 4.7% 5.9% 9.8%
4 Argentina 4.5% 7.5% 8.7% 15.0% 23.8%
5 Armenia −10.3% −6.0% 9.6% 15.4% 28.0%
6 Australia 2.1% 6.0% 8.9% 10.4% 16.0%
7 Austria 1.5% 5.6% 7.1% 8.4% 12.1%
8 Bahrain 2.2% 4.4% 4.1% 1.4% 4.5%
9 Bangladesh 2.0% 6.4% 11.3% 18.0% 33.1%
10 Barbados −1.2% 1.7% 2.7% 3.2% 4.3%
11 Belgium 1.3% 5.0% 6.8% 7.6% 10.3%
12 Belize 2.3% 5.9% 9.3% 9.2% 13.1%
13 Benin 1.3% 4.1% 4.8% 5.8% 11.4%
14 Bolivia (Plurinational State of) 2.1% 4.4% 6.1% 9.9% 19.5%
15 Botswana 1.8% 6.4% 9.3% 12.8% 23.8%
16 Brazil 1.4% 2.4% 4.1% 8.5% 13.2%
17 Bulgaria −1.9% −3.8% 4.6% 9.9% 16.1%
18 Burundi −4.2% −8.5% −10.1% 1.0% 8.4%
19 Cambodia 2.9% 9.3% 19.5% 27.2% 47.9%
20 Cameroon −4.0% −2.7% −1.4% −1.0% 1.8%
21 Canada 0.6% 4.6% 6.6% 7.0% 11.1%
22 Central African Republic −0.6% −1.0% −3.6% −1.8% −16.4%
23 Chile 7.0% 12.7% 17.3% 21.1% 34.7%
24 China 11.0% 24.8% 39.0% 57.8% 102.4%
25 Colombia 2.6% 2.5% 5.3% 9.7% 19.1%
26 Congo −2.2% −3.0% −1.1% 1.7% 4.5%
27 Costa Rica 2.8% 7.0% 10.3% 14.7% 24.8%
28 Côte d’Ivoire −1.8% −1.6% −3.8% −3.0% 0.2%
29 Croatia −5.8% −1.9% 3.5% 4.3% 5.8%
30 Cuba −7.6% −4.7% 1.0% 7.7% 13.8%
31 Cyprus 2.9% 6.1% 8.5% 10.0% 7.9%
32 Czech Republic −0.8% 1.4% 6.6% 9.1% 13.1%
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33 Democratic Republic of the Congo −10.7% −20.0% −19.4% −17.2% −17.4%
34 Denmark 2.0% 5.8% 7.2% 6.6% 9.1%
35 Dominican Republic 3.2% 10.8% 13.6% 20.4% 33.4%
36 Ecuador 1.1% 0.6% 4.5% 6.7% 14.6%
37 Egypt 2.6% 7.5% 10.0% 15.9% 21.5%
38 El Salvador 4.9% 9.1% 11.7% 13.2% 20.7%
39 Estonia −5.3% 1.3% 11.2% 11.2% 22.4%
40 Fiji 0.8% 2.5% 5.3% 5.1% 10.3%
41 Finland −0.9% 4.8% 7.9% 8.4% 10.5%
42 France 0.9% 4.3% 5.5% 5.7% 8.0%
43 Gabon 0.4% −2.7% −4.2% −5.6% −3.2%
44 Gambia −0.7% 0.7% 0.8% 2.5% 1.5%
45 Germany 1.5% 4.1% 4.8% 6.6% 11.4%
46 Ghana 1.5% 4.4% 7.8% 12.4% 26.4%
47 Greece 0.5% 4.8% 9.3% 8.6% 5.2%
48 Guatemala 1.7% 4.1% 4.8% 6.6% 11.3%
49 Guyana 6.9% 11.8% 12.8% 18.1% 31.3%
50 Haiti −4.3% −4.5% −7.1% −8.0% −7.6%
51 Honduras 0.9% 2.1% 5.4% 7.9% 13.5%
52 Hungary −2.3% 1.1% 6.9% 6.9% 11.8%
53 Iceland −0.7% 4.1% 8.1% 7.9% 12.8%
54 India 3.1% 8.9% 16.1% 25.9% 45.4%
55 Indonesia 6.1% 6.7% 11.2% 17.3% 30.8%
56 Iran (Islamic Republic of ) 1.5% 4.0% 9.5% 14.6% 17.5%
57 Iraq −15.7% 1.7% −1.0% 2.8% 7.1%
58 Ireland 4.0% 16.9% 21.9% 20.3% 31.3%
59 Israel 3.1% 7.5% 7.8% 11.0% 17.2%
60 Italy 1.3% 4.1% 4.8% 3.8% 2.7%
61 Jamaica 2.2% 1.6% 3.0% 2.0% 3.0%
62 Japan 1.1% 2.2% 3.5% 3.9% 6.4%
63 Jordan 1.0% 2.8% 8.0% 10.8% 13.9%
64 Kazakhstan −8.7% −6.5% 5.3% 11.4% 21.9%
65 Kenya −1.5% −2.5% −1.1% 1.7% 5.9%
66 Kuwait 14.8% 17.5% 24.5% 17.1% 21.3%
67 Kyrgyzstan −13.4% −12.1% −9.1% −5.3% −3.1%
68 Lao People’s Democratic Republic 3.4% 9.7% 16.3% 25.3% 46.2%
69 Latvia −11.9% −8.0% 3.0% 4.1% 12.9%
70 Lesotho 2.2% 6.3% 9.1% 15.0% 25.3%
71 Liberia −22.3% −1.5% −1.6% 8.7% 18.5%
72 Lithuania −10.0% −6.3% 4.0% 7.4% 18.2%
73 Luxembourg 2.6% 9.4% 11.6% 12.6% 17.4%
74 Malawi 0.3% 1.6% 2.2% 7.8% 10.3%
75 Malaysia 6.7% 11.5% 15.3% 19.2% 32.8%
76 Maldives 3.5% 12.1% 16.4% 25.0% 45.1%
77 Mali 1.9% 3.4% 7.6% 9.7% 12.9%
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78 Malta 4.5% 11.7% 13.0% 15.1% 23.7%
79 Mauritania 0.3% 0.2% 2.1% 5.2% 11.3%
80 Mauritius 3.6% 10.3% 14.0% 20.1% 33.3%
81 Mexico −0.4% 4.0% 4.8% 5.2% 9.1%
82 Mongolia −3.8% −2.4% 4.2% 10.7% 30.5%
83 Morocco −0.8% 2.2% 7.2% 12.3% 20.5%
84 Mozambique −0.3% 10.3% 18.3% 24.9% 42.2%
85 Myanmar 4.5% 14.9% 32.1% 49.5% 86.3%
86 Namibia 1.7% 3.1% 6.6% 10.3% 18.0%
87 Nepal 2.4% 6.5% 9.2% 13.9% 24.0%
88 Netherlands 1.6% 6.8% 7.9% 9.1% 12.2%
89 New Zealand 1.2% 3.9% 7.3% 7.3% 12.2%
90 Nicaragua −0.4% 3.6% 5.9% 7.4% 15.8%
91 Niger −1.9% −2.9% −2.0% −0.5% 2.3%
92 Nigeria −1.1% −0.7% 8.9% 14.3% 23.4%
93 Norway 3.2% 7.9% 10.1% 9.8% 14.0%
94 Pakistan 1.9% 3.4% 7.1% 8.9% 14.8%
95 Panama 3.4% 7.5% 10.8% 18.3% 36.4%
96 Papua New Guinea 5.9% 4.9% 4.5% 9.0% 20.9%
97 Paraguay 0.9% −1.8% 2.6% 7.2% 15.4%
98 Peru 3.2% 5.4% 9.3% 17.0% 29.5%
99 Philippines −0.3% 1.3% 4.5% 8.9% 18.4%
100 Poland 1.9% 9.4% 13.7% 20.6% 33.2%
101 Portugal 1.6% 6.6% 7.2% 7.8% 8.9%
102 Qatar 1.3% 11.2% 12.6% 14.9% 24.2%
103 Republic of Korea 7.3% 15.6% 21.7% 27.2% 42.5%
104 Republic of Moldova −16.9% −22.9% −15.8% −12.2% −10.3%
105 Romania −1.7% −2.2% 6.3% 11.6% 19.5%
106 Russian Federation −9.1% −9.2% −1.7% 2.8% 6.9%
107 Rwanda −4.7% −1.0% 6.0% 13.3% 25.2%
108 Saudi Arabia 0.6% −0.3% 0.9% 1.1% 5.4%
109 Senegal −1.5% 0.8% 3.2% 4.0% 5.9%
110 Serbia −13.8% −15.3% −8.5% −4.9% −5.5%
111 Sierra Leone −4.5% −18.6% −10.5% −7.7% 1.3%
112 Singapore 5.5% 10.8% 15.9% 20.4% 32.0%
113 Slovakia −2.0% 1.7% 8.1% 14.5% 22.9%
114 Slovenia −0.5% 4.7% 9.3% 11.0% 14.6%
115 South Africa −1.2% −1.1% 1.9% 3.9% 6.3%
116 Spain 1.2% 6.2% 8.5% 8.1% 9.6%
117 Sri Lanka 4.3% 11.2% 15.7% 23.8% 44.5%
118 Sudan (former) 0.5% 6.1% 11.6% 8.8% 10.2%
119 Swaziland 1.2% 2.9% 5.3% 6.6% 10.7%
120 Sweden 0.1% 4.5% 7.4% 8.5% 12.5%
121 Switzerland −0.8% 1.3% 2.3% 3.8% 5.9%
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122 Syrian Arab Republic 5.1% 7.7% 11.6% 14.6% 1.5%
123 Tajikistan −19.0% −24.4% −17.2% −12.8% −12.6%
124 Thailand 7.5% 8.9% 15.0% 20.0% 31.9%
125 Togo −2.7% −3.9% −5.7% −5.3% −3.7%
126 Trinidad and Tobago 0.9% 10.4% 21.0% 25.1% 36.2%
127 Tunisia 1.9% 7.9% 12.4% 17.3% 24.7%
128 Turkey 1.6% 5.2% 9.3% 11.8% 20.2%
129 Uganda 4.1% 9.4% 15.0% 21.7% 32.2%
130 Ukraine −13.6% −17.8% −8.9% −7.1% −9.6%
131 United Arab Emirates −0.9% 0.2% −2.8% −14.3% −15.3%
132 United Kingdom 1.4% 5.4% 8.5% 8.0% 12.7%
133 United Republic of Tanzania 0.7% 2.9% 8.2% 12.0% 21.7%
134 United States of America 1.3% 5.6% 7.7% 7.5% 11.8%
135 Uruguay 3.3% 6.2% 6.4% 14.0% 25.4%
136 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) 1.2% −0.1% 0.9% 3.5% 5.0%
137 Viet Nam 6.3% 15.3% 24.0% 32.1% 53.9%
138 Yemen 0.4% 7.0% 10.2% 12.2% 9.4%
139 Zambia −3.2% −2.9% 1.4% 8.5% 16.2%
140 Zimbabwe −1.0% −3.1% −9.1% −0.6% 6.0%
Africa Asia Europe
Eastern Africa Eastern Asia Eastern Europe
Burundi China Bulgaria
Kenya Japan Czech Republic
Malawi Mongolia Hungary
Mauritius Republic of Korea Poland
Mozambique South−Central Asia Republic of Moldova
Rwanda Afghanistan Romania
Uganda Bangladesh Russian Federation
United Republic of Tanzania India Slovakia
Zambia Iran (Islamic Republic of ) Ukraine
Zimbabwe Kazakhstan Northern Europe
Middle Africa Kyrgyzstan Denmark
Cameroon Maldives Estonia
Central African Republic Nepal Finland
Congo Pakistan Iceland




Table A3.54 Country classification by region
Table A3.53 (Continued)
Annex 3: data 441
(Continued)
Africa Asia Europe
Northern Africa South-Eastern Asia Lithuania
Algeria Cambodia Norway
Egypt Indonesia Sweden
Morocco Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic
United Kingdom
Sudan (former) Malaysia Southern Europe
Tunisia Myanmar Albania




South Africa Western Asia Portugal
Swaziland Armenia Serbia
Western Africa Bahrain Slovenia
Benin Cyprus Spain





Mauritania Saudi Arabia Luxembourg
Niger Syrian Arab Republic Netherlands
Nigeria Turkey Switzerland
Senegal United Arab Emirates
Sierra Leone Yemen
Latin America and Caribbean Northern America Oceania
Caribbean Northern America Australia/New Zealand
Barbados Canada Australia
Cuba United States of America New Zealand
Dominican Republic Melanesia
Haiti Fiji













Bolivia (Plurinational State of )
442 Annex 3: data
Africa Asia Europe
Northern Africa South-Eastern Asia Lithuania
Algeria Cambodia Norway
Egypt Indonesia Sweden
Morocco Lao People’s Democratic 
Republic
United Kingdom
Sudan (former) Malaysia Southern Europe
Tunisia Myanmar Albania




South Africa Western Asia Portugal
Swaziland Armenia Serbia
Western Africa Bahrain Slovenia
Benin Cyprus Spain





Mauritania Saudi Arabia Luxembourg
Niger Syrian Arab Republic Netherlands
Nigeria Turkey Switzerland












Table A3.55 Country classification by income
Country Income group
1 Afghanistan Low Income
2 Albania Lower Middle Income
3 Algeria Upper Middle Income
4 Argentina Upper Middle Income
Table A3.54 (Continued)
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Country Income group
 5 Armenia Lower Middle Income
 6 Australia High Income
 7 Austria High Income
8 Bahrain High Income
9 Bangladesh Low Income
10 Barbados High Income
11 Belgium High Income
12 Belize Lower Middle Income
13 Benin Low Income
14 Bolivia (Plurinational State of ) Lower Middle Income
15 Botswana Upper Middle Income
16 Brazil Upper Middle Income
17 Bulgaria Upper Middle Income
18 Burundi Low Income
19 Cambodia Low Income
20 Cameroon Lower Middle Income
21 Canada High Income
22 Central African Republic Low Income
23 Chile Upper Middle Income
24 China Upper Middle Income
25 Colombia Upper Middle Income
26 Congo Lower Middle Income
27 Costa Rica Upper Middle Income
28 Côte d’Ivoire Lower Middle Income
29 Croatia High Income
30 Cuba Upper Middle Income
31 Cyprus High Income
32 Czech Republic High Income
33 Democratic Republic of the Congo Low Income
34 Denmark High Income
35 Dominican Republic Upper Middle Income
36 Ecuador Upper Middle Income
37 Egypt Lower Middle Income
38 El Salvador Lower Middle Income
39 Estonia High Income
40 Fiji Lower Middle Income
41 Finland High Income
42 France High Income
43 Gabon Upper Middle Income
44 Gambia Low Income
45 Germany High Income
46 Ghana Lower Middle Income
47 Greece High Income
48 Guatemala Lower Middle Income
Table A3.55 (Continued)
(Continued)
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Country Income group
49 Guyana Lower Middle Income
50 Haiti Low Income
51 Honduras Lower Middle Income
52 Hungary High Income
53 Iceland High Income
54 India Lower Middle Income
55 Indonesia Lower Middle Income
56 Iran (Islamic Republic of) Upper Middle Income
57 Iraq Lower Middle Income
58 Ireland High Income
59 Israel High Income
60 Italy High Income
61 Jamaica Upper Middle Income
62 Japan High Income
63 Jordan Upper Middle Income
64 Kazakhstan Upper Middle Income
65 Kenya Low Income
66 Kuwait High Income
67 Kyrgyzstan Low Income
68 Lao People’s Democratic Republic Lower Middle Income
69 Latvia Upper Middle Income
70 Lesotho Lower Middle Income
71 Liberia Low Income
72 Lithuania Upper Middle Income
73 Luxembourg High Income
74 Malawi Low Income
75 Malaysia Upper Middle Income
76 Maldives Upper Middle Income
77 Mali Low Income
78 Malta High Income
79 Mauritania Low Income
80 Mauritius Upper Middle Income
81 Mexico Upper Middle Income
82 Mongolia Lower Middle Income
83 Morocco Lower Middle Income
84 Mozambique Low Income
85 Myanmar Low Income
86 Namibia Upper Middle Income
87 Nepal Low Income
88 Netherlands High Income
89 New Zealand High Income
90 Nicaragua Lower Middle Income
91 Niger Low Income
92 Nigeria Lower Middle Income
93 Norway High Income
94 Pakistan Lower Middle Income
Table A3.55 (Continued)
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Country Income group
 95 Panama Upper Middle Income
 96 Papua New Guinea Lower Middle Income
 97 Paraguay Lower Middle Income
98 Peru Upper Middle Income
99 Philippines Lower Middle Income
100 Poland High Income
101 Portugal High Income
102 Qatar High Income
103 Republic of Korea High Income
104 Republic of Moldova Lower Middle Income
105 Romania Upper Middle Income
106 Russian Federation Upper Middle Income
107 Rwanda Low Income
108 Saudi Arabia High Income
109 Senegal Lower Middle Income
110 Serbia Upper Middle Income
111 Sierra Leone Low Income
112 Singapore High Income
113 Slovakia High Income
114 Slovenia High Income
115 South Africa Upper Middle Income
116 Spain High Income
117 Sri Lanka Lower Middle Income
118 Sudan (former) Lower Middle Income
119 Swaziland Lower Middle Income
120 Sweden High Income
121 Switzerland High Income
122 Syrian Arab Republic Lower Middle Income
123 Tajikistan Low Income
124 Thailand Upper Middle Income
125 Togo Low Income
126 Trinidad and Tobago High Income
127 Tunisia Upper Middle Income
128 Turkey Upper Middle Income
129 Uganda Low Income
130 Ukraine Lower Middle Income
131 United Arab Emirates High Income
132 United Kingdom High Income
133 United Republic of Tanzania Low Income
134 United States of America High Income
135 Uruguay Upper Middle Income
136 Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of) Upper Middle Income
137 Viet Nam Lower Middle Income
138 Yemen Lower Middle Income
139 Zambia Lower Middle Income
140 Zimbabwe Low Income

Note: Page numbers in italic indicate a figure and page numbers in bold indicate 
a table on the corresponding page.
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conventional accounting 115–117, 
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ambient air pollution 214–216, 215, 216
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categories of non-market valuation 
146–148
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in 182
challenges faced by GDP 3
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India 170–171, 170
characterizing ecosystems as natural 
asset 151
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accounting 62
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coevolution of capital assets 49
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116, 117
core strengths of SDGs 63–64, 63
cost- versus income-based accounting 
107n1
cost-based methods of valuation 147
country classification: by income 
442–445; by region 440–442
critical capital 57–58
cropland, accounting for 239–240,  
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crude oil price movements since  
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income and savings 131–132; in 
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Wealth Index)
developing countries, capital 
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ecosystem assets: accounting for the 
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to users 150–151; integrating with 




ecosystem services 55, 140–141; 
benefits of 140–141; defining 
144–145; exchange values 156; 
institutional arrangements 145–146; 
intermediate 141; market price 
145–147; non-market pricing 
147–153; see also EEA (Experimental 
Ecosystem Accounting)
ecosystems: characterizing as natural 
asset 151; condition of, evaluating 
142; restoration costs 149; valuing 
136–137, 143; see also ecosystem 
services
education 236–237, 237; explicit 
quality of 187–188, 188; HDI 3–4; 
implicit quality of 189–190, 189; 
PISA 192n6; policy lessons for 
212–214, 212, 213, 214; vocational 
213; see also education approach
education approach: global aggregate 
wealth composition 35, 36; growth 
rates in IW 43; growth rates of 
Index 449
inclusive wealth 38; happiness vs. 
growth rates in IW per capita 44; 
HDI 40; measuring performances 
based on changes in wealth 28–31, 
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human capital and natural capital 
in total wealth 36; wealth change 
compositions 31–33, 32, 33; wealth 
composition 33–37, 34, 35, 36
educational attainment 181–182; 
across world regions 182–184, 183; 
gender gaps in 184–185, 184; of 
women 185–186, 185; of young 
workers 186
EEA (Experimental Ecosystem 
Accounting) 136–137, 138–144, 
139, 142; accounting for the value 
of ecosystem assets 153–156, 154; 
accounts 142–143; categories of non-
market valuation 146–148; challenges 
faced by 144–145; ecosystem 
capacity 155–156; ecosystem service 
delineation 144–145; ecosystem 
services 141; municipal-level 
ecosystem accounting 154–155, 154; 
non-market pricing for ecosystem 
services 147–153; TR 141–142, 
142; valuing natural resources and 
ecosystems 143
EEZ (economic exclusive zone) 104
enabling assets 4–5
energy-saving technology, adoption of 
220–221
environmental degradation,  
air pollution 55
environmental economics 148
environmental policy and productivity 
219–220
environmental sustainability 78–79
equations: educational attainment 
distributions 181–182; fish wealth, 
estimating 103–105; inclusive wealth 
60; for policymaking game 203–204; 
saving rate 131–132
equivalence between inclusive wealth 
and well-being 7
estimating wealth 71; fish wealth 
103–105, 244
Europe, educational attainment in 182
evaluating ecosystem conditions 142
EVRI (Environmental Valuation 
Reference Inventory) 157n4
exchange value, and market price 136
expansions in IWR 2017 6
experiential learning 198–199, 199
explicit quality of education 187–188, 188
financial assets 132n3
“financialization” of the global economy 
113, 117–121, 118, 119, 120
fish wealth 48, 77, 83–84, 83, 84, 
102–103; declining value of 107; 
estimating 103–105; Gordon-
Schaeffer model 104; per capita 
growth 367–370; shadow prices of 
fish species 104; top 10 countries in 
fishery capture production 105
fisheries 211, 358–361; accounting 
for 243–244; growth 364–367; 
Norwegian 145–146; open access 
management regimes 145–146; 
per capita 361–364; policymaking 
216–218, 217, 218
food security 82; see also agricultural 
land
forest capital 77, 82–83, 83, 84, 
345–348; accounting for 240–243, 
241, 242; benefits of 67–68; 
competing users 68; economic 
growth, dependence on 68; growth 
351–354; of India 166–167; NTFB 
241–243, 242; other sector impacts 
on 68; per capita 348–351; per capita 
growth 354–357; total economic 
contribution of 67
forestry policy 66–67
fossil fuels 77, 84–86, 85, 86, 371–374; 
accounting for 239; growth 377–380; 
per capita 374–377; per capita growth 
380–383
frontier approach 6, 9, 47; see also 
education approach
Future We Want, The 62
games 197–198; experiential learning 
198–199, 199; scenario-based 
computer game for policymaking 
199–202, 201, 202
GDP (gross domestic product) 23, 
39–40, 56, 194; challenges faced 
by 3; comparison with IWI 56; by 
country 427–430; growth 434–437; 
and inclusive wealth 54–55; of India 
163–164, 163, 164; as measure 
of social well-being 54; natural 
resources 61–62, 61, 62; as outcome 
of three capitals 50n13; per capita 
430–433; per capita, comparison 
with IWI 40–42, 41; per capita 
450 Index
growth 437–440; sustainable growth, 
correlation with 53
gender gaps in educational attainment 
184–185, 185
genuine savings 45–47, 46, 49, 50n10
global aggregate wealth composition, 
education approach 35, 36
global change in inclusive wealth 14–15, 
14, 15
global trend in capital shares 63
GNI (gross national income) 47, 
121–122
goals of SEEA 137
Gordon-Schaeffer model 104
growth accounting 58–62, 59, 62
growth volatility, impact on sustainable 
development 42
happiness 24; correlation with IW 
44–45, 44, 45; vs. growth rates in IW 
per capita 44
HDI (Human Development Index) 
3–4, 23–24, 24, 40, 64; correlation 
with IW 43–44, 43; of India 
164–165, 165
health 237–238; HDI 3–4, 40; shadow 
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hedonic pricing 146–148
high-income OECD countries 122–124, 
122, 124
human capital 4, 54, 179, 180; in 
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in education 212–214, 212, 213, 
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with natural capital 18; education 
236–237, 237; growth 269–273; 
health 237–238; income approach 
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236–237, 237; of India 168–169; 
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substitutability of 57–58; valuation of 
169; see also education approach
implicit quality of education 189–190, 189
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inclusive wealth accounting 135–138, 
151, 156
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high-income OECD countries 122–124, 
122, 124; India, per capita income 
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income approach to human capital 
computation 236–237, 237
income inequality 117–121, 118,  
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growth of 163–166, 163, 164, 
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per capita income 163; physical capital 
169–170
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indirect outcomes 192n5
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poor 130; see also gender gaps in 
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initial value of IW 56
institutional framework for IWI and 
SDGs 65
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4–5, 5
interdependence of capital assets 49
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capita growth 259–262; wealth 
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IWI (Inclusive Wealth Index) 3, 53; 
annual average growth rate 10; 
average annual growth rates 22; bonds 
221–223; comparison with GDP 56; 
growth in 11; HDI, correlation with 
43–44, 43; institutional framework 
65; key strength of 64; objectives of 
54–55, 55–56, 56; and policymaking 
195–196; scenario-based computer 
game 199–202, 201, 202; schematic 
representation of 9; SDGs, tracking 
64–66, 65; sources of growth 
60–62, 61, 62; see also scenario-based 
computer game for policymaking
IWR 2014 64
IWR 2017: advancements and 
expansions in 6; frontier approach 6
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Natural Capital and ecosystem 
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LAC (Latin America and Caribbean) 
region: educational attainment in 
184; natural capital growth 92–94, 
93, 94; vulnerability to natural 
disasters 97
life of ecosystem assets 155
long-run trends in net national saving 130
low-income countries: depreciation of 
natural capital 126–128, 127, 128
Malawi inclusive wealth growth 
accounting 61
management regimes 145–146
marine fisheries policy 216–218,  
217, 218
market price 197; of ecosystem services 
145–147; and exchange value 136
Mayer, Igor 198
measuring: ANNI 121–122; countries’ 
performances based on changes 
in wealth 10–14, 10, 11, 12, 13; 
countries’ performances based on 
changes in wealth using education 
approach 28–31, 29, 30, 31; national 
wealth 115–117, 116, 117; NDP 
135–136; per capita changes in 
natural capital 80
metals and minerals, accounting for 239
Middle East: educational attainment  
in 183
Millenium Development Goals 62, 
179, 194; see also SDGs (Sustainable 
Development Goals)
minerals 77, 86, 384–386; accounting 
for 239; growth 390–393; India’s 
mineral wealth 167–168; per capita 
387–390; per capita growth 393–396
MSY (Maximum Sustainable Yield) 107
municipal-level ecosystem accounting 
154–155, 154
national accounts 136
national wealth 113, 117, 169–170; 
measuring 115–117, 116, 117
natural capital 4–5, 5, 54, 54–55, 64, 
77–78, 78–79, 238–244, 290–293; 
accounting for depletion of 114; 
agricultural land 82–83, 82, 239–240, 
239, 240; correlation with human 
capital 18; critical capital 57–58; 
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on human capital 162; fish wealth 
48, 102–103, 216–218, 217, 218, 
243–244; forest capital 66–67, 
67–68, 240–243, 241, 242; fossil 
fuels, accounting for 239; growth 
296–300; India’s forest capital 
166–167; measuring per capita 
changes in 80; metals and minerals, 
accounting for 239; mineral wealth 
of India 167–168; natural disaster 
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in 32; non-linearity of 78; oil 49n7; 
per capita 293–296; per capita 
growth 300–303; percentage share 
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79–81, 80, 81; shrinking base of 
57; as source of wealth 15–16, 16; 
substitutability of 57–58; total natural 
wealth 77; units of 72n6; water 48; 
see also depreciation of natural capital; 
regional natural capital growth
452 Index
natural disaster resilience, incorporating 
in the assessment of natural capital 
96–97
natural gas 84
natural resources: depreciation of 114; 
as source of GDP 61–62, 61, 62; 
valuation of 168; valuing 136–137; 
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NDP (net domestic product) 3; 
measuring 135–136
negative growth: countries with negative 
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NNI (net national income) 115
NNP (net national product) 6
NNS (net national savings) 115
non-linearity of natural capital 78
non-market pricing: categories of 
146–148; “channels” to users 
150–151; contingent valuation 
149–150; for ecosystem services 
147–153
non-renewable resources 77, 318–321; 
fossil fuels 84–86, 85, 86; growth 
325–328; minerals 86, 167–168; per 
capita 321–324; per capita growth 
328–331; see also renewable resources
North Africa, educational attainment  
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North America: regional natural capital 
growth 94–96, 95, 96; vulnerability 
to natural disasters 97
NPV (net present value) 155
NTFB (non-timber forest benefits) 
241–243, 242
objectives: of economics 194; of 
policymaking game 199–200, 
208–209
OECD (Organization for Economic 
Cooperation and Development) 
countries: developing countries 
124–126, 125, 126; high-income 
122–124, 122, 124; human capital 
168–169; low-income countries 
126–128, 127, 128; wealth inequality 
in 114
OHI (Ocean Health Index) 217
oil 84
oil capital gains 8; adjustments for 245; 
crude oil price movements since 1976 
39; effect on well-being 38–39, 38, 
39; “losers” affected by 37
open access management regimes 
145–146
Pacific Region: educational attainment 
in 183–184; natural capital growth 
86–88, 87, 88; vulnerability to natural 
disasters 97
Pan-European region: natural capital 
growth 90–92, 91, 92; vulnerability 
to natural disasters 97
Paris Agreement 77
pastureland, accounting for 239–240, 
239, 240
physical capital 54; of India 169–170; 
substitutability of 57–58; valuation of 
168; see also produced capital
Piketty, Thomas 113
PISA (Programme for International 
Student Assessment) 192n6
PM2.5, sources of 214–216, 215, 216
policy: air pollution 214–216, 215, 
216; energy-saving technology, 
adoption of 220–221; forestry 
policy and IWI 66–67; lessons for 
education 212–214, 212, 213, 214; 
on marine fisheries 216–218, 217, 
218; preferences for 153; see also 
policymaking
policy instruments, IWI-linked bonds 
221–223
policymaking: experiential learning 
198–199, 199; and games 197–198; 
IW framework 196; and IWI 
195–196; and population growth 
197; scenario-based computer game 
199–202, 201, 202; trade-offs 196; 
see also scenario-based computer game 
for policymaking
pollution, regulating 214–216, 215, 216
population growth 60, 197
positive growth in IW 29
produced capital 4–5, 5, 54, 54–55, 
276–279; in ASEAN countries 32; 
calculating 235–236, 236; growth 
283–286; per capita 280–283; per 
capita growth 286–290; percentage 
of in total wealth 16; percentage 
share in total wealth 20; as productive 
base of the economy 162; as source 
of wealth 17; substitutability of 
57–58
production/damage function 
approaches to valuation 147
productive base of the economy 4–5, 5, 
53, 196; produced capital as 162
productivity: and environmental policy 
219–220; on sectoral case 220–221
provisioning services 55
Index 453
quadrants for annual growth rate of 
wealth and natural capital per capita 79
quality of education: explicit 187–188, 
188; implicit 189–190, 189
RE (renewable energy): ratio to natural 
capital 100; solar energy 98–99; wind 
energy 99–100
regional natural capital growth: Africa 
88–90, 89, 90; Asia and the Pacific 
86–88, 87, 88; LAC region 92–94, 
93, 94; North America 94–96, 95, 
96; Pan-European region 90–92, 91, 
92; West Asia 94
regulating pollution 214–216, 215, 216
regulating services 55, 58
renewable resources 77, 79, 79–81, 
80, 81, 304–307; agricultural land 
82–83, 82; fisheries 83–84, 83, 84, 
243–244; forests 83–84, 83, 84, 
166–167; growth 311–314; per 
capita 307–310; per capita growth 
314–317
rent: resource rent 145–147; see also 
shadow prices
resilience to natural disasters, 




revealed preference methods of 
valuation 146–148
Rio+20 summit 63
rule of constant shadow prices 8
saving rate 131–132
scenario-based computer game for 
policymaking 199–202, 201, 202; 
balancing short- and long-term goals 
206; design 200; dichotomy between 
achieving SDGs and sustainability 
205–206; equations used 203–204; 
global scenario 206; objectives of 
199–200, 208–209; preliminary 
results 204–205; relationship between 
variables in IWI and SDGs 207–208; 
shortlist of countries 200–202,  
201, 202
schematic representation of IWI 9
SDGs (Sustainable Development 
Goals) 53, 62–64, 63, 179, 
194–195; achieving, dichotomy with 
sustainability 205–206; core strengths 
of 63–64, 63; environment dimension 
63; individual 197; institutional 
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